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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICAL-ECONOMYOF NUCLEARPOWER1946-1982
September 1986
Steve M. Cohn, B.A. Amherst College
M.P.A. Princeton University,
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Samuel Bowles
The dissertation seeks to explain the pattern of
nuclear power development in the United States, treating the
subject as a case study of how major infrastructural
development choices are made in a modern capitalist economy.
Because such decisions are laden with uncertainty and
sensitive to numerous scale economies, different
technologies may be able to win enduring market dominance if
first in capturing scale and other "critical mass"
efficiencies. Recognition of this potential can spur
political-economic interests to attempt to capture critical
rna s s f or conge ni al technologi es, in purs ui t of econom i c
rents or positive political externalities.
The main concept adduced in the thesis to organize
nuclear history is that of an Official Technology (OT). The
latter enjoys stron~ state support, the promoted image of
the "coming technology" and capture of critical mass
advantages. The dissertation analyzes the incentives key
vi
political-economic interests had for promoting nuclear power
to OT status 1946-1974 and the mechanisms used by these
groups to facilitate nuclear expansion. An "aT differential",
tallying the microeconomic impact of nuclear's capture of aT
status is calculated. Included in the differential are the
benefits of: scale economies, learning curve cost
reductions, federal subsidies and regulatory incentives,
misleading information environments and bureaucratic
momentum. Nuclear's decline after 1974 is tied to the
erosion of this differential by a political challenge to the
the technology's OT status.
The dissertation's key claim is that the aT framework
can uncover socio-political roots for technical choice
decisions that appear determined solely by engineering
parameters in a static, a-historical framework.
vii
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C HAP T E R I
OVERVIEW
11 .Thesis Tasks
This thesis seeks to accomplish two linked tasks.* It
attempts to provide an explanation for the pattern of
nuclear power development in the United States (1945-1982),
and a case study demonstrating the weakness of technically
deterministic theories of the market's organization of
infrastructural technical change. The linkage is forged by
analyzing the history of nuclear power within a framework
that highlights the impact on market behavior of various
"social" as opposed to "technical" variables.
A technical variable is defined as a variable whose
value is determined solely by natural phenomena, such as the
geological distribution of fossil fuels. A social variable
is a variable whose value is sensitive to the results of
social processes, such as the character of a society's
ideology or its distribution of power. Decisions dependent
on technical variables are invariant to social contexts,
while decisions dependent on social variables reflect the
relative power of the decision agent and/or the larger
•structure of society.[l]
-----------------------------------------------------------
* All cost references in this chapter have been standardized
to 1979$ through use of the GNP deflator unless otherwise
noted.
1
2The present chapter outlines the differences between
socially and technically deterministic theories of the
market's organization of technical change. The implications
of these differences for explaining the history of nuclear
power are then addressed. The discussion concludes with a
chapter by chapter summary of the thesis's non-technically
deterministic analysis of nuclear development.
II The Economics of Technical Change:
Technically Deterministic Models
While the technically deterministic model of the
market's organization of technical change developed below
represents the work of no particular neoclassical theorist,
it reflects the logic of many traditions within the
neoclassical school and a popular applied use of the theory.
The model employs the image of the firm and the concept of
economic activity contained in Walrasian general equilibrium
theory. The latter derives all economic outcomes (i.e. the
price and quantity of all goods produced or exchanged, their
distribution amongst final demanders, and the input-output
matrix employed) from a set of exogenous variables (Le.
utility and production functions and the distribution of
initial endowments).[2] The causal logic flows entirely
from consumer preferences to firm responses. While firms
are portrayed as maximizing actors, they are denied any
influence over the character or magnitude of the economy's
independent variables. Firms enter the neoclassical model
3as collections of machines, with blueprints reflecting the
model's exogenous variables. The firms function as mediums
through which technical variables register their economic
implications. The entire economy appears as a mega-
machine transforming given variables into economic
outcomes. [3]
From this perspective, the task of economic theory is
to explain how the tra.n~l..g.t.ion process works; that is, to
explain why the dependent variables represent the
interactive implications of the independent variables.
The model is a "technical" model of the economy because
its image of economic activi ty is devoid of soci al content.
Like the calculus, the translation process is invariant to
social contexts.
Social variables are acknowledged to influence the
model's independent variables, and thus relative prices and
all mar ke t out comes. The posi ted uni -di recti onal or
sequential nature of this influence, however, permits
dichotomous treatment of socio-political and economic
phenomena. The key assumption is tha t economic activi ties
in general and firm behavior in particular do not influence
the logically prior character of the independent variables.
Consumer tastes are sovereign. State policy is exogenous.
The firm is a price-taker and blueprint user. These
assumptions permit "economic" analysis of the translation
process, and socio-political analysis of the determination
4of the independent variables to proceed separately.
Using the above framework it's possible to construct a
stylized general equilibrium (GE) picture of infrastructural
evolution which expresses the above technically
deterministic spirit. It is this picture I wish to
juxtapose to the thesis's model of infrastructural change.
The GE approach begins by considering technical change
the product of an information producing industry, as Arrow
(1962) suggests, and/or a joint product (i.e. learning)
produced by existing industries. In the first case
technical change enters the model in the same fashion as an
extra capital good in each industry. R&D spending is
conceived as an alternative form of capital investment,
providing an additional dimension to the production
possibilities surface. The conception creates a logical
continuum from factor substitution to innovation. In the
second case, technical change enters the model as a shift
~
parameter that expands the production possibilities set
through the incorporation of learning effects. In both
cases a predictable set of economic outcomes can be derived
in principle from a set of technically given exogenous
variables. The ..t.-.t:anslatiQ.llmetaphor assumes that the
process of market activity does not feedback and influence
the character of the independent variables. Firms remain
conceptualized as sets of machines rather than active agents
5seeking to influence tastes and preferences, state policy,
and market structure. Information is treated as immanent
in existing knowledge or production experience. Taken
together these assumptions imply that market governed
technical change discovers rather than creates development
paths. Like a line drawn between two points, the discovered
path is efficient. The optimality properties attributed to
static competitive equilibrium are extended to technical
change deci sions.
The most extreme form of technical determinism posits a
translation metaphor for both economic activity and
institutional design. The latter is perceived to reflect
the social implications of technical relations. Leslie
White, for example, asserts that social systems are
functions of technological systems, wri ting, "The technology
is the independent variable, the social system the dependent
variable. Social systems are therefore determined by
systems of technology: as the latter change, so do the
former."[4] Such views depoliticize social questions by
removing responsibility for the character of human
experience from the logic of social processes. Ellul, for
example, remarks, " It is useless to rail against
capitalism. Capitalism did not create our world: the
machine did." (Ellul 1967, 5) [5] The present analysis calls
into question such claims by revealing the social roots of
patterns of technical innovation.
62.1lConceptual problemR within technically deterministic
models Qf the market's organization of technical change
Rigorous attempts to integrate large scale R&D based
technical change into a general equilibrium (GE) framework
encounter logical difficulties. The most serious problems
stern from GE theory's passive view of the firm and
abstraction from the impact of uncertainty on economic
behavior. The conundrums also reflect the problems
associated with using a static model to generate dynamic
properti eSt [6]
Since R&D activity consists of the production of
information, its very performance challenges the underlying
certainty-perfect information assumption of GE theory.
Efforts to minimize this contradiction by assuming perfect
information in most cases, and certainty equivalents[7] for
R&D decisions, are misleading. The use of certainty
equivalents artificially incorporates the impact of
\
uncertainty into economic results without altering the
underlying translation model of economic decision making.
Firms are still thought to behave as if they and their
rivals possessed certain knowledge, with final market
outcomes diverging from "perfect information" results due
only to the presence of random error. The model does not
permit firms to react to the existence of shared uncertainty
with promotional campaigns and strategic investment
activity. "Bluffing", forexample, is precluded.[8] The
7prohibition is an ad hoc constraint on the logic of
competitive behavior, artificially insulating the older
Walrasian image of the firm from challenges by more
activist-strategic player conceptions.[9J
The methodologically subversive implications of fully
incorporating uncertainty into models of firm behavior are
exacerbated when combined with the long planning horizons
associated with the R&Dprojects under consideration. In
such circumstances the ceteris paribus assumption is
untenable. Relaxing this assumption leaves the dichotomous
treatment of GE theory's independent and dependent variables
more problematic. Such treatment arbitrarily denies
maximizing firms an area of productive investment (Le.
expenditures to influence state policy, tastes and
preferences, informational environments, market entry and
exit costs, e t c.}, This denial is encouraged within a
Walrasian world because the latter represents economic
activity as a static and one time specification of an
infinite series of inter-temporal contracts. If one
si tuates economic activity in real historical time, amidst
enduring organizational entities, a more activist view of
the firm emerges. The presence of this planning firm
undermines technically deterministic pictures of
inf rastructural evolution. [10] ;.
8~ll Anomalies within technically deterministic
histories Qf nuclear DQ~
The conceptual problems noted above generate a number
of anomalies when technically deterministic models of
innovation are used to explain u.s. nuclear development.
These difficulties involve the apparently paradoxical
reaction of firms to the uncertainties associated with
nuclear economics. From 1954-1974 the nuclear industry
enjoyed major growth, capturing investment commitments of
over $100 billion ('74$) (U.S. AEC 1974c, 1). Thereafter,
the industry collapsed. After winning 210 net plant sales
(new orders minus cancellations) during the 1965-1974
period, the industry suffered 87 cancellations against only
13 new orders during the 1975-1982 period.[ll] Current
projections foresee only 125 plants on line by the turn of
the century[12], as opposed to the more than 1000 reactors
predicted by the AECand conventional opinion in the early
s even tie s , [13]
Two'arguments have been adduced to explain this
dramatic reversal within a technically deterministic
framework. The arguments tie the market turnaround to the
vagaries of imperfect information and mistaken judgement,
or the impact of shifting exogenous variables. Both
explanations generate anomalies.
Several versions of the "mistaken judgement" hypothesis
have been proposed. All are unsatisfying. Very little is
9explained within the approach and the deus ex machina of
poor judgement contradicts the working rationality postulate
of production theory. Claims that nuclear cancellations
illustrate the technical rationality of a self-correcting
market, leave unexplained the reasons for the original
mistaken purchases. The large size of these outlays and
their subsequent $30+ billion abandonment costs[14]
contradict a trial and error, experimental purchase
explanation for the original orders. Nuclear industry
claims, tying declining nuclear sales to irrational
reestimations of relative generating costs, leave
unexplained the basis for current rather than past mistakes.
Combining a technically deterministic perspective with
reference to shifting exogenous variables to explain
nuclear's rapid rise and fall also generates problematic
conclusions. Most of the factors held responsible for the
industry's collapse, such as rising real interest rates or
declining electricity demand, involve second order
phenomena. The technology's problems stem chiefly from
plant construction cost increases. The latter jumped in
constant dollars from a predicted rate of less than $400 per
kilowatt of capacity ($400/kw) for plants ordered in the
mid-sixties to $2200/kw for plants coming on line in the
late eighties. [15] Operating performance concurrently fell
about one- third below projected values [16], leaving real
} ,~ .
construction costs 8 times higher than expected.
10
While rising utility credit costs 1975-1977 were
detrimental to nuclear power they added only 20% to nuclear
capital costs[17], a modest increase in comparison with
construction cost escalation. The surge in the prime
interest rate 1980-1984 had a more serious impact, but this
affect occurred after many years of negative nuclear orders.
The collapse in nuclear sales is similarly a separate
problem from the slow down in peak load electricity demand
growth. From 1/75 to 11/83, for example, net nuclear
cancellations totalled 68,000 MW, while net new coal orders
totalled 58,000 HW.[18]
Appeals to the impact of regulatory hysteria following
the Three Mile Island (TNI) Accident as the basis for
nuclear's decline are also unconvincing. Nuclear cost
escalation problems and the collapse in reactor sales
preceeded Tr-n by 15 and 4 years respectively. Constant
dollar construction costs increased by approximately 140% in
real terms for both the seven years prior and after TMI.[19]
There aIr 00 t s 0f nuc1ear dec 1 i n eli e i n red u ced
political support for the technology and shifting
information regarding nuclear hazard containment costs,
expected plant capaci ty rates and al terna ti ve energy costs.
Acknowledging the importance of these factors, however,
raises methodological questions about the market's assumed
passive relationship with non-market variables in
11
technically deterministic histories. The exogenous variable
interpretation fails to explain: why informational
environments shifted and why market participants took a
passive stance towards information[20], why changing
political conditions were able to affect energy investment
decisions more significantly than their immediate cost
impact would imply and, most importantly, why firms
originaly made such large capital commitments to nuclear
power amidst a potentially fluid situation.
11 A SQ~iall¥ n~~~ImiDl~~i~ ~D~~I~I~~g~ioD
of Nuclear History
The dissertation's response to the above questions
builds on recent work in the area of oligopoly firm
behavior. Parsimonious answers are possible if one adopts
an active as opposed to a passive view of the firm, and a
"critical mass" concept of energy sector competition. An
active firm has been defined as one seeking to alter the
independent variables of neoclassical theory, rather than
simply maximize within them.[21] Critical mass competition
is defined as competition for the capture of scale
economies.[22] Combining these two ideas allows for the
construction of a nuclear history within which the key roles
played by state decisions, corporate risk taking, and
volatile information environments no longer appear
anomalous. Corporate nuclear gambi ts, for example, appear
more rational if attributed to active firms pursuing market
12
share positions in a new technology, than if attributed to
passive firms reflexively reacting to immediately given
technical coefficients. The impact of state decisions on
nuclear history can be illuminated by tying it to the
leveraging affect of public policy on competition for
critical mass. The instability of nuclear cost information
is less perplexing if information is treated as a socially
produced variable, sensitive to the changing strategic needs
of the sponsors of various competing technologies, rather
than an immanent presence in existing knowledge or
production experience. The dissertation seeks to ground
such observations in a general framework.
hll .b "social conj uncture" -"planning context"
model Qi nuclear evolution
In contrast with technically deterministic models of
innovation, the model developed here involves a "social-.
conjuncture" analysis of the market's organization of
technical change. Such analyses are particulary applicable
to technical change decisions involving large potential
scale and systemwide efficiencies, such as those associated
with infrastructural evolution. [23]
Because major infrastructural innovation generally
requi res the coordination of many distinct but complementary
private investments and state activities, it frequently
requires the presence of a common set of expectations or de
13
facto plan. Conjunctural analysis examines how such
expectations are generated in the midst of uncertainty and
the absence of formal planning. The analysis rejects a
dichotomous treatment of social variables and economic
behavior. The two phenomena are portrayed as interactively
rather than sequentially determined. The Walrasian firm and
auctioneered image of economic activity as a technically
governed translation process are replaced by the active firm
and the image of economic activity as a planning and
architectonic process. Within the latter conception,
economic actors are viewed as agents who compete to impose
their plan on collective actio~
As a result of phenomena such as scale economies,
infrastructural choices may be technically ambiguous, that
is to say, different technologies may be able to win
enduring market dominance if first in capturing scale and
oth er "cr i ti cal mass" advantage s. Marke t pa ths to technical
efficiency can therefore be created by the distribution of
political and economic power, or the character of
ideological belief and institutional design, to the extent
such variables determine the capture of systemwide
efficiencies. This thesis examines the creation of such
pa ths.
The analysis employs the concept of a "planning
context" to summarize the characteristics of social
conjunctures. Planning contexts are defined by social
14
variables in three dimensions: by their participants'
objectives and relative economic and political power, the
context's ideological milieu, and the context's
institutional structure. Once established planning contexts
generate an interactive momentum which influences the
direction of technical change. The momentum also feeds back
and modifies the original social variables which created the
planning environment. [24]
participants fall into 3 groups: active firms, public
bur eaucr aci es, and organized vol untary associ ations. Acti ve
firms compete to gain critical mass for technologies within
which they possess a competi ti ve advantage. Among the
tactics employed are preemptive R&D, loss leader investment,
and marketing and political initiatives. The present
analysis extends to inter-technology competition the logic
.
of recent oligopoly theory concerning intra-technology
battles for market share.
The state is also an active player in the planning
process. Three characteristics of infrastructural evolution
encourage state ini tiatives: the significant amount of R&D
and long lead times often involved with major
infrastructural innovations, the significant interaction
between infrastructural investments and regular state
activities, and the need for a scope of investment beyond
15
the financial or organizational expertise of any single firm
for any particular investment to be prof itable.
Most of the above stimulai for state action flow from
the interdependencies involved with infrastructural
choices.[25J All illustrate how markets generate non-market
com pLem ent s, and thus requi re an integr ated rather than
dichotomous political-economic analysis.
State decisions are partially determined by the realm
of economic possibility created by private planning through
private investment decisions and direct corporate
intervention into the political process. The latter can
take several forms, ranging from very visible actions, such
as political contributions, to more subtle dynamics such as
Galbraith's "bureaucratic symbiosis". [26J
Alongside key state and corporate bureaucracies,
voluntary associations can affect the informational and
public policy environments surrounding infrastructural
evolution. Such groups normally play only a modest role in
shaping the direction of technical change. They are not
part of the organizational context with functional
responsibility for organizing production. Circumstances can
arise, however, that expand planning context participants
and deflect the momentum of established corporate-state
planning. Such was the case with nuclear power.
U2l Other planning context dimensions; i.deological.9.illl
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.i.nJ2.t.i.tJJ.t.iQ.ng~va.r..ig.b~~ A plann in g con text mod el 0f
technical evolution allows institutional and ideological
variables to significantly affect market behavior and
technical change by influencing critical mass strategies.
Ideological variables are especially important as they
provide the context within which market expectations and
political coalitions emerge. Because no single firm can
independently finance the R&D efforts or plant and equipment
necessary for successful infrastructural deployment, firms
must temper their own judgement concerning engineering
promise by their expectations of others' expectations. Such
second guessing creates the potential for bandwagon and
self-fulfilling prophecy dynamics and thereby encourages
technical solutions consistent with existing ideological
beliefs. The potential for capturing critical mass
efficiencies is thus influenced by the popular imagery
created by social movements and patterns of expectations
whose short run credibility is relatively independent of
empirical data. Institutional variables gain similar
leveraging influence, and are especially important as
mediums for coordinating critical mass accretion.
The character of both ideological and institutional
variables is partially determined by planning context agents
and the dynamic feedback created by planning context
momentum. This phenomena reinforces the holistic or
17
"systems" character of planning context analysis.
dynamics in a modern capitalist economy (Le. one
characterized by the presence of active firms, an active
state, real uncertainty and the need for coordinated
planning) result in infrastructural choices that reflect
corporate growth strategies, state political decisions,
ideological and institutional variables, and technical
parameters. When the market's organization of
infrastructural evolution is situated in historical time,
technical change appears path dependent. Infrastructural
evolution expresses an interactive and cumulative logic
rather than the timeless auctioneered logic of Walrasian
general equilibrium theory. The economic meaning of
different technologies' engineering characteristics is
mediated in planning context models by social variables
which create rather than discover critical mass development
pa ths. Market activities as well as market outcomes embody
social content and can not be conceptualized as agentless
translation exercises. The market's organization of
infrastructural evolution emerges as an inherently
politicized process. The resulting image of technical change
challenges the normative implications frequently attached to
market solutions. From the OT perspective, one can not claim
that "given the independent variables", market solutions are
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"optimal", even in terms of the limited meaning of "optimal"
within neoclassical theory.
~ The Official Technology fraID~~
The main concept developed in the thesis from the logic
of planning context dynamics is that of an Official
Technology (OT). The construct is employed to facilitate
analy si s of planning context par ti cipant behav i o r and
critical mass competition. An Official Technology is
defined as a technology that enjoys strong state support,
the promoted image of "the coming technology", and capture
of cri tical mass advantages. All three characteristics are
to some extent interdependent and serve as a basis for the
technology's market success.
OT dynamics can be thought of as the dynamic
implications of conceiving of technical change in terms of
competition for OT status. The major participants in the
competition are the political and economic sponsors of
different technologies. From an OT perspective, the task
of economic history is to reconstruct the path to critical
mass. The analysis tries to uncover the socio-political
variables influencing technical change by tying dominant
technologies to thei r sponsor ing dynam ics. Outcom es which
appear technically determined from an a-historical
perspective may appear socialy determined from an OT
per specti ve.
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Employing the OT framework to analyze the history of a
particular infrastructural innovation involves a three step
process. step one involves specifying the three dimensions
of the planning context which oversaw the technical change;
that is, specifying the context's political-economic
participants, its ideological milieu, and its insti tutional
structure. Step two involves dynamic analysis of how
advocates of different development paths attempted to
achieve critical mass or OT status for their favored option,
and how various ideological and institutional factors
influenced the success of their efforts. Step three
calculates the impact of promotional support on the
microeconomic competitiveness of the victorious Official
Technology.
Not all infrastructural histories need to be understood
in OT terms. The concept is inappropriate for analyzing
technical choices for which the "natural monopoly" or
critical mass advantages of in-placeness are minimal, or
situations where the technical choice is bounded by widely
available and certain information. In the energy area the
above conditons are absent, and the OT framework is useful
for understanding the development of nuclear power. It is
the thesis of this dissertation that the technology's rapid
expansion 1965-1974 was a product of its OT status; its
subsequent decline the result of a suprisingly successful
political challenge to that status. The analysis presented
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in Chapters 2-8 is designed to demonstrate this proposition
by applying the 3 step analysis of the OT framework to
nuclear history.
The OT model of infrastructural technical change was
specifically designed to explain the development of nuclear
power, and thus employs fewer exogenous variables or ad hoc
assumptions than technically deterministic models. The
generalizability of the OT model awaits applications to
non-nuclear technical histories.
J.
~ Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 reviews the economics of technical change,
and the history of nuclear power literatures. The survey
situates the dissertation's analysis with respect to other
treatments of the relationship between social and technical
variables.
Chapter 3 develops step one of the OT framework's three
step process for analyzing infrastructural innovation. The
di scussi on spe ci fies th e th ree di mensi ons of the pLa nn i,ng
context that promoted nuclear power to OT status 1954-1974.
It identifies state geo-political planners and select energy
sector firms as the major planning context participants;
cold war ideology, "technocratic prof essi onaLi sm " and
consumerism as the major ideological phenomena; and the
character of utility and nuclear regulation, and oligopoly
competition as the dominant institutional factors
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facilitating nuclear expansion.
State support for nuclear power is tied to the
character and import of military priori ties, international
prestige concerns, market share pressures in export
competition, and an emergent bureaucratic alliance between
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the nuclear industry.
A more technically deterministic hypothesis (that state
nuclear support was precipitated by prescient anticipation
of the seventies' energy crisis and careful selection of
nuclear development as the most promising technical
response) is also analyzed and rejected.
Corporate nuclear promotion is tied to the growth and
rent maximizing strategies pursued by four groups of firms
in the energy sector: the naval reactor vendors, whose
technical experience and particular capabilities endowed
them with a large competitive advantage in the nuclear
field; a number of growth oriented utilities, who viewed
nuclear development as an attractive vehicle for maximizing
their long run role in the economy; various large
engineering-construction firms, and a collection of
petroleum companies. Like the reactor vendors and utilities,
the latter two groups possessed competitive advantages in
nuclear markets. The analysis demonstrates the economic
incentives the companies had for promoting nuclear power to
official technology status, and treats the groups' nuclear
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investments as instances of "active-firm" strategic
behavior.
The analysis also demonstrates how the logic of
competition within the capital and research intensive
nuclear industry spurred numerous companies to take larger
and larger economic risks in order to capture viable market
shares once initial efforts to establish a nuclear industry
appeared successful. -
The discussion repeatedly illustrates how the planning
context established by state and corporate promotionalism
generated a self-perpetuating momentum built around the
potentially self-fulfilling prophecy of nuclear power as
"the corning technology". This momentum was insulated from
political challenge by the technocratic stance of nuclear
sector professionals and a popular deference to cold war
projects; it was protected from economic challenge by the
expected capture of critical mass efficiencies, favorable
social/private cost differentials and a profusion of
misleadingly optimistic economic projections by industry and
the AEC.
In a Neo-Schumpeterian sense the chapter implies that
epoch making innovations result as much from political-
ideological consensus as from engineering opportunity. The
analysis thus suggests a link between Gordon, Edwards and
Reich's concept of a "social structure of accumulation" [27]
and a theory of technical change, as particular social
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conjunctures and their derived pattern of shared
expectations are tied to particular technical initiatives.
Chapters 4-8 proceed with step two of the OT argument,
analyzing how the promoters of nuclear power won OT status
and resulting economic viability for the technology.
Chapter 4 analyzes both the magnitude and dynamics behind
the skewing of public and private sector R&D towards nuclear
proj ects.
Chapter 5 focuses on the pattern of nuclear subsidy,
demonstrating that promoters of the technology deferred or
shifted to public shoulders 9 H/kwh of nuclear generating
costs during the '65-'74 expansion years.(28J This sum
approximates the average expected generating costs of
nuclear plants purchased during this period. It is more
than 4 times the 2 M/kwh expected nuclear cost advantage
that publicly justified many nuclear orders in the sixties
(Perry 1977,37).
Chapter 6 analyzes the impact of promotional regulation
on nuclear development. The pro-nuclear incentives created
by a variety of procedural regulations, such as utility rate
base formulas, are briefly examined. The chapter focuses
on the economic implications of the lenient "infant
industry" regulation of nuclear's negative externalities
during the OT period. By comparing the cost of hazard
containment for plants in operation by the early seventies
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with the costs projected for plants coming on line in the
mid to late eighties, an "externatlity discount" of 20 M/kwh
is estimated for the aT years.
Employing 11annheim's concept of a sociology of
knowledge, Chapter 6 presents a detailed analysis of the
impact of corporate and AEC promotional activities on the
informational environment surrounding nuclear power's
routine radiation release, accident hazard, and thermal
pollution burdens. An historical analysis of the
insti tutional roots of available technical information is
used to explain the origins of the OT period's misleading
optimism concerning the seriousness of nuclear hazards. The
discussion demonstrates how political and economic
objectives, and ideological beliefs can infuse scientific
activities by influencing the context of research.
Information taken as "given" within the Walrasian framework
is thus "endogenized" within an aT analysis of planning
context' dynam ics,
Chapter 7 extends the implications of Chapter 6's
sociology of hazard knowledge to the character of nuclear
cost projections. Detailed histories of cost
underestimation are presented for all segments of the
nuclear production function. aT dynamics are used to
explain the origins of the downward bias. Among the factors
cited are the effects of nuclear industry marketing
campaigns and industry rivalry dynamics. The latter
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encouraged firms to consider the risks of underestimating
nuclear costs less serious than those associated with
overestimation. Though official government and industry
cost predictions gradualy increased, they invariably
underestimated plant costs by 50% and spurriously encouraged
nuclear commitments.
Chapter 8 completes step 3 of the OT argument,
calculating the combined impact of nuclear promotion on the
technology's microeconomic competitiveness. Included are
lower bound estimates of the critical mass advantages
nuclear power enjoyed because of its OT status, such as
increased capture of scale economies and learning curve
efficiencies. The assistance totals 56 H/kwh.[29] The sum
excludes many OT related benefits that are difficult to
quantify, such as privileged access to capital markets.
Nevertheless, the total is more than 5 times the constant
dollar expected cost of nuclear electricity during the
expansion years. As sections of Chapters 4-8 demonstrate,
loss of OT status and erosion of this differential were the
primary cause of nuclear's decline.
Chapter 9 summarizes the dissertation's findings and
speculates on the applicability of the Official Technology
framework to other infrastructural choices. The chapter
concludes with comments on the relevance of the analysis for
the paradigm debate between Neoclassical and l1arxist
26
economic theory.
C HAP T E R I
NQTES
1. Throughout the dissertation the term "politicization"
refers to the impact of social processes on human behavior
and the products of human behavior. It thus includes but is
not limited to the impact of state and governmental
decisions on individual and colLect Lve action. Politicized
outcomes reflect the logic of a social system, with its
historically existing structure of social roles,
institutions, and beliefs, rather than the timeless logic of
technical rationality or the illogic of randomness.
2. State policy can be considered a fourth exogenous
variable if a state sector is added to the model.
3. It is therefore possible to conceive of "the market" as a
"technology" which produces input-output matrices, with
characteristics exhaustively determined by the afore
mentioned independent variables. From this perspective it
makes no difference whether one conceives of the firm as
overseen by workers who hire capital, or capitalists who
hire workers. If firm behavior is technically determined,
then it is invariant to the identi ty of the decision maker.
Thus Samuelson notes, "'Remember that in a perfectly
competitive market it really doesn't matter who hires whom;
so have labor hi re "capital" .... ' Paul Sam uelson, 'Wage and
Interest: A Hodern Dissection of Marxian Economic Hodels,'
American Economic Review, December 1957" (Marglin 1977, 36).
4. Les1 ie W hit e, 1'.bj; 13gl.enc.e Q.£ -C.1!.l.t.1!X.el- h .s1-.1!.Q.Yf 11~.ll -.a.llg
-CiYiliz a.tion (New Yor k: Far rar, Str aus and Cornpa ny, 1949),
p. 365.
5. A popular by-product of this technically deterministic
view of market functioning is a variant of the "convergence
hypothesis" which asserts a universal character for
capi talist economies' production techniques. The asser tion
follows from the claim that the processes adopted express
the logic of engineering imperatives. Subject to the impact
of modified objective functions (such as the use of
employment rather than profit maximization) socialist
planners are pictured as choosing similar production
techniques as capitalist firms for similar reasons. A
related intellectual offshoot defends the use of markets and
private ownership as an attractive means for insuring the
rule of technical rationality. \'1hilethe market enforces
efficiency, socialist planners might not.
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6. Many of these difficulties are similar to the theoretical
problems encountered when efforts are made to integrate
money into general equilibrium models. (See also footnote
9.) The similarity arises because analysis of'both money
and technical change requires analysis of the impact of
uncertainty on economic behavior, and the situating of
events in real historical time. Besides implying the
potential for miscalculation, the inclusion of uncertainty
and temporal irreversibility in economic analysis raises the
possibility of strategic behavior. In the latter case,
economic actors recognize their potential influence on each
other's decisions. Rather than passive optimization in
response to given constraints, strategic behavior, in
response to interactive constraints, emerges.
7. The use of certainty equivalents implies the use of
probabilistic decision rules (often some form of mean
variance analysis) to translate incomplete information into
a deterministic form. It illustrates the tendency of
technically deterministic views to reduce technical change
decisions to factor substi tution choices, an alchemy that
minimizes the implications of uncertainty.
8. In the context of technical competition, bluffing might
involve massive and very public investment in an uncertain
technology within which a corporation possessed a
competitive edge. By conveying the misleading impression of
technological maturity, the firm might discourage
alternative development. The result could be "triumph by
default" and the capture of economic rents.
9. Analogously, in the area of monetary theory it is the
~Q~~n~igl for disequilibrium which creates the special
character of money. Just as strategic investment behavior is
a reaction to uncertainty, so too are liquidity premiums and
liquidity crises. This reactive behavior (illustrated by
the speculative demand for money) challenges the dichotomous
market-quantity theory of money treatment of monetary
phenomena.
10. On the most abstract level the challenge reflects the
difference between a static and dynamic conception of
economic processes and social life. The dynamic view
recognizes the "institutional feedback" generated by the
structural function of firms within Walrasian theory, as
well as the broader social implications created by an
economy based on the private ownership of the means of
production. Alongside producing commodities, the economy is
perceived as producing organizational entities.
Corporations emerge as agents (as their legal status as
persons suggests) whose planning visions and growth
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strategies need to be integrated with technical variables
and consumer preferences in order to model the evolution of
capi talist economies.
11. U.S. Department of Energy - Energy Information
Administration: 11/82 p. 28; 11/83 pp. 5,77-84.
12. As of late '83 there were 73 operating nuclear plants,
48 units in active construction, and 7 in suspended
construction (Komanoff and Bupp 1983, 4).
13. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1974a, 6-8.
14. Excluding the multi-billion dollar losses suffered by
other segment s of the nuclear industry, Komanoff es tima tes
the economy's dead weight loss from outlays for nuclear
plants originally scheduled to enter service in the mid-
eighties at $80-$115 billion (mixed historical dollars).
This total is comprised of $25 billion in expenditures for
already cancelled plants, $10-$30 billion in monies spent
for units likely to be cancelled, and $45-$60 billion for
the present value of the excess lifetime generating costs of
plants still under construction. The latter figure assumes
comparison with new fossil fuel generating units, and would
be even larger if conservation or other alternative energy
options were included in the generating mix (Komanoff
1984b).
15. 1980's costs are based on current utility projections
(Komanoff 1984a, Table 2).
16. Early nuclear cost projections were based on assumed
rates of 75-80%. Through 1983 actual rates have been 55%
(U.S., Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1984, 195).
\
17. From 1955-1974 utility credit costs averaged 2.81%.
From 1975-1977 credit costs averaged 3.71% (U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission 1980, Table 1). Holding
construction duration constant, the increase implies about a
5% increase in interest during construction costs and
additional 15% increase in overall capital costs due to
higer fixed charge rates (Komanoff 1981, 244, 272).
Utilities also suffered from cash-flow financing problems
during the mid-seventies. Though inconvenient, the problems
would not have inhibited nuclear expansion had capital costs
remained constant, or regulators friendly.
18. Flavin 1983, 33; U.S. Department of Energy- Energy
Information Administration 11/82, p, 28. See also: U.S.,
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1984, 30-31.
While slower than anticipated GNP growth has hurt
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nuclear sales, it is a second order effect, dwarfed, for
example, by the price elasticity of deman~
19. Komanoff 1984a, Table 2. Costs deflated by Handy-Whitman
construction cost deflator.
20. To some extent the difference between socially and
technically deterministic models of technical change hinges
on differing concepts of information as an economic
variable. Within the Walrasian world, information is
treated as an exogenous variable, benignly omnipresent.
Wi thin socially deterministic economic models, information
is treated as a social product, reflecting the context of
its production, i.e., the character of a particular planning
context.
21. Activist policies include: marketing and R&D outlays to
affect tastes and preferences, information environments and
technical possibilities; political activities to influence
state decisions; and strategic pricing and capacity
investment decisions to control oligopolistic competition
and protect market shares.
22. These economies can take many forms, including the
potential scaling efficiencies associated with R&D, learning
by doing, mass production, marketing and finance. The
economies loom especially large when they inhibit similar
achievement by competing options.
23. The decision to develop nuclear power is treated in the
dissertation as an example of a major infrastructural choice
decision. Such decisions involve large long term fixed
capital investments in technologies that actively interface
with much of the rest of the economy (chiefly as inputs into
other production processes but frequently as consumers due
to thei r large sector size). The model of technical change
developed is particularly applicable to lumpy
infrastructural choice decisions, such as those involved
with rail systems and nuclear fired electricity grids, which
require large scale introduction to achieve economic
efficiency.
24. The phenomena of "own laws of motion" and dynamic
feedback, that is the development of an interactive momentum
and self-defining logic, constitutes the planning context as
a distinct object for economic analysis. The combination
req ui res th e rej ecti on of or thogo naI trea tm ent s of soci al
and economic variables, as the character of planning
contexts inherently involves a fusion between economic (firm
strategies) and non-economic (ideological and institutional)
variables. Rather than simply altering values within a pre-
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existing set of structural equations, shifting social and
technical variables can alter the equations themselves if
they lead to a reconstitution of the planning context.
25. This is true for even the first two factors, which
result from the inability of private firms to fUlly capture
the benefits of R&D projects, and the shorter time horizon
(Le. higher discount rate) employed by most private
planners in comparison with public planners. These
motivations have been stengthened recently by the pressures
generated by incr eased international competi tion.
26. The latter illustrates the phenomena of "institutional
feedback" noted in footnote 10. Organizations like the firm
and pUblic bureaucracy conceptualized functionally within
neoclassical theory (Le. as instruments of others'
purposes), assume an agency role within the thesis's model
of technical change. The design of pUblic policy is held
sensitive to the realm of practical discourse created by
these institutions' historical experience and working
relationship.
27. See Gordon, Edwards and Reich (1982).
28. See Chapter 5 especially Tables 16 and 17.
29. See Chapter 8 especially Table 25.
C HAP T E R II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The thesis's dual focus on providing an explanation for
the pattern of nuclear development, and a demonstration of
the social dimensions of the market's direction of technical
change, lends itself to a two step literature reveiw. The
thesis is first situated within the R&D and technical change
literature and then within the nuclear history literature.
Each section is further divided into three subsections,
situating the argument with reference to neoclassical,
institutionalist and Marxist theory.
2..l .N~ssical Theorj~ Q.f KcSc.Qgnd Technical Cha~
~l Basic theory
The economics of R&D and technical change were
relatively neglected by neoclassical analysis until the end
of World War II. With notable exceptions technical change
was treated as an exogenous variable. Post war interest in
the factors influencing general economic growth, and the
rate of innovation in the weaponry and energy sectors,
however, spurred attempts to understand R&D behavior and
technical change as economic phenomena amenable to
maximization subject to constraint analysis.
Within the resulting literature the level of investment
in R&D and the pace of technical advance are explained by
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the behavior of the supply and demand schedules for
technical change. [1] Nelson (1959, 1977) and Rosenberg
(1976a), for example, highlight the importance of
"technological opportunity" on the supply side (i.e. the
reduced cost of innovation in areas of expanding scientific
knowledge) in explaining the speed and direction of
technical change. Others, like Schmookler (1966) and Karnien
and Schwartz (1982), emphasize the role of induced demand
side factors (e.g. relative market growth rates) in shaping
technical progress. Much of this literature has sought to
specify theoretically and test empirically various
functional forms for the supply and demand curves. More
recent papers examine the impact of rivalry behavior on
research and development activity, often employing game
theoretic models to explain firm R&D decisions (Hay and
Norris 1979; Kamien and Schwartz 1982).
Within this general approach one can differentiate
between the "active" and "passive" firm schools. The latter
is dominant,within the neoclassical tradition and lends
itself to modes of technical determinism. On the supply
si.de, innovation is tied to the rhythm of scientific
discovery; on the demand side, the incentives are economic
and the responses technically deterministic.
Besides sUbstituting factors along isoquants, firms are
posited to move between isoquants. R&D spending is
conceived as an alternative form of capital investment,
-_. -.• -. ~~o::;;:--.-:c:--=-~"~--"--::;-:-------<- ---- -
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thereby providing another dimension to the production
possibilities surface and a conceptual continuum from factor
sUbstitution to innovation. The analysis abstracts from the
uncertain character of R&D activity by imputing certainty
equivalents for probabilistic outcomes. The resulting
treatment of technical change does not depart substantively
from the context of static production theory (Rosenberg
1976a, 336-338; Schmookler 1966, 185). The theorized
optimality characteristics of static equilibrium are
extended to innovation.
The active firm perspective permits a greater agency
role for the firm in shaping technical evolution. Like
marketing strategies, R&D programs are perceived as efforts
to manage as well as react to economic environments. The
dominant approach within this literature has been game
theoretic analysis. The tendency has been to model R&D
decisions with reference to competitor R&D responses. The
analysis\abstracts from political competition for state
support and ideological phenomena.
Two areas of the neoclassical literature are especially
relevant to the OT explanation of the pattern of nuclear
development: market failure discussions and analyses of the
impact of market structure on technical change. In the
latter area a large number of papers have sought to test the
Schumpeterian ([1942] 1962)-Galbraithian (1952, 1973)
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hypothesis that firm size and market concentration are
positively correlated with R&D inputs and outputs.[2]
Composite findings, both theoretical and empirical, have
been inconcl usi v e, [3]
In the market failure literature, inquiry has built
on Arrow (1962) • [4] Early work highlighted the likelihood
of insufficient R&Dfrom a socially optimal point of view.
More recent papers suggest that rivalry dynamics can lead to
excessive resource allocation to R&Dactivity {Barzel 1968;
Hirshleifer 1971).[5]
One can summarize the theoretical implications of the
neoclassical literature as follows. R&Dinput and output
levels can be integrated into a general or partial
equilibrium model by specifying a supply and demand
framework for technical change. The factors underlying the
supply and demand schedules are extremely complex and not
yet well s pe c i fie d. Ref i nemen t will r eq uire dy nami c
analysis a~ market structure, technical change, and inter-
firm rival ry behav ior appear interactively def ined. - Recent
theoretical initiatives point towards game-theoretic or
"rule of thumb" approaches (Kamien and Schwartz 1982;
Nelson and Winter 1977). While many kinds of market
imperfections exist in the R&Darea, the focus of concern
has been on determining whether competitive and existing
market R&Dlevels are socially optimal.
---_. -.--~-- -,--~---- ----_.~4
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~ Applied neoclassical analyses of nuclear development
Applied neoclassical work in the passive firm tradition
portrays nuclear development as the product of isolated
maximization subject to constraint decisions. The
government's active role in promoting early nuclear
development for defense purposes is universally
acknowledged, but subsequent nuclear expansion is viewed in
terms of the translation process. The earlier cited
"mistake" and "exogenous variable" interpretations are used
to explain the technology's rise and fall pattern of growth.
The nuclear industry, the AEC, and other government
agencies are among the leading proponents of this view. [61
A technically deterministic spirit also pervades partial and
general equilibrium models of the energy sector.
Econometric studies, such as those of Hudson and Jorgenson
(1974), model energy sector evolution with optimizing
programs. This approach implies the existence of a "correct
pa th " and suggests that the market will "discover" it.
IIIustra tively, the Ford Founda tion's Nuclear Power Issues
and Choices volume asserts,
For the purpose of estimating how resources should
be allocated and how the economic and political process
of society will allocate them in the long run, the
competitive model is of great value- even in the face
of market defects ••• in summary markets work well
enough to allow us to predict trends on the basis of
real costs and scarcities, and then to use long run,
cost minimizing models to predict responses to these
prices (p, 45).
Passive firm models of nuclear development abstract
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from the process origins of information. During the 1960's
and 1970's these models absorbed the promotional assumptions
of the AEC and nuclear industry. The resul ting projections
underestimated nuclear costs by more than 100%. The
period's programming models of energy sector development
also reproduced the contextual biases of their information
sources. The result was excessive nuclear growth
proj ections. [7]
Neoclassical analyses of the nuclear industry in the
active firm tradition, emphasize the strategic aspect of
firm behavior. The OT framework builds on this approach.
Sultan's (1975) analysis of market share competition in the
turnbine-generator industry is used as a model to explain
reactor vendor behavior. Arguments raised by Hay and Morris
(1979), Stonebraker (1976), and fv1ueller and Tilton (1969)
concerning the use of R&D expenditures as barriers to entry
are used to illuminate nuclear fuel cycle investments. The
regulated f~rm's Averch-Johnson bias in favor of capital
intensive technical choices is used to illuminate the
utilities long run interest in nuclear development.
Most of the inferences drawn from neoclassical analyses
of active firm behavior emphasize the impact of rivalry
conditions and market structure on the pace of technical
change. The OT framework shifts the focus to directional
issues. The framework extends the strategic linkage
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argument found in Hirshleifer (1971), by conceiving of R&D
externalities with reference to firms' fixed rather than
liquid assets.[8] A strong bias is asserted towards
research projects capable of increasing the value of
companies' existing plant and equipment, institutionally
embodied human capital, and other intangible assets like
marketing networks and political contacts.
While most of the reasons noted within OT theory for
state activism in infrastructural selection are consistent
with neoclassical theory, the composite role adduced is
somewhat alien. Greater emphasis on the implications of
uncertainty, strategic firm behavior, and critical mass
dynamics within the OT framework, highlights the role of the
state in establishing a consensus development path. The
treatment of state activism as an institutional response to
uncertainty parallels Nelson and Winter's '77 derivation of
firm "rule of thumb" behavior. Both claims stress the
inappropriateness of using a perfect information framework
to model technical change decision making. Nelson and
~oJinter, however, develop a stochasti c theory of innova tion
decisions in contrast to the politicized critical mass
appr oach of OT theory.
The OT framework also directs greater attention to the
impact of ideological and institutional variables on the
market's organization of technical change than most active-
firm neoclassical models. The attention reflects the path
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dependent character of infrastructural evolution within the
OT approach and the constitution of planning contexts as
objects of analysis.
II Institutionalist Theories Qf Technical Change
~ Basic theory
Unlike neoclassical theory, institutionalist theory has
persistently focussed economic analysis on the process of
technical change. The attention reflects the school's
dynamic methodology[9], and conception of the economy as an
evolving whole, knit together by institutional and
technological inter-relationships.[lO] The school has
produced both technically and non-technically deterministic
theorists. I The former assert that technology develops
according to an internal logic of discovery. [Ill Firms and
other institutions are thought to affect only the pace of
technical advance, and generally appear as parochial
tradition bound obstacles to rational progress. A second
,
view asserts a more dialectical approach, deriving the path
of technical advance from an interaction between the
momentum of sci entif ic discovery and channel ing context of
institutional arrangements. Describing the second view,
Samuels (1977) writes, :
Technological determinism has been held ••• a
single factor explanation at variance with the
institutionalist critique of neoclassical economics
which rejects narrow mechanism and urges multifactor
cumulative causation .••(p. 877) A role of hierarchical
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power structures is to govern the distribution of
technological opportuni ties Technology assessment
is a function of values and attitudes; a change in
power structure likely will lead to a change in
technology assessment (p. 890).
The OT framework is compatible with the above approach.
It is difficult to identify a formal body of
r ':-
insti tuti onal ist theory, however, regarding the character
of non-technically deterministic technical change. Wilber
(1978) suggests that this absence is partly due to the
historical specificity of institutionalist analysis. The
latter is claimed to inhibit the development of formal
propositions by asserting the uniqueness of each
technological-institutional nexus (Wilber 1978, 72,73, 85).
Rather than generating a priori propositions and testable
hypotheses, institutionalist approaches are asserted to
generate methods of analysis and case studies.[12] To
some extent the OT framework provides an analytic context
for formal izing case study insights. [13]
~ h~~~i~g ill~~i~~~igng~i~~ gngl~~~
of nuclear development
Nany popular histories of nuclear development reflect
neo-institutionalist interpretations. The three leading
studies of this type are: Bupp and Derian's ~.h~ E..9iilg
K.r.g.illi~~.Q1 B~J;;le..9.r -E.Q.Y!..e.r.,Nader and Abbotts' j'.h~ l1~.n..9ce .Q1
h~g.ill..i~ .r;.n~..t:.gy, and sections of Lovins' .Q.Q1~ ].n~.r..9y
Paths. [14] Huch of the anti-nuclear literature also
reflects this approach. All of the above studies emphasize
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the roles played by active firms pursuing growth strategies,
promotionally oriented and politically insulated government
bureaucracies, institutional science, and cold war ideology
in determining the course of nuclear expansion. The pattern
of technical development that emerges contradicts both the
translation image of economic activity and technically
deterministic theories of technical change. Summar izing a
common conclusion, Bupp and Derian write, "••• the real
world ignored or overrode technical rationality. Military,
political, and commercial constraints turned out to have a
decisive causal influence on the development of nuclear
power" (Bupp and Derian 1981, 184).
Nader and Abbotts' analysis is representative of this
literature. In many respects it applies Galbraith's
planning sector model of economic evolution to the energy
sector. [151 Nuclear power is portrayed as an ideal
planning-sector technology, midwifed into existence by the
self-interested bureaucracies which Galbraith argues
organize modern economic life.
The major differences among institutionalist
interpretations of nuclear history involve the causal weight
assigned to different institutional factors. Bupp and
Derian, for example, assign less weight to corporate
initiatives and more to pro-nuclear efforts of
bureaucratically ensconced scientists than do Nader and
42
Abbotts in explaining nuclear growth. Gyorgy et a l., (1979)
give greater attention to the interests of financial capital
than either of the above treatments.
The logic of OT dynamics is implicit in much of the
institutionalist literature. By organizing nuclear
history in terms of the character of planning contexts and
logic of critical mass mass dynamics, the OT framework
offers a conceptual structure for unifying diverse
institutionalist insights. The framework provides a
microeconomicbasis for measuring the dimensions of
corporate power, and the impact of institutional variables
on economic evolutio~ It thus permits a more comprehensive
and quantitative treatment of arguments developed
qualitatively elsewhere. For example, the OT approach
provides quantitative support for Lovins' claim of
significantly more "mutual exclusivity" between energy
options than is implied by neoclassical analyses of purely
technical parameters.
~ Marxist Theories of R&D and Technical Change
4.11 Basic theory
Technological change has traditionally played a greater
role in Marxist than neoclassical economic theory. The
Marxist literature can be divided into three traditions.
The first reflects a technologically deterministic approach.
The logic of competition is argued to keep the engine of
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capitalist accumulation rolling along the rails of technical
rationality. This view is reflected in Plekhanov's work and
Lenin's celebration of Taylorist techniques (Reinfelder
1980, 14-19).[16]
A second tradition highlights the impact of class
conflict on technical change. The adversary character of
the workplace is perceived as encouraging capitalists to
develop and deploy administrative or control technologies
that minimize labor's bargaining position (Braverman 1974,
Stone 1974, Harglin 1974). The fragmentation and
deskillling of work, and discipline of the assembly line,
for example, are perceived as by-products of the conflict
laden social relations of capitalist production.
The two traditions are sometimes found
idiosyncratically fused in Marxist crises theories built
around the "law of the falling rate of pr of i t;", The "forces
of productionll-technologically deterministic school asserts,
an inherent engineering bias towards capital intensive
technical change. The "class-conflictll tradition derives a
similar conclusion from the adversary character of work
relations.
A third and recently expanding school has the most
affinity with the OT framework. It rejects technical
determinism and seeks to tie the shape of technical change
to broader social characteristics of a capitalist society
than the immediate conflicts between labor and capital.
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Elements of Best and Connoly's 1982 discussion of the
evolution of the u.s. transportation sector, Bowles and
Gintis's 1976 analysis of the techniques of education, and
Commoner's (1979, 1977) analysis of energy sector dynamics,
implicitly ground the evolution of various institutional and
technical practices in a Marxist sociology.[17] Cowling
(1982) similarly extends fliarglin's (1977) focus on the
distributive implications of technical change in the labor
market to the product market, writing,
••• we can expect innovations to be biased in a
direction favouring the aim of a more concentrated
structure. Thus innovations implying scale economies
or facilitating control of large organizations are
likely to dominate innovations implying deconcentration
and disintegration. Given that monopoly rents are
available as prizes for capital, we can expect that the
stream of innovations will reflect the pursuit of such
pr i z e s a s well as the pur sui t of ef f i c i en cy ina soc i a1
sense. Thus we can expect technical progress in a
capi tal ist society to contr ibute to the developm ent of
more concentrated market structures (p. 11, see also
p. 35).
Recent use of the concept of the "social structure of
accumulation" (SSA) (Gordon, Edwards and Reich 1982) to
periodize American economic history represents an effort to
formalize the insights of the third tradition. The OT
framework's planning context model of technical change is
con si stent with an SSA model of e conomi c hi sto r y, The
framework operationalizes the notion of "conjunctural
logics" by specifying the macro social variables that create
micro incentives for particular development paths.
~tii
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~ Applied Marxist analyses of nuclear development
Support for nuclear power amongst the Russian,
Eastern European, and many Western European communist
parties[18] reflects a technically deterministic
perspective. The analysis extends Lenin's view that
socialist countries need adopt the technology of capitalist
production within an altered pattern of ownership relations.
Nuclear power's early market triumph and BTU/lb fuel
intensity are appealed to as demonstrations of the
technology's "progressive" character. Nuclear's recent
difficulties are tied to petroleum company efforts to
maintain the value of their fossil fuel assets (Chapman
1983, 200).
In some variants of this approach nuclear power's
social implications are seen as the contradiction that will
"burst asunder" the social relations of capitalist
production. The hazards associated wi th nuclear energy are
argued to require state ownership, which is perceived as a
major step towards a broader program of nationalization and
socialist transformation. Perception of this threat,
especially from interests tied to the investor owned
utilities, is perceived as another source of nuclear
opposi tion.
Illustrative of non-technically deterministic Marxist
oriented analyses of nuclear power is the work of Barry
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Commoner (1979), Andre Gorz (1979), Alan Roberts (1976), and
Hark Hertsgaard (1983).[19] This literature is similar in
many respects to the institutionalist literature cited
above. The main difference lies in the authors' self-
conscious attempts to tie the characteristics of nuclear
evolution to broader conceptions of the logic of American
society as a capitalist society. [20] The analysis includes
an implicit conceptualization of the social whole as a mode
of production, and an eclectic use of orthodox and neo-
Marxist categories to analyze it.
The OT framework fits comfortably within this milieu.
While maintaining a dialectical methodology, the framework
ignores many categories of orthodox Marxist theory. The
framework also rejects the tendency in Marxist analysis to
abstract from microeconomic explanations for economic
events. The OT approach seeks to analyze how power is
exercised in a modern capitalist economy without appeal to
abstract statements about "capital" which can not be
\
instanciated in terms of specific actions by identifiable
agents in response to specific incentives. In effect, the
OT framework seeks to operationalize Narxist and
Galbraithian categories without recourse to the metaphysical
language frequently associated with Marxist writings and the
anecdotal approach of Galbraithian analysis.
Host importantly, the OT framework offers an analytical
context capable of operationalizing the Althuserian concept
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of "structural causality".[21] Further analysis could link
the OT framework's treatment of the social variables shaping
energy sector evolution, to a structuralist analysis of the
dynamics of modern capitalism.
5.1 Literature Reyie~ .fu!.mmary
The OT framework challenges technically deterministic
modes of economic theory, criticizing the passive firm-
translation model within neoclassical theory, the "logic of
scientific discovery" school within institutionalist theory,
and the "unfolding forces of production" perspective within
Marxist theory. An OT model of technical change is easiest
to accomodate within institutionalist and Marxist frameworks
but can also be linked to an aggressive extension of the
active firm school within neoclassical theory. The spirit
of analysis, however, conflicts with the the latter's
methodologically individualistic underpinnings. By seeking
to brLn q.w i t hLn an interactive explanatory framework such
variables as government policy and ideology, and by giving
the firm an agency role in determining technical
efficiencies, the model exceeds the limits of maximization
subject to given constraint analysis.
Implicit in the OT framework is the question of why
particular planning contexts emerge and generate particular
interactive constraints. Latent, is a structuralist
response, tying planning context character isti.cs to soci al
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structure characteristics. Underlying the OT approach is a
shift from viewing economic outcomes as the result of
constrained consumer maximization, to a conception of
economic evolution as an expression of the interactive logic
of insti tutional reproduction.
C HAP T E R II
NOTES
1. The level of investment in R&D and the pace of technical
advance are generally argued to be highly correlated. For a
review of the literature in this area see Kamien and
Schwartz (1982), 54-57.
2. On the cost/supply side, the Schumpeter-Galbraith
hypothesis implies incentives for large firm R&D activities
due to financing advantages and asserted economies of scale.
Demand side incentives are tied to opportunities for greater
appropriatability and the tendency for rivalrous behavior to
assume the form of product innovation in large firm
oligopoly markets. Similar arguments are raised in Villard
(1958) and Lilienthal (1953).
3. See for example: Kamien and Schwartz (1982), 22-104; Hay
and Morris (1979), 440-471; Hansfield (1968c), 83-108; and
Norris and Vaizey (1973),60-75. The studies suggest that
links between firm size and/or market concentration levels
on the one hand, and R&D inputs and/or outputs on the other,
are more complex than implied by simple Schumpeterian or
Galbraithian models. The impact of increasing rivalry, for
example, appears to depend on the character of secondary
variables, such as fixed or flexible R&D contracting and the
patentability of second place discoveries. The impact of
firm size and concentration levels on R&D activities may
vary by activity (being greater for innovation than
invention), and across industries (being greater in areas
where a well developed scientific base, amenable to large
lab extension, exists).
4. Arrow'~ 1962 paper treated invention as the production of
knowledge. It noted that the appropriatability problem,
higher private than social burden of R&D risk, and presence
of economies of scale in information use could lead the
competitive market solution to be lower than the socially
efficient level of knowledge production.
5. The distortion reflects the market's equation of private
marginal costs and benefits, where some of the benefits
reflect redistributive rather than efficiency gains.
Hirshleifer's 1971 paper focussed on the speculative value
of new technical information for financial investment in
effected industries. Other papers have treated product
differentiation oriented R&D outlays analogously to
a dvertising expenses.
o
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6. See for example:
1) The 1977 testimony of Gordon Corey, Vice President of
Commonwealth Edison, the nation's leading nuclear utility
(U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations
1977,77).
2) The AEC's 1967 Supplement to Civilian Nuclear Po~er: h
B~J2Q.£.t .tQ .t.h~ g.£~..Q..i.Q~.n.t (U. S. AEC, 1 9 6 7 a ) •
3) Burn (1967, 36; 1978, 1). Burn treats the market's
tilt towards nuclear power in the sixties and seventies as
prima facie proof of the technology's optimizing properties.
4) Hogerton (1968) and Dawson (1976). Both accounts
highlight the role of geopolitical objectives in mobilizing
early government support for the technology and the logic of
cost minimization for its eventual commercial triumph.
5) For a technically deterministic, optimizing oriented
view of market functioning in the energy R&D area see J.
Herbert Holloman's chapters in Holloman (1975).
7. Baughman and Joskow (1976), for example, explicitly treat
nuclear cost predictions as "exogenous variables" and rely
on nuclear industry expectations for these parameters in
their econometric modeling. Their base case for nuclear
capital costs in 1980 ($662/kw) proved 300% below the
constant dollar cost of plants corning on line in the mid-
eighties. Allan Nanne's Energy Technology Assessment model
uses nuclear capaci ty rates 15-25% above current estimates
(f-1anne 1976). Based on similar assumptions, Jorgenson ana
Hudson (1974) predicted year 2000 nuclear generating
percentages more than twice currently projected levels. The
Institute 'for Energy Analysis's 1978 study of the impact of
a nuclear moratorium assumed nuclear capital costs of
$650/kw (Institute for Energy Analysis 1978,173). Similar
methodological errors led to exageration of the benefits of
nuclear development in early cost benefit studies (U.S. AEC,
1962 and Cambel 1964).
In defense of mathematical models it should be noted
that they often contain formal constraints and alternative
cases. The extra parameters attempt to capture the impact of
different regulatory policies (as illustrated by Manne's
ETA model) and alternative supply curve schedules (as in the
Project Independence model). Similarly, the referenced
historical accounts in footnote 7 invariably acknowledge the
role played by political factors in the day to day evolution
of events. Dawson in particular pays special attention to
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the details of the institutional nexus that oversaw nuclear
development. Nevertheless, both the narrative histories and
mathematical models treat the social factors involved with
nuclear development as second order effects, floating atop
the log i c of tee h n i cal rat i on ali t y an den g i nee r in g
imperatives. There is no serious attempt to construct an
interactive political-economic model within which relative
economic efficiencies are strongly influenced by social
dynamics. Within neoclassical theory the adjustments are
appended on to a general equilibrium model rather than
derived from an integrated view of the social dimensions of
infrastructural development.
8. Recall that Hirshleifer emphasized the R&Dincentives
created by potential speculative gain in linked financial
securities. The OT framework emphasizes the impact of R&D
and promotional development strategies on the value of fixed
capi tal.,
9. It is difficult to over-emphasize the importance of the
dynamic/static distinction when trying to identify what
separates OT and institutionalist economic models from
neoclassical theory. To draw a psychological analogy, one
can compare neoclassical models of consumer behavior based
on traditional utility theory with developmental
psychological theory. In the former, one analyzes how
individuals maximize subject to exogenously given
constraints and utility functions. In the latter, one
analyzes how behavior redefines the context for
maximization, both by changing preferences and the logical
structure of perception. The latter is the style of
analysis applied by institutionalist and OT theory to study
economic systems. Within this approach the economy is
treated like a living organism, demanding a dynamic
conception of existence. In contrast the economy appears as
a clock in neoclasical theory. It proceeds through time but
never changes.
"
10. For summaries of institutionalist thought and
methodology in this area see: Wilber (1978), Elliot (1978),
Samuels (1977), Gordon (1980) and r1irowski (1981).
11. Gordon, for example, writes, " The first characteristic
of the technological process is its cumulative nature, in
the sense that knowledge grows of itself. Jacques Ellul has
commented on this phenomena: 'Essentially the preceding
technical situation alone is determinative. \\Then a given
technical discoverey occurs, it has followed almost of
necessity certain other discoveries" (Gordon 1980, 11).
12. Wilber (1978) suggests that the approach represents an
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instance of the "pattern model" of social theory.
13. A major weakness of institutionalist theory seems its
lack of an overall theory of "the whole", and absence of a
derived set of categories with which to dissect it. In
def ining the boundries of analy sis con sidered appro pria te
for specific subjects, the school seems to rely on ad hoc
judgements. The tr adi tion'sasser tion of the "pr imacy [or
self-defining logic] of the subject matter" (Wilber 1978,
74-75,81) is somewhat disingenuous, as it implies that
perception is independent of organizing categories, and
conflicts with the holist spirit animating the entire
institutionalist project.
The reason for this methodological gap would appear the
difficulty posed by the scope of inquiry necessary to
constr uct a hoI ist analysi s, If th e w hoIe inf orms all of
its parts, and each element can only be understood in
relationship to the logic and content of the whole, initial
analysis is extremely difficult. Case studies appear to be
one response to this "Catch-22" or simultaneity problem.
Such studies can function as a prologue to a fully
constructed holist economic science. By tying together
threads drawn from these studies it may be possible to begin
to construct general categories of holist analysis.
Presumably, the original studies would then be re-examined
and theoretical categories refined anew. Theory would thus
proceed as dialectically as social life. The OT framework
is adduced as a preliminary effort in this intellectual
process.
14. Another illustration of this perspective is Mullenbach
(1963) w hi ch pres ciently an tici pa ted many of Bupp and
Derian's conclusions. The Rand nuclear studies (Allen 1977,
Gandara 1977, Perry 1977, and Rolph 1977) reflect a similar
though less well integrated interpretation. Quirk and
Montgomeiy (1978, 1980) highlight the facilitating impact of
utility and vendor self-interest on nuclear risk taking,
though their context of analysis narrows the scope and
objectives of corporate planning from the focus of Bupp and
Derian and the OT framework.
15. For elaboration of Galbraith's model see Galbraith
(1973) •
16. Proponents of this perspective frequently reference a
passage from The Poverty Qf Philosophy in which Marx states,
" The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the
steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist •••" For
a general discussion of the technicaly deterministic strand
in Marxist writings see Braverman (1974, 11-24) and Gendron
(1975). Rosenberg (1976b) points out that if the above
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passage is situated in the entire essay, it loses its
technically deterministic implications.
17 Contemporary Marxist rejections of technical determinism
have also been argued at much higher levels of abstraction.
Norbert Kapferer (1980), for example, explores Sohn-Rethel's
attempt to tie the basic categorties of western science to
an analytic framework dictated by the experience of life
within a market society. Sohn-Rethel argues that the
abstractions involved with the exchange process create a
general context for conceptualizing existence. He in effect
historicizes Kant's universal categories, tying them to the
logical operations habitually necessary for exchange
relations. The categories of value theory (especially the
notion of exchange as opposed to use value) thus take on
epistemological implications. The analysis resembles
Lukac's critique of "bourgeoisie categories of thought" in
fl~~~QLY gng ~lg~~ ~Qn~~~Q~~n~~~ for their historical
inability to conceptualize the social whole as a distinct
object from its parts.
The argument implies that the social character of
technical evolution derives not only from the mediated
application of scientific principles, as the class-conflict
school sugggests, but also from the basic set of
abstractions used to contemplate the physical world within a
market society.,
18. See Falk (1982), 228-246.
19. Also illustrative of neomarxist non-technically
deterministic analysis of nuclear development is Pector
(1978), Falk (1982}, Lindberg (1977), Hays and Zarsky (1984)
and aspects of work cited in the institutionalist
literature ,rev~eVl, such as Gyorgy et al. (1979).
20. Commoner's (1979) analysis, for example, reflects a
personal combination of populist, ecologist, and traditional
Narxist met a ph 0 r s, His pol itic a1- e con 0m ican a1y sis
persistently ties the rise of nuclear power to what he
argues is the class interest of capital. His discussion of
corporate promotion of nuclear power goes beyond the Nader-
Lovins focus on the immediate exercise of power by nuclear
sector firms. He suggests that the capitalist class as a
whole may have promoted energy subsidies in order to
facilitate economic concentration. (This view perceives
energy and capital as complementary goods in production,
with capital intensity breeding economic concentration and
cheap energy allowing greater capital labor ratios.) He
also utilizes the orthodox Marxist assumption of an inherent
bias in capitalist production in favor of capital intensive
technical change to partially explain the energy sector's
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enthusiasm for nuclear power and other capital intensive
technologies. He implies that a profound social revolution
is necessary to reorient energy policy, differing with non-
Harxist r ecomm enda ti ons, 1ike those of Lov ins, f o r mar ke t
solutions to energy issues.
Andre Gorz (1979) stresses the appeal of nuclear
power's capital intensity and centralized industrial
organization to industrial and financial capital in
explaining the technology's period of rapid expansion.
Characteristically (for Gorz) he focusses on the effect of
class conflict considerations on the economy's choice of
technique.
21. Structural causality implies that the roots of economic
events are located in the dynamics of a social system,
rather than in a priori human natures and engineering
constraints. The OT framework offers a device for
connecting soci al structur al character i sti cs to pa rti cular
microeconomic outcomes. The framework thus provides a
microeconomic foundation for structuralist arguments.
For example, OT theory can be used to link the history
of nuclear development to the character of American
capitalism, by tying nuclear evolution to the distribution
of power in America. The OT approach can also be used
to look at the indirect impact on nuclear development of
miscellaneous pr oducts of modern capi tal ism. For example,
the stimulating impact of McCarthyism and the public/private
electric power debate on nuclear development (see Chapter
3), can be used to illustrate the diffuse logic of a social
system. The "pro-nuclear" impact of these phenomena was
unintended by the events' participants, but reflected key
aspects of modern capitalism, such as cold war ideology, and
expanding government economic activities. The indirect
result of nuclear expansion illustrates the phenomenon of
system or structural causality, and demonstrates its
distinctness from the simpler notion of pluralist
confl uence.
C HAP T E RIll
THE NUCLEAR PLANNING CONTEXT
II .lD..t.Ioduction
This chapter develops step one of the OT framework's
three step process for analyzing the history of nuclear
power. It specifies the planning context that promoted
nuclear's early expansion, by identifying its major
participants, their strategic objectives, and the
ideological and institutional variables that conditioned
how they pur sued these objectives.
The analysis demonstrates that nuclear's expected
economic efficiency was not the reason for its initial
development. Nuclear expansion is tied instead to the
promotion of a particular planning vision by cold war and
corpora te growth strategists. The chapter highlights the
avenues by which social variables (such as the distribution
of political and economic power, and the character of
,ideological belief) influenced technical choice decisions.
The chapter is divided into five parts. Each
section focuses on the behavior of a different agent in the
nuclear planning process. The five actors are: the state,
reactor vendors, utilities, nuclear engineering-
construction firms, and nuclear fuel cycle companies.
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2..l .The Role of the State in ..the
Nucl~ar Planni.n..g ..conte~..t
~ Bases for ~..tEte ~tivism
As not e din chap t e ron e, the 0T f ram e vi 0 r k s uggest s
several reasons for expecting an active state role in
infrastructural selection. This is due to the importance
of pUblic R&Dand regulatory decisions in determining long
run infrastructural efficiencies, and the symbolic function
of federal support. By appearing to signal the existence of
a consensus development path, public policy can inhibit the
development of competing options. In the energy area,
federal R&Dsubsidies, environmental policy, and utility
regulation were especially influential in shaping
inf rastructural evolution.
Taken together government activities can annoint
Official Technologies. Such was the case with nuclear
power. Government initiatives, however, can not be viewed
in isolation. Besides reflecting decision makers'
perceptions of the general welfare, public policy reflects
the distribution of political-economic power, and
ideological and insti tutional variables. One's perception
of which of these factors is dominant is closely related to
one's broader theory of the state. The analysis below
avoids ranging very far into this arena by presenting a
narrow descriptive conclusion. It is asserted that
government nuclear promotion reflected the political
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dominance of cold war priorities during the 1950-1970
period and the congeniality of nuclear expansion with key
energy firm interests. The reasons for this dominance are
not discussed.
~l Ideological support for nuclear ~~er. During
the 1950's and 1960's a number of ideological beliefs
nurtured a political-economic consensus in favor of nuclear
expansion (Dawson 1976, 235,241,261; Bupp and Derian 1981,
188; Del Sesto 1979, Chapter 7).[1] This consensus
facilitated the creation of a highly centralized,
promotionally oriented government structure for managing
nuclear policies. It also helped generate a popular
optimism about the ease of containment of nuclear hazards
and the expected costs of nuclear power that was resistant
to empirical challenge. These factors insulated government
nuclear support from political challenge and created a
context conducive to long term private sector investm ent.
Future attempts to generalize OT analysis of the process of
infrastructural innovation, might explore if similar
ideological consensus accompanied other periods of
infrastructural initiatives.
The three most important ideological beliefs
promoting nuclear power in the fifties and sixties were
cold war ideology, consumerist (as opposed to ecologist)
sentiments, and technocra tic profes sional ism. [2] Cold war
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dynamics led directly to public policy support for nuclear
power development as a national security measure and
vehicle for competi tion wi th the Soviets. The HcCarthyi te
climate of the fifties also discouraged research into
nuclear power hazards. Concern over the radiation dangers
of atomic testing, for example, was often attacked as
subver sive (Wasserman 1982, 303, Hetzger 1972, 125). The
cold war also contributed to the general weakness of the
Left during this period. This weakness strengthened the
pUblic credibility of corporate and government claims about
nuclear safety and nuclear economics, and minimized public
concern about the concentrated character of nuclear
markets. The significance of the period's elevation of
growth over environmental concerns is best illustrated by
the impact of a shift in these priorities in the seventies,
when new environmental health and safety regulations more
than tripled the real cost of nuclear power (see Chapter
6) •
In summary, the ideologies of the fifties and
sixties discouraged popular participation in nuclear
planning, reserving decision roles for pro-nuclear oriented
military and corporate leaders, and technocratic scientists
fascinated by the atom.
2....l.2.U.nJ2..tll.lJ..t.i..QD.,gl. J2.lJ.P.P..Q.L:...t1..Q.£ n.lJ..Ql.~.,g.L:..PQXl~.L:.: The
most important institutional factor facilitating nuclear
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power's expansion was the centralized character of early
government nuclear policy making. DeLeon reports that a
similar phenomenon has characterized other nations' nuclear
programs (DeLeon 1979, 70-77). This centralization
avoided the policy delays common in more open environments
and the possibility of pluralist dilution of pro-nuclear
programs. In the U.S., the centralization was embodied in
3 measures: the preemption of state and local regulatory
authority by federal standards (established by the 1946 and
1954 atomic energy acts and reaffirmed in the Northern
States decision in 1971), the concentration of
congressional authority in the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy (JCAE), and concentration of executive authority in
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). //
The Joint Committee was virtually the only
Congressional committee with legislative jurisdiction
empowered to hold substantive hearings on nuclear related
subjects. \ This monopoly was used to prevent the
technology's critics from testifying at legislative
hearings and mobilizing the investigatory powers of
congress for critical review. The JCAE also acted as its
own conference committee making it procedurally difficult
to amend its legislative recommendations.
The AEC exercised similarly centralized control over
the executive dimensions of public policy. Of particular
importance was nuclear power's early insulation from
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regulation by less sympathetic government agencies like the
Public Health Service or Department of Labor. The AEC used
its control over research funds, classification authority,
and joint monopoly with the JCAE on official credibility,
to manage the nuclear information environment in a
promotional manner. [3]
Judicial review was the one avenue for formal
political activity not controlled by nuclear advocates.
Early opposition to the technology often entered the
planning context through this gap. The invulnerability of
the French and Soviet programs to similar legal challenge
has contributed significantly to their continued expansion
(Smart 1982, 176) •
~l Basis i~ state nuclear support~
mic.I..Q efficiency hypothesis
Given the high energy costs of the 1970's and
government funding of a massive R&D response, could the
nuclear proqr arn have represented a prescient anticipation
of the energy crisis? Both the period's perceived energy
R&D needs and its available basis for comparing nuclear
with other energy development options strongly imply a
negative answer (Mullenbach 1963, 110 , 80-102,185; All en
1977, 32; DeLeon 1979, 53 Nelson and Ead s 1959, 410).
Some publ ic sta t ements by th e Atom ic Ene rgy Commis si on and
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy do cite the long term
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energy needs of the West (especially those of western
Europe and Japan), and the short term danger of relying on
oil flow s through the Suez Canal, (after the 1956 crisis),
as key rationales for a large nuclear program. Inspection
of the period's energy planning environment and the overall
flow of U.S. energy policy, however, leaves one skeptical
about the economic case for massive nuclear R&D support.
The respected 1958 National Planing Association
study, Nuclear Energy and the ~ Fuel Economy 1955-1980,
for example, was relatively sanguine about the adequacy of
conventional energy supplies (Teitelbaum 1958, 31, 84-5).
As early as 1955 the Association's nuclear project
reported, "Middle East oil reserves are so huge and
production costs so low that substantial increases in
output ••• can be accomplished without substantial
increases in cost Noreover, the availability of
petroleum' products from oil shale at prices not
substantially higher than from crude is expected to deter
th e rise of oil pr ice sin the U.S. for som e tim e."[4] Th e
report added, "Coal reserves in the U.S. are ample for
centuries" (p. 54).[5J The widely cited 1962 AEC study
~vili~n Nuc~gr ~~~J = A R~port to ~ President foresaw
falling coal fired generating costs for the next 40 years
(JCAE 1968,188,220,227). The Cambel study of U.S. energy
R&D in 1964 concluded, "The findings of this staff study
indicate no grounds for serious concern that the Nation is
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using up its stocks of fossil fuels too rapidly; rather
there is the suspicion that we are using them up too
slowly. Thus rather than fearing a future day when fossil
fuel resources will be largely exhausted and the Nation
will want for energy, we are concerned for the day when the
value of untapped fossil fuel resources might have tumbled
because of technological advances and the Nation will
regret that it did not make greater use of these stocks
when they were still precious" (Cambel 1964, 54) •
Representatives of the conventional fuel industries and
utilities testified annually during the 1950's that no
pressing need existed for alternative energy development
(Mullenbach 1963, 79) • While the 1952 President's
Commission on Materials Policy (the Paley Commission) did
make an economic case for rapid nuclear development, it
placed an equal emphasis on the need for solar R&D. This
recomm enda t i on was entirely ignored. Solar research
received less than 1% of the nuclear budget during the next
20 years (Holloman and Grenon 1975, 83). Most of this sum
was related to NASA'S space projects. A parallel neglect
attended alternative fossil fuel resources. A federal
decision in 1954, for example, transferred responsibility
for developing shale oil technology from the Bureau of
Mines to the private sector, thereby postponing R&D in the
field indefinitely (Mullenbach 1963, 90-91,94-95,320). Many
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promising coal based innovations were similarly ignored
(JCAE,1968, 5,13-14).
The private sector's lack of interest in advancing
significant venture capital for non-petroleum, non-nuclear
energy development, reinforces the impression that the
purely economic case for aggressive energy R&D was
uncompelling. [6]
~ Basi§ ~ state nuclear §upport~
militar~ externalities
Rather than economic, the underlying motivations for
nuclear expansion were geopoli tical. The early character
of American policy was dominated by military concerns,
focusing first on the development of atomic and hydrogen
bombs, second on the production of significant amounts of
weapons grade material, and finally on the development of
reactors for naval and aircraft propulsion. Other defense
projects included attempts to develop mobile power plants
for use in remote outposts, and floating atomic plants for
operating damaged port facilities (JCAE 1952, 49).
Although military enthusiasts failed to formally tie the
AECto the Department of Defense, AEC-DoDlinkages remained
strong. A special liason committee, for example, was
established by statute to insure close coordination (Del
Sesto 1979, 21, l6-18~ Orlans 1967, l72-3~ Thomas 1956,
45 i Hertsgaard 1983, 16-17).
Prior to April 1950 there was only one civilian
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nuclear power construction project. It was reoriented
towards s ubmar ine devel opment when Gener al El ect ric was
pressured to drop its breeder reactor program in favor of
research that led to the launching of the Nautilus in 1955
(Bupp 1977, 316-317). From 1951-1958 less than 13% of the
AEC's budget was earmarked for ci viI ian power developm ent
(Orlans 1967, 112).
During the mid-fifties the civilian side of u.s
nuclear technology grew as a joint product of military
research. Civilian projects benefitted directly from
military experience and indirectly from the political
support they received in anticipation of the military
spinoffs that a healthy civilian nuclear sector might
produce. The National Security Council, for example,
proclaimed in 1953 that the early development of civilian
nuclear power was a prerequisite for the national security
goal of maintaining American dominance in the atomic field
\
(Allen 1977, 30). Oak Ridge lab director Alvin Weinberg
told the JCAE in 1954 that, " our potential in military
nuclear explosives ••• would be greatly increased if we
had a large scale economic central nuclear power industry"
(Hertsgaard 1983, 26). The Joint Committee relied on
similar arguments in mobilizing Congressional support for
generous nuclear funding {Orlans 1967, 178).[7]
support for the "peaceful atom" was also seen as a
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way of softening the militaristic image at home and abroad
of the u.s. atomic energy program (Allen 1977, 32; Sommers
1978, 23-24; Ford 1982, 35; Mullenbach 1963, 264).
In the Soviet Union, civilian nuclear power grew as
a physical joint product of mili tary reactor development.
The Russians' early nuclear strategy called for the
construction of dual purpose reactors designed to produce
both weapons grade plutonium and electricity (Atomic
Industrial Forum, FO~~ID ~~IDQ 6/56 15; Mullenbach 1963,
241) •
The dominance of the American and world nuclear
market by the light water reactor, also illustrates the
technology's military lineage. The light water design was
originally chosen by Admiral Rickover in the fifties to
serve as the basis for the navy's submarine program because
it appeared to be the quickest and least uncertain path to
an operational naval reactor (Allen 1977,15-17). > All
current American reactor manufacturers participated
actively in the navy's nuclear program. The technology's
entrance into the civilian market resulted from a 1953
government decision to transform ~vestinghouse's aircraft
carrier project into the nation's first nuclear power plant
(Allen 1977, 29-34).[8J This beginning was later parlayed
by Westinghouse and GE's multi-billion dollar marketing
efforts into bandwagon purchases of more than 100 reactors
(see section 3.2 below).
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Although this risk averse, rapid development
strategy may have been wise militarily, it appears to have
been an unfortunate basis upon which to build a civilian
power industry. Light water reactors are relatively
inefficient users of uranium and pose greater accident and
proliferation hazards than some alternative designs (Office
of Technology Assesment 1984, 16-17).
The martial stamp is also borne by the French,
British, and Russian atomic energy programs and helps
explain the otherw ise curious popularity of early nuclear
power development efforts in the absence of a compelling
economic logic (DeLeon 1979, 43-61; Perry 1977, 64).
~~l ~g~i~ iQ~ ~tgt~ D~~~~g~ ~~DDQ~t~
ideological competition with the Soviets
Alongside promoting civilian nuclear power for its
direct military spinoffs, the government sought to enhance
U.S. Ln t erna t i onaI prestige and extend U.S. dominance of
nuclear weaponry by promoting and funding the Atoms for
Peace program. The latter promised easy access to American
technology and U.S. stockpiles of enriched uranium in
exchange for for eign nations' inspectabl e renuncia tion of
atomic w eap o n s development. [9J Heralded by President
Eisenhower in a December 1953 address to the UN, the race
for atomic power, like the race to the moon, was perceived
as a key ideological and economic competition with the
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soviet Union. [10] The foreign policy goals of the Atoms
for Peace program thus became a key stimulant for domestic
power research. Interestingly, the President's speech had
not been shown in advance to the AEC and in many ways it
exceeded even the unrealistically optimistic claims of the
Commission about the near term economic potential of
nuclear energy (Mullenbach 1963, 16, 270). Like many other
such announcements, the speech helped create a misleadingly
supportive environment for nuclear development.
The speech also generated significant pressures for
selecting reactor designs based on short term viability
rather than long run economic efficiency or environmental
concerns.[ll] As Alvin Weinberg, director of the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, indicated a year after Eisenhower's
speech, the choice of the light water design " was dictated
by the requirement that the reactor demonstrate reliable
n u cl ear power ra ther than cheap nucl ear power" (Allen
1 97 7 , 3 1) • F0 ur tee n yea r s 1ate r, for mer AEC con s ul tan t
John Hogerton wrote, " ••• the thrust for an accelerated
nuclear power program was not sparked by any specific
technical development, nor did it develop solely f rom the
buildup of economic pressures within the U.S. power
industry. Considerations of national prestige and foreign
policy were of central importance" (Hogerton 1968, 23).
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~ Basis for state nuclear support~
export ~mpetition
State support for nuclear power was also motivated
by the apparent security of nuclear fuel resources (due to
favorable uranium concentrations in the U.S., Canada,
Australia and South Africa) and the expected absolute
advantage of U.S. corporations in international nuclear
competition (due in part to prior government investment in
multi-billion dollar enrichment facilities). Combined with
nuclear's large scaling efficiencies, these conditions
stimulated state support for corporate efforts to capture
critical mass efficiencies and export markets for American
reactor designs (DeLeon 1979, 268-271; Lindberg 1977, 330;
Mullenbach 1963, 8) • Export
concerns also spurred national support for the British and
French reactor program (Allen 1977, 8; DeLeon 1979, 243-
44) •[12J
The logic of OT dynamics in international trade
extends the implications of the industrial organization
literature linking market share and profitability. The OT
perspective allows for inter-technology as well as intra-
technology struggles for market share. Within the nuclear
history literature, Hays, Bupp, Nau and others have
developed this theme with reference to the competition
between the U.S. light water and British and French gas-
graphite reactor designs. The OT framework highlights this
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struggle and extends its logic to the competition between
nuclear and non-nuclear energy technologies.
Evidence of u.s. deployment of a critical mass
capturing development strategy emerged as early as the mid-
fifties Euratom negotiations. From an OT framework
perspective, the Euratom subsidies sought to seduce
European funding for American light water reactor
demonstration plants, at a time when many u.s. utilities
were unwilling to take significant investment risks [13],
and pUblicly funded demonstration plants were ruled out by
pUblic power opponents. The program was designed to allow
u.s. manufacturers to move down the technology's expected
steep learning curve and establish important client
relationships with the relevant European bureaucracies.[14]
Along with the AEC's general promotional efforts, it has
been credited by many observers as a key reason for the
global triumph of U.S. nuclear technology in the sixties
and early seventies Bupp and Derian 1981, 15-42, 56-69;
Lonnroth and Walker 1983, 25-29).[15] The ability to
capture such OT deference was an early stimulant for u.s.
nuclear promotion.
Since the Euratom success, the Export-Import Bank
has continued to promote u.s, nuclear sales.[16] The
Bank's skewing of credit subsidies towards R&D intensive
industries, like nuclear power, reflects the large scaling
efficiencies perceived to be characteristic of these
70
technologies. In 1975, for example, Bank President William
Casey stated, "By adding foreign sales to domestic sales
these high technology industries spread their costs over
larger production runs and pay for research and development
which ••• keeps us competi tive in the world" {U.S. Export-
,I
Impor t Bank Annual Report lll.5.}.
The success of such an industrial policy has been
commented on by Rand analyst Robert Perry, who generalizes
from nuclear experience to other technologies. He writes,
The cost of independently developing commercial
scale reactor power can be enormous ••• the West
European nations were unable to command and control
the resources essential to the independent development
of nuclear energy cycles ••• Analogies involving the
commercialization of novel and 'high' technology in
the last three decades are civil air transpor ts, {and}
computers ••• for all practical purposes the market
provided by the United States supported the
development and eventual commercialization of
technology that was more attractive to prospective
buyers than anything individual West European nations
could develop by themselves ••• In the case of
nuclear reactors, a vast range of variables
contributed to that outcome. The chief contributor,
howev~r, was the willingness of the government of the
United States, of the several large commercial
enterprises interested in selling reactor plants, and
of the healthy and hungry utility complex of the
United States to invest more in the development and
exploitation of nuclear power energy sources than any
single European nation could afford •••• If, on
theoretical grounds, the offerings of the Americans
had less economic attractiveness than some of the
alternatives, in both the United States and Europe,
that attractiveness was in most instances insufficient
•••Th e cos t s 0f com pet ition w ere too hi gh, not 0n1y
for nuclear power stations but for aircraft and
computers as well {Perry 1977, 73-75}.
Paul Krugman suggests that appreciation of the
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scaling efficiencies noted above underlies aspects of
Japan's international trade policy.[17] Hogendorn and
Brown have drawn similar implications for trade theory from
learning curve analysis. [18]
In summary, the logic of the OT framework suggests
that state planners are encouraged to adopt a systems
approach to infrastructural technical change. Choices
between technologies can embody path decisions, involving
the dynamic evolution of alternative input-output
condi tions. Historical review indicates that U.S. planners
<. subsidized nuclear power, in part, in order to capture
international market shares and technological rents for
U.S. corporations. [19] Similar reasoning lay behind
corporate nuclear risk taking, as elaborated in section 2
of this chapter. Further research may illuminate how an
international division of labor is reproduced that
maintains global inequalities by monopolizing positive
externaliti~s (such as scale efficiencies and learning curve
cost reductions) amongst the developed nations.
"p"
~ Conclusioni The State gnQ Nuclear ~~er .
State nuclear initiatives were the product of a
particular planning context and planning vision. The latter
associated the national .interest with the evolution of an
input-output matrix that maximized military capabilities
and the industrial power of certain high-technology U.S.
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firms. The criteria for technology selection thus
reflected particular concepts of the general welfare and
not necessarily microeconomic efficiency pressures.
Studies by DeLeon and Nau suggest that similar motivations
lay behind most foreign nuclear initiatives.
Cold war sentiments were critical in solidifying the
powerful consensus behind nuclear promotion. The collapse
of this consensus followed the social upheavals
accompanying the Vietnam War and the rise of the
env ironmental and consumer movements.
Nuclear promotion was also aided by the technology's
location within a growing sector of the economy. This
location made the industry's expansion more an opportunity
than a threat to many existing energy sector interests.
(See sections 3-5 below.) The only significant corporate
opposition to nuclear promotion came from the coal
indust rYe It wa s muted by the sector's poli tical weakne ss,
\deference to national security, and perhaps the hope that
very cheap nuclear power could allow coal resources to be
used as feedstock for syn-fuel and the chemical industry.
The policy implications of the nuclear planning
context were operationalized by the AEC and JCAE, who with
the help of self-interested firms, created a nuclear-
industrial complex. Over time the public bureaucracies
developed a degree of independence and self-sustaining
momentum in support of nuclear expansion. Hany impor tant
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nuclear historians however ascribe too much independence to
these bodies and their immediate scientist employees. [20]
When bureacratic or scientific interests collided
with cold war or corporate priorities, the latter generally
triumphed. The prestigeous scientist-laden General Advisory
Committee, for example, lost much of its influence and was
removed from the area of general policy making when it
opposed the rapid development of the hydrogen bomb (Orlans
1967,184-187). Cold war enthusiasts like Edward Teller
replaced more moderate scientists like Robert Oppenheimer
as government spokesmen and public educators about the
atom. The AEC's first chairman, David Lilienthal, and its
general manager were similarly forced from office by a
series of McCarthy-like hearings held by Senator
Hickenlooper. Lilienthal has noted that the skepticism of
some members of the General Advisory Committee concerning
the feasability of civilian nuclear power was ignored,
while voice's urging full scale development were publicized
(Lilienthal 1963, 98). A selective attention to
scientific opinion also prevailed in the radiation and
accident hazard areas. (See Chapter 6.)
While the cold war consensus promoted nuclear
expansion, even it was constrained by corporate priorities.
Chief among these was the concern that nuclear power not
become a trojan horse for socialism.[21] The tilt of state
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policy toward nuclear development thus reflected broad
planning context characteristics, more than the fancy of
nuclear scientists, the turf decisions of interested
bureaucracies or the simple assertion of military
priorities.
The next four sections analyze corporate
participation in the nuclear planning context, focusing
sequentially on the nuclear activities of the reactor
vendors, powerplant construction and engineering firms,
utilities, and oil companies.
~ The Nuclear Planning Context~·
The ~actor Vendorsl221*
One of the legacies of the military atom was the
creation of a group of powerful nuclear contractors with an
interest in promoting a civilian version of the technology.
This section analyzes the nuclear activities of the two
most important firms of this group, Westinghouse and
,
General Electric. The discussion is divided into four
parts.
Part 1 demonstrates the large technical
uncertainties accompanying early nuclear investments.
----------------------'--------------------------------------
* All dollar references in Section 3 "The Reactor Vendors"
are denominated in historical dollars unless otherwise
noted.
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Part 2 outlines the firms' competitive advantages in
nuclear markets which promised the companies significant
quasi rents if nuclear became a dominant technology.
Part 3 details the firms' pursuit of these rents
through loss-leader reactor pricing, pro-nuclear public
relations activities, and other policies aimed at winning
cri tical mass for nuclear power.
Part 4 analyzes how intra-industry battles for
market share within an emerging Official Technology also
spurred nuclear risk taking.
Part 5 summarizes the argument, tying the growth of
nuclear power to its congeniality with GE and
Westinghouse's corporate growth strategies.
~ Speculative Character of Early Nuclear ~IDIDitIDents
Nearly all energy sector studies have concluded that
uncertainty dominates the decision making problem.[23] The
ease of substi tution amongst different energy sources and
large cost'uncertainties within each technology interact
mUltiplicatively. The history of massive energy sector
forecasting errors illustrates the risks involved with R&D
investment. [24]
The uncertainties associated with nuclear economics
were particularly large. Through the late '60's there was
no operating experience data from which to derive cost
estimates for commercial sized nuclear plants. popular
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projections were based on optimistic scaling and learning
curve assumptions. These predictions gave only cursory
attention to the economic implications of containing
nuclear externalities, such as accident hazards and thermal
pollution. waste disposal and decommissioning uncertainties
were totally ignored in economic forecasts. The degree of
indeterminacy introduced by these and other unknowns is
evidenced by the more than 500% real cost increase in
expected nuclear construction costs from 1963 to 1983 and
the downgrading by 25% of expected plant capacity
performance. [25J
When one considers the character of nuclear's
competition in the '50's and '60's, the period's nuclear
investments appear even more speculative. Because flat or
declining coal generating costs were expected for several
decades, nuclear's 1960 generating costs had to fall by at
least one-tqird to be competitive (Mullenbach 1963, 64, 98;
AEC 1962, 17-19, 27; ~~~t~i~gl ~Q~lg 4/13/64 p. 19).[26J
Despite these uncertainties, the vendors had by the late
sixties committed well over a billion dollars to nuclear
development. Commenting on this behavior, the widely cited
Arthur D. Little study ~IDQ~titiQn in tb~ ll~~l~gL ~Q~~L
.sJ.u?.l21y .rng~Rt~y.concluded in 1968, " Insofar as the size
of the investment concerned, the NSSS[27] vendors may be
undertaking a level of exposure paralleled only by
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commercial jet aircraft manufacturers and the U.S. computer
industry" (Little 1968, 24) •
~ Incentives for nuclear ~motionalisffiL
the military ato~ corporate legacy
Direct corporate involvement with nuclear energy
began during World War II. Interestingly, the weapons
program was not administered through military or government
channels (as was the space program through NASA) but
through private contractors overseen by the military and
AEC. This arrangement seems to have initially been
employed to appeal to university scientists working on the
bomb. It assured them greater flexibility than was
allegedly possible working within federal or military
bureaucracies. The arrangement was maintained after the
war to please the private sector. In effect, AEC-JCAE
policy systematically created a nuclear-industrial complex
which directly employed more than 150,000 people by 1953
(Orlans 1967, 11). Eventually key elements of the sector,
such as the uranium mining and reactor manufacturing firms,
outgr ew thei 1: mil itary roots and sough t new markets.
While nuclear contractors did not initially make
significant profits, by the early '60's management fees
rivaled "normal commercial" arrangements (Orlans 1967,
198). The payoff for private firms in government nuclear
work, however, lay in the development of an information
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and expertise monopoly which created possibilities for
massive commercial returns in the future. As Admi ral
Rickover, the architect of the nuclear navy noted, "In
essence government financed research and development
subsidizes and augments their (the contractors) own
research and development effort, and so enhances their
competitive position" (Orlans 1967, 19-20).
From the start of the nuclear program, AEC
contracting policies concentrated nuclear projects among
very few firms. Over $1 billion, or more than one-half
the Commission's annual budget in the late '50's and early
'60's, was allocated amongst just seven contractors.
Significant subcontracting did occur, but it did not
extend to R&Dprojects (Little 1968, 115; Orlans 1967, 13-
16). Though legislatively directed to encourage
competition in the nuclear sector, the Commission's
oligopoly-like contracting policies were defended as,
necessary in the face of nuclear technology's huge capital
and organizational requirements. These characteristics
made civilian nuclear power attractive to key corporations,
as the sector's technical requirements promised very
concentrated markets.
Commercial nuclear power's earliest and strongest
corporate backers were the reactor vendors, chiefly General
Electric and Westinghouse. Their interest in the
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technology was a product of their special advantages in the
nuclear field. The claim is not that the firms' nuclear
commitments were demonstrably unsound, but that they were
highly s pe cu La t i v e, They were undertaken prior to the
accumulation of definitive knowledge of nuclear's
commercial potential. The companies' goal was to transform
their self-interested development choice into a self-
fulfilling economy-wide prophecy.
The firms enjoyed a large headstart in nuclear
markets due to their military contract work. Besides
managing the AEC's 9 weapons material production reactors
at Hanford, GE personnel staffed the AEC's $100 million
Knolls research and development laboratory in Schnectady
(Mullenbach 1963, 116). [28] Westinghouse administered the
AEC's $50 million Bettis lab in Pittsburgh and the naval
reactor testing facility in Idaho. Both companies
benefitted greatly from their prime contracting for the
nuclear navy~ Westinghouse in particUlar gained enormous
experience and commercial credibility from its successful
design of the reactors for the majority of the navy's
submarines (Little 1968, 137).[29] Using its aircraft
car r i err e act 0 r des ig n , the com pan y s e r v e d a s AEC
contractor for the nation's first commercial power reactor
at Shippingport Pennsylvania in 1954. The company also
received over 60% of the subsidized megawattage of the
AEC's Power Reactor Demonstration Program (1956-1965)
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(Little 1968,316).
Though the AEC was quite aware of the oligopoly
implications of its contracting policies, it resisted
pressures for change. In a study prepared for the
Brookings Institution, Harold Orlans writes,
At one time Westinghouse and at another time
General Electric has appeared predominant in the
private nuclear power industry ... but at no time has
any 'third echelon' company - Allis-Chalmers, Atomics
International, Babcock and Wilcox, Combustion
Engineering, or General Atomic - superseded them.
Speaking in 1965, at a time of apparent G.E.
domination, an employee of one of the latter companies
observed that the Commission was torn between its wish
to promote these 'weaker sisters' and recognition that
G.E. was best qualified to bring nuclear power to
immediate commercial application. Repeatedly G.E.
would proffer arrangements so attractive AEC staff
called it 'the generous electric company'; but after
contracting for them, they would bemoan the
consequences for a competitive nuclear industry
(Orlans 1967,47).
The nature of technical change in the nuclear sector
raised the possibility that westinghouse and General
Electric could transform their initial headstart into
permanent technological leadership. Because of the rapidly
evolving character of the sector, contractor experience is
built upon staff experience and general expertise rather
than upon licenses or circumventable patents. The
character of continuous.innovation suggests a cumulative
learning curve, like that in the turbine generator (T-G)
industry. In the latter case, production costs have
declined as a logarhythmic function of cumulative
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contractor output (Sultan 1974, 176). Westinghouse and
General Electric could thus hope to maintain their nuclear
leadership through the same high R&D/sales strategy they
employed in the T-G market (Sultan 1974, 226-233).
Besides giving the companies a large headstart in
technical matters, the firms' military contracts
established valuable bureaucratic linkages and goodwill
with the AEC. As the industry grew, AEC and contractor
bureaucracies evolved collectively.[30] Over time a
partnership relationship emerged, illustrated by the
"administrative contract" which committed the Commission
and contractor to a common project without specifying
precise responsibilities. The relationship strengthened
the firms' credibility with the utilities as reactor
suppliers and long term maintenance resources (Little 1968,
22). It also ensured that the companies' viewpoints would
gain Commission attention.
The puo's historical client relationships with the
utilities also lent credibility to the firms' optimistic
cost predictions and allowed them to mobilize traditional
utility partners in the innovation process (Little 1968,
83, 361). In return for expected future discounts, for
example, select utilities often served the equipment
vendors as vehicles for de facto demonstration projects
(Sultan 1974, 288-9).[31]
The companies were also well situated to capture
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popularly expected nuclear scale and vertical integration
economies due to their:
-access to strong internal and external financing,
-organizational experience in coordinating large
proj ects,
-linked domination of the turbine-generator market,
-strong existing research laboratories.
The major basis for scale economies in the reactor
industry has proved to be the distribution of R&D costs
over larger sales volume. The Little study estimated that
such economies could reduce reactor costs by 10 to 15% if
out put inc rea sed fro m th ree to six un its pe rye ar (Little
1968, 158). It had been thought that production economies
of scale might also be achieved in aspects of NSSS
manufacture. The rapid escalation in megawattage and
regulatory requirements, however, has militated against
this. Production economies also exist along the nuclear
fuel cycle. The duopoly has moved aggresssively to capture
many of these in areas such as fuel fabrication and
zirconium tubing production (Little 1968, 257). Besides
allowing for synergistic R&D activities, such vertical
integration offered marketing edges. The Little study
notes the competitive advantage GE gained by offering the
utilities a package including nuclear steam supply system,
fuel fabrication, and reprocessing services (Little 1968,
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36-45,234).
The concentrated structure of nuclear markets and
the history of price fixing between GE and Westinghouse may
have also attuned the duopoly towards nuclear development.
Alongside the potential for collusive behavior in the
reactor industry, the linked character of the larger fuel
reload market raised opportunities for the exercise of
market power. Because the four vendors dominated the fuel
fabrication industry, the opportunity existed to offset
loss-leader reactor pricing with high future fuel reload
prices.[32] Mark Hertsgaard's late '70's interviews
provide some evidence of the existence of this practice.
According to Babcock and wilcox official Nelson Embrey,
profit rates in the refueling and service industries are
1.5 to 2 times those on reactor sales (Hertsgaard 1983,
171). GE's International Harketing Division r1anager,
Adrian Fioretti, also indicated that competitive pressures
were I owe.r in such captive markets (Hertsgaard 1983, 118).
Even with nuclear's post '74 collapse, the financial
implications of such practices are not insignificant.
westinghouse expects to capture $1 billion in service and
fuel reload sales annually in the late '80's (Hertsgaard
1983, 118).
~~l g~QIDQ~iQngl in~gn~iyg~ ~gIDIDg~iz~~ The
cyclical character of utili ty capaci ty addi tions, and the
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ratio of efficient production size to market size, leaves
the reactor industry an inherently concentrated one. The
Little study in '68 foresaw no more than four or five
possible NSSS domestic contractors (p. 22). In a '79 study
of global nuclear markets, Lonroth and Walker found similar
concentration ratios worldwide, and the likelihood of even
tighter markets in the future. GE and Westinghouse's
political economic resources left them well positioned to
capture oligopoly market shares, and quasi rents on their
particular organizational capital. Because of the expected
doubling of electrici ty demand every ten to twelve years,
the firms' potential market payoffs from promoting nuclear
power to OT status within the energy/electricity sector
were enormous. In 1971, for example, the AECestimated
that total domestic expenditures for atomic power plants
would top 100 billion dollars by 1985 and approximate 11
billion dollars annually thereafter (Dawson 1976, 141).
Based on mid-70's plant component and market share
statistics, about 15% of these revenues would have been
expected to accrue to the two firms. [33] The former
president of Westinghouse's Power Division gave an even
more optimistic assessment of his company's potential
nuclear revenues in 1973 stating, "Between now and the year
2000 the potential return to Westinghouse, just assuming it
maintains its present share of 38% of the nuclear reactor
mar ke t, co u1d be 300 bill ion do11a r s " 02us i n~E.E. iY..e..e.k
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(2/4/73 p , 68) •
The breeder reactor offered the greatest growth
potential for both companies. Its internally generated fuel
source and massive capital costs, insured an Exxon-like
role for its contractors if adopted as part of an all-
electric economy. From the beginning of nuclear
development such a vision was behind the AEC's promotional
strategy and the duopoly's long run plans. GE, for
example, fell behind Westinghouse in the light water
reactor market because it initially sought to jump directly
to breeder designs. In 1968 Westinghouse indicated breeder
development was its Number One R&D project W~}i YO.I.k
Times (4/4/68 p. 76).
~ RxQmotional Responses to Profit Opportunities
hA.ll B.&D itn.d lIlg.I.k~.t.i.n.9 .s.t.I.g.t~.9.i~ The com pa nies
were very aware of the potential market value of their
nuclear advantages. Westinghouse vice president, Charles
Weaver, :l:irst head of the company's atomic division,
recently indicated, "Our perception of nuclear energy's
commercial potential certainly accounted for a large part
of 0 uri ntere stin the Navy w 0 rk" (Her ts9aard 19 83, 2I)•
Kuhn's 1960's interviews with Westinghouse officials
reveal that nuclear programs quickly assumed the highest
priority in company planning, having first calIon company
personnel (Kuhn 1966, 93). A similar view emerges in
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Hewlett and Duncan's E~~~A ~~ (pp. 93,97-98). Kuhn
speculates that it was their nuclear interest that led the
company to sacrifice market share position in the key
turbine and aircraft industries.
GE's interest in civilian nuclear power also
animated its naval work (Hewlett and Duncan 1974, 35, 82).
In the early '60's the firm established a Growth Council to
construct a long term investment strategy. GE executives
indicated in a For~~n~ interview that the company was
searching for markets with anti-trust acceptable growth
potential, (i.e. markets with massive capital requirements
and technologically determined economies of scale or other
natural barriers to entry) (FOA~1!n~ 10/70 p, 91). Nuclear
power seemed an ideal solution as it also offered a chance
to capitalize GE's AEC contract experience.
1
Based on similar reasoning GE had constructed a $20
million reactor research complex in Pleasanton, California,
in the late '50's (Nehrt 1966, 259). It also contracted at
an expected loss of $15-$20 million (all mid-'50 $'s) to
build the Dresden I reactor for a consortium of utilities
headed by Commonwealth Edison (.E.Qrt.Y.1l~0/70 p. 91).[34]
The company's demand that the utilities decline government
subsidy assistance freed GE from the extra limitations on
patentable innovation and proprietary information that
government participation entailed.[35] The company built
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the Humboldt Bay plant in the early '60's under similar
patent terms. It agreed to share its research results with
the AEC in return for government funding at the Big Rock
plant in Michigan only after considerable Commission
pressure (Nehrt 1966, 259-260). The cost of such
information disclosure has proved minor. The relevant
technical expertise and marketing advantages gained from
the projects appear to have been institutionally embodied.
As Lee Nehrt's study of reactor development 1954-1962
con c1 ude s, the ev ide nce is" t hat i tis not pa ten t rig h t s
nor the pu bLi ah e d technical data which are important.
Rather it is the technological know-how, buil t up within
the company carrying out the research and development for
the USAEC, which is of value ••• " (Nehrt 1966, 330) •
Orlans reaches similar conclusions (Orlans 1967, 48).
Despite GE's sense of technical success, the company
received only three domestic orders from 1955 to 1962, and
feared a' massive devaluation of its expertise or
"organizational capital". As the GE vice president in
charge of the Growth Council recalls, "We had a problem
like a lump of butter sitting in the sun. If we couldn't
get orders out of the utility industry, with every tick of
the clock it became progressively more likely that some
competing technology would be developed that would
supersede the economic viability of our own. Our people
understood this was a game of massive stakes and that if we
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didn't force the utility industry to put those stations on
line, we'd end up with nothing" (Fort.!J.n~10/70 p. 91). In
effect, the company perceived the development process in OT
terms.
..! t
As a result, GE (followed quickly by Westinghouse)
proffered the "turnkey" contract, which offered the
"I!
utilities fully constructed power plants at a fixed price.
Both GE and Westinghouse perceived the contracts as loss
leader extensions of their R&D programs. Though complete
data has never been released, most conventional estimates
suggest losses in the 800 million dollar to billion dollar
range, with per unit subsidies of about 50% on the thirteen
plants (Perry 1977, xii, 35, 94; Gandara 1977, 53; Business
~eek 12/25/78; Quirk, Burness and Montgomery 5/80, pp. 188,
193, 200). General Atomic[36] appears to have lost a
similar amount on its nuclear programs, with at least half
of this sum tied to the Fort Saint Vrain turnkey plant
(Stewart 1981, 186, 188; ~~.n~~ ~~~k 12/25/78). The
Lit tLe stu dy a1so est imat est hat th r0ugh the mid - ,60's
.';
about half of the non-turnkey sales were sold at bargain
prices (Little 1968, 23). The vendors also extended
various performance warranties, including the absorbtion of
the cost of regulatory escalation in the licensing process
(Little 1968, 153). Similarly bold guarantees were
extended foreign purchasers (Nehrt 1966, 276).
t•
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Westinghouse's marketing strategy also guaranteed
twenty-seven utilities an eighty million pound supply of
uranium at an average price of $9.50/1b. (Nuclear Industry,
7/77; Adams and Duffy 1978, 29). Partly due to the uranium
producers cartel, the market price had risen to more than
$40/1b. by the end of 1977. As a result Westinghouse was
forced to renege on its multi-billion dollar contracts.
The company has since been engaged in a series of lawsuits
totalling 2.5 billion dollars. Though more cautious than
Westinghouse, GE reportedly lost $500 million through
similar guarantees (Adams and Duffy 1978, 34).
Though the turnkey losses were apparently larger
than expected, the promotional strategy proved successful.
The subsidized plants literally transformed the industry
fro man ide a int0 a con cret ere ali ty• Th ey 1aid the
psychological groundwork for what Philip Sporn has called
the "great bandwagon market" of 1966-1967. During this
period the .ut dLi.ti es contracted for fifty-eight plants,
inc rea sin g 0rde red nuc1ear capa cit Y fro m 2,0 00 meg aw atts
(MW) to 45,000 MW. In the words of GE vice president
Bertram Wolfe, "The turnkeys made the light water reactor a
viable product. They got enough volume in the business
that we could build an engineering staff, standardize our
product, and put up facilities to mass-produce things so
that the cost went down. That way we got over this tailor
made, one-of-a-kind, high cost plant" (Hertsgaard 1983,
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43) •
As intended, the subsidies also drove out most of
the competition.[37] In 1954 there had been some twenty
firms seeking a foothold in the reactor field. This number
had fallen to ten by 1959, and only four or five remained
shortly after the turnkey plants (Allen and Melnik 1970,
392) •
3.42l pursuing ~Itic~l in~~Iation adyan~~g§§l
Besides investing in reactor capital equipment and loss-
leader marketing strategies, the companies actively pursued
vertical integration opportunities. By the mid to late
'70's GE was:
-the 7th largest holder of domestic uranium reserves,
-the 4th largest uranium miller,
-one of 5 fuel fabricators,
-one of 4 reactor vendors,
-one' of 2 nuclear turbine-generator vendors,
-one of 3 fuel reprocessing firms,
-a partner with Exxon in a major fuel enrichment R&D
project,
-a leader in breeder reactor research,
-a nuclear weapons contractor.
By the late '70's Westinghouse was similarly diversified.
While less active than GE in the mining and milling end of
the fuel cycle, the company has been more active in the
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engineering and enrichment areas. It also subcontracts
fewer aspects of its nuclear stearn supply system (Hays
7/84, 21).
Westinghouse and GE's late entry and expected
takeover of the zirconium tubing (the metal casing around
nuclear fuel) market illustrates the firms' nuclear growth
potential. In 1968 Wah Chung, Woverine Tube, and Amex
controlled 90% of the tubing market. After the duopoly's
mid-'60's decision to enter the field, however, the Little
study foresaw their joint capture of 65%-70% of tubing
sales. Their predicted dominance reflected access to
internal markets and the capture of modest scale economies
(Little 1968,268).
3.43JPromotional political-informational activities;
The companies also promoted nuclear expansion by
influencing the informational, ideological, and political
environments surrounding energy planning.
The ,firms' technical expertise and the AEC's
decision not to create an independent research capacity in
many areas left the vendors with significant functional
authority in regulatory matters. For example, the
Commission relied heavily on industry analysis in designing
reactor safety studies and tests of the emergency core
cooling system (Ford 1982, 146, 163-164, 106-107).
Subsequent review has challenged the companies' optimistic
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hazard probability confidence intervals.
The vendors also lobbied actively for more lenient
safety regulation (Rolph 1977, 23). They urged approval
of urban reactor sitings and reduced retrofit requirements
(Rolph 1977, 23, 86; Okrent 1981, 146, 194, 310 Rolph 1977,
24, 34, 86).
Despite egregious exceptions the firms probably
acted in good faith in the vast majority of technical
matters. The problems created by their technical optimism
reflect the dangers posed by insulated research
environments rather than purposeful deceit. These matters
are discussed in Chapter 6.
The firms' successful promotion of excessively
optimistic cost projections is less innocent. From the
turnkey plants forward, the companies engaged in an
aggressive and misleading marketing campaign. The
character of these efforts is discussed in Chapter 7.
III ustra tive of the companies' intervention in the
electoral process is their joint contribution of $215,000
to help defeat the California and Maine anti-nuclear
referendums (~~~~ ~~~k 6/7/76; ~QDQ~~~ll 9/80).
The companies have engaged in a myriad of less directly
political pro-nuclear public relations campaigns.
Westinghouse, for example, dispatched ten engineers for 10
day nuclear promotion visits to college campuses (,N,gll
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Street Journal 7/21/77 p. 32).
~ Rivalry ~ID~
Alongside the pressure generated by competition
between different technologies for OT status, intra-nuclear
industry competition for market shares spurred nuclear
investment. Ralph Sultan's two volume study ..Eri..Qingin
the ~ctric£1 Qligopoly is especially helpful in situating
nuclear decisions within a history of rivalry dynamics
between General Electric and Westinghouse. Sultan analyzes
the charcter of the turbine-generator (T-G) industry, which
has traditionally accounted for approximately 10% of
Westinghouse and General Electric's sales. He argues that
the industry's large scale economies enabled General
Electric to reproduce its early market dominance for over
fifty years.[38] If taken as a model for the expected
behavior of the nuclear market, it implies strong
incentives for aggressive early nuclear investrnents.[39]
Substantial evidence indicates that such rivalry induced
spending occurred.[40] As early as 1948 the director of
the AEC's Argonne Na tional Laboratory complained that GE-
Westinghouse competition was forcing hasty reactor choices
(Hertsgaard 1983, 23).[41] Describing the late '50's,
Commonwealth Edison Chairman Thomas Ayers indicates
"Everybody was in there cutting each other's throats •••
The people in the business were anxious to be up front in
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this new technology, so they were willing to offer plants
or equipment at more favorable prices than otherwise ••• In
the big capi tal good businesses, the thing you don't want
to be is left behind" (Hertsgaard 1983,34).
Rivalry dynamics within the nuclear steam supply
system also spilled over into linked markets. Babcock and
Wilcox and Combustion Engineering, for example, were
pressured to enter the reactor market by the threat of
westinghouse and General Electric's canabalization of the
linked thermal equipment market. Due to vertical
integration economies, the newcomers were forced to enter
other areas of the nuclear field as well. In assessing
market entry the firms appear to have faced asymmetric
risks. Particpation in an unsuccessful nuclear industry
threatened a large but one time loss. Failure to enter a
viable nuclear industry threatened permanent market
exclusion.
Describing Babcock and Wilcox's decision making a
company official stated, "Our concern was purely defensive.
We had'built equipment for energy transfer for over sixty
years, and we felt compelled to keep up to date wi th
nuclear energy if we were to survive in our chosen field
••• What alarmed us, however, was the deci sion by these two
companies (i.e. Westinghouse and General Electric) to build
their own components. We realized they were organizing
their facilities to include our part and share of the
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business. We decided immediately that we would have to
jump all the way in and do it quickly if we were not to
lose out" (Kuhn 1966, 16 ,189). Combustion Engineering
Vice President William Connolly's explanation for his
company's nuclear investment, reveals similar deference to
gathering OT dynamics~ Connolly indicates, "We went in at
a time when the projections were that half of the
additional installed capacity for the rest of the century
would be nuclear. That meant that the market for our most
fundamental product, namely stearn supply systems, would be
literally cut in half if we stayed only in coal. So in
order to protect our birthright as a company we had to go
in" (Hertsgaard 1983, 46).
The oil companies' nuclear fuel cycle investments in
the late '60's and early '70's, which raised the likelihood
of industry wide surplus capacity, partially reflect
similar dynamics.
Once established, the reactor market generated an
internal momentum. Westinghouse's increasing consolidation
of market leadership in the early 1960's led to GE's 1963
turnkey offer. Westinghouse responded with similar
terms. [42] The scaling battles of the mid-'60's reflected
the same dynamic. Because significant efficiencies were
believed to accompany larger megawatt plants, the vendors
rushed to offer the utilities larger and larger capacity
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designs in order to capture reactor orders and learning
curve advantages. From most accounts, the technological
leaps required were beyond the prudent management of the
competing vendors. [43J The result was the employment of
relatively expensive development and construction
techniques and the toleration of potential safety hazards
(Hertsgaard 1983, Bodde 1975).
In a late '70's interview, for example, Babcock and
Wilcox official James Deddens admitted that companies would
sometimes "go out on a technical limb" to win orders.
"When you get into that kind of competitive situation",
Deddens indica ted, "you may sell something that hasn't been
tested as thoroughly as it would be today" (Hertsgaard
1983, 64). Mor ethan 10 years earl ier, James Kuhn's
discussants (from what appears to be Babcock and Wilcox)
similarly acknowledged "(the company) went out and got
orders and then we tried to get the people to do the
work ••• \We didn't really know what was involved in our
research and development program" (Kuhn 1966, 164-166).
The scaling race was finally stopped by AEC intervention,
in the form of a licensing ceiling of l300MW (Hertsgaard
1983 64).[44]
The 1968 Little study found the same dynamics
spilling over into research and development and investment
in a new generation of reactors. The study reported, " ...
the 5 current thermal reactor manufacturers are all
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participating in breeder reactor design and development.
At least part of the reason for this is that in order to be
considered progressive suppliers by current utility
customers, it is almost essential that these manufacturers
also participate in the development of expected future
reactor types. The same is true for participants in a
number of other segments of the industry ... " (p. 401).
Considering the implictions of competition in the
heavy electrical equipment industry more generally, Sultan
writes,
Many economists worry about the 'quiet life'
and technological sluggishness which they suspect to
be a pervasive tendency in oligopolistic market
structures. In recent years the problem seems more
often to have been the reverse: oligopolies in high-
technology settings have been too willing to escalate
the technological competition, and to promise products
and technologies that do not yet exist and which will
be rushed to the customer in untested form •••
(Sultan 1974,224).
Nuclear power's market characteristics, its
technically determined oligopolistic market structure,
open-ended growth potential, and opportunities for
cooperative development through existing arrangements
between public and private bureaucracies, attracted strong
support from General Electric and Westinghouse. The
companies sought to transform their competitive advantages
in the nuclear field into realized quasi-rents. In
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particular they sought to capitalize their: relative
monopoly on military reactor design experience; marketing
advantages due to existing client relationships with the
utilities and federal energy bureaucracy; and greater
access to nuclear scale, vertical integration, and learning
curve efficiencies. Even though both companies already
possessed strong market positions in fossil fuel fired
generation, the potential prize in nuclear markets was much
greater. As GE's 1972 annual report noted, "Our potential
revenue base in a nuclear plant, for example, is some six
times that of a fossil fuel plant because we can supply the
reactor, the fuel, and fuel re-loads, as well as turbine-
generators and their auxiliary equipment" (Nader and
Abbotts 1979,265).
GE and Westinghouse's behavior demonstrates how
modern corporate planning encour age s technical innova tion
in areas already organized by large corporations or
arnenab 1e t,o sue h manage ment, The 1a r ge fir m's ac ce sst 0
retained earnings, external financing and the public
bureaucracies organizing state planning, facilitates
oligopolistic oriented technical change. Alongside nuclear
power, for example, GE's Growth Council committed the
company to computer and jet aircraft production. Both of
these choices reflected the same quest for capital
intensive oligopolistic market investments. 0
/
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it ~ Nuclear Planning Context: The utilities*
This section analyzes the nuclear activities of the
utili ties. [45] The analysis demonstrates that the firms'
nuclear purchases reflected aspects of advocacy-promotional
planning and a deference to the OT momentum generated by
the vendors and state supporters of the technology. The
discussion also situates utility generating choice
decisions within an institutional and ideological context.
The section is divided into five parts. Part 1
describes the nature of the u.s. utility industry 1954-1969
and the main promotional lever available to its firms to
influence the direction of technical change. Parts 2&3
analyze how active firm utilities used this tool to
encourage nuclear expansion. Part 4 examines the impact of
AEC-nuclear industry promotionalism on utility behavior.
Part 5 compares the OT framework's approach to
understanding utility actions with representative
ne ocLa ssi'ca I analyses.
~ The character Qf ~ ~ utility industry ~
its leverage over the direction of technical change
When the nuclear option emerged (1954-1963), the
utility industry was characterized by robust demand and
financing environments, and increasing concentration. The
----------------------------------------------------------
* All section 3 costs expressed in historical dollars
unless otherwise specified.
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industry was expected to continue its decades of 6%-7%
annual growth through the turn of the century. The
industry had heal thy levels of internally genera ted funds
and easy access to external financing. Al though hundr eds
of pUblicly and privately owned utilities existed, the top
35 investor owned utilities (IOU's) accounted for about 70%
of IOU assets in 1966. The TVA and a small number of
federal regional power systems similarly accounted for over
50% of p ubLi c sector generating capacity. [46] The
combination of market concentration and sector growth
potential left the generating choices of the largest firms
a significant determinant of the direction of energy sector
technical change.
The utilities' role in technological innovation has
often been overlooked. The industry has been commonly
portrayed as a technically lazy one, composed of passive
firms allocating only 0.25% sales to R&D, as opposed to a
national average of 2% and a 4%-10% range in the most
innovative\ sectors. This picture is misleading. While the
utilities did not directly fund significant research, they
encouraged the equipment manufacturers to pursue a high
R&D/sales development strategy by adopting a Schumpeterian
attitude towards supplier market structur e and equipment
pricing. [47] l10re importantly, many of the largest
companies actively participated in the innovation process
by self-consciously funding de facto demonstration
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pr ojects. [48] For reasons elaborated below the utili ties
were especially sympathetic to nuclear initiatives.
~ ~ impact of utility ~wth strategies and
rivalry ~IDics Qll generating choice decisions
4.21) .lQQ .9.I.Q.w..t.h strategies. Three characteristics
of nuclear technology led a number of large utilities to
promote nuclear expansion as a vehicle for firm expansion:
its central power station format, growth potential, and
capital intensity.[49] Because the utilities' regulatory
environment limited non-electricity providing investments,
firm growth required the expansion of central power station
generating capacity. The widespread expectation of
enormous long run demand growth if supply costs could be
kept from rising steeply, and the utilities' apparently
guaranteed ability to recover outlays for de facto
demonstration plants, made "risk-taking" in pursuit of new
generating technology an attractive option.[50] More than
any other foreseeable technology, nuclear power seemed to
promise the possibility of an all-electric economy, replete
with electric heating, electric cars and nuclear
desalinization. [51]
The technology's capi tal intensi ty recommended
nuclear power to utility planners because of the character
of utility regulation. The logic of the OT framework
extends the implications of the observed capital intensive
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bias in utility factor substitution to the realm of de
facto R&D policy. The bias arises because rate base
regulation allows only flow through recovery for operating
expenses (basically labor and fuel) and cost-plus for
capital outlays. As long as the allowed rate of return is
higher than financing charges, firms have an incentive to
"gold-plate". [52] Gandara, citing Alfred Kahn's work,
finds evidence of such practice in the electric utility
sector until the credit crunch of the mid-seventies
(Gandara 1977, 81). Scherer's work suggests a 25% excess
capital investment (Brannon 1974a, 112, 117). While the
current nuclear/coal: capital/kilowatt ratio (2+:1) is
higher than anticipated in the fifities and sixties,
nuclear technology was always expected to be significantly
more capital intensive than fossil fuel fired generation.
Thus, ceteris paribus, long run rate base maximization
favored nuclear promotion.[53]
In \arguing that nuclear power's market
characteristics left it a logical favorite for utility
promotional support, the claim is not that the industry
knowingly promoted an inefficient or hazardous technology.
The assertion is that amidst extensive uncertainty, the
utilities promoted an innovation path congenial with their
own expansion. [54]
~~~l Biyg~IY ~yngIDi~~~ The character of
competition in the utility sector also spurred nuclear
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initiatives. Although electric generation and distribution
is a regulated market with fixed service areas, utilities
compete to attract new industry to their geographic region,
and to capture an institutional slot in an increasingly
concentrated industry. As in the electric equipment field,
rivalry dynamics created an asymmetric perception ofthe
risks associated with laggard or excessive nuclear
investment. Fear of potentially endur ing disadvantage
within an economical nuclear technology dominated fear of
short term losses from potentially inefficient nuclear
plants.
This dynamic operated most intensely amidst the
rivalry between pub lI.c and private power. Due to the
pub Ld c sector history of nuclear technology, the IOU's
acted early and continuously to establish private sector
nuclear generating precedents. The TVA and other public
power entities may have similarly launched nuclear programs
to assert an institutional presence. Intra-IOU sector
rival ties were another source of nuclear risk taking. High
cost fossil fuel regions, like New England and New York,
promoted nuclear development as a vehicle for eliminating
their energy cost disadvantage&
The large IOU's were also attracted to the
technology by anticipated scale economies. The latter
foreshadowed the likely absorption of smaller utilities
(especially municipals) by systems able to finance and
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integrate into their grid large megawatt projects. Learning
curve competition amongst large utilities (who act as their
own power plant construction engineers) may have similarly
encouraged early nuclear orders, just as efforts to "get in
on the ground floor" spurred some political entities (like
New York state) to encourage their utilities to invest in
nuclear plants.
The chronology of utility nuclear activities
developed below ties specif ic utili ty nuclear ini tiatives
to the growth and rivalry dynamics identified above.
Wl. An /IActiye .f..ilID~History g.f .litiIi ty
.fuJ.P.portfor Nuclear Deye!opmgffi,1954-1969.
utili ty par ticipa tion in nuclear development 1954-
1969 can be divided into 5 groupings: the Industrial
Participation Studies (1951-1954) and early IOU involvement
in vendor and government owned nuclear production (1954-
1957); the first IOU financed and owned projects (1955-
1963); the 3 rounds of the AEC's Power Reactor
Demonstra'tion Program (1955-1963); the turnkey years
(12/63-1966); and the bandwagon market (1966-1969). The
utilities participating in each phase are listed in Tables
1-6 below. As the asterisks indicate, 15 active firm
utilities dominated the development process.[551
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Table 1
~ Participation in t~ Industrial Par~pation ~~
(Total Estimated Private Sector Costs - $8 million)(l}
(histor ical dollars)
Year Utility(2*} Ranking(3}
1952 *Commonwealth Edison 4
*Pacific Gas and Electric 2
*Detroit Edison(4} 5
Union Electric 17
191953 *Duquesne
*Commonweal th Edison, 4
*Pacific Gas and 2
Electric, Union Electric, and 17
American Gas and Electric of NY
/
Pennsylvania Power and Light
(consortium including
5 non-top 20 IOU's)
< > 12
1954 Pacific Northwest Power Co.
Rocky Mountain Nuclear Power
Study Group
(consortium includ-
ing 4non-top
20 IOU's)----------------------------------------------------------
1) Source unless otherwise specified: U.S. AEC, ~IDi-Annual
B~£Q~~ ~Q ~D£L~~~ (1953-1955): No. 13 p. 23; No. 14 p.
23; No. 15, pp. 20-23; No. 16 pp. 26-28; No. 17 pp. 25-27.
2*) Companies who are amongst the 15 most active utilities
that helped promote nuclear power to OT status are
identified with an asterisk. The studies often included
participation by non-utility private sector firms. These
companies and any participating public sector firms are not
listed in the table.
3) Rankings based on number of customers as reported in
Electrical World 10/2/50 p. 16. Only the top 20 firms are
noted.
4} Ten additional utilities joined the Detroit Ed. study
within a year and another 7 by the end of 1953.
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Table 2
Earliest ~ participati9D lNithout Plant Ownershipl
i n .lliJ..Q.l~..t: .l:Q.h'.e.L: ProductiM (1)
(Total estimated IOU outlays - $17 million [historical $])
~~..t: of utility{2*.l Ra.n.klng(3). l1Yl Esti.ID.ste.dl.illJ Cost.s
Operation
1957 *Duquesne 19 60 $15 million
1957 *pacific Gas 2 3 $1 million
& Electric
1958 *S. California 6 8 $1 mill ion
Edison
-----------------------------------------------------------
1) Sources: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy: DevelQpm~ ~.h'th £D9 State Qt ~he Atomic Energy
.I.n.QustryU5.1. p. 264; Dml~ID..mua ~.h'th and State Qf th~
Atom~ Energy Industry 1~2li p. 376.
2*) Companies who are amongst the 15 active utilities that
helped promote nuclear power to OT status are identified
with aster isks.
3) Rankings based on number of customers as reported in
Electrical Ylorl.d10/2/50 p. 16.
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Table 3
~-Turn~ ~ ~liD~ and Financed Nu~l~aI PlantE
(19 5 5 -1.c1Q..ll. (1 )
(Estimated IOU Outlays - $370 million [historical $] )
Yr. Contract Utility
bXlg.lll&Q Plant
1955 *Commonweal th Ed(4) 4 200 $49 million(5)
Dresden 1
1955 *Consolidated Ed. 1 265 $129 million
Indian Point
1958 *Pacif ic Gas 2 65 $23 million
& Electric
Humboldt Bay
1959 *General Public 16(6) 5 $7 million
utilities
Saxton
1963 Niagara Mohawk 8 625 $162 million(7)
9 Mile Point "~,I
/
/'
--------------------------------------------------------------
1)Sources: Unless otherwise specified: U.S. AEC, .T.h&
Nuclear lDdustry l.c1li p. 8; U.S. Congress, Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy, D~Y~lQ~m~n~ ~~Q~~.h.9n~~~£~~ Q1 ~.h~
AtoIDj~ Energy Industry l.c1Ql pp. 765-776. Companies who are
amongst the 15 active utilities that helped promote nuclear
power tb OT status are identified with an asterisk.
2) Rankings based on number of customers as reported in~~~ N~ 10/2/50 p. 16. Only the top 20 firms are
ranked.
3) Costs as estimated by AEC or JCAE as cited above.
4) Lead utility for larger consortium.
5) Dresden 1 costs are known to have been under reported
due to the impact of GE subsidies. -
6) GPU ranking based on '68 kwh sales, treating holding
companies as single firms. Other rankings treat
subsidiaries as single firms (Nucleonics 10/64).
7) Total represents final costs; projected costs in '63
were approximately $90 million (U.S. Congress, Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, .NJ.l~lgsU 2Q~~..r .E~QnQ.mi...QR l.2.Q.2..
Through 1..2.6.2, 2/68, 50).
Table 4
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Private Utilit~ .F.9.Lt.i-QipatiQD.in ag Po~ ReactQI.
DevelopmJillt Program (PRDP.)1955-19.6.3(1)
(Total private funding for projects negotiated
through 1963 - $494 million [historical $])
Round utility Co. AEC
dat~ (plant M1J!rl Ranking(3) N~lAl. Costs~
IOU Costs
in $ mil-
lions(S)
Round l
1956 *Yankee Atom ic(6) --
(Yankee Atomic)
141 $9 million $41
1959 *PRDC(7)
(FERMI)
5,10 61 $9 million$113
Round 2: No Private Sector projects
Round .3.
1957
1957
1958
1959
1960
1962
1963
ECNG & FWCNG (8)
*Northern States 14 62 $10 million $33
Power (9)
(pathfinder)
*CVNPA(lO) 11,13 17 $12 million $26
(Parr Tube Reactor)
*Philadelphia 7 40 $17 million $40
Electric
(Peach Bottom)
*ConsurriersPower 10 48 $5 million $32
(Big Rock)
*S. California 6 430(12) $13 mil. $100
Edison(11)
(San Onofre)
*Conn. Yankee 575(12) $13 mil. $109
(Haddam 1)
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(Notes to Table 4)
1) Source unless otherwise specified: u.S. Congress, Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, ~Q~~~iY~ EQ~~ B~~~
lIQS..r~.m ll.6..3.. 7,8,10/ 63, pp. 224-234. Along with the
private utility projects identified above, the PRDP funded
a Nebraska pUblic utility project in round 1 and several
small public utility projects in round 2. A contract was
negotiated with the Dept. of Water and Power of Los Angeles
in round 3, but never executed due to public controversy
over site selection. A final project with Public Service
Company of Colorado was awarded in 1965.
2) Date indicates year of major agreement with AEC on
contract terms.
3) Rankings from ~~~gt..rig~l~Q..r~~10/2/50, based on
customer numbers.
4) Philip Mullenbach Civilian Nuclear 2Q~ EconQmic Issues
~ Policy EQLmation (Philadelphia: Twentieth Century Fund,
1963) p. 137.
5) Frank Dawson ~~ 2Q~ Deyelop~ ~ Manage~
of ~ ~e~hn2lQgy (Seatle: University of Washington Press,
1976) •
6) Yankee Atomic was a consortium of about a dozen New
England IOU's. The companies named the plant Yankee Atomic
as well. Asterisks identify companies who are amongst the
15 active utilities that helped promote nuclear power to OT
status, or consortia containing such companies, such as
Yankee Atomic.
7) PRDC stands for power Reactor Development Corporation, a
consortium spearheaded by Detroit Edison and Consumers
Power.
8) ECNG stands for East Central Nuclear Group. FWCNG
stands for Florida West Coast Nuclear Group. A contract
was signed with these consortia, but the project was
subsequently cancelled.
9) Lead utility for larger consortium.
10) CVNPA stands for Carolinas-Virginia Nuclear power
Associ ates, a consor tiurn spearheaded by Duke Power and
Virginia Electric and Power Company.
11) The project was a joint venture with San Diego Gas and
Electric, which held a 20% share.
1 2) U. S. AEc, ~M BY.Qllg..r.rn.dY~..t.£y lil~ p. 8.
13) Like Yankee Atomic, Connecticut Yankee was a joint
venture of about a dozen New England IOU's, with plant and
managing consortium assuming the same name.
Table 5
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utility ~~ Orders 12/63 -1/67 The Turnkey Years(l)
Co st (hist. s)
in millionsYr. utility - (plant)
1963 *General Public utilities (Oyster Creek) $91
1964 No Orders
1965 *Boston Edison (Pilgrim)
*Commonweal th Edison (Dresden 2)
*Consolidated Edison (Indian Pt. 2)
Florida P. & L. (Turkey Pt. 3)
*Northeast Nuclear Energy Co.(3) (Millstone)
Pub. Sere of Col. (Fort St. Vrain)
Rochester G.& E. (Ginna)
1966 Carolina P.& L. (Robinson 2)
*Commonwealth Edison (Dresden 3)
*Commonweal th Edison (Quad Cities 1)
*Commonweatlh Edison (Quad Cities 2)
*Consumers power (palisades)
*Duke power (Oconee 1)
*Duke power (Oconee 2)
*General Public Utilities (3 Mile Island 1)
*Northern states power Co. (Monticello)
*Omaha Pub. Pwr. District (Fort Calhoun)
*Pacific Gas & Electric (Diablo Canyon 1)
*Philadelphia Electric (Peach Bottom 2)
*Philadelphia Electric (Peach Bottom 3)
Pub. Sere E. & G. (Salem 1)
TVA (Browns Ferry 1)
TVA (Browns Fer ry 2)
*vt. Yankee Nuclear power Corp. (vt. Yankee)
*Virginia E. & P. (Surry 1)
*Virginia E. & P. (Surry 2)
Wisconsin Michigan Pwr. (Pt. Beach 1)
$232
$100
$206
$110
s 97
$239
$ 83
$ 81
$130
$150
$100
$147
$156
$160
$408
$105
$175
$397
$527
$226
$496
$242
$242
$184
$251
$149
$ 74
----------------------------------------------------------
1) Source: U.S. AEC, ~ Nug~~I InQyR~I~ l~Li pp. 8-9.
Companies who are amongst the 15 or so active utilities
thathelpedpromotenuclear power toOTstatusare identi-
fied with an asterisk, as are consortia containing them.
2) Costs as estimated by the AEC, based on contemporary
(circa 1974) sources.
3) Joint venture subsequently integrated into Northeast
utili ties.
Table 6
utility Nuclear Orders 1967-1969(1)
Year utility & (plant)
1967 Arkansas P. & L. (Nuclear One 1)
Bal timore G.& E. (Calvert Cliffs 1)
Baltimore G.& E. (Calvert Cliffs 2)
*Commonweal th Edison (Zion 1)
*Commonweal th Edison (Zion 2) :
*Consolidated Edison (Indian Pt. 3) r
*Duke Power (Oconee 3)
*Duquesne Light (Beaver Valley 1)
Florida P.& L. (Turkey Pt. 4)
Florida P.& L. (St. Lucie 1)
Florida Pwr. Corp. (Crystal River 3)
Georgia Pwr , Co. (Hatch 1) "
Indiana & l'-lichigan Pwr. (D.C. Cook 1)
Indiana & Hichigan Pwr. (D.C. Cook 2)
*General Public utilities (3 Mile Island 2)
Long Island Lighting (Shoreham)
Maine Yankee (Maine Yankee)
Nebraska Pub. Pwr. District (Cooper)
Northern Indiana Pu~ Sere (Bailly)
*Northern States Pwr. (Prairie Island 1)
*Northern states Pwr. (Prairie Island 2)
*N.E. Nuclear Energy Corp. (4) (Millstone 2)
*philadelphia Electric (Limerick 1)
*Philadelphia Electric (Limerick 2)
Public Sere E.& G. (Salem 2)
Sacramento Munic. Utile Dist. (Rancho Seco)
TVA (Browns Ferry 3)
*Virginia E.& P. (North Anna 1)
Wisconsin Elec. & Pwr. (Pt. Beach 2)
Wisconsin Pub. Sere Corp. (Kewaunee)
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Cost [hist. $)
in millions
$228
$338
$258
$276
$271
$400
$166
$451
$121
$366
$335
$366
$400
$400
$521
$695 f
$219
$316
$244
$200
$200
$380
$1,212
$539
$496
$335
$242
$446
$ 88
$202
1968 Carol ina P. & L. (Brunsw ick 1) $269
Carolina P.& L. (Brunswick 2) $339
*Consumers Power (Midland 1) $470
*Consumers Power (Hidland 2) $470
*Detroi t Edison (Fermi 2) $501
Iowa Electric L.& P. (Duane Arnold) $211
*Pacific Gas & Electric (Diablo Canyon 2) $282
Penn. P.& L. (Susquehanna 1) $692
Penn. P.& L. (Susquehanna 2) $692
portland Gen. Electric (Trojan) $334
Power Authority of N.Y. (Fitzpatrick) $301
TVA (Sequoyah 1) $312
TVA (Sequoyah 2) $312
Toledo Edison (Davis Besse 1) $409
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Table 6 continued
1969 Alabama Pwr , (Farley 1) $455
Cincinnati G.& E. (Zimmer 1) $434
*Duke Power (McGui re 1) $364
*Duke Power (McGuire 2) $364
*General Public Utilities (Forked River 1) $694
Pub. Ser. E.& G. (Hope Creek 1) $565
Pub. ser , E.& G. (Hope Creek 2) $565
----------------------------------------------------------
1) Source: U.S. AEC, :rhe NU.Qil£!.£ l..D.QJJ~.t.£y liN p. 9.
2) Companies who are amongst the 15 active utilities that
helped promote nuclear power to OT status have been
identified with asterisks, as have joint ventures including
them.
3) Costs as estimated by the AEC, based on contemporary
(circa 1974 )sources.
4) Joint venture owned by the companies of Northeast
Utilites.
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4.31) The Industrial participation Studies (IPS) and
.t.h~ .-Sb.inn..ingnQL.t. L~.sg.t.QL nLQj~g.t. 1.9-5..1.=l2.5..i . IOU
involvement with nuclear power began with the IPS in 1951.
The studies were designed to give an increasingly restless
private sector access to formerly classified material. As
predicted, it was generally the largest IOU's who were
attracted, along with nuclear defense contractors
interested in transforming their military experience into
civilian markets (see Table 3-1).[56] The studies
concluded that nuclear power was not close to economic
competitiveness (Mullenbach 1963, 55,58).
In 1954 the AEC contracted with Duquesne Light to
build the nation's first commercial power plant using
Westinghouse's naval reactor design. The project was
conceived as an R&D exercise and eventually produced
electricity at about 7-8 times the cost of a conventional
plant in the same location.[57]
Although the AEC absorbed most of this cost
differential, Duquesne did bear an economic burden. The
company agreed to purchase stearn from the AEC reactor at
prices 30%-40% higher than the expected cost of
conventionally generated steam and to contribute $5,000,000
('54 $) to reactor construction (JCAE, 196 3c, 225).
Duquesne's leadership appears to mildly contradict
the "big" or "high cost fossil fuel" nuclear utility
hypothesis adduced above. Duquesne ranked only 19th in
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~l~~~Ii~glNQL~ 10/2/50 utility rankings, and enjoyed
relatively low fossil fuel costs in the plant's Pittsburgh
vicinity (Mullenbach 1963, 56). Close scrutiny of the
nuclear project, however, allows easy integration into the
planning context, active firm logic of the Official
Technology framework. Research by Jim Sneddon of the
BegveA ~Q.1!n.ty l'imes suggests that Duquesne's nuclear
initiative represented a planning thrust by Pittsburgh's
concentrated energy interests (i.e. Westinghouse, the
city's energy intensive metalurgical industry, and local
banks) to facilitate the development of a new Westinghouse
dominated energy technology. The regulated cash flow of
Pittsburgh's local utility was used as the financial
instrument for the developm ent proj ect (Sneddon, "Nuclear
"\'leb" series, Beaver County Times 12/23-31/74).
Duquesne has traditionally had a close relationship
with Westinghouse, purchasing all 7 of its turbine
generators 1948-1962 from the company [58] , and additional
reactors in '67 and '71. Sneddon's research reveals a
number of board of director interlocks and financial
relationships between Duquesne, the city's local banks,
Westinghouse, and the area's heavy energy using industries.
Other popularly ci ted explana tions f or Duquesne's nuclear
initiatives are less microeconomicly satisfying, such as
rationales relying on publicity seeking (Allen 1977, 34;
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Hewlet and Duncan 1974, 238-239) or patriotism (Strauss
1962,322).
4.32) Privately financed IOU reactor projects
1955-1963. From 1955-1959 four privately financed reactors
were funded by U.S. utilities. Three of the utilities w e r e
amongst the nation's five largest IOU's (See Table 3). The
plants were considered development projects and not
expected to produce least cost power. [59]
Rather than embodying short run cost minimizing
choices, the investments reflected the sponsoring firms'
long run growth strategies. A similar interpretation,
comparing the plants to the vendors' early nuclear
initiatives, was offered by Richard Tybout at the 1957
American Economic Association meetings. Tybout asked:
Why might so much nuclear capacity be
installed when it will result in costs above those of
alternative conventional facilities?" After noting
va~ious cost estimating adjustments which could reduce
the expected nuclear cost penalty, he writes, " •••
these are not adequate explana tions of the magnitude
••• of installation of nuclear power. Perhaps more
important (and recognized by our source) [an AEC-JCAE
panel] is the incentive to gain know-how •••• There is
evidence that just such an approach is being taken by
designers of nuclear reactors and equipment, but this
does not take care of our present problem, for the
contract pr ices entered into by supply firms were
used as a starting point for the 1960 nuclear
cost figures ••• To explain the installation of high-
cost nuclear capacity, we must turn to the electric
power i ndus try its elf ••• the ope rat i on of a full
scale electric power station at a cost above that of
alternative methods in order to advance technology is
something of an extension of the research concept •••
(pp. 359-360).
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Confirming this interpretation, a March 1960
article in N..YJ;;~onicsreported, "Officials of the earliest
pioneering utilities - Consolidated Edison, Commonwealth
Edison, Detroit Edison, Duquesne Light- have said privately
that they wouldn't be investing as heavily as they are in
nuclear power if they planned to build only one nuclear
plant" (p. 21). In 1963 Con. Ed. Board chairman Harland
Forbes told the JCAE, "So far as Consolidated Edison is
concerned, as I think our investment activity to date
clearly demonstrates, we look primarily to nuclear energy
to meet the future thermal generating requirements in our
territory, gD~ ~~ gI~ ~~~~gI~~ ~g ~g gll ~~ ~gD ~g
~gD.t~.i.bjJj;;~.tg .i.tJ2 ~§ ve.1.Ql2.ID~D.t."[em pha sis add ed ] (JCAE,
1963a, 62l). Alongside the technology's general appeal as
a vehicle for central power station expansion, nuclear was
especially attractive to Con. Ed. due to its service
area's high fossil fuel costs.
The leader in nuclear activism was Commonwealth
Edison of Chicago, which pursued an aggressive growth
strategy built around nuclear expansion. From 1963-1972 it
contracted for 13 additional reactors, accounting for 9% of
the nation's nuclear orders (AEC 1974a). It now appears to
enjoy significant learning curve cost advantages in
managing nuclear construction (Komanoff and Supp 1983}.[60]
The company also pursued nuclear initiatives in the
radioisotope, weapons material, fuel reprocessing, and
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nuclear manpower training markets.[6l] It acquired the
tenth ranked uranium milling company, the Cotter
Corporation, in 1974 (Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources 1977, 327) . and has been a leader in
breeder reactor development, serving as the chief utili ty
for the Clinch River project.
In the political sphere, the company has funded
expensive pro-nuclear campaigns, contributing, for example,
over $3 million to the Committee for Energy Awareness'
pro-nuclear advertising efforts (l'o.YierLine 8-9/83). Com.
Ed. executives have also frequently lobbied Congressional
Committees for increased nuclear support.
Complementing its nuclear supply side initiatives,
the company balanced its growth strategy with an aggressive
advertising campaign on the demand side. Fortll.n~ (3/67)
reported," l1uch can be credited to vvard's [company
chairman] marketing team, 'We tried to convince present and,
potential customers of new uses of electricity. We've been
very successful ... .. The EQ~~1lD~ article details the
anxiety associated wi th the company's high risk expansion
p L an s , quoting the firm's president, .. 'We have a
construction program for the next five years of 1.7 billion
dollars. Sometimes I wake up worrying if we will have
enough demand for all the new capacity this program will
provide. 'II
; ~--.;,.'~"""",, """""'"--"-=--==-'-~ ~
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As Note 62 demonstrates, Con. Ed., PG&Eand GPU also
quickly followed their initial nuclear plants with other
nuclear commitments. Their collective behavior suggests
that early IOU financed
investment strategies. [62]
The only other nuclear plant to be completely
projects reflected long run
financed by the utilities before the turnkey orders was
Niagara Mohawk's 1963 9 Mile Point project. It was
probably expected to have higher generating costs than
available fossil fuel alternatives[63], and was undertaken
as a technology promoting investment. Like its
pr edecessor s, the company soon announced an ambi tious
follow-up nuclear expansion plan. In 1967 it projected 2300
NW of atomic capacity to complement its existing 2800 HW
fossil fuel - hydro base (AIF, .N!Jclear .I..n.d!J.s.il.Y 3/67).[64]
Like Duquesne's Westinghouse reactor purchases, Niagara's
GE orders can be linked to the vendor's operation of major,
turbine-generator and nuclear facilities in the utility's
service area.[65]
9 Mile Point also reflected the nuclear
promotionalism of New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller.
The la tte r was intent upon t ur ni ng N.Y. in to a nucl ear
center in an effort to overcome the state's disadvantaged
position within a fossil fueled economy.[66] Building on
GE's existing New York activities, Rockefeller sought to
win synergi sti c . econom ic advantage by promoting linked
119
nuclear initiatives. Included was support for power
generation, fuel processing, materials transport and
desalinization projects. Efforts to coordinate nuclear
promotion with the state's private sector were facilitated
by the creation of a General Advisory Committee (chaired by
GE vice president Francis McCune) in the late fifties, and
the IOU's joint formation of Empire State Atomic
Development Associates (ESADA) in 1960. Like the New
England Yankee Atomic and Connecticut Yankee projects,
ESADA's activities represent a collective IOU response to
regional fuel cost disadvantage and the threat of publicly
owned nuclear power plants.[67]
From 1959-1963 ESADA sponsored about $25 million of
nuclear research. Among the key projects funded were GE's
superheat R&D reactor, General Atomic's high temperature
gas reactor, Atomic International's sodium graphite
project, and GE's breeder components project (JCAE 1963a,,
784-5~ AIF, Nuclear Industry 2/68 p. 53). The declared goal
of these expenditures was the quick construction of a
maj or commercial sized demonstration reactor in New York.
State planning was equally aggressive. In 1959 the
Office of Atomic Development sought to gain greater
regulatory control over local atomic energy activties in
order to facilitate private investment (JCAE 1960a, 359)•
In the same year a nuclear research center was established
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at the University of Buffalo and a study undertaken to
identify nuclear development projects worthy of state
support (JCAE 1960a, 364). In 1960 plans were announced to
promote the local siting of: a fuel reprocessing plant, a
high level waste disposal facility, a materials testing
reactor, and a nuclear port. A program was also initiated
to promote greater use of industrial isotopes (JCAE 1960a,
359-360). By the late sixties the state had given its
nuclear development authorities: license to float tax
exempt bonds to subsidize private nuclear R&D, land use
powers to facilitate nuclear siting[68], funds to develop
nuclear desalinization (AEC 1968a, 11-12; AIF, ll~~~g~
~Dg~~~~y 12/64 p. 43), and monies to subsidize the
construction of a private fuel reprocessing facility.[69]
Also proposed by Governor Rockefeller were subsidies for: a
fast breeder reactor project, a plutonium fuel fabriction
facility, and permanent financing assistance for nuclear
plant equipment. [70] Similar notions of regional
competition spurred some Southern economists in the fifties
to urge local support for nuclear development, lest the
South's access to inexpensive fossil fuels retard its
future economic growth by limiting experience with nuclear
technology. [71] Two decades later Jacksonville Florida
proffered extensive subsidies and incentives (including the
proposed purchase of two nuclear power plants) to
Westinghouse-Tenneco in return for the local siting of
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their proposed nuclear plant manufacturing facility.[72]
These public policy nuclear initiatives mirror on a local
political level the growth strategies of the private
utilities and national rivalries that spurred nuclear
expansion on an industry and global level.[73]
4.33 The Power Reactor Demonstration Program {PRDP}
1955-1963.[74] Like the privately financed plants during
this period, the government subsidized PRDP projects (See
Table 4) were dominated by large utility planning
initiatives. A group of multi-sized New England utilities,
spurred by the region's fossil fuel cost disadvantage, also
participated in two key plants. Even with AEC assistance
the projects' uncompetitive economics, and the
participants' rapid succession of nuclear commitments,
imply that the utilities were behaving as "act i.ve-ifLr m s"
(pursu.inq planning visions and strategic objectives),
rather than short run cost minimizing firms.[75]
The private sector aspect of the PRDP was
administered in two rounds. Emerging from round 1 was
Detroit Edison's Fermi breeder project, and the Yankee
Atomic plant sponsored by a consortium of New England
utilities. The Fermi plant was the most technically
ambitious PRDP proposal. The plant cost its private sector
sponsors $110 million and eventually suffered a partial
meltdown. The project represents the clearest illustration
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of aggressive IOU risk taking in pursuit of an all-electric
IOU managed future. The breeder design was simultaneously
the most difficult engineering challenge and the most
promising long run growth technology available to the
utili ty industry. Even the normally optimistic AEC staff
believed the project to be technically premature (Allen
1977, 51). The driving force behind the project was Walker
Cisler, Detroit Ed.'s president and an ideological champion
of private enterprise. In his battle to win support for
the plant, he warned that rejection meant, " We are headed
down the socialist road" (Fuller 1975, 51).
The Yankee Atomic project was owned by a consortium
of New England utilities. Like subsequent nuclear
development in the region it was dominated by Boston
Edi son, New England Electric and the companies tha t later
merged into Northeast Utilities. The project was a
collect~ve R&D response to the region's fossil fuel cost
disadvantage. [76] The plant was expected to have
generating costs of lO-12M/kwh (with modest improvement
over its lifetime), or a cost penalty of about 1-3H/kwh
versus available fossil fuel alternatives (AIF, Forum M~mo
6/57 p. 27, 2/64 p. 3). As the consortium's president,
William Webster, told the JCAE in 1955, ''New England has
no natural deposits of coal or oil, and must import its
requirements of these fuels, resulting in relatively higher
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fuel costs in its conventional thermal plants. For that
reason ~~ ~~l g ng~~ig~~~ Q~9~n~y ~Q g~~l~~ in ~b~
~cessary next ~ to~ard the developm~ of economically
cOIDpetitiye atomic .P.Qwer(emphasis added) ... New England
is also rich in the engineering skill and the technical
industrial know-how necessary for the successful
development of such a pioneer plant, and we are confident
that we will have full and able support for our venture in
this respect. In addition, we believe that the early
installation of an atomic power plant will have an
important stimulating effect in the New England industries
most closely connected with the broader development of
peacetime uses of atomic energy" (JCAE 1955, 594).[77J
Alongside New England and New York's nuclear activities,
the heterogeneous character of U.S. energy costs also
spurred the Carolinas-Virginia tube reactor and nuclear
initiati~es by Florida Power and Light and several pacific-
northwest utilities (JCAE 1957, 542,544; Gandara 1977, 70-
71; AIF, Nuclear Industry 4/65).
Round two of IOU PRDP participation can be divided
into two phases. Phase one witnessed the construction of
several moderately sized reactors by large IOU's (ranked
7,10,11,&14) or consortia spearheaded by them.[78J The
plants were conceived as R&D projects and not intended to
generate competitive power.[791 Phase two spurred the
funding of two full scale commercial sized demonstration
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plants: San Onofre by Southern California Edison (ranked
6), and Connecticutt Yankee by essentially the same
consortium that funded Yankee Atomic. It is unlikely that
either plant was expected to generate minimum cost power
(Quirk and Montgomery 1978, 13; Quirk, Burness and
Montgomery 5/80, 190}.[80] All PRDP projects thus appear to
reflect planning initiatives by large growth oriented or
high cost fossil fuel utilities, rather than short run cost
minimizing decisions. .
Before turning to the turnkey years, which were
triggered by GE's reponse to Westinghouse's capture of the
two large demonstration plant orders noted above [81], it
is useful to focus more attention on the impact of the
public/private power rivalry on nuclear development.
4.34l Variations _Qll g theme: nuclear ~motion ~ g
~&g~Qn in ~h& ~gQ~~ vekSU~ Eklygte ~~&~ con~~QY~~~Y·
Even the more passive IOU's were stimulated to participate
minimally in collective IOU development projects to preempt
public power nuclear initiatives. Widespread
acknowledgement of this planning-strategic behavior,
however, has rarely led analysts to consider the
possibility of offensive rather than defensive IOU nuclear
investment. [82]
The IOU's had historical reasons to be wary of the
growth of a pUblic sector nuclear electricity industry.
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Public power had grown from 5% of all electricity generated
in the U.S. in 1933 to nearly 25% in 1960. Its advance had
been spearheaded by the the TVA, which the AEC's first
chairman, David Lilienthal, had directed. The military
aspects of nuclear power had produced a legacy of
information classification and government ownership along
the nuclear fuel cycle that threatened to extend to
electricity production. Although the 1954 amendments to
the Atomic Energy Act prohibited the federal government
from intentionally entering the generating market, the law
reaffirmed the "preference provision". The latter granted
local public power groups first access to any electricity
generated at federal research or military installations,
and priority in license applications if public and private
proj ects confli cted.
Although the AEC was ideologically committed to
transfering nuclear technology to the private sector, the
Commission's top priority was rapid nuclear development.
The AEC and nuclear industry were thus quick to use fears
of nuclear TVA's to promote private investment. AEC
chairman Lewis Strauss warned in 1957 " ••• if industry
does not submit acceptable proposals for reactor plants of
the types considered ready for full-scale demonstration and
construction, the Commission will request funds to initiate
such projects under complete federal financing" (JCAE 1957,
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16; see also JCAE 1956c, 36-39; & AIF, Fo.r.!JIDl1.§IDQ1/57 p,
3). Speaking before the Edison Electric Institute in 1958,
the Chairman of General Electric asked, " Will atomic
energy provide a second chance for those who want to see
investor owned electric utilities wither away, replaced by
federal power plants?" (Mullenbach 1963 104). The
strongest supporters of an expanded government development
program were powerful members of the JCAE. with their
assistance, the Gore-Holifield bill, calling for a 400
million dollar federally owned reactor construction
program, passed the Senate in 1956 but died in the House.
In response to these pressures the IOU's lobbied
Congress against public nuclear power. Th ey w er e
successful for example in defeating legislation to attach
what were believed to be economically efficient federally
owned generating units to the government's existing Hanford
military reactors in 1961 (Mullenbach 1963, 151-152). The,
utilities also increased their own nuclear spending
(Mullenbach 1963 139,104). As early as 1955 the ~g~l
Street Journal reported," The United States with abundant
cheap coal and oil, really has no urgent need for atomic
power. Officials of the companies which make reactors say,
frankly most of their utility customers have no early
expectation of cutting costs by building atomic plants;
their primary motive is to stake this out as an area of
private rather than public power" ( .Ngl.l .s..t.I..e..e.t .JQ.JJ.r.ngl
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8/22/55 p. 1). Kuhn quotes the president of one early
nuclear utility, " We acted because we needed to guarantee
the position of private industry. The money spent was a
gamble to preserve the private sector" (Kuhn 1966, 115).
Southern California Edison described its '64 nuclear
desalinization initiatives in a similar light (AlP, Nuclear
ln~~~~~Y 12/64 pp. 12-14). Memos from New England IOU
planning meetings in 1965 indicate that a Maine nuclear
plant was precipitated by fear of the creation of a Maine
Power Authority with nuclear construction assignments
(Senate Judiciary Committee 6/70, 454-55). As late as
1970 the Atomic Industrial Forum reported that IOU support
for Rockefeller's nuclear initiatives was spurred by the
Governor's promise to bar nuclear construction by the
sta tel s power a uthori ty (AIF, .N!Jclear lndustry 4/70). (~.
Rivalry dynamics also spurred some large scale
public power ,nuclear initiatives, such as those of the New
York State Power Authority in the early sixties (AlP,
Nuclear Industry 3/61 p, 28). The TVA's 1966 Browns Ferry
reactor, located at a site with expected fossil fuel costs
of .283M/kwh ('66 $), and Nebraska's ea rly nuclear pr oj ects,
also seem, in part, technology accessing investments.[83]
A second aspect of the public/private power
conflict, the competition between local IOU's and small
pUblic power systems, may have also stimulated nuclear
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development. The technology's anticipated scaling economies
were perceived by numerous IOU's as a convenient mechanism
for favorable competition with small municipally owned
utilities (HUNY's) and local rural cooperatives. Industry
and government projections have generally predicted
reductions of 20% or more for each megawatt doubling in
nuclear capacity.[84] During the sixties many investor
owned utilities sought to prevent MUNY's from reaping these
expected efficiencies, by excluding them from equity or
wholesale customer participation in large joint venture
nuclear projects (Senate Judiciary Committee 6/70). By
1970 IOU collusive behavior had become so widespread that
Congress adopted special legislation forcing more extensive
nuclear plant anti-trust review.[85]
On the other side of the competition,
representatives of public power groups urged expanded
federal support for small megawatt nuclear projects. Their,
spokesm en repeatedly claimed that the IOU's were unl ikely
to develop the small scale reactors useful to their systems
(JCAE 1955, 439; JCAE 1961,250-253; AIF, .EQ.IJJID H~.IDQ 1/57
p, 10). Relatively large MUNY's like those of Holyoke
Massachusetts and Jamestown New York offered to take part
in PRDP projects, though their meager resources limited
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their ability to assume project risks and cost penalties.
In summary, public-private sector competition
spurred early utility nuclear initiatives in a manner
similar to the rivalry dynamics between GE and
Westinghouse. Fear of being left out of a successful
nuclear industry overrode conc~rn over participation in an
inefficient nuclear industry.
~l~ ~QQ nQQ1~gx B~D gQ~iyi~i~~ l~~i=l~~l
SUillillg..t.ize£t.Before discussing utility generating choice
behavior 12/63 -1969 it is useful to briefly summarize the
level of utility nuclear activity 1954-1963. A total of 14
reactor projects were planned at a cost of more than $750
mill ion (mixed His t•$)•[86] The act ivitie s con tradict the
frequent claim that the utilities were quite reluctant to
develop nuclear technology prior to the inducements offered
by the turnkey contracts. The IOU's appear cautious only
in relationship to the time tables favored by the AEC-JCAE
and vendors. The firms' willingness to fundde facto
nuclear R&D projects and their succession of nuclear
commitments prior to accumulating empirical data about the
costs of commercial-sized reactors, suggests the presence
of a pro-nuclear planning bias.[87]
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The size of the utilities' nuclear research
activities can be grasped by comparing the IOU's implicit
nuclear R&D expenditures with coal sector R&D outlays over
the same period. Nuclear expenditures have been calculated
by tallying the full costs of purely R&D projects like the
Fermi breeder and a percentage of capital costs for
projects that contributed significant power to IOU grids.
As Table 7 indicates, utility spending approaches $300
milllion (mixed historical dollars) and tallies more than
1.5 times the level of coal sector R&D over the same
decade.
L.li The turnkey years and their immediate aftermgth
il.9.Q..3..=.llQ..ll. The turnkey period opened in December '63
w i.t.hGE guaranteeing GPU'S Jersey Central power and Light
cap ital cos t s for its Oy ster Creek p1ant 0f $13 2/KW 0 r a
25%-30% decline from Westinghouse's '62 PRDP bids. Similar
terms were maintained by GE and Westinghouse through 1966,
and 12 turnkey contracts were signed. Another 16 plants
were purchased during the '64-'66 period under non-turnkey,
basically cost-plus, terms.
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TABLE 7
~ Nuclear ~ Expenditures lin millions) 1954-1963(1)
Year of utility Estimated Plant Cost Defacto R&D-Outlays
operation Plant ~ M.D .H.i.sU (Hist.S) ('79$)
'57 Duquesne -----
Shippingport '
'60 Corn.Ed 30%
Dresden 1
14 (2) 36
34 14(3) 34
'61 Yankee Atomic 25%
Yankee Atomic
38 10 24
'62 Con.Ed. 50%
Indian Pt. 1
'62 GPU 100%
Saxton
162 Consumers Pwr.50%
Big Rock '63
126 63 149
8(4) 8 19
26 13 31
'63 PG&E 50%
Humboldt Bay
'63 Ca.-Va. NPA (5) 100%
Tube-Reactor
24 12
20
28
20 (6) 46
P.R.D.C.(7)
Fermi
100% 110 90
90 (thru '63)(8)
24 12
12 (thru '63)
208
,66N. StateSPWr , 100%
Pathfinder
28
'67 Phil. Elec.
Peach Bottom
100% 25 (9) 5 12
,68 S. Cal. Ed.
San Onofre
'68Conn. Yanke e
Conn Yankee
10%
10%
84
(0 thru
92
(0 thru
o
63)
o
63)
'69 Niag. Hohwk. 33%
9 Mile Pt.
162 0
o (thru '63 )
Misc. IOU nuclear R&D projects not in-
cluded in above expenditures 33(10) 33 76
TOTALS 294 691
250Estimated Coal Sector R&D 1954-1963(11)***
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Footnotes - Table 7
1) Plant costs (unless otherwise specified) are taken from
the Federal Power Commission's .s.t.§.f!!I\ ..E~~ll .l:l..g.n.t
~struction ~Q~.t .f!.n~ AnDQ.f!l RLQQMg.tiQ.n ..EzQg.n~.§~ annual,
using second year of operation statistics. Mixed . (
historical dollars converted into '79$ by assuming all
construction financed in year prior to initial operation
and applying GNP inflator. For incomplete plants, outlays
equal one-half total outlays times percentage construction
elapsed. Estimated R&D percentage equals (actual nuclear
generating costs -expected fossil fuel generating costs)
divided by actual nuclear generating costs, all times
actual nuclear construction expenditures.
2) JCA E 1 956 a, p. 239.
3) R&D outlays took the form of a $15 million R&D fund ($14
million of which was IOU financed) and were not included in
the plant's $34 million rate base entry.
4) JCAE 1962, p. 505.
5) Carolinas-Virginia Nuclear Power Associates.
6) JCAE 1962, p. 505.
7) Power Reactor Development Company - spearheaded by
Detroit Edison and Consumers Power. The Fermi plant
suffered a partial melt-down in 1969 and was retired before
full commercial operation.
8) JCAE 1962, p. 505. .~
9) Stewart 1981, p, 185.
1 0) JCA E 1 96 2, 5 09.
11) Cambel 1964, 30-31; Perry 1973,39. (De facto coal R&D
through utility financing of coal fired demonstration
technologies has not been included in the coal R&D totals.)
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As noted earlier, the turnkey discounts were crucial
in persuading the utility industry of the validity of the
promotional claims made for nuclear power by its vendor-
government sponsors. The identity of the ordering
utilities, however, suggests that utilty receptivity
augmented the impact of the turnkey terms. Of th e 28
plants ordered during the turnkey era, 8 were purchased by
utilities who had previously bought non-turnkey plants, and
11 by large IOU's who had actively funded PRDP
projects. [88] In total, about two thirds of the 28 turnkey
era orders were placed by large IOU's who previously
exhibited a prmomotional-rivalry interest in non-turnkey
nuclear development. For the '67-'69 period, 20 of the 59
plants purchased fall into these two categories.
Throughout the 1954-1969 period a core group of
approximately 15 utilities played an "active-firm" role in
winning Official Technology status for nuclear power. By
purchasing defacto demonstration plants, and often publicly
championing the competitiveness of the technology, the
firms helped stimulate intra-industry rivalry dynamics and
the capture of scale economies and learning curve cost
reductions. [89] Along with the AEC/JCAE, and vendors, they
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fused their growth strategies into a critical mass
development path. As is often the case, the exception
pr ove s th e logi c of the rul e. Th e large st IOU h oIding
company, American Electric Power, lent relatively modest
support to nuclear development due to its strong position
in coal based technologies. [90]
The neglect, and at times active hostility,
displayed by large utilities towards technical options
within which scale was less of a competitive advantage, or
within which competition was more likely from non-central
power station sources, also reveals the impact of
institutional self-interest on technical evolution. Recall,
for example, Con Ed, PG&E and Consumers Power's
inattention and/or opposition to various alternative
energy options. [91] Gandara indicates the IOU's similarly
opposed conservation oriented demand managementpolicies,
sue has pe ak loa d pric ing, prio r to th e credit cruch 0f the
mid-seventies (Gandara 1977, 81). Many accounts indicate
that the utilities aggressively retarded cogeneration
technologies, paying cogenerators less than competitive
market values for grid feed-ins, charging them
pr ejudi ciously high back-up rates, and placing procedur al
obstacles in the way of grid hook-ups (Stobaugh 1979, 157-
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160; u.s. Congress, House Government Operations Committee
197 7 r 11 61-11 80; P0.w~L .1.i.n~ 10/ 81)•[92] When the ci ty of
Chicago indicated it might build a garbage burning
cogeneration facility, Commonwealth Edison threatened to
shift its headquarters and $140 million tax revenues out of
the city (Wgl.l.stre~.t .!I.Q.Y.I.MllO/23/85p. 6). The work of
Princeton professor Robert Williams suggests that these
efforts successfully discouraged innovation in the
cogeneration area. The declining block and all-electric
discount aspect of utility rates also discouraged the
expansion of passive solar and other alternative energy
options.
A wide variety of previously ignored technologies,
such as wind, geothermal and low head hydro, now appear
competitive with nuclear power.[93] The economics of
conservation seem even more favorable. The fact that these
options only received utility attention after anti-nuclear
protests and IOU financing difficulties sidetracked the
nuclear option suggests the socially determined character
of technological realms of discourse.[94]
4.AL .T~ .imwg.t Q.f OT IDQID~.n..t..YID Q.D .u.tilllY
generating choices 1954-1969
In discussing the OT dynamics underlying nuclear
generating choices, we have previously emphasized the
utilities internal motivations for nuclear investments.
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This section examines the impact of externally generated OT
momentum on utility behavior. Vendor AEC-JCAE
promotionalism created a pervasive and excessive nuclear
cost optimism. Promotional campaigns demonstrated the
availability of committed partners for the construction of
a critical mass development path to active firms, and
induced a bandwagon [95] psychology among passive firm s,
The level of OT momentum generated by 1969 is
suggested by two statistics: the more than 25:1 ratio of
ordered to operating nuclear capacity in 1969, and the more
than 3:1 ratio of average plant size ordered to the largest
pLa ntin 0 pe rat ion thr0ugh 1 967 (AEC 197 4c). Bot h rat i0 s
reveal the minimal empirical data available about the
kinds of reactors purchased prior to the flood of nuclear
sales.
The utilities' tolerance of objective uncertainty in
nuclear contracting signals the presence of OT dynamics.
~
Non-turnkey plants ultimately cost about one and three
quarters as much (in constant dollars) as predicted.[96]
All plants, including turnkeys, were vulnerable to poor
capacity performance. Through 1980 the most common sized
plants (800+MW) performed at less than 3/4 their expected
rate (Komanoff 1981 248). Many of these units have also
had to be expensively retrofitted to meet upgraded safety
requirements and unexpected technical problems.[97] The
utilities also faced uncertain fuel, maintenance, waste
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disposal, and reactor decommissioning costs.
While there was also a degree of uncertainty
associated wi th fossil fuel generating costs, it was much
smaller than that associated with nuclear power, due to the
relative maturity of the two technologies and the known
character of coal deposits. The asserted cost advantage of
nuclear projects often rested on a claimed edge of only
.5M/kwh (Perry 1977, 37) or a differential of 5-15%. The
utilities' decision to contract for 13 billion dollars
(mixed historical $) [98] of nuclear capacity 1963-1969
is thus puzzling without appeal to the character of utility
regulation and logic of OT dynamics.
In the last section we argued that half of these
investments could be linked to the planning visions of
active firms with pro-nuclear growth strategies. This
section otfers an OT explanation for passive firm nuclear
contracting. The core claim is that the OT process
generated a pro-nuclear bias in the information available
to these firms and an asymmetric pro-nuclear treatment of
uncertainty on their. part. Four factors left the utilities
vulnerable to bandwagon pressures: (1) The biased character
of the institutional environment dominating nuclear
information production and circulation. (2) The perceived
self-fulfilling prophecy character of nuclear cost
optimism. (3) The nature of utility regulation. (4) The
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cyclical character of heavy electrical equipment
purchasing. Most of these factors reflected the decision
making context created by nuclear's sponsors, rather than
the vagaries of imperfect information or random error.
They were endogenous to the OT process.
4.411 Information environments. The information on
nuclear economics available to the utilities during the
bandwagon years was dominated by vendor-AEC/JCAE
promotional campaigns. Even nuclear skeptics like Philip
Sporn and the National Coal Association acknowledged as
late as the mid-'60's that their cost projections relied
primarily on vendor supplied material (JCAE 1968, 93;
i;]g~.t.I:icgl NQ.I:.l.d 8/31/64). While to some extent this
situation reflected the extreme novelty of nuclear
technology and its classified early history, it also
reflects more generic aspects of technology assessment,
such as the scale economies associated with the use (and
occasionally the production) of information. [99]
Vendor marketing activities, such as the loss-leader
turnkeys, were partly responsible for mistaken cost
expectations. More influential, however, was the impact of
vendor-AEC dominance of nuclear power research. The pair's
activities were directed towards finding technical
solutions to known engineering problems, and not towards
uncovering potential nuclear hazards. This focus was
reflected in the kinds of data collected, the methodologies
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used to organize information, and the attention given to
anom alous findings. The resulting research minimized the
economic implications of the technology's negative
external i ti es, and thus generated misl eadi ngly optimisti c
cost pr oj ections.
The spread of nuclear optimism from the vendors and
AEC to the utilities is a fascinating example of
ideological diffusion. The optimism often carne "embodied"
in personnel previously employed (and socialized) by the
vendors (Kuhn 1966,142) and/or AEC. [100] It was mediated
through trade journals inundated with nuclear industry-AEC
promotional literature. Utility staff members often
participated in formal and informal AEC training programs
and many received early hands on experience within
industry-wide demonstration projects like Fermi (Kuhn
1966, 145). These individuals reproduced the promotional
outlook of their training wi thin thei rhome fi rm, serving
as instructors for new generations of nuclear personnel
(Kuhn 1966, 147-148). The util i tie s s el f-cons ciously
pursued a very passive attitude towards the training
process, choosing to prepare the minimal number of staff in
the least expensive fashion. James Kuhn of Columbia's
Graduate School of Business writes,
1
Before actual construction of a nuclear plant
begins, none of the companies ever had more than a
sm all handf ul of men, som eti mes no mor e th an 0 ne and
usually no more than four, who had any exposure to,
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or experience with, nuclear technology. So small a
number of "experts" was sufficient in the eyes of the
managers. To train or prepare any more employees in
nuclear technology before a company made a commitment
to build a nuclear plant was both unnecessary and
unw ise ••• Even during the training per iod employees
did not usually devote full time to courses or to on-
the-job instruction. They usually worked at their
jobs part time, except when away from the company at a
national laboratory or reactor test station. One
company, for example, required their engineers to work
every other day alternating regular assignments with
classroom studies. For less highly skilled personnel,
studies might amount to no more than one class day a
week or every two weeks. The instructors were
usually the engineers who had trained at ORSORT, or at
NRTS, Idaho, or with the manufacturer (146-147).[101]
By seeking merely to internalize the AEC-vendor
message the industry minimized its capacity for independent
jUdgement. [102] This trend may have been exacerbated by the
IOU's pursuit of a "Babbage-like" deskilling and
routinization of the engineering and operating task. As
Kuhn writes, (at the time approvingly)
The companies are proceeding as Charles F
MacGowan of the Boilermakers Union predicted almost a
decade ago Lapp. 1954] 'American industry has many
times developed its genius for breaking down complex
operations such as operation of these plants. The
highly trained technicians and engineers currently
operating these experimental models will give way, I
think, to especially trained skilled and semiskilled
workers. They will not obviate the necessity for
training those people, but it will greatly reduce the
amount of training now required.' Where one would
have found a nuclear power plant operated by graduate,
highly trained engineers in its first months, within a
few years one finds that the employees are mostly
experienced, able men with no more than a high-school
degree. The complex job of control has been broken
down into routines that can be mastered by men without
a highly technical educational background even if they
do not fully understand the theoretical details of the
process (148).
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Retrospectively, Kuhn, MacGowan and the utili ties'
celebration of the industry's "lean manpower" policies
seems ironic, as recent analyses have partially blamed
inadequate training for nuclear plants' poor capacity
rates. [103J GPU's manpower policies were held largely
responsible for the seriousness of the Three Mile Island
accident. [104J Review of utili ty trade journals 1954-1969
indicates that the industry had little appreciation of the
magni tude of the engineering and quali ty control problems
associated with the technology. Paralleling the vendors'
experience in the rivalry induced scaling race, the IOU's
financial investments, outpaced their technical
competence. [105J
~~l ~~li=i~liilliD~ nIQnh&~ygYD~IDi~~. The
credibility of vendor-AEC cost claims was reinforced by the
utilities' acceptance of their self-fulfilling prophecy
character.' This deference further reduces the importance
of some of nuclear power's novel characteristics (like its
classified early history) in explaining the origins of the
OT process. The clear commitment of the vendors and
AEC/JCAE to develop the technology appeared to promise
future economic viability independent of current technical
assessment, through the capture of learning curve cost
reductions, scale economies, and state regulatory and
s ub s i dy favors. [106] It was assumed, for example, that
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future pUblic and private R&Dcommitments would solve the
waste disposal and decommissioning problems without
significant financial hardship to the utilities. Early
discouraging experience with nuclear construction costs and
capacity performance was similarly neutralized by the
vendors' appeal to future learning curve cost reductions
(Bupp and Derian 1981, 46-47).[107]
The self-fulfilling prophecy dynamic imbued nuclear
power with the image of "the coming technology". Former AEC
consul tant John Hogerton wri tes, " (the dynam ic) placed the
burden of proof not on the new technology, where one would
normally have expected it to be put, but on the old one
[coal]. And even if a utility president took his staff's
nuclear cost estimates with a grain of salt, he could still
justify going ahead with a nuclear project on the grounds
that it would give his organization essential training and
e xper ien ce in wha t seemed de s tined to be the coming
tee h nolo gy " (Hoge r ton 1 96 8, 2 9) • A s e r i e s 0f uti 1 i t Y
executive interviews conducted by Rand analyst Arturo
Gandara tend to confirm Hogerton's account.[108] Gandara
also concluded that nuclear development was often perceived
by ambitious utility presidents as the way to leave their
stamp on company policy. It was the pioneer's path, with
much the same social appeal as solar experimentation today
(Gandara 1977, 68).
The nuclear industry was quite aware of the
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importance of capturing OT momentum. Just prior to the
bandwagon sales, for example, the Atomic Industrial Forum's
membership journal highlighted the "psychological
importance" of two 1965 reactor sales, noting, " there is
presumably a point where the utilities faith in the future
of nuclear power becomes firm confidence in its present"
(AIF, N.u.Qleg];:.In.QJ!.Qlly9/65 p. 4).
The inverse of this dynamic, the self-fulfilling
pessimism inflicted on the economics of non-nuclear energy,
was noted by Sporn in '67. He argued that deference to
expected nuclear cost declines discouraged investment in
coal and rail sector improvements, and led di rectly to
increased fossil fuel generating costs. [109J In 1963 the
National Coal Association similarly asserted," The coal
industry's ability to finance new mines or mining equipment
is adversely affected by unfounded claims for nuclear power
and the financing of new conventional utility plants is
also affected by the mistaken notion that nuclear power may
o bs 01 e te th em ina shor t time" (.NJJ.Q.leon.i.Q.Q5/63). A
similar deference crippled the European nuclear industry's
ability to compete with u.S. light water designs.[llO]
~l uti.l.i~y~gJJ~at.iQn. The character of utility
regulation also tended to encourage nuclear orders. As
Quirk et ale (5/80) argue, the rate adjustment process
encouraged risk taking in capital contracting. [lllJ The
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IOU's expected quick recovery for cost overruns, and
belated, if any, regulatory recapture of cost underruns.
The decline in regulator tolerance of overruns since '74
has sharply discouraged nuclear orders.
4.44) Uti~y ~ing beDgyior. Sultan and others
have argued that the cyclical-queing character of utility
capital equipment markets has also encouraged a tendency
for bandwagon dynamics. The utilities' felt need to "get
in line" in order to avoid the danger of being caught in a
supply bottleneck, for example, has tradi tionally fostered
herd behavior in the turbine-generator market. As Sporn
notes, a similar dynamic appears to 'have characterized
utility nuclear contracting in the late '60's, when plant
order lead time significantly exceeded expected
construction durations (JCAE 1968, 16).
L15...L Ql' iIDDac.t. In sections 4.1 - 4.3 we analyzed
the microeconomic basis for, and historical presence of,
active-firm utility support for nuclear development. In
section 4.4 we analyzed the basis for passive-firm utility
susceptibility to bandwagon dynamics. Taken togethur the
discussions highlight the importance of six factors in
explaining utility nuclear expenditures 1954-1974:
-the technology's congeni al i ty with key IOU gr owth
strategies
-the nature of intra-industry rivalries (especially
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that between public and private power)
-the impact of vendor and AEC/JCAE promotional
activi ty
-the selfulfilling prophecy character of successful
infrastructural innovation
-the risk minimizing nature of utility regulation and
-the tendency for cyclical queueing in utility
equipment markets.
The factors reflect the dynamic implications of the
three dimensions of the nuclear planning context, and
illustrate how social and technical variables interact to
determine the character of technical change.
~ Other explanations Qt utility ~~or
The O'I'perspective on utility behavior differs
significantly from the two dominant strains of explanation
wi thin neoclassical theory. The first strain represents a,
technologically deterministic perspective [112], while the
second emphasizes the impact of exogenously given
institutional variables (like regulatory constraints and
imperfect inf orma tion) on utili ty behavior (Gandar a 1977).
In both views the utLl Lti es' nuclear choices reflect the
logic of technical efficiency, subject to the regulatory
policy and random error. British political-economist
Duncan Burn, for example, lectured his countrymen that the
American ut Il d t Le s' reactor purchases _r.~y~gl~.Q the
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impersonal collective engineering judgement of the market,
writing, "A score or more of utilities would not buy
nuclear power at great expense for a whim, or to be in
fashion. The U.S. utilities, most of them privately owned,
are highly competent, have strong engineering staffs, and
employ expert consultants" (Burn,1967, 36).
It is difficult to empirically ajudicate between
active firm OT models, and passive firm technically
deterministic models of utility nuclear purchases. Appeals
to mistaken nuclear cost expectations, or prescient
anticipation of fossil fuel cost increases can reconcile
most nuclear orders with passive firm interpretations.[l13]
Sommers (1980), for example, found that recent plant cost
data was not statistically significant in regression
equations designed to predict the probability of nuclear
pur ch ase, He ties this result, however, to the lack of
correlation between current and expected nuclear costs,
rather than a pro-nuclear bias in utility contracting. A
more extreme expression of the same perspective is found in
Joskow and Rozanski (1977).[114] Sommers writes,
A second uncertain aspect of nuclear power
economics is the reliability question ••• Joskow and
Rozanski (1977) agree that reliability is lower in
large nuclear units than in small nuclear units, but
they argue that economic viability can only be
determined by private sector decisionmakers. Utility
purchases of large units are ,pAlm£! li..cil evidence of
perceived or expected viability at the time of
purchase (Sommers 1980, 285).
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aT and non-aT approaches to understanding utility
sector behavior also suggest different dynamic
implications. Consider for example the treatment of the
Averch-Johnson effect. The latter asserts that utility
regulation imparts a capital intensive bias to utility
behavior. While acknowledging the validity of the A-J
effect found in tradi tional Neoclassical analyses, the O'I'
framework expands its scope. The larger IOU's are
perceived to be interested in maximizing their long run as
well as current rate base; thus their promotional support
for nuclear power development. This interpretation helps
explain an anomalous finding within neoclassical theory
identified by HacAvoy and Breyer (1974). The authors ci te
the utilities' persistent opposition to increased capital
expenditures for plant safety features (even when urged by
regulators) as contradicting other A-J behavior. The
apparent inconsistency can be dissolved by positing a short,
t e r m de fer en ceo nth e pa r t 0f the uti 1 it i est 0 the i r 10 ng
term interest in nuclear development. The same deference
was cited by Con. Ed. Presient Louis Roddis in 1974 as a
common reason for the utilities' kid gloves treatment of
the vendors' misleading cost estimates. Roddis noted that
various utility executives "d i.d not want to criticize the
nuclear industry because they were depending on it heavily
as a fut ur e power sour ce" (NeYlYork Times 2/3/74).
The aT approach offers a similar extension of Quirk,
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Burness and Montgomery's (5/80) conclusions concerning the
rationale for utility behavior during the turnkey era.
Recall the authors argue that the historically asymmetric
treatment of cost underruns (ie slow Public utility
Commission recovery of utility surplus profits) and
overruns (rapid recovery through IOU petitioning for rate
relief) imparted a bias in favor of risk taking in capital
contracting. The authors use this conclusion to explain
the speculative behavior of the IOU's during he turnkey
years. The OT framework extends this insight, arguing that
similar motives spured the IOU's to put their revenue base
in the service of long term development efforts. Because
of regulator unwillingness to include explicit R&D
expenditures in the rate base, development projects were
funded through defacto demonstration plants. ~.
As previously noted, the economies of scale in
information use created a significant role in utility
decision making for outside consultants such as the
architect-engineering-construction firms who generally
manage the utilities' power plant constructio~ Section 5
below analyzes the nature of these firms participation in
the nuclear planning context.
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21 The Nuclear Planning Context: The AIchit§ct
-Engineering = Construction Fir~*
~ Introdu~~iQn
Like the active utilities, the architect-
engineering-construction (A-E-C) firms were drawn to
nuclear activism by their comparative advantage, and pushed
towards it by vendor-state promotionalism. Their behavior
and role in nuclear development fit neatly into the OT
framework. The analysis below begins with a brief
discussion of the nature of the A-E-C market. It then
seeks to demonstrate the self-interest major A-E-C firms
had in promoting nuclear expansion, and the pursuit of that
interest by the largest of the A-E-C's, Bechtel. The
section closes with a discussion of the impact of external
OT momentum on the company's behavior.
In 1968 the architect-engineering-construction
market accounted for about 10% of plant costs (Little 1968,
55) • Its share has increased significantly since then
(Dawson 1976, 141; Stoller 1982, 3-2). The A-E-C's
generally act as the utility's agent, and are employed
under cost-plus rather than fixed price contracts (Little
1968, 289). This convention insulates the firms from many
-----------------------------------------------------------
*All dollar references in section 5 denominated in
historical dollars unless otherwise noted.
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of the economic risks associated with technical
uncertainties.
The A-E-C market's political-economic
characteristics strongly predispose it towards a tight
01 igo poly str uct ur e (Little '68 p. 74). Th r0ugh 1980
Bechtel, Stone &United Engineers, and Sargent & Lundy
accounted for more than 70% of all architect-engineer
contracts (Office of Technology Assessment 1981, 28). The
1968 A. D. Little study of competition in the nuclear
industry foresaw little likelihood of the 4-firm
concentr ati on rati0 falling below two-thi rds (p, 74). The
most important factors inducing concentration are:
1) the cyclical character of utility purchasing
behavior, (which necessitates large market shares in
order to avoid discontinuous work periods
2) the benefits of established client relations with
the utilities and AEC
3) the scale and quality control requirements of
nuclear construction
4) the potential for learning curve cost reduction
in plant construction (i.e. cumulative scale
economies) .[115]
These characteristics made it likely that the
leading fossil fuel utility construction firms would also
dominate the nuclear A-E-C market. Nuclear however had an
extra appeal due to its larger growth potential, greater
capital intensity and higher barriers to entry. Thus
like the active IOU's and electric equipment manufacturers,
the leading A-E-C firms had a self-interest in nuclear
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expansion.
Bechtel was the largest of these firms and the
subseq ue nt;discussion focuses on its behavior. Though the
company's privately held character limits information
availability, its estimated 1984 revenues of $14 billion
would have ranked 21st on the '84 £Q~~~D~ 500 list of
publ icly traded firm s (}Yilll .s~.bJ;.J;~ .J:.Q.1liDill 10/16/84).
Through 1980 the company had captured 30% of all U.S.
nuclear plant engineering-constructon contracts (Office of
Technology Assessment 1981, 28). This market share was
expected in the early seventies to generate annual
revenues of a half a billion dollars ('71$) by 1985 (AEC
1971a, 85).
Bechtel's interest in nuclear promotion was also
stimulated by its strong position in nuclear fuel cycle
markets. As with GE, Westinghouse, and the pro-nuclear
utilities, the claim is not that the company knowingly
sought to foister an inefficient technology on the American
economy. The argument is that amidst large uncertainties
it chose to use its political-economic resources to promote
nuclear power to economic efficiency; Le. to capture OT
status for the technology. It also sought to insure itself
a dominant position within the technology.
~l Bechtel's nLQmotional role
As the history of Bechtel's nuclear involvement
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below demonstrates, the company's promotional activities
included: subsidizing utility nuclear R&D projects,
assuming demonstration plant risks through turnkey
contr acting, proffering pro-nucl ear adv ice to its util ity
and government clients, and engaging in pro-nuclear
political initiatives. Its intra-industry battle for
market share similarly found expression in fixed price
contracting and aggressive efforts to participate in early
AEC and utility nuclear projects. The company also sought
to hire key AEC personnel and to orient government policy
in ways favorable to it.'
As the Little study reports, "Bechtel's interest in
the nuclear field dates back to 1949. / It grew out of a
determination after World War II of Bechtel's management to
gain a stronger participation in the utility business.
Electric power was viewed as a growth industry ... "
(Little 1968, 291). Thus, like the vendors, the company
made a conscious effort to involve itself in AEC projects,
taking part in the Commission's late '40's breeder reactor
experiments and one of the first four Industrial
Participation Studies in 1951 (JCAE 1959, 176; Hertsgaard
1983, 24). It also assumed fixed price contracting risks
and economic losses in several early nuclear plant
development projects. As Bechtel executive David Nerell
indicated in 1984, "Building demonstration plants is a good
way to get a jump on technologies that have big futures"
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(~g~~ Q~~~~~ ~Q~rna~ 10/16/84). The company served as a
contractor for an early AEC fuel reprocessing plant. It
was an active member of the mid-'50's Nuclear Power Group
which aided Commonwealth Edison in the construction of
Dresden 1. Besides serving as plant A-E-C it contributed
$1 million ('58$) to the R&D fund (JCAE 1956a, 239). It
assumed risks many times that amount in early 1958 when it
contracted on a fixed-price basis to build the Humboldt Bay
plant for PG&E. As the late fifties was marked by a
struggle between the AEC and IOU participants over who
would bear the overrun risks associated with development
plants, Bechtel's sole liability in the private sector's
Humboldt Bay project is striking (Bowring 1980, 25; JCAE,
1957,246,393; JCAE 1963c, 227-228). In the summer of
1958 the company made extensive efforts to enlist utility
support for high temperature gas reactor (HTGR) projects
(JCAE 1960b, 70-71). Late in the year it negotiated a
,
fixed price contract with a HTGR consortium led by
Philadelphia Electric to build the Peach Bottom plant. In
1959 former AEC Director of Reactor Development, W. Kenneth
Davis, noted the apparently high risks involved with the
contract (JCAE 1959, 186).
By 1960 Bechtel had also assumed an A-E-C role for
the Vallecitos, Consumers Public Power District, Big Rock,
and San Onofre reactors. It was prime contractor for the
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AEC's organic cooled reactor study, and a nuclear power
consultant for a number of clients (JCAE 1959, 176-177).
The company has also been active along the nuclear
fuel cycle, taking aggressive action to win a dominant
market position. Besides serving as construction engineer
for the AEC's Idaho fuel reprocessing plant, it designed 2
of the 3 existing private reprocessing plants and did
preliminary design work for Exxon's proposed plant
(Hertsgaard 1983, 318, 241). It won the engineering-
construction contract for Nuclear Fuel Services' (NSF) West
Valley plant by offering a turnkey contract for ninety
percent of the facility and numerous engineering
waranties. The company was also the driving force behind
Uranium Enrichment Associates' 5+ billion dollar enrichment
privatization proposal, which would have given it and its
partners a monopoly over the nation's enrichment
facilities. Bechtel has been equally active in the
nuclear export area, serving as A-E-C for 17 overseas
reactors (Hertsgaard 1983, 122). It has also engaged in
exploratory discussions with U.S. and foreign officials
regarding the construction of enrichment or reprocessing
facilities in Japan and Brazil (Hertsgaard 1983, 81, 233).
Besides aggressively assisting nuclear development
through R&D contributions and turnkey contracting, Bechtel
has also promoted the technology through political
ini tiatives. It contr ibuted, for exampl e, $180,000 to hel p
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defeat the 1976 California anti-nuclear referendum
(~~~~D~~~ N~~k 6/7/76) and was a key founder of the
extremely active pro-nuclear Commi ttee on Energy Awareness
(Hertsgaard 1983, 187,201). Its major political influence
however has probably been exercised more covertly through
direct contacts with high ranking government officials.
Hajor AEC-Bechtel linkages began in '58 when a key
former business partner of Steve Bechtel, John McCone,
became AEC Chairman. About the same time the company hired
W. Kenneth Davis, AEC Director of Reactor Development 1954-
1958, to head its nuclear efforts. In the mid-seventies it
hired Richard Hollingsworth, General Manager of the AEC
1964-1974. i Former Expor t-Import Bank director John Hore
became executive vice president of Bechtel Financing in
1984 (NaIl Street Journal 10/16/84). At a higher level of
Administration, Secretary of State George Schultz served 8
years as Bechtel president after terms as Secretary of the
Treasury ana Labor. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger
served as special counsel to the firm after his period as
Secretary of HEW.
Reflective of these linkages is the Ng~~ ~~~~~
.Journal's report that Bechtel's enrichment privatization
proposal received special attention due to its Bechtel
authorship (Ng]"l .s.t~~~.t .J.Q..u..rDgl 11/20/75). It w a s
subsequently forwarded to Congress as a Ford Administration
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proposal. W. Kenneth Davis similarly authored the Reagan
Administration's nuclear trade and proliferation policies
(Hertsgaard 1983, 232-233). He also persuaded the
Department of Energy to support a government insured
program for Bechtel's takeover of the Barnwell reprocessing
plant (Hertsgaard 1983, 241).
Bech tel staffers also inf luenced government pol icy
in numerous technical-regulatory areas through the
functional authority created by the firm's research
capabili ties and practical nuclear experience. Davis, for
example, served as chairman of the AIF's 1961 Committee on
Reactor Safeguards (JCAE 1961b, 207). He was probably
involved in the Forum's successful recommendation to the
AEC that the pessimistic results of the mid-sixties
Brookhaven accident probabilities study be withheld from
the public. Davis also chaired the National Academy of
Sciences influential Energy .in Transition 1985-2010 panel
on energy supply and delivery. Bechtel staffers similarly
performed some of the safety analyses underlying the 1975
Rasmussen safety study and participated (along wi th Stone
and ~vebster employees and representatives of GE,
Westinghouse, two nuclear utili ties and the AEC) in an
internal review of the preliminary draft of the report
(Nader and Abbotts 1979, 372). The promotional biases
introduced through these activites were more subtle than
those associated with the company's marketing efforts or
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high level policy lobbying. They reflect the functional
biases introduced by the firm's commercial interest in the
technology. As discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7,
the biases were embodied in the methodological approaches
to research problems taken by the firm.[116]
Bechtel and the other A-E-C's similarly influenced
U.S. nuclear development through their capaci ty as utili ty
advisors. As noted in section 4, the scale economies
involved with technology assessment, encouraged the
utilities to rely heavily on outside consultants for
technical advice in making capital equipment purchase
decisions (Sultan 1974, 20; Kuhn 1966, 123; Little 1968,
361, 378). While it is difficult to acquire information
about the content of utility-A-E-C relations, the available
evidence suggests the A-E-C's did little to mute the
promotional optimism emanating from the AEC/JCAE, reactor
vendors and pro-nuclear utilities. Published plant cost
predictions by Bechtel assisted utilities, for example,
have been, like all utility projections, notoriously over
optimistic.
On at least two occasions Bechtel has been sued by
former utility clients f.o r failure to adequately protect
them from the risks associated with nuclear contracting.
In a suit concerning its 1966 Palisades plant, Consumers
Power argued in part that Bechtel had not fulfilled its
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"duty and obligation to warn the company about potential
operating problems" (Dowie 1978,35). In responding to a
somewhat similar charge concerning Portland General
Electric's 1968 Trojan plant, Bechtel argued the
construction contract limited its risk exposure (Hellman
and Hellman 1983,4-6). On the international front, Bupp
and Derian have noted the promotional impact of Bechtel et
al.' s e xce ssi vely opti misti c pr esenta ti on to th e 1971
Geneva Conference on The Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.
They wri te,
the remaining two coauthors were executives
of Bechtel... As a promotional document, the report
was not especially objectionable, although it was no
more informative than an advertisement in a trade
journal. But it was objectionable to place such a
report, which obscured the truth rather than
illuminated it, in officially sanctioned and
authoritatively sponsored technical literature. It was
with self-serving documents like this one that the
American nuclear industry created a persuasive
illusion.
Th~ advertisements were undeniably effective.
Manufacturers in the fragmented European nuclear
industry began intense competi tion to become licensees
of the American companies (Bupp and Derian 1981, 83).
~ The .im.!?act .Qt OT ID.QID...e..n.tJJm.Qll Bechtel
While Bechtel clearly had a promotional interest in
nuclear expansion, it would be an over: simplification to
interpret its optimistic cost predictions (especially those
forwarded to its own clients) as self-serving propaganda.
The basis for Bechtel's participation in the nuclear
bandwagon is much more subtle, and involves self-deception
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as well ass elf -intere st. Th e err 0 rs are m 0re err 0 rs 0 f
omission than commission and reflect the firm's
participation in a socially created realm of discourse.
The latter was bounded by a collective failure to
investigate the economic implications of the technology's
negative externalities and an engineering hubris that
minimized the potential problems posed by the technology's
extreme novelty. The combination resulted in flawed cost
predicting models, which mistakenly assumed static
regulatory standards and routine learning curve cost
reductions. In 1960, for example, Bechtel confidently
asserted "complete, accurate and reliable" cost projections
for commercial sized versions of reactor designs for which
even modest sized demonstration plants had yet to be built
(JCAE 1960b, 611).
While Bechtel's willingness to participate in this
discourse was influenced by its self-interest in nuclear
expansion and insulation from the risks of over-optimism
due to its cost-plus contracts, the existence of a pro-
nuclear bounded rationality was the product of larger
bandwagon-OT dynamics. Like the utilities' management,
Bechtel planners were influenced by the promotional
activities of the vendors, AEC and JCAE, and the fail-safe
logic of self-fulfilling prophecy dynamics. They
implicitly assumed that the political consensus behind the
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technology insured the availability of economically
acceptable engineering solutions to all potential technical
problems.
Bechtel's behavior may have also been conditioned by
pressures emanating from the vendors, AEC, JCAE and large
IOU'S not to disrupt the technology's growth path. Recall,
for example, former Con. Ed. ann AIF president Louis
Roddis's assertion that the IOU'S interest in nuclear
expansion had muted their own criticism of the vendors'
excessive cost optimism (Section 4.5).[117] Jessup and
Lamont staffers claim that the utilities' hostile reaction
to the company's prescient 1976 study, "Problems of Nuclear
Power: possible Implications for Investors", hurt the firm
financially. In a phone conversation with Congressional
staffers, a company spokesman asserted that pUblication of
the report had resulted in a partial blacklisting of the
firm from utility underwriting. Company vice president
Sch roede r Boul ton added, " •.. we could be excl uded from
\other offerings if we testified publicly" (Government
Operations Committee 1978, 44-45; Government Operations
Committee 1977, 1803-4, 1574). Hertsgaard's industry
interviews suggest a similar picture. He notes, "Many
nuclear executives point out that even if they wanted to
leave the business, they could not without severely
damaging their corporate reputations and customer
rela tionships ••• The vendors are also keenly aware that
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many of the larger electric utilities want nuclear power to
be at 1eastan 0pt ion 1ate r in the 1980 's ••• Unde r the
circumstances, to abandon nuclear could cost a reactor
manufacturer millions of dollars in non-nuclearsales. As
one Babcoc k and W il cox execu tive explained, I We can't cut
our own throats by leaving nuclear. ~'le depend on the
uti 1 itY bus iness"I (Her tsgaard 19 83, 11 7). In Feb rua ry '84
the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment confirmed
that some utilities were channeling their non-nuclear
purchases to companies that continued to offer nuclear
services (Office of Technology Assessment 1984, 183). The
bitter anger directed at A. D. Little at the AlF's 1968
annual meeting, (in response to the company's carefully
qualified pUblic suggestion that the utilities may not have
bargained as aggressively as possible with reactor
vendors), reinforces this impression (Little 1968, 27-28;
AlF, Nuclear Industry 11-12/68 pp. 3, 18-19).
5...Al. .conclusion
Bechtel's role in creating the nuclear bandwagon was
the result of a complex interaction between the company and
the afore mentioned participants in the nuclear planning
context. A conjuncture of self-interest, rivalry dynamics,
inter-industry deferences and political presures created a
collective misperception of uncertainty. Bechtel helped
both produce and consume its illusions.
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The last major group to participate in the nuclear
planning context were the oil companies, many of whom made
major nuclear investments in the mid to late '60's as the
bandwagon market unfolded. The next section analizes their
behavior and role in the OT process.
QL The Nuclear Planning Context~
The Nuclear ~ Industry ~
The last aspect of the nuclear power industry is the
nuclear fuel cycle. Its firms complete the participant
list in the nuclear planning context. The discussion below
demonstrates how the evolution of the fuel industry and its
dominance by vertically integrated vendors, and several
large oil and chemical companies (See Table 8), reflects
the 1a rge rOT log ic 0f nuclea r devel 0 pm en t. Three main
points are made: that through 1965, the industry was a
product of AEC promotional ism; that its subsequent
expansion reflected the impact of the bandwagon market; and
that this expansion was congenial with the interests of
many large oil and chemical industry firms. The latter
fact provides an important insight into why nuclear's
-----------------------------------------------------------
*The nuclear fuel cycle begins with uranium exploration,
mining and milling; proceeds through conversion, enrichment
and fuel fabrication; and terminates with reprocessing and
waste disposal. All but the last of these steps will be
discussed below. There is at present no accepted permanent
waste disposal technology or industry. All dollar
references denominated in historical dollars unless
otherwise noted.
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sponsors were able to create a critical mass development
path.
Through August 1964 private ownership of nuclear
fuel was prohibited. The industry was a heavily
subsidized step-child of the AEC, created to serve the
military program. It consisted of two sets of firms,
uranium exploration-mining and milling companies, and AEC
fuel processing facility contractors. In order to insure
an adequate supply of materials for the Commission's
weapons reactors and the nuclear navy, the AEC guaranteed a
relatively high floor for uranium prices for 5-10 year
periods. It also extended numerous mining subsidies,
including bounties for new discoveries, funds for mining
and milling R&D, and monies for road construction to remote
mining sites (Dawson 1976, 161). The industry drew
\
participation mainly from mining companies and a few oil
and chemical firms. As military requirements were met,
prior investments created pressures for expanded civilian
nuclear development (l1ullenbach 1963, 121-122).
In the fuel processing area the AEC concentrated
contracts among a few companies, many of whom subsequently
sought to create commercial variants of their military
expertise. Allied Chemical administered the Commission's
conversion facility which prepared the U308 result of
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uranium milling for enrichment. The company subsequently
built one of the nation's two commercial conversion plants.
The other is owned by Kerr-McGee, which by 1966 was the
AEC's chief uranium supplier (AEC 1966, 29).
The Commission's multi-billion dollar enrichment
contracts were shared between Union Carbide and Goodyear,
both of whom were subsequently involved in private sector
enr ichment proposals. Many of the firms which transformed
the enriched uranium into fuel elements for the nuclear
navy later diversified into civilian markets. Allied, GE,
AReO, and National Lead's reprocessing initiatives
similarly followed AEC fuel cycle contractor roles.
~ The .impact of OT momentum:: Q.9..n.QWagon.Q.yngIDics
The late '60's was a turning point in fuel cycle
developments. The bandwagon reactor sales (1966-1969) and
fuel markets' expected scale and vertical integration
economies, triggered large rivalry induced fuel cycle
investments, and the aggressive entry of the oil companies.
This in turn encouraged further utility nuclear orders.
After the Gina and Millstone plant sales in 1965, the AIF's
membership journal reported, "••• some feel that these two
contracts confirm th~t nuclear power has entered a new
phase. They point out, for example, that the volume of
work to be done ••• assures that production of components
and fuel and the supply of services will be expanded, and
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the basis for commercial operations strengthened, not only
by the reactor manufacturers but in other important sectors
of the industry, including fuel preparation, chemical
reprocessing, pressure vessel manufacturing and uranium
production. The result must be improvements in quality and
economics that will increase the attractiveness of nuclear
power" (AlP Nuclear lndustr~ 9/65 p, 4).
More formally expressed, the AlP anticipated
nuclear's capture of systemwide efficiencies, as reciprocal
positive externalities accumulated from capital outlays in
different aspects of the nuclear industry. The oil firms'
investments thus offer another example of the self-
fulfilling prophecy dynamics associated with nuclear's
emerging OT status. The opposite phenomenon, a self-
fUlfilling pessimism, was simultaneously weakening the coal
sector, as complementary investments were retarded in rail
and other interfacing technologies. [118]
As predicted, the AEC reported growing oil industry
interest in nuclear fuel activities in 1966. Exxon began
its u.s. uranium exploration efforts and City Service
expressed interest in acqui ring united Nuclear, a leading
fuel cycle firm (ABC 1966, 31). In '67 Gulf purchased
General Atomic, a major (though eventually unsuccessful)
competitor in the reactor and fuel fabrication markets,
becoming the second oil company to move beyond the mining
and milling stage of the fuel cycle (AEC 1967b, 48; AEC
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1966, 87-88). In the same year Atlantic Richf ield (ARCO):
purchased NUMEC (a major f~el processing firm) and
announced plans for the construction of a commercial
reprocessing plant. The company also assumed a contractor
role at the AEC's Washington reprocessing facility.
In 1968 Getty purchased one-half interest in Nuclear
Fuel Services (NFS), (a major fuel processing and
reprocessing firm), and expanded its uranium exploration
and mining efforts (AIF, N~clegr In~ustry: 5/68 p. 26,
11/67 p. 29). A year later the company purchased the
remaining half of NFS and announced plans to triple its
reprocessing capacity (AlF, Nuclear Industry 3/69,6/69).
During 1968 the oil companies as a group were responsible
for 44% of all exploratory and development drilling for
uranium (Senate Judiciary Committee 1970 33). The
following year Exxon announced plans to become a major
factor along the entire nuclear fuel cycle (AlP, Nuclear
Lndu s t.r y 3/69 pp. 15-16 i Electr ical WorIii 3/31/69). ' Other
oil company nuclear activities announced in 1969 included:
a major new uranium discovery by Gulf (AIF, Nu~lear
Industry 3/69 p. 27), a fuel fabrication initiative by
Continental (AlF, Nuclear Industry 3/69 p, 16) and
discussions by Ashland 'Oil of a takeover of United Nuclear
(AIF, N.u~lear In.dustry 1/69 p. 23). Kerr-McGee expanded
its nuclear activities throughout these years (AIF, Nuclear
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Industry 11/67, 3/69).
The rivalry dynamics in the fuel reprocessing market
nicely illustrate the expansionary pressures created by OT
momentum. [119] Recall that construction of the first
commercial reprocessing facility was begun by NFS in 1963.
The project was part of Governor Rockefeller's efforts to
transform New York State into a nuclear center. Pursuing
vertical integration economies, GE received a construction
permit for the second reprocessing project in 1967. As the
Little study of '68 noted, GE's ability to offer utilities
a complete reactor-fuel fabrication-reprocessing service
gave the company a competitive edge in the linked markets
(187,234-236). In pursuit of large scale economies, Allied
announced plans in 1968 for a reprocessing facility five
times the ton/day size of either GE or NFS's plants. [120]
Subsequent competition for market share and scale
efficiencies created pressures for excess capacity (Little
1968, 235/ 245). Hore or less concurrent with Allied's 5
ton/day announcement, ARCO and National Lead indicated
their interest in building similar sized facilities (Little
1968, 217; AIF, fl~~l~g~ lng~§try 10/68, AEC 1967b, 137).
A year later Getty announced its intention to triple NFS's
reprocessing capabilities (AlF, Nuclear lnQustry 6/69), and
Exxon began a major reprocessing R&D program (Senate
Judiciary Committee 1977, 170). Completion of all these
plants (independent of Exxon's program) would have produced
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a reprocessing supply of 19 tons/day by 1973, a capacity
three times the available market (AlF, NUc.l~.r .I.n.QJJJ2.t.r~
5/68 pp. 19,41; AEC 1968b, 174-175). Even after National
lead and ARCa's withdrawal, surplus capacity persisted as a
result of NFS, GE and Allied's construction programs (AlF,
The companies' willingness to
expend $150 million (late '60's mixed historical $) in the
face of 5-10 years of load short losses testifies to the
power of scale competition. Even more impressive, however,
is the firms' willingness to make such investments in the
face of large technical and regulatory uncertainties. All
three plants eventually pr oved technical fail ur es and are
currently inoperative. Their aborted history presents
another occasion where rivalry induced investments in
nuclear power outpaced firms' technical competence •
.6......3.l The Qi.l industr~ and .nJJclear .llQw.er
,
Th'e ability of nuclear power's sponsors to promote
the technology to OT status was facilitated by nuclear's
congeniality with the long run interests of the major oil
companies. The latter enjoyed significant political-
economic influence over energy policy during this
period [121] and their opposition to nuclear expansion
could have limited federal support and critical mass
momentum.
While it might have been expected that the oil
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industry would mirror the coal industry's opposition to
nuclear development[122], the different end uses served by
the two fossil fuels left nuclear power a much more serious
competi tor for the coal industry's utility market than the
oil industry's liquid fuel market. Once it was clear that
nuclear could not provide a near term competitive energy
source for air propulsion and auto electrification, the
technology ceased to be a major threat to the petroleum
industry (Mullenbach 1963, 334-336). Based on a literature
review and petroleum industry interviews, the Department of
Interior concluded in 1956 that nuclear expansion would
have little impact on oil industry markets over the next 20
years. The DOl's study noted, "If all incremental large
power stations built after 1960 were to use atomic energy -
an unlikely assumption - the estimated loss to the oil
indus try w 0 ul dam 0un t by 1975 to 17 0,000 bar rels da i1Y 0 r
1 .3 % 0f the ant icipa ted do me stic de man d ••• t rif 1 in g
losses" (JCAE 1956b, 100). The study added that oil
\
executives did not expect nuclear power to become
competitive in transportation or heating markets, noting, "
It appears more likely that some other source of energy
might enter these fields before atomic energy does. Solar
radiation, for example, might very well compete with oil
and gas in household heating ahead of atomic energy" (JCAE
1956b, 101).
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The president of Standard Oil of New Jersey
indicated in the same year that his company welcomed
nuclear development as a way of accelerating third world
economic growth and the derived demand for liquid fuels
(AlF, Forum .M..§mo1/56 p. 35). The companies may have also
thought of nuclear power as a post-petroleum medium for
reproducing their dominance of the energy sector, as they
possessed potential competitive advantages in many nuclear
fuel markets.
6.31} Qil COI!l1?illlY dominance ..Q.f the uranium ..i.llitJ121i2·
The uranium industry is composed of three activities:
exploration and reserve purchase, mining, and milling.
Because of their functional overlap, all three areas are
often pr opr ietarily connected. The oi 1 compa ni e a' massive
capital base, extensive mineral rights holdings, large
geological libraries, chemical processing expertise and
working relationships with existing public energy
bureaucracies, left them in a strong position in uranium
markets. As William Slick, Senior Exxon vice president
indicated in 1977, n••• exploration for, and mining and
milling of uranium was a logical extension of Exxo n vs
historical activities ••• diversification into the nuclear
fuel cycle offers business opportunities that match Exxon1s
capabilities" (Senate Judiciary Committee 1977). The
Little study reached similar conclusions (Little 1968, 79).
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By the 1970' saIl thr ee ar eas had concentrated
markets dominated by petroleum companies. The American
Petroleum Institute estimated in 1977 that 72% of all known
uranium reserves available at less than $20jlb were
controlled by oil companies (Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources 1977, 323). Fifty-two percent of u.S.
mining and milling capacity was similarly owned in 1978
(Chapman 1983- 214).
The 4 and 8 firm concentration ratios in reserve
holding (at less than $30jlb) in 1976 were 42% & 53%; for
mining and milling, the ratios were and 54 and 78% (Senate
Energy and Natural Resources Committee 1977,326-7). The
industry's concentrated character is the result of
economies of scale in exploration [123], mining [124], and
R&D, as well as the competitive advantages accruing from
vertical integration.[125] The politicized environment of
energy economics also benefits large companies with
extensive lobbying and client relationships with public
pol icy makers.
A number of analysts have minimized the technically
determined momentum for concentration in the uranium
industry. [126] These observers overlook the dynamic
elements of nuclear sector evolution. The latter transform
static snapshots of a "mining" industry into a motion
picture of a "nuclear industry", with significant long run
technical change, escalating capital requirements,
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opportunities for vertical integration, and the need for
experienced interaction with federal bureaucracies.[127]
The oil companies' competitive advantages in uranium
industry markets promised significant returns. In 1971 the
AEC projected that domestic and foreign uranium purchases
for the '71-'85 period would approach one million tons and
total more than $13 billion at a price of $7/1b. (AEC
1971A, 14).[128] The petroleum companies' potential
windfall gains at the $30+/1b. price prevailing in 1977
were more than $10 billion (Chapman 1979, 12; Dawson 1976,
165) •
~21 Qi~ ing~~~~y Eg~~igiEg~igD in ~D~ t~~l
~~gg~~~lng jDg~B~~Y. Oil firms have also sought to
capi tal ize on var ious competi tive advantages they possess
in fuel processing markets. As Exxon vice president William
Slick noted in 1977, "••• activities in the nuclear fuel
cycle are technplogically intensive and capital intensive,
with long lead times between investments and return of
investment - a capi tal management environment similar to
oil production and refining" (Senate Judiciary Committee
1977, 166). Such activities also offer opportunities for
vertical integration and close coordination with federal
officials for which the oil companies are especially well
suited. The major fuel processing markets are enrichment,
fuel fabrication and reprocessing.
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Exxon and ARCa have been active in efforts to assume
enrichment responsibilities. [129] The $80 billion dollar
market available to U.S. firms through the year 2000 (AEC
1974c, 42) and its technically determined oligopoly
character [130] were especially alluring. Through '76 Exxon
had spent $20 million for centrifuge and $30 million for
laser enrichment R&D. In 1975 the company began
negotiations with ERDAfor the construction of a privately
designed and owned centrifuge plant. In contrast, the
company had spent a total of only $9 million on all kinds
of solar energy research through 1976 (Senate Judiciary
Committee 1977, 170-171). ARca was a partner with Electro-
Nucleonics in a major enrichment R&D team in the mid-
seventies.
The next step in the fuel processing cycle is fuel
fabrication. [131] By the early seventies it was expected
to generate annual sales of $700 million (Dawson 1976,
144). By 1974 Exxon, with 1.4 billion dollars in uranium
and fuel ass'embly orders, had broken the vendors'
collective monopoly on fabrication activities (Senate
Energy and Natural Resources Committee 1977, 368). The only
firm able to do this previously had been United Nuclear
(Little 1968, 187). Gulf, ARCa, Continental .and Getty have
also sought (as yet unsuccessfully) to win fabrication
market shares. [132]
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Exxon has also aggressively entered the reprocessing
market. Explaining the company's 25 million dollar R&D
outlays 1969-1977, Slick noted, "Reprocessing is both
technol ogi clly and capi tal intensi ve ••• (a) sm all ch ange
in regulatory requirements can carry large financial
implications ••• The demands of the fuel reprocessing
sector combine many of Exxon's skills ••• (The company) now
has a license application pending ••• (for a facility large
enough) to satisfy the fuel needs of 40 large nuclear
plants" (Senate Judiciary Committee 1977, 169-170).
Similarly motivated, Getty, ARCa and Gulf announced plans
to enter the market in the late sixties and early
seventies.
Ml Conclusion.. the OT .lQgic Qf .fJJ.tl .QYQil ~lQl;>lJlilllt
As Table 8 indicates the nuclear fuel cycle by the
mid-seventies was dominated by 6 oil firms (Kerr-McGee,
Exxon, Gulf, Getty, ARca and Continental), 3 chemical firms
(Union Carbide, Allied Chemical and Goodyear), and 4
vertically integrated reactor vendors (Westinghouse, GE,
Combustion Engineering and Babcock and Wilcox). These
firms along with Bechtel and the pro-nuclear utilities
comprise the core of the nuclear industry. As one reviews'
the history of nuclear power, an interactive logic emerges.
Amidst the massive uncertainties surrounding energy sector
investment, each firm's nuclear commitments were taken by
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other firms as rationales for further nuclear investment.
By the late sixties and early seventies the technology's
sponsors had established a seemingly self-perpetuating
momentum.
While the oil companies were late participants in
this process, the technology's congeniality with their long
term interests facilitated its consensus expansion.
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Table .!U. MiQ-Seyenties ~ Cycle W.m~
The nuclear fuel cycle is dominated by the 4 light water
reactor vendors, 6 oil companies (Kerr-McGee, Gulf, Exxon,
/I.RCa, Getty and Continental), and 3 chemical firms (Allied
Chemical, Union Carbide and Goodyear). To highlight this
fact, asterisks have been placed next to all Qther firms.
Uranium Reserye.s U92.6.l.(1)
,CQmpany ~ Total ~ Reser~~
Kerr-McGee
Gulf
*Uni ted Nuclear
Continental Oil
*Phelps Dodge
Getty
GE
Exxon
21
12
6
4
3
3
3
3
.u.rgniJJID .Mining £ng .Mil.l.in.s 11.~1A..1..( 2)
Kerr-McGee 16
GE 15
Anaconda (ARCa as of 177) 15
Union Carbide 9
Exxon 8
*Uni ted Nuclear 7
*Rio Algom 4
*Atlas 4
CQmpany ~ Market
Kerr-McGee (after expansion) 52
Allied Chemical 48
potential Entrants: Getty,
Allied-Gulf,Babcock and Wilcox
--------------------------------------------------------
1) Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 1977
pp.326-7.
2) Ibid.
3) AEC 1974 p. 47.
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Table 8 continued
Enrich~ il~1Al(4)
Existing AEC Contractors:
Union Carbide
Goodyear
Consortia Participating in Part II of AEC R&D Access
Program:
Uranium Enrichment Associates (various combinations of
Bechtel, Westinghouse, Union Carbide, Goodyear and the
Williams Company), Cengex (Exxon,GE),
Centar (ARCO,Electro-Nucleoni cs) ) .
Other firms active in the enrichment area:
*Pratt and Whitney, *ITT,the *Garrett Corporation and
several *util i ti es.
~ Fabrication (19741(5)
Westinghouse
GE
Combustion Engineering
Babcock and Wilcox
Exxon
Other active firms:
Kerr-HcGee, Getty.
Continental-Aerojet,
*Anaconda-National Lead.
Previously active firms: ARCO,
Gulf, *Atomics International,
Reprocessing (1974)i[l
Commercial Plants Attempted:
Getty
GE
Allied-Gulf
/
Other historically Active Firms:
Exxon
ARCO
*Anaconda-National Lead.
---------------------------------------------------------
4) AEC 1974c pp. 50-52.
5) AEC 1974c p. 53; AEC 1970b pp. 76-78.
6) AEC 1974c p. 61; AEC 1970b p. 250.
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Table ~ M~ ~ gnQ ~mical ~mpanies Inyolyed
Along ~ Nuclear ~ Cycle(ll
&. .Q..iJ,. Fir ms
ExxOIU (largest u.s. oil firm by sales 1971) Exxon began to
participate in nuclear development in a serious manner in
the mid-to late sixties. By 1976 it was:
-the 8th largest holder of domestic uranium reserves
-5th largest uranium miller
-one of the most active firms in enrichment R&D
-one of 5 firms with fuel fabrication orders, and
-one of about 6 firms active in reprocessing.
~~ (4th largest oil firm) Beginning with the 1967
acquisition of General Dynamics' General Atomic Division,
Gulf began an aggressive entry into many areas of the
nuclear industry. At one time General Atomic had managed
to win 7 orders for its high temperature gas cooled
reactor. Had the technology proved marketable, Gulf could
have occupied a position similar to GE and westinghouse.
-by '76 the company was also the 2nd largest holder of
uranium reserves. It acknowledged in 8/77 that it had
participated in the international uranium cartel's price
fixing activities.
-in partnership with Allied Chemical it built one of
,the 3 existing commercial reprocessing plants.
-through a General Atomic joint venture it
participated with Shell in the European URENCO enrichment. 'proJect, and
-through a partnership with united Nuclear it entered
the fuel fabrication market. .._'
----------------------------------------------------------
1) Mining and milling rankings listed in table drawn from
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 1977 pp.
326-327. For a general summary of oil company energy
sector involvement see pages 376-384. Oil company sales
rankings drawn from Medvin 1974, p. 14.
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Table 9 continued
At~n~~ E~h~~ LA~ (# 8 oil firm) with its
acquisition of Anaconda in 1977 ARCO became the 3rd largest
miller and 9th largest holder of uranium reserves
-through its 1967 acquisition of NUMEC it entered the
fuel fabrication market
-through a joint venture with Electro-Nucleonics it
has been one of the most active firms in the enrichment R&D
field
-it has also been one of the 6 most active firms in
the fuel reprocessing area.
Continental Qil (#9 oil firm) By 1976 the company was:
-the 4th largest holder of uranium reserves
-9th largest uranium miller, and
-a partner with Aerojet in a fuel fabrication venture.
~etty ~ (#19 oil firm) By 1976 the company was:
-the 6th largest holder of uranium reserves
-16th largest uranium miller, and
-an entrant into the fuel reprocessing and fabrication
markets.
~.£=-.M.Q.G~ (#22 oil firm) For over 20 years the company has
been the leading uranium firm in the U.S., ranking # 1 in
both mining and milling in 1976.
-it is one of the two firms with commercial conversion
facilities, and possesses fuel fabrication capabilities.
A number of other oil companies have been moderately active
in the nuclear industry: Phillips Petroleum, Mobil,
Standard Oil of Ohio, Standard of California, pioneer,
Union Oil, Union Pacific and Reserve Oil (Mulholland 1979,
78,87; Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
1977,363,378).
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Table 9 continued
Union Carbide:
-1 of 2 enrichment contractors, and a participant in
the UEAprivatization discussions.
-15th largest holder of uranium reserves, and
-4th largest uranium miller in '74.
All i ed .c.b..g.m..i.Q.9.l :
-1 of 2 firms comprising the conversion industry
-a partner with Gulf in 1 of the nation's 3 commercial "
reprocessing plants, and
-a joint contractor overseeing the AEC's Idaho Falls
nuclear testing facility.
~dyeari
-1 of 2 U.S. enrichment contractors and a participant
in UEAprivatization discussions.
Dupont, Dow, and Monsanto have been chiefly involved
with processing materials for nuclear weapons purposes,
serving at various times, for example, as contractors for
the Hanford, Savannah River and Rocky Flats facilities.
i
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We developed in this chapter step one of the OT
framework's three step logic for analyzing nuclear history
by specifying the dimensions of the nuclear planning
context. The conjuncture's key ideological and
insti tutional variables were cold war sentiments, and the
character of utility and nuclear regulation. The planning
context's major participants were the AEC and JCAE, 4
reactor vendors, the pro-nuclear utilities, and
Bechtel. [133J Pursuing various political objectives, long
run growth strategies, and the logic of rivalry dynamics,
these agents, both consciously and unconsciously, carved
out a critical mass development path for the technology.
The bandwagon markets of the late sixties and early
seventies, and the oil companies concurrent nuclear
investments testi fy to thei r success.
?he implication of nuclear history is that the
market's organization of technical change reflects social
as well as technical variables. The market is not
perceived as a medium of aggregation which translates
engineering parameters into economic outcomes in the
process of finding technically efficient solutions to
engineering problems. Instead it is viewed as a particular
context for integrating strategic behavior, ideological and
institutional variables, and technical parameters. Active
agents are perceived as creating as much as discovering
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development paths. The social variables defining planning
contexts complement (and to some extent dominate)
technical parameters as the determinants of the pattern of
inf rastructural technical change.
The nuclear planni nq context was particularly well
defined. Numerous observers have noted the closed character
of the decision making environment that oversaw nuclear
development before 1970.[134] Though many besides the
above groups testified at the JCAE's annual hearings on the
"State of the Atomic Energy Industry", for example, their
representatives appeared in cameo roles. Their spokesmen
repeated the cost optimism and nuclear world view created
by the OT process and rarely contributed any independent
rnateri ale As Bupp and Derian write, " The voluminous
record of the hearings is an impressive monument to the
mutually reinforcing government-industry capacity for self-
deception" (Bupp and Derian 1981, 227).
Through the early seventies, participation in the
AEC's licensing process was similarly circumscribed. As
Ebbin and Kasper concluded in their widely cited National
... the only consensus amongSci ence Founda ti on study, "
all the parties to the proceedings [Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board hearings] appeared to be a general
evaluation that the whole process as it now stands [circa
1972] is nothing more than a charade, the outcome of which
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is for all intents and purposes predetermined" (Ebbin and
Kasper 1974, 246). Public involvement in the planning for
a local reactor was precluded until the plant's formal
hearing stage, which occurred years after coordinated
efforts by the utility, vendor, architect-engineer and AEC
to design and promote the project. Subsequent to being
granted intervenor status, non-industry groups were given
only 30-60 days to review formerly inaccessible plant
information in preparation for the hearings. The
procedures were administered in an adversary context with
the burden of proof on the intervenors to demonstrate why
the plant should not be licensed (Ebbin and Kasper 1974,
244-253; Chubb 1983, 92-96).
I
The character of both the AEC and JCAE's proceedings
illustrates the functional authority conferred by the
industry's "hands-on" nuclear expertise. The Commission's
early reliance on informal as opposed to judicial rule
making also heightened the influence of industry lobbying
at the expense of ad hoc citizen groups(135]. The
influence illustrates Galbraith's notion of bureaucratic
symbiosis as def a ct o economic planning. In conjunction
with the cold war's discouragement of anti-nuclear inquiry,
this context insulated nuclear power from critical review.
The only source of sustained criticism of nuclear
promotion before 1970 was the coal sector, and its
competitive small firm character, and limited political
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clout during this period minimized its impact. Organized
labor sporadically raised health and safety concerns and
objections to nuclear concentration ratios, but never
developed an independent perspective on nuclear power from
that cultivated by the industry and AEC (AlP, ~QLMIDM~IDQ
11/59 p, 37; .N.!ll;ilQni.g~ 4/63 p. 20; Dawson 1976,153;
Hullenbach 1963,25). The resulting consensus permitted
public subsidy and private promotion to create a powerful
momentum in favor of nuclear development. Rivalry dynamics
and passive firm deference to "coming technology" imagery,
reflected nuclear's emerging capture of OT status, and were
key preconditions for the 200 plant orders 1964-1974.
Elaborating this theme, the next four chapters
attempt to quantify the market advantage OT status gave
~
nuclear p ow e rv . Chapter 4 looks at the effect of OT
momentum on the R&Dprocess, and the impact of nuclear's
increased capture of research funds on its pace of
development. Chapters 5-8 examine the nature and level of
public subsidy, incentive regulation and other OT related
benefits, such as the increased capture of scale economie~
An aggregate cost reduction differential is derived in
Chapter 8 (expressed in terms of mills per kilowatt hour)
to sum up the market impact of OT status.
C HAP T E RIll
1. By ideological belief is meant a general outlook whose
retention is based on broad value judgements or sets of
impressions that are not immediately sensi tive to changes
in empirical information. Such beliefs tend to limit or
define realms of public discourse and impart an inertia to
planni ng context s,
2. By technocratic professionalism is meant the tendency
for professionals to avoid participation in political
matters related to their expertise. This abdication
maximizes the political influence of official corporate or
government policy. The evolution of a more politicized
group of nuclear sector professionals in the late sixties
and seventies played an important role in the technology's
decline. (See Chapter 6.)
3. Harvard Business School professor Irvin Bupp and co-
author Jean Derian write, II ••• the Atomic Energy Commission
and Joint Committee on Atomic Energy became soap boxes for
light water promotion literature •••The influence of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was especially pernicious
•••The1946 atomic energy legislation established a
perfectly insulated, self-perpetuating organization with
plenary powers •••" (Bupp and Derian 1981, 189).
4. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 1956b, 50.
5. The study was also optimistic about nuclear's economic
potential, but as an avenue for achieving even lower
energy costs, rather than a response to fossil fuel
scarcity. As Chapter 7 demonstrates, this optimism was the
product of AEC'and nuclear industry promotionalism, rather
than empirical experience. It was a result rather than a
cause of the nuclear planning context.,,~, l c
6. Nuclear's role in energy planning was always limited by
its electrical form. The latter made it unlikely that the
technology could displace oil in the transportation sector.
It also required nuclear compete with coal in the
electricity market. The latter fuel's abundant supply
appeared to limit future cost escalation as environmental
concerns were relatively undeveloped (Perry 1977, 72).
7. Interestingly, parallel arguments have been raised
against the drift of the u.S. economy towards a service
economy by observers concerned with maximizing American
geopolitical power. Hays quotes M. H. Finney "The big
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consumption, nonproduction service oriented economy sounds
very good ••• but this assumes a peaceful political world.
Can we imagine what could hapen if we produced no steel, or
plastic, or electronics etc., but only managed their
production in the rest of the world. Suppose there are
expropriations of our investments around the world? We'd
be left with an elite with no one to manage around the
world ••• In our judgement, undermining the industr ial base
of this country cannot but lead to serious political
consequences. We need a strong production oriented economy
to maintain our military and poli tical strength" (Hays 1983
"File Suvrive", 15).
8. During World War II civilian power research was begun at
Hanford as a way to induce key nuclear scientists to remain
on call for maintenance interventions at the weapons
material producing reactors (Kuhn 1966, 2). The
technology was thus totally incubated within a military
environment.
9. The Euratom variant of this program, for example, was
especially designed to forestall French acquisition of
nuclear weapons. Though unsuccessful in this objective, the
program did aid in limiting proliferation on the continent
(Nau 1974, 96-97). Euratom was also perceived by its
American sponsors as a mechanism for containing soviet
expansion by facilitating European integration (Lonnroth
and Walker 1983, 12-13).
10. Appointed by the JCAE to study the peaceful uses of
atomic energy, the McKinney Panel, for example, concluded
in 1956 that, " In the uncommitted areas of the world,
American leadership in making atomic power available could
be a strong influence in guiding these areas toward a
course of freedom ••• This consideration should strongly
influence ••• the rate at which the development of atomic
power suitable for such purposes is pursued" (Donnelly
1972, 32). AEC Commissioner Thomas l1ur ray declared in 1953
that a Soviet victory in the nuclear power race posed a
greater threat to u.s. security than the Soviet H-bomb
(Falk 1982, 119). Concern about potential nuclear
cooperation between India and the Soviet Union was
especially high (Hullenbach 1963, 294). For a general
discussion of the impact of ideological rivalry on nuclear
development see also: (l1ullenbach 1963, 294-296, 19, 264);
Allen (1967, 31-32, 76-77); Hogerton (1968, 23); Nau
(1974, 71); Perry (1977); and DeLeon (1979).
Non-superpower nuclear efforts were also mobilized
by symbolic nationalist dynamics. Like the olympics or
competition for Nobel prizes in the humanities, nuclear
proficiency became a symbol of national pride (DeLeon 1979,
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55-61; Lonnroth and Walker 1983,11; Nau 1974, 71). The
JCAE for example reported that some developing nations
sought Atoms for Peace reactors to demonstrate their coming
of age, despite their lack of scientific personnel to
manage the facilities (Donnelly 1972, 35). Henry Nau
emphasizes the psychological dimension underlying the
French and German nuclear efforts. Of the French program
he writes, " Under the Fifth Republic technological
progress became the expression of the country's
independence in the widest sense ••• " (Nau 1974, 71).
Describing the German reactor program, he quotes its
director, " For us it is not a matter of military or
political power. Nor is it a matter of prestige. But it
is indeed a matter of asserting and securing the place of
the German people among the industrial nations, a place
which we have regained again with so much effort" (Nau
1974,72).
11. AEC chairman and key Eisenhower nuclear advisor Lewis
Strauss expressed the Administration's point of view in a
1953 letter to the JCAE, indicating, "In all recent
planning for construction of a central station atomic power
plant we have worked on one principle assumption, that the
United States should start construction of a power reactor
now -- rather than continue research and development
looking to the 'last word' in an economical reactor ••• "
(Allen 1977, 3 0) •
12. While nationalist dynamics in the developed nations
were always expected to compromise the degree to which U.s.
firms could capture European and Japanese reactor orders,
recourse to licensing and joint venture arrangements, and
domination of third world markets, offered attractive long
term prospects.
13. Besides being contingent upon European purchase of
American reactor designs, foreign utility participation in
Euratom required assumption of all project cost overruns.
Debate over who would bear such liabilities in the domestic
power reactor demonstration program limited domestic
utili ty nuclear projects.
14. The McKinney panel advising the JCAE in 1956 suggested
a somewhat similar strategy, noting, " A gap may occur for
the power equipment manufacturing industry between present
domestic interest in atomic power reactors and actual sales
in substantial volume. If the equipment manufacturers
••• areto be ~xpected to carry forward research and
development directed toward making atomic power competitive
in the United States, the foreign market may offer a
solution to bridging this gap" (Donnelly 1972, 32).
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15. The Euratom program, supported by both AEC and Export-
Import Bank subsidies, was designed to facilitate the
European purchase of a million kilowatts of U.S. reactor
technology. The plans called for a $350 million
construction expenditure (historical dollars), an outlay
sl igh tly la rge r than all U.S. util ity nuc1 ear spending
through 1960 (Mu11enbach 1963, 138,245). About half of the
funds were to be supplied in below market interest rate
loans by the Ex-1m Bank (r1ullenbach 1963, 245). The AEC
also agreed to insure European access to American
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, guarantee the
performance of U.S. nuclear fuel, and provide a 10 year
assured market for recovered plutonium (BUpp and Oerian
1981, 36). These subsidies and persistently misleading AEC
assurances about the economic promise of U.S. technologies
were instrumental in precipitating a key 1957 Euratom
report ("A Tar get for Eura tom "). The la tter recommended
acceptance of th e natur al monopoly ch aracter isti cs of
nuclear R&D. It urged deference to the greater resources
the AEC and U.S. corporations could mobilize in the
development process. As one of the three coauthors, Louis
Armand, wrote, II One can see no country, even France, with
its three reactors of the same type under construction
•••that could be capable alone of counterbalancing the U.S.
which already has 30 different types of reactors
manufactured" (Bupp and Derian 1981, 28).
Such sentiments turned Euratom to American designs,
and were important in insuring the U.s. capture of the Senn
purchase in Italy and Gundremmingen order in Germany (Bupp
and Derian 1981, 37-38; Nau 1974, 145). Though various
other events in the late fifties slowed the pace of nuclear
expansion in Europe, (especially the increased availability
of oil and coal resources) these early purchases are
generally .cr ed.ited with insuring the market triumph of U.S.
light water technology over the British and French gas-
graphite reactor designs. Many years later similar
arguments were offered by the director of the French
national utility for rejecting renewed efforts to develop
the French gas-graphite reactor. The official argued, II We
have to acknowledge that a light water model is not more
reliable than a gas graphite model But the world
currently has around 80,000 MW under construction or on
order from light water models, while there are 8,000 MW
under construction or on order from gas-graphite models •
•••For France, within our little borders, to continue
pursuing a technology in which the world has no interest
doesn't make sense ••• The fact that the world market is
now clearly oriented towards light water models means that
our industrialists will only be able to enter the
industrial world insofar as they have their own valid
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experience with the models that the world is interested in"
(Gorz 1979).
16. Hays writes, " The goal of Eximbank's nuclear activity
was first to create an international market, and then to
defend it." From 1959-1982 $7.1 billion in loans and
guarantees had been extended the nuclear industry, through
more than 100 distinct agreements. These funds financed
approximately two-thirds of all U.S. nuclear exports and
about 50 reactor sales. In 1979 nuclear activities
accounted for about one-fifth of the Bank's total exposure
(Hays & Zarsky 1984, 32-34).
17. Krugman writes, " •••in imperfectly competitive markets
there is some monopoly rent for which firms are competing.
Government action may enable domestic firms to sieze a
larger share of these rents than they would otherwise be
able to get. Introducing technological competition into
trade theory, then does seem to give some justification for
the kinds of industrial policies which Japan is accused of
following. Or at any rate, it offers support for the idea
that protecting R&D intensive industries may really be a
beggar-thy-neighbor policy, not simply a beggar-thyself
poLi.cy" (American Economic ReyieYl 73, No.2: 346).
18. Hogendorn and Brown's analysis extends the Boston
Consulting Group's emphasis on the competitive implications
of learning curve efficiencies into the international trade
area (Hogendorn 1979, 237-244).
19. The conclusions of a little cited work, International
~arketing of Nuclear ~~ by a foreign sales executive and
engineer for North American Aviation, parallel those
offerred here. writing in 1966, based on his own marketing
experience 'and a series of interviews, the author
concludes, "•••the business government relationships
described in this framework of nuclear power are the first
of many-the beginning of a pattern. As future
breakthroughs are made in other technologies, there will be
competition among governments to develop those technologies
as quickly as possible for the purpose of gaining
international prestige and obtaining an advantage for their
own manufacturers in the export markets •••11 (Nehrt 1966,
vii) •
20. Bupp and Derian write, " ••• the original clients of
these two bodies were the scientists ••• it was the
interests of these scientists that the Joint Committee and
the Commission protected and promoted ••• the government
atomic energy machinery fit the standard Ameican pattern of
providing 'clientele' interests with public agencies to
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further their own ends" (Bupp and Derian 1981, 180).
David Lilienthal emphasizes the atonement motive behind
u.s. civilian nuclear programs in a similar manner
(Lilienthal, 1963 108). Horgan Thomas writes" (the
JCAE's) awareness of the absence of organized public
opinion, lobbyists, and special interest groups caused them
to rely on their own reasoning powers for guidance in
pubLic policy" (Thomas 1956, 116).
21. The 1946 Atomic Energy Act, for example, required the
AEC to seek out private enterprise solutions to nuclear
development. The memoirs of AEC Chairman Lewis strauss
indicate that it did (Strauss 1962, 319). When AEC policy
deviated from this principle, reaction from the private
sector was swift and powerful. In 1961, for example, when
the AEC proposed the addi tion of genera ting facili ties to
its Hanford weapons reactor complex, anti-federal power
project sentiment defeated the proposal in Congress (Green
and Rosenthal 1963, 263, Mullenbach 1963). In 1954 the
Johnson amendment, and in 1956 the Gore-Hollifield bill
were both defeated when the technology's supporters tried
to expedite its development through the construction of
large federally owned demonstration projects. On the other
hand, the Power Reactor Demonstration Program, which mainly
subsidized investor owned utility projects, received $265
million (historical dollars) in the fifties and sixties
(Dawson 1976, 101). While there were relatively minimal
pUblic controversies during the first twenty years of
nuclear development over nuclear health, safety, and
environmental issues (Ford 1982, 41-44), there were very
large congressional debates over patent issues and reactor
and materials ownership rights (Mullenbach 1963, 159, 162,
324). or
22. In most market studies the vendors are referred to as
nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) suppliers. Though
somewhat an elastic concept, the NSSS generally includes
the reactor core, pressure vessel, associated heat
transfer equipment (pipes, pumps, etc.) and control and
safety systems. The Little study estimated in 1968 that
its provision accounted for about 30% of plant construction
costs (Little 1968, 17). Its share has fallen
significantly since then. Many components of the NSSS are
purchased by the prime contractors.
Though more than twenty firms expressed interest at
various times in entering the reactor industry, the number
of active contractors had fallen to four by the late 70's.
A fifth firm, Atomics International, maintained an active
breeder development contractor role. Through 1982
Westinghouse had won 35% of all reactor orders, GE 30%,
Combustion Engineering 15% and Babcock and Wilcox 13%. The
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remaining 7% of the market was split between General
Atomic, Allis Chalmers and miscellaneous companies, all
of which ultimately withdrew from the industry (Hertsgaard
1983, 289).
23. See for example: Cambel (1964), xvii-xviii; perry
(1973), 20; Holloman and Grenon (1975), 41-42; Ford
Foundation (1979), 71-72, 111-112, 543; Schurr et ale
(1979), 46.
24. Conventional projections of u.s. energy use in the year
2000, for example, fell from 160-200 quads in the early
'70's (Schurr et ale 1979, 182; Ford Foundation 1979, 92)
to approximately 100 quads in the early '80's (Energy
Information Administration 1981). projections for annual
electricity demand growth similarly fell from 7% to 3%
(Office of Technology Assessment 1984, 32).
25. The period'sunder estimation of low cost urani urn
reserves added to nuclear uncertainties. Many believed
that rapid development of breeder reactor technology was
necessary for long term nuclear investment to be viable
(AEC 1962,22; Bupp and Derian 1981, 173; Ford 1982,55).
The engineering problems associated with breeder designs
are an order of magnitude more difficult than those
involved with the period's light water reactors. While the
uranium constraint has proved less binding than expected,
the breeder assumption illustrates the "leap of faith"
behind the firms' nuclear commitments.
26. In the early '60's coal fired electricity costs ranged
from .41-.62 cents/kwh (AEC 1962, 33). Though a number of
factors left future generating costs uncertain, the
conventional wisdom expected no significant change. Coal
generating cos~s depend primarily on plant capital and fuel
costs. In the '60's the long term trend towards reduced
capital costs was expected to continue, aided by increasing
plant size (Mullenbach 1963, 98). In 1962 Philip Sporn
foresaw a fall from $120/kw to $lOO/kw over the next
fifteen years (JCAE 1968, 42). Concern over potential
pollution abatement requirements tempered such optimism
only slightly. Though both upwards and downwards pressures
existed vis a vis coal fuel costs, the conventional wisdom
expected very modest cost increases. Fuel costs depend on
three factors; mine face coal costs, transportation costs
and util ization efficiencies. From 1952 to 1966 the cost
of coal fell from twenty-seven cents/million BTU's to
twenty-five cents/million BTU's (Gandara 1977, 24). This
tendency, however, was not expected to continue, due to
aggressive United Mine Worker bargaining and increasingly
stringent mine safety and strip mining reclamation
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standards. On the other hand, increasing mechanization, a
greater ratio of strip to underground mining, reduced rail
transport costs and higher fuel utilizationefficiencies
were expected to minimize overall fuel cost increases.
For example, from 1930 to 1960 the number of BTU's required
for a kilowatt hour of coal fired electricity had fallen
from twenty-five thousand to ten thousand and was expected
to fall to between seven and nine thousand over the next
few decades (Hullenbach 1963, 98).
27. NSSS stands for Nuclear Stearn Supply System. The
latter consists basically of the reactor and its control
systems. See note 22.
28. According to the AECls first Chairman, David
Lilienthal, the Knolls lab was constructed as an inducement
to involve GE in the nuclear sector. Lilienthal writes, II
We [the new Commission] spent most time on a contract with
General Electric for the operation of Hanford and the
operation of an expensive laboratory in Schnectady which
the contract provides that the Government will pay for •••
the Schnectady laboratory was provided [by General Groves]
as a means of inducing General Electric to operate Hanford
though the two are not otherwise reLa t ed" (Lilienthal
(1964) 113).
29. By the time the turnkey contracts were initiated in
1963, westinghouse had been prime contractor for 50 naval
reactors.
30. Rickover, for example, was instrumental in shaping the
organizational structure of westinghouse's nuclear division
(Hewlett and Duncan 1974, 235-236). The latter frequently
provided key personnel for the Commission's staff. The
current chair of the NRC, for example, is a former
Westinghouse engineer. The DOEls chief long term energy
planner is a iormer Westinghouse market analyst (Hertsgaard
1983, 213). Richard Roberts sandw iched a period as ERDA's
assistant administrator for nuclear energy amidst a GE
career (Nader and Abbotts 1979, 277). Common Cause's study
IlServing Two Mastersll documents this tendency more
generally, indicating that more than half of ERDA's top 139
employees came from private enterprises involved with
energy activi ties (Nader and Abbotts 1979, 277).
The Commission frequently treated client staff as an
extension of its own bureaucracy, often adhering to the
principle of Ilself-regulation". The AEC relied heavily on
industry studies for key safety information (~~~ YQ~k
.Times 10/16/83; Rolph 1977, 40; Ford 1982 52,54, 180, 186).
Borrowed or existing GE and Westinghouse personnel, for
example, supplied key data and performed primary analyses
---~--~~-~----_."--=- ~
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for important AEC reactor safety studies. The vendors
similary provided the information for the AEC's widely
cited and misleadingly optimistic cost estimates in the
1962 study ~iyili£n BM~l~£x ~Q~~X~ h B~QQX~ ~Q ~n~
President.
The AEC has reciprocally sought to protect the
economic health of its contractors. In 1963, for example,
a Commissioner acknowledged, II \'Jedo feel some obligation
to tide the industry over for a brief period of years by
going forward with a reasonably aggressive development
p ro q ram " (BMQ1~QDl.Q~ 12/63 p. 17). In 1970 the
Commission's Assistant Director for 11ilitary Applications
affirmed a similar commitment, noting that "the specific
goal of LSAL (Los Alamos) and LRL (Lawrence Radiation
Laboratory) is to keep employment constant beyond the usual
swings of 0.0.0. contract s " (l-letzger1972, 66).
31. Nehrt, for example, notes the disadvantages Atomics
International faced in marketing its reactors due to its
lack of traditional utility relationships (Nehrt 1966,
238) •
32. Through the late sixties there did not appear to be
enough data from which to draw firm conclusions about the
four vendors' pricing policies. Allen and Melnik (1970)
cite some evidence for the existence of predatory pricing
and tied sales behavior in the late sixties but emphasize
the tenuousness of their findings. .
33. Revenue calculations based on the power plant component
list pUblished in Nuclear Buyers Guide 1975, and market
shares listed in Little 1968. To put these numbers in
perspective, GE's total sales in 1967 were $7.7 billion and
westinghouse's $2.9 billion (Little 1968, 130).
34. GE vice pr~sident Bertram Wolfe has indicated, " We had
business plans from the beginning characterized by what we
call the hockey stick, which means there is a long negative
cash f Low " (Hertsgaard 1983, 106).
35. The purely private sector character of the project also
set an attractive ideological precedent for mobilizing
future utility participation in nuclear demonstration
projects (Nehrt 1966, 257, 260-261).
36. General Atomic began as "a subsidiary of General
Dynamics. It was subsequently acquired by Gulf and
transformed into a joint venture with Shell Oil. Alongside
its Fort St. Vrain turnkey contract (which included nuclear
fuel cost guarantees and large penalties for failure to
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meet a 7 year construction deadline) the company was forced
to negotiate loss-leader contracts for later high
temperature gas reactor sales (stewart 1981, 186-188).
37. In withdrawing from the NSSS market in 1966, for
example, Allis Chalmers cited its inability to absorb such
development losses (Little 1968, 145). GEvice president
Wolfe argues similarly. II ••• it was the turnkey years that
really did it [consolidated the industry]. A lot of
companies ••• found out it was a long-term endeavor and
that profits were way in the future ••• You either had to
be a big firm or one that was inherently tied to the
utility industry •••" (Hertsgaard 1983, 47).
38. Sultan's statistics indicate that relative costs in the
T-G industry were a logarhythmic function of cumulative
turbine-generator units produced (Sultan 1974, 176). He
argues that this relationship chiefly reflected the impact
of learning curve efficiencies (Sultan 1975, 14). Other
cost reducing factors, such as the impact of sales volume
on per unit R&D costs, scheduling flexibility,
specialization opportunities and marketing are also cited
(1975, p. 15; 1974, p, 93). GE's early market dominance in
Sultan's view was self-perpetuating. In the absence of
anti-trust concerns the industry would have become a
monopoly.
The charm of Sultan's analysis is that it demonstrates
how GE's pricing, output and R&Dbehavior enabled it to
reproduce a dominant position without inviting monopoly
regulation. Sultan indicates that GE adopted a high R&Dto
sales investment strategy. Though its two rivals,
westinghouse and Allis-Chalmers, tended to match this
ratio, their smaller sales base prevented themfrom
challenging GE's technical leadership (1974, 226). When
introducing nE7wT-G innovations GE simultaneously raised
prices on older models. It also priced its new innovation
high enough to permit a healthy market to continue to exist
in the dying technology, wher ein Wes tinghouse and All i s-
Chalmers could enjoy company sustaining short term profits.
As GEmoved down the learning curve of the new technology,
it gradually lowered its price. It was thus able to
permanently undercut Westinghouse and Allis-Chalmers market
initiatives and maintain healthy profit margins, without
eliminating its competitors (1974, 226-233).
39. Sultan presents his analysis as a case study of the
behavior of an industry "character ized by large unit sales,
large customers, long delivery times and long product
development cycles", all of which describe the nuclear
industry (1974, vi).
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40. See for example Hays (1983) Hertsgaard (1983), and Kuhn
(1966) •
41. Hays suggests that Westinghouse may have perceived
nuclear development as a means to overturn GE's T-G market
advantages. He also notes the growing erosion of U.S.
firms' international T-G position, especially in the
Pacific and Latin America. Nuclear export initiatives may
have been per cei ved as away of r ever sing thi s trend
through linked nuclear-T-G sales (Hays 1983). "
42. Westinghouse vice president Weaver indicates, " The
competition was rather desperate in those days. To meet
it, we had to go a route we didn't necessarily feel was
desi rable... The turnkeys were a very unfortunate
perturbation away from the normal way to construct power
plants. The construction costs went haywire, and we all
suffered. GE suffered a lot more than westinghousell
(Hertsgaard 1983, 43).
43. See, for example, Hertsgaard (1983), Hays (1983), Bodde
(1975), Kuhn (1966), Sultan (1974), and Bupp and Derian
(1981) •
44. Hertsgaard writes, II Deddens of Babcock and wilcox sees
the AEC's move as a blessing. 'It stopped the horsepower
race,' he says. 'We were extrapolating plants further and
further out [in size] without the benefit of operating
experience.' Deddens concedes that no vendor could have
unilaterally taken such a decision, because 'the
competition would not have allowed it'll (Hertsgaard 1983,
64) •
45. It is likely that representatives of financial capital
played an, important role in the utilities' nuclear
planning, due to their portfolio connections with the
industry and inevitable involvement with financing on the
level anticipated by the period's nuclear projections.
Electric utility investment accounted for about 9% total
U.S. capital outlays for the 1961-1971 period, reaching 12%
in 1971 (Hass, Mitchell and Stone 1974, 3, 84). The
industry was the nation's largest issuer of stocks and
bonds in the early seventies and employed the highest
capital/sales ratio in the economy (Messing, Friesma and
Morell 1979, 19).
Due to the unique problems involved with assembling
information about the planning visions of financial
capital, however, this aspect of the development process is
not addressed in the thesis.
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46. In calculating utility rankings, holding companies have
been treated as single firms (Little 1968, 13-15; Gandara
1977,1).
47. Sultan, for example, reports, " The president of Ebasco
[a leading utility consulting firm] claimed that no client
had ever complained about the level of prices paid for
electrical equipment ••• One utility executive reportedly
commented: 'You don't have to cut prices to get our
business. We more or less have a policy that we give a
certain percentage of our business to one manufacturer and
a certain percentage to another ••• We want research and
development work to go on. We don't want prices to get so
low that you can't do that •••" (Sultan 1974, 24-25). A. D.
Little reports similar findings (Little 1968, 83).
48. Sultan notes, " Under the traditional division of labor
in the industry, manufacturers developed new products, and
utili ties debugged them in service. Utili ty-manufacturer
partnerships were vital to technological change" (Sultan
1974, 288).
49. Because of their greater ability to capture the
benef its of sector al technical change, the large utili ties
had a greater interest in funding de facto demonstration
programs than smaller firms. The scale economies expected
in nuclear generation also encouraged large firm domination
of the research process.
50. Sultan and others employing a variant of the
"managerial control" hypothesis have suggested that the
strong presence of engineers in utility management also
biased firms towards support for growth and technology
promoting investments (Sultan 1974, p. 20; 1975, p. 199).
51. Emerging\ concern over potential mid-run environmental
constraints on exponential fossil fuel fired capacity
growth (Gandara 1977, 19-20), and fears of diminishing
returns to R&D in fossil fuel fired technologies (Sultan
1974, p. 225; 1975, p, 199), may have also spurred some
early nuclear ini tiati ve s, The country's most aggr essive
nuclear utility, Commonwealth Edison, for example, reports
that its nuclear efforts began in the early fifties,
because "••• we were concerned wi th how over the next
projected 25 years of growth, we would transport and what
we would do with all the by-products of the coal we would
have to burn" (Hertsgaard 1983, 142). The severe air
pollution constraints on fossil-fuel generation in Los
Angeles appear to have similarly motivated the L.A.
Department of Water and Power to pursue its pioneering
Halibu plant. On the whole, however, environmental
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concerns were relatively modest during nuclear's early
expansi on (Perry 1977, 72).
52. This bias, first formalized by H. Averch and L. Johnson
(1962) is frequently referred to as the Averch-Johnson
effect.
53. The character of nuclear technology also permitted
partial capitalization of nuclear fuel costs. Though fuel
core leasing options were available, a 1968 AEC study noted
" most utilities ••• appear to prefer the clasical
method of financing capital items which would permit their
investment in nuclear fuels to be included in their rate
bases" (AEC, 1968a, p, 5-49).
54. Bupp and Derian assert a similar conclusion, writing,"
There has been considerable specuLa t Lo n about the
motivation of the utilities which rushed to accept the
turnkey contracts and so created the Great Bandwagon Market
••• (a) very influential factor was that the American
utility industry was ready even eager for a new source of
technological progress in the sixties" (Bupp and Derian
1981,74-75).
55. The 15 firms are: Commonwealth Edison, Consolidated
Edison, Consumers Power, Detroit Edison, Duke power,
Duquesne Light, General Public Utilities, 3 New England
utilities (Boston Edison, New England Electric and
Northeast Utilities), Northern States Power, Pacific Gas
and Electric, Philadelphia Electric, Southern California
Edison, and the Virginia Electric and Power Co.; selection
based on level of overall nuclear participation 1950-1969,
emphasizing early years. The list is not well defined at
the margin. Among other utilities with significant nuclear
projects, especially during the '65-'69 period, are: the
TVA, Florida ,Power and Light, Pennsylvania power and Light,
Public Service Electric and Gas, and Carolina power and
Light. For a listing of utility nuclear participation
1950-1969 see Tables 1-6.
56. Commonwealth Edison, the nation's 4th largest electric
utility in 1950, Detroit Edison (#5) and Pacific Gas and
Electric (#2) participated in 3 of the first 4 research
teams, with among others, Dow Chemical, the contractor for
the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons facility, and Monsanto,
contractor at the AEC's Miamisburg Ohio and (briefly) Oak
Ridge facilities (Orlans 1967, 18, 61).
57. The plant had generating costs of about 6 cents/kwh.
Conventional costs were in the neighborhood of .7
cents/kwh (JCAE 1968, 86; Mullenbach 1963, 56; Electrical
_"';, _ c='-- -'?,--OI "-:: __
6 u ,,-3 _" 'Il-,_ ,Q.
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World 5/18/64 pp. 14-17).
58. This brand loyalty compares with Westinghouse's 33%
market share nationally (Sultan 1974, 290-291, 295). Brand
loyalty to a manufacturer within one's own service area
seems a common aspect of utility planning. As sultan
indica tes, " Sporn of American Electric Power conceded
that 'everyting else being equal, we always favored a
manufacturer who was a customer of ours.' The utilities
wanted to stimulate industrial activity within their
territory" (Sultan 1974, p. 288; 1975, p. 174).
59. The Commonwealth Edison Dresden project included a $14
million IOU R&D program that pushed the project's expected
costs to about 1.3 times that of a conventional plant.
Consolidated Edison's Indian Point project was designed to
develop a novel thorium fuel cycle, and was expected to
have at least a 20% cost disadvantage relative to available
fossil fuel alternatives (AIF, ~~~~L ID~~~~ 6/56 p.
40). Company President H. R. Searing told the JCAE in '55,
" I am not particularly interested in just how economical
the thing is within limits. I am interested in getting
something done" (JCAE 1955, 403). The project's
electricity ultimately cost about twice the expected cost
of fossil fuel generation. The GPU reactor was funded as a
materials testing facility rather than a commercial power
plant (JCAE 1961,562-3; 1958a, 539). While PG&E publicly
predicted competitive power from its Humboldt Bay plant, it
seems unlikely the company actually expected this resul t.,
In claiming competitiveness the firm was forced to assume
capacity performance rates 10% higher than the AEC's
optimistic projections and plutonium buy back credits about
twice as high as popularly expected (JCAE 1958, 609-10,
6 24; 196 3a, 239)• Ital soh ad t0 ass umea rever sal 0f
the already significant trend towards nuclear cost
escalation. Even with its fixed price terms and partial
fuel cost warranties, the plant produced power at about 1
1/2 times the expected cost of fossil fuel alternatives.
(Actual nuclear costs based on statistics drawn from annual
edi tions of the Federal power Commission's "Steam Elecr ic
Plant Construction Cost and Annual Production Expenses"
1964-1976, assuming a 14% fixed charge rate. Fossil fuel
costs drawn from company testimony, [JCAE 1958a]). The
plant was retired prematurely due to its inability to meet
upgraded safety requirements (~~ ~ 8-9/83).
60. Like several large utilities Com. Ed. serves as its own
architect-engineering firm, supervising plant construction.
61) In the mid-fifties the company querried the AEC about
the possibili ty of utili ty entrance into the radioisotope,
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nuclear by-product, and weapons material markets (JCAE
1956b, 379). It participated in a 6 firm consortium formed
in 1959 to develop fuel reprocessing and in another in 1968
to research fuel managem ent. In 1970 it establ ished a
subsidiary to market nuclear management services (AIF,
NY~~~~L ~n~Y~~LY 4/70), and in conjunction with
Westinghouse operates a school to train nuclear personnel
for other utilities.
62. Consolidated Edison joined Commonwealth Edison in the
nuclear fuel reprocessing consortium in 1959 , and lobbied
unsuccessfully in 1962 for AEC approval of a plant .rz.ll.h.ill
New York City. In 1965 and 1967 it contracted for two
additional units at its Indian Point site. In late '69 it
announced plans for multiple unit stations in upstate New
York, the Long Island Sound, and lower New York Bay
(1/26/70 Electrical world). The company has simultaneously
been a foe of cogeneration (Fortune 12/31/78).
Pacific Gas and Electric's '58 Humboldt Bay and '62
Bodega Bay announced plants followed the company's junior
partner role in Com. Ed.'s '55 Dresden project and a '57 GE
financed R&D reactor. By the time of Bodega Bay's
contracting, the company was forced to claim nuclear
generating costs of less than 5.8M/kwh in order to under
price expected fossil fuel generating costs. Rather than
acknowledge the plant as a development project, the company
stretched the AEC's optimistic cost predictions by
asserting the reactor would achieve a 90% capacity rate.
(Through the early eighties, boiling water reactors like
Bodega Bay have averaged only 62% capacity rates [Komanoff
1981,249]). Even after its optimistic assumptions, the
company was only able to claim a 1% (.07fv1/kwh)nuclear cost
advantage. The forecas ting gymnas tics ill us tra te the
tendency for utilities to present their strategic long run
decisions as short run cost minimizing decisions.
In February 1963 PG&E released a 17 year generating
strategy calling for up to two-thirds of all new capacity
to be nuclear (AIF, ~ID ~IDQ 3/63 p. 3-4). The firm has
also been an active nuclear lobbyist. It has sponsored
extensive pro-nuclear advertising (Berger 1977, 182), and
has sought to prevent the airing of an anti-nuclear
documentary on California TV (Berger 1977, 179; Hertsgaard
1983, 200-201; ~li~ L~ 8-9/83). As late as 1978 the
firm had yet to initiate a single study comparing the
economics of its nuclear expansion program with solar, wind
or conservation options (Stobaugh and Yergin 1979,
141,302).
As early as 1953 GPU urged the rapid development
of nuclear power, declaring "We want atomic power if it is
economical. We can absorb large quantities of it. The
sooner we get it, the better we like it" (Hertsgaard 1984,
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141). In '56 the company asked for bids on a reactor for
its Philipine subsidiary (JCAE1957, 395-6). It followed
its '59 R&Dreactor with the '61 planning (Electrical tl.9.tl-Q
7/20/64) and '63 purchase of the first turnkey plant,
Oyster Creek. In the ensuing months its spokesmen seemed to
serve as GE sales representatives, making claims for the
plant that exceeded the AEC's optimism and GE's capital
cost guarantees. (The utility assumed an 88% capacity
figure for the plant's first 15 years and a 20% "stretch"
of the megawattage rating guaranteed by GE.) During 1963
the president of its Pennsylvania Electric subsidiary
served as head of the Atomic Industrial Forum. The company
purchased additional reactors in '66,' 67, and '69, and
indicated in the mid-seventies that its generating strategy
called for an all nuclear base load capacity (Gandara 1977,
64). The company has also been active in breeder reactor
plutonium fuel cycle, nuclear desalinization, and
enr ichment pol icy research.
63. The term "probably" is used because it is impossible to
determine the subj ective assessment of the company's
decision makers. Electrical World and Nucleonics reported
that the company expected more or less similar costs from
nuclear and coal fired generation, with nuclear having a
small edge (Electrical World 10/28/63, 7/8/63; Nucleonics
5/5/64, 12/63). This seems questionable and dependent at
best on the assumption of significant learning induced cost
reductions over the construction period. AECproj ections
and Niagara Mohawk's access to coal at 29 cents per million
BTU's (Electrig~~ tl~~ 11/2/64) suggest expected fossil
fuel generating costs of 5.1M/kwh and nuclear costs of 5.8-
6N/kwh (JCAE 1968, 89). Sporn's '62 analysis suggests a
similar 15-25% nuclear cost disadvantage. Interestingly,
the latter differential approximates GEls turnkey discounts
from westinghouse's '62-'63 plant prices.
,
64. Niagara is also part owner of an in-situ uranium
recovery facility (Taylor 1979, 14). Anderson (1981)
indicates that the company's aggressive growth strategy
left it in the forefront of utilities and organizations
opposing marginal cost attacks on declining block rates
structures in the seventies (113-115).
65. Niagara's "br and loyal ty" caused it to purchase 91% (10
of its 11) turbine generators (1948-1962) from GE, compared
with a national average of 58%. probability theory would
predict such purchasing behavior, less than 5%of the time,
if Niagara's brand loyalties reflected the national average
(Sultan 1974, 293-295). The promotional aspect of the
proj ect is fur ther illustrated by the company's statement
that" (The) principle goal of the 9 Mile point project is
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to prove on our own system, that a nuclear power plant can
be buil t and the cost no more - at worst- than a coal fired
plant. This has never been done yet" (Nucleonics 5/64).
66. New York ranked 7th highest among all states in fossil
fuel costs in 1952 (Mason 1957, 323). Downstate N.Y. by
itself ranked 2nd highest in the early sixties amongst 36
fuel regions (JCAE 1965, 265). Paralleling Governor
Rockefeller's thinking, Robert Moses, the Chairman of New
York's Power Authority, told the JCAE in 1961, "Modern
stearn plants in the Ohio Valley, in western Pennsylvania
and in the Southeast can produce power for about 4 or 5
mills ••• To produce power from the newest coal plants in
the New York City area costs about 8 mills ••• with power
produced from coal, gas or oil New York can not hope to
overcome this disadvantage ••• But eventually power from
nuclear fuels should be cheaper than coal. When atomic
research has progressed to that point New York will again
be able to compete with other areas in power costs" (JCAE
1961, 786). III ustra tive of the intra-nuclear utili ty
group rivalries that helped spur nuclear development, Moses
added, " ••• New York can beat other parts of the country
to the punch, pioneer in bringing down power costs and
regain a competi tive advantage for its industry.... While
we debate other areas of the country are growing faster not
only in power production but in manufacturing. Southern
and Western states actively seek to lure industry away
In the long run the major advantage which other parts of
the country can offer to industry is cheaper power •••
those who control fusion and fission will be the masters of
population growth and location, industry, trade,
commerce •••" (JCAE 1961 789-790).
67. The companies were adamantly opposed to Robert Moses's
efforts to build a nuclear plant through the state's power
authority. '
68. The initiative was publicly defended as necessary to
circumvent increasing public opposition to nuclear
construction (Electrical World 9/15/69).
69. The state began searching for a reprocessing plant site
in 1959, purchasing a 3300 acre plot in '61. In its
successful negotiations with Nuclear Fuel Services in '63,
it agreed to sweeten the site by funding the construction
of an $8 million waste disposal facility. It also agreed
to assume long term liability for the reprocessing plant's
radioactive waste for a minimal fee (JCAE 1963b, 97; see
also JCAE 1960a, 367). It now appears that this
guarantee will cost state and federal taxpayers 300 million
to 1 billion dollars (~~ X.2il .!.iID~.Q 9/19/81 p. 26). To
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further sweeten the project ESADA extended the $24 million
plant a $2 million grant (JCAE 1963b, 108, 80). In 1968
the Atomic and Space Development Authority sought similar
subsidies for the siting of a plutonium fuel reprocessing
plant. Included were funds for the construction of a fast
br eeder prototype, II because, through it, there can be
brought into being within the state ••• the pl,utoni urn fuel
industry (Oliver Townsend, Chairman of the New York State
Atomic and Space Development Authori ty; AIF, .NJJ..Ql~L.
l..n.Q~J;.y, 2/68 p. 53). Both projects were motivated by a
sense of rivalry dynamics.
70. Hertsgaard and others have noted a similar nuclear
activism on the part of David Rockefeller and the Chase
Bank. Hertsgaard writes," The Rockefellers' got their
start in nuclear in 1950, when they hired Lewis Strauss,
recently resigned Atom ic Energy Commission member, as thei r
investment adviser. Strauss served them until 1953 when
President Eisnhower called him back to chair the AEC. In
1954, Laurence and David Rockefeller founded the United
Nuclear uranium company, and Chase Manhattan became the
first bank to establish a nuclear power division. In 1955
Nelson Rockefeller, who was then serving in the White House
as president Eisenhower's special assistant, persuaded
Eisenhower to reinvigorate and expand the Atoms for Peace
program to include more training for foreigners and
increased funding for exporting U.S. manufactured research
reactors. As governor of New York between 1959 and 1973,
Nelson worked hard and successfully to stimulate, through
state subsidies, the private development of nuclear power
in New York. And in 1975, as vice-president, he pushed for
creation of a federal Energy Independence Authority, a $100
billion program of government subsidies and loan guarantees
intended to stimulate U.S. domestic production. Most of the
money was targetted on such nuclear-related projects as
breeder r ea c t o r s , uranium enrichment, and fuel
reprocessing" (Hertsgaard 1983, 133).
71. See for example Sugg 1957, pp. 9-10.
72. The municipality offered to: subsidize plant site
acquisition, construct a $137 million access bridge to the
proposed site, fund an $11 million vocational center to
train plant personnel, and float $180 million in municiipal
bonds to provide the project with extra liquidity (Olson
1976 202).
73. For examples of other state and local government
nuclear initiatives, see issues of .tl.Y..Q~I .ID.Q.Y..Q.tIY,
subheading: "state and local government".
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74. The PRDP also subsidized the high temperature gas
reactor Fort St. Vrain plant whose contract was not
finalized until 1965, more than 2 years later than the
other 9 proj ects.
75. Under the PRDP, the AECprovided about 25% of the
projects' costs. Because the Commission's contributions
were fixed in advance, the utilities (and vendors in the
case of fixed cost contracts) still bore the brunt of the
plants' cost uncertainties.
76. New England has historically had the highest fossil
fuel costs in the nation, enduring coal costs 43% higher
than the national average in the late 50's and early '60's,
and 66% higher in '75 (AIF, 1964 Annual Conference
Proceedings Vol. 2 p. 88; Gandara 1977, 25).
77. It is thus not suprising that like Duquesne's
Pittsburgh's reactor, the financing of the Yankee project
illustrates the regional logic and corporate coordination
behind early nuclear development. About one-third of the
project's projected $40 million cost was financed by a
consortium of banks led by the First National Bank of
Boston, through 4% unsecured notes (AIF, Forum ~mo 1/59 p.
15). The First of Boston has also been active in financing
other nuclear projects in New England. It headed a
financial consortium that extended $115 million in credit
to the Public Service Company of New Hampshire for the
Seabrook station and $500 million for the Pilgrim 2 plant
(Hertsgaard 1983, 134-5).
The bank has a number of interlocks with regional
util i ties and local nucl ear inter e sts, po sses sing for
example 3 interlocks with Boston Edison and 5 with Raytheon
and Stone and Webster, the 3rd and 2nd ranking nuclear
engineering and construction firms (Hertsgaard 1983, 134-
135) •
78. Rankings drawn from ~l&~~~ ~Q~ 10/2/50 p. 16
based on customer numbers.
79. The Philadelphia Electric led Peach Bottom and
Carolinas-Virginia projects were not intended to operate on
a permanent basis and we r e decommissioned within 7 years
(Stewart 1981, 185; JCAE 1958a, 537). Northern States'
Pathfinder project was designed to research superheat
boiling water reactor technology, rather than produce
competitive power. It proved a technical failure and was
replaced by gas fired boilers (Allen 1977, 71). In
announcing early plans for the Big Rock plant, Consumers
Power indicated a willingness to write off $10 million as
an R&D expense (AIF, .£.Q~.!!IDl1..eIDQ7/59). The plant
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ultimately generated power at more than one and one-half
times the expected cost of fossil fuel fired generation.
80. Enough uncertainty, however, surrounded both fossil
fuel and nuclear generating cost projections to blur this
conclusion. In 1962 there existed almost no empirical data
about comm ercial sized reactor construction or operating
costs from which to draw solid economic inferences. The
AEC's optimistic projections were suspect due to the
Commission's acknowledged history of cost underestimation
(JCAE 1968,86; AIF, ~.YID l1~IDQ7/59 p. 31).
81. Along with San Onofre and Connecticut Yankee,
Westinghouse also won a third PRDP demonstration plant
order from the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
(Malibu). Public opposition, however, subsequently forced
cancellation of the project.
82. By "offensive strategy" is meant the promotion of
nuclear power as a vehicle for creating additional scale
economies in electricity generation and therefore
competitive disadvantages for small municipal utilities.
83. Nebraska's nuclear initiatives included: participation ,
in the IPS program, submission of one of the first four
PRDP projects, full scale commercial orders in '66 '67,
and efforts to secure federal funds for subsurface nuclear
desalinization R&D (JCAE 1961a, 335). The state's all
public power policy appears to have created a felt need to
insure local access to a new technology.
84. Komanoff 1981, p. 200. The 5/2/66 issue of Electrical IN~, for example, projected declines from 10.7M/kwh for a
50NW plant to 5M/kwh for a 500 MW plant to 4.2H/kwh for a
1000MW plant. 'The AEC (1968a) foresaw a further 20%
decline between 1000 and 3000MW. For evidence of earlier
perceptions of scaling economies see: JCAE 1955, 408;
JCAE 1958b, 347; Tybout 1957, 353; and AEC 1962.
85. The potential market concentrating impact of nuclear
technology may have also caused the most ambitious growth
oriented utilities to see it as a vehicle through which
they could emerge as a "mega-utility" (See for example,
AIF, .tlJ.!.Qil.g.£ .l.n.Q.1!.e.t.£.Y. 9/65 p. 4). Over the last 50 years
the private production and distribution of electricity has
followed the classic pattern (with interruptions) of
centralization of most of American industry. In 1927 there
were 2135 separate IOU's, in 1945 1000, and in 1970 about
300 (Senate Judiciary Committee 1970, 410). In the late
sixties the president of the largest utility holding
company predicted there would only be 12-15 mega-firms
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within 50 years (Fortune 11/69).
86. Two other large plants, PG&E's Bodega Bay and Con.
Ed.'s Ravenswood projects, were also announced during this
period, but both were later withdrawn due to AECand/or
popular opposi tion.
87. The link between later nuclear initiatives and the
early projects of Consolidated Edison, Commonwealth Edison,
Detroit Edison, Pacific Gas and Electric, General Public
Utili ties, and the New England utili ties has already been
noted. The same planning vision, appears to have animated
Southern California Edison (AIF, ~~l~~L In~ustry 9/64,
4/65). The company participated in (but did not own) an
early Atomics International R&Dreactor proj ect in 1957,
signed a letter of intent in '59 for its '63 San Onofre
plant, and .sought to contract for a nuclear desalinization
plant in the mid-sixties (1/65 Nucleonics; AIF, ~ID MeIDQ
12/64). In 1970 it announced an "all-out commitment to
nuclear power", and in '71 it promised $10 million for
breeder reactor research (~~ ~QLk ~lm~~ 1/28/70 p. 55;
N~ll .s.tL~et .J.Q.l!LMll 8/13/71 p. 1). Consumers Power
similarly jumped from its PRDPBig Rock plant to 3 large
nuclear orders 1966-1968. The construction permit for two
of these reacors was temporarily voided when the courts
ruled that the company had neglected to examine potential
alternatives to nuclear generation. Major 1960's nuclear
plant orders also followed Philadelphia Electric and
Northern States power's PRDPprojects.
88. The IOU purchasers were: Commonwealth Edison: Dresden
2&3, Quad Cities 1&2; Consolidated Edison: Indian Point 2;
PG&E: Diablo Canyon 1, and GPU: Oyster Creek 1,Three Mile
Island 1. The PRDP participant purchases were: Yankee
consortium pur ch as e s e Pilgrim 1,Millstone 1, and Vermont
Yankee; Consumers Power: Palisades, Duke Power: Oconee 1&2,
Philadelphia Electric: Peach Bottom 2&3; Virginia E.P cc..
Surry 1&2; and Northern States Power: Monticello.
89. GPU and the TVA's spirited defense of their Oyster
Creek and Browns Ferry purchases, for example, played an
important role in establishing nuclear power's economic
credibility, as did the tireless advocacy work of
Commonwealth Edison. "
90. Gandara, for example, reports "AEP has purchased its
own railroad cars for unit train service; own river barges,
tow boats, a railroad company; and in 1973 purchased a
barge transport company. Already the owner of seven coal
mines in Appalachia, AEP in 1975 acquired Braztah
corporation, a low sulfur mine in Utah. Through such
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sources, AEP owns,controls or has surface rights to more
than 3.3 billion tons of recoverable coal" (Gandara 1977,
66). The latter figure is more than 20% of all utility
controlled coal (Senate Judiciary Committee 1977, 381-383).
It is thus not suprising that AEP and 3 other utilities
with access to cheap fossil fuels were the only firms
amongst the top 15 IOU's in 1968 that had not aggressively
pursued nuclear development initiatives.
91. See footnotes 62 & 87.
92. The Harvard Business School's lin~~Y ~~~ study
concluded, "••• industry is sitting upon an easily
recoverable, relatively cheap new source of energy. Is it
quickly being exploited? Not especially. Why? Because we
have a near perfect example of obstacles being not
technical but almost entirely institutional and
organizational •••" (Stobaugh and Yergin 1979,160). The
study adds," The cogenerator cannot unplug himself from the
utility, because he will sometimes have to buy electricity
to met his needs. At other times, he will have extra
electricity which he will want to export, that is, send
into the utility grid •••As things now stand, the whole
system discourages cogeneration •••utilities do not want
electricity produced by cogenera tors•••" (160). Princeton
Professor Robert Williams estimates that employment of
competitive cogeneration options would lead to a
cogeneration sector larger than the nuclear sector by the
year 2000.
93. See for example: u.S. Solar Energy Research Institute:
1981a, 1981b; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment
1984, pp. 70-73; Stobaugh and Yergin 1979; Lovins 1977
and Taylor 1979.
94. The Harvard Business School authors of Energy £Yture
draw an interesting conclusion from the historical
opposition of the utilities to non-central power station
technologies. Rather than attempt to limit IOU
institutional clout, the authors favor giving the utilities
a self-interest in the promotion of such technologies.
They write, " The utilities can see solar heating competing
with their own role as producer and converter of energy,
and like conservation, solar can be perceived ~ ~ threat
tQ ~b~ uti~~ ~!~iin~~ gLQ~~b ~XQ~L~ID (emphasis
added). Many utilities, therefore show indifference or
even hostility to solar energy and conservation •••But
without utility support or at least cooperation, solar home
heating will be greatly retarded •••It is these economic
and institutional barriers, and not technological
obstacles, that will determine whether solar heating does
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or does not make a major contribution in the next two
decades ••• (pp, 195-196) ••• Because it is desirable to
use existing organizations where possible, electric
utilities should be encouraged to deliver energy
conservation ••• (p. 228). The exclusion of utili ties from
the conservation business in the 1978 National Energy Act
was, in this connection not some minor mistake but a major
blunder, creating a very significant and totally
unnecessary barrier to the exploitation of conservation
energy. "
The research agenda of the utilities' collectively
financed research institute (the Electric power Research
Institute-EPRI) also reflects the industry's pursuit of
centralized generating technologies. In 1980, for example,
the Institute allocated funds in a 70:1 ratio for nuclear
and solar projects, with most of its solar spending
earmarked for centralized solar technologies (.£Q~ll.L.i..n.§
10/81). See.xD.§..full}etraY.§.Qfor a mor e gener al analy si s
of the insti tutonal forces promoting a centralized version
of solar technology.
95. The term "bandwagon market" was authored by American
Electric Power president Philip Sporn in a December '67
letter to the AEC to characterize the dynamics behind the
50 nuclear orders placed 1966-1967 (JCAE 1968, 2-20). It is
used here to refer to the 71 orders of the '66-'69 period
and 144 orders of '70-'74 years. Bupp and Derian (1981)
have given the metaphor wide circulatio~
96. For a detailed discussion of the magnitude of and
reasons for nuclear cost underestimation, see Chapter 7.
97. Bechtel has estimated the 1960's market value of
partial insurance against these risks at about 50% plant
costs. In a successful legal defense against liability
for the poor economics of Portland General Electric's 1968
Tr oj an nucl ear plant, the company noted construction
contracts typically imposed the risks of nuclear projects,
(which it characterized as "••• extraordinarily variable,
unpredictable, and uncontrollable") on the utilities
(Hellman and Hellman 1983, 5).
98. Nuclear totals based on cumulative plant costs, and
projected figures as of 1969 for plants still under
construction (AEC 1970b, 154-155). Due to overruns, actual
investments exceeded projected levels.
99. Besides encouraging individual utilities to rely on the
vendors, federal government and outside consultants for
nuclear information, these economies increased the
importance of collective industry research projects which
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were organized and administered by large pro-nuclear
utilities.
100. In 1955 the u.s. had 18,000 nuclear scientists and
engineers; 1,400 were employed by the AECand its prime
contractors. The bulk of the remainder were former AEC
employees (Kuhn 1966, 46,133). For some time this pool
served as the basis for industry manpower (Kuhn 1966, 133).
Formerly high ranking AEC employees were especially
attractive to utility managers, due to their ease of access
to Commission staff. Kuhn reports that the Yankee Atomic
pr oj ect benef it ted handsom ely f rom the pr esence of an
informal communications network between its staff (which
conveniently included the former liason officer between the
AEC and 000) and the Commission's, especially regarding
safety issues and future government plutonium price
policies (Kuhn 1966, 140-141). In the late sixties John
Conway, former JCAE staff director, joined Con. Ed.'s
executive staff.
101. ORSORT=Oak Ridge School of Reactor Technology.
NRTS=National Reactor Testing Station.
102. Sporn, in particular, was a strong critic of this
practice. He warned in a '67 letter to the AEC"there is a
clear indication that the utilities need very badly to cut
the umbilical cord ••• that ties them to the manufacturers
••• To paraphrase the late Mr. Charles Wilson, what is best
for the electrical equipment manufacturers, or what they
think is best, may not be best for the utilities" (JCAE
1968,16-17).
103. See, for example, Congressional Off ice of Technology
Assessment 1984, p. 255 and Hellman and Hellman 1983, pp.
21-22.' ,
104. Both the President's Commission on the Accident at
Three Mile Island (The Kemeny commission) and the NRC's
special Inquiry Group report on TI1I (the Rogovin report),
for example, emphasized the need for upgraded nuclear
operator training.
105. Kuhn points out that along with attempting to
economize on the number of engineers and technical
personnel employed, the utilities appear to have accepted
"lower than average quality and ability. If salaries are
taken as a rough indicator of ability, the average quality
of engineers among utilities is noticeably lower than in
industry in general. The median salary is 9% lower and in
the upper decile about 20% lower" (Kuhn 1966, 108).
, ,
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106. In this light, the Ford Foundation's 1974 energy study
h ~.iID~ .t.Q .cM.Q..S..e co ncluded, "Expecta tions concerning
government policy are probably as important to industry as
the actual prices and tax level ... for long term capital
investments •••" (Ford Foundation 1974, 35).
107. Sommers (1978) interprets his regression results
(which found little correlation between current nuclear
plant construction costs and utility generating choice
decisions) in a similar light.
108. As one of Gandara's executive interviewees expressed
it, "If the management of a utility company believes a
particular type of generation is going to become a major
factor in the long range generation picture, there is the
desi re to become a part of such technology" (Gandara 1977,
58-59). Sporn argues similarly (JCAE 1968, 7).
109. Sporn writes, " ••• 1966 witnessed an increase in coal
prices that is being continued in 1967. While there is
some economic basis for this development, the non-economic
contributions were in all probability much more
significant." He then cites as key, " a resignation to the
inevitable", and notes the industry's resulting failure to
take advantage of investm ent oppor tuni ti es to fur ther
automate mining, reduce rail costs, innovate in slurry
pipelines and increase fossil fuel utilization efficiencies
(JCAE 1968, 5,13-14).
110. Recall for example the rationale given by Marcel
Boiteux, executive director of France's state owned
national utility for not proceeding with the French
graphite-gas reactor program. "We have to acknowledge that
a light water model is not more reliable than a gas-
graphite model ... But the world currently has around
80,000 MW under construction or on order from light water
models, while there are 8,000 [MW] in service or on order
from graphite-gas models ••• For France, within our little
borders, to continue pursuing a technology in which the
world has no interest (sic) doesn't make sense ••• The fact
that the world market is now clearly oriented towards
light-water models means that our industrialists will only
be able to enter the industrial world insofar as they have
their own valid experience with the models that the world
is interested in" (Gorz 1979).
Ill. Gandara and others' qualitative description of utility
executive "conservatism" would tend to contradict the
behavioral implications of this hypothesis, as would
Sommers' regression results (which appear to confirm an
inverse relationship between the level of uncertainty
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surrounding nuclear costs and utility nuclear investment).
112. In the technically deterministic approach, the
utilities' generating mix decisions are derived from static
cost minimizing calculations. The decision making process
is represented as a technical procedure capable of partial
and general equilibrium modeling within an engineering
framework. See Manne (1976) and Hudson and Jorgenson
(1974) •
113. One need not assume odd cost expectations to avoid
finding pro-nuclear utility planning. IOU interest in fuel
diversification or short term bargaining threats to win
lower coal and rail prices, permits interpretation of
utility behavior without appeal to OT dynamics. Jersey
Central Power and Light, for example, reported receiving
discounts of about 15% after announcing its intention to
contract for a nuclear plant. Similar coal sector
responses were also reported by Yankee consortium
companies, Vepco, and Duke Power ( .N..u..QilQlli.~..s. 3/64; AIF,
l.~ hnnJJ.9l. -C.QnU..L~.n£~ .£.r.Q.Q,§~.Q.in.s.£ Pp. 7 8 , 80 ; A IF,
Nuclear Industry 5/65).
The earlier success of the nuclear navy in the face of
widespread skepticism offers yet another basis for
interpreting nuclear commitments in non-promotional terms.
114. Joskow and Rozanski (1977) "The Effects of Learning by
Doing on Nuclear Power Operating Reliability", MIT Dept. of
Economics, Working Paper 209, 9/77 (Sommers 1980, 285).
115. Mooz, for example, found a 10% decline in
construction costs for each doubling in A-E-C plant
construction experience. The learning was not transferable
across firms (Mooz 1979, v), The results imply that early
A-E-C market leadership may impart enduring competitive
advantages. Komanoff and Bupp (1983) indicate that more
recent data suggests learning resides with the utility.
116. The biases effected the kinds of data collected, the
abstractions used to organize the data, and the attention
given to anomalous results. The conventions adopted
resulted in an underestimation of the engineering
safeguards needed to contain the technology's hazards. Rand
analyst Robert Perry has suggested that the narrow scope of
the industry's safety research reflected the inherent
limitations of a commercial perspective (Perry 1977, 60).
117. Bupp has similarly observed, "Since the mid-1970's,
it has been incr easi ngly appa rent th at the 'post-OPEC'
expectations for rapid and cheap expansion of nuclear power
were at odds with some harsh realities. From the beginning
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of commercial-scale nuclear power two decades ago, costs
have always risen, never fallen."
"One might have expected documentation of these cost
increases to come from the nuclear power industry, or at
least from the electric utilities that purchase and operate
nuclear power plants. The utilities have the cost data and
anecdotal experience necessary for such analysis, and
presumably they would be ardently interested in learning
industry cost trends. But, reluctant to buck what my
colleague, Jean-Claude Derian, and I have called the
'extravagance of prophesy' that has long prevailed among
nuclear power supporters, and wary about offering
ammunition to its critics, the nuclear industry has
produced remarkably little analysis of its economic
misfortunes. Nor have the industry's official government
and academic sponsors produced any objective analysis of
nuclear costs."
"That task has had to be assumed by outsiders •••"
(Komanoff 1981, p. i ).
118. As would be expected this dynamic turned against
nuclear power after it lost OT status. As Bupp wrote in
1977, "The mining industry is understandably hesitant to
commit capital to exploration and development in the face
of a declining market for reactors. This hesitation in
turn arouses doubts about the availability of adequate
supplies of fuel. Utilities must consider the future of
uranium supply very seriously before ordering plants" (Bupp
1977,312).
119. Reprocessing was planned to be the penultimate step in
the fuel cycle. In a breeder system it was envisioned that
plutonium extraction from "used fuel" would extend
nuclear's fuel base indefinitely. Even without the
breed e rt.s special plutonium cycle significant amounts of
reusable uranium and small amounts of fissionable plutonium
are theoretically recoverable from the cur rent generation
of light water reactors' waste material. This availability
has also raised the specter of accelerated nuclear weapons
proliferation.
120. The Little study estimated plant capital costs to vary
as the .35 power of plant size (Little 1968, 221). This
projection is consistent with popular estimates that
Allied's plant would enjoy costs one-third as high as
existing 1-2 ton/day plants (AlP, Nuclear Industry 3/68 p.
12) • "
121. The presence of generous depletion allowances, import
quotas, aggressive prorationing legislation, friendly tax
treatment of foreign royalty payments and federal
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indifference towards shale oil development all reflect this
influence.
122. Such an interpretation has in fact been advanced by
Anatoly Aleksandrov, the president of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences, who asserts, "Coverage of the western press of
the accident at the nuclear reactor in Harrisburg, in which
some basically minor unpleasant consequences were described
in an extremely exagerated manner, was an extension of the
campaign against atomic power. The campaign was supported
by fuel companies whose profits would be endangered by a
shift to nuclear power" (Chapman 1983, 200).
123. Since exploration is a high risk activity, risk averse
pr eference functi ons should impart a competi tive advantge
to large scale operations that can minimize success
variance. The Little study '68 suggests this capacity may
generate above average profit rates (Little 1968, 79).
124. Duchesneau estimated the minimum efficient mine size
to be 6.4% of the industry's early 1970 output (Duchesneau
1975,104).
125. Consistent with the hypothesis of scaling and vertical
integration economies, large numbers of mergers and
acquisitions occurred in the seventies in the uranium
industry. Firms appeared to be staking out demonstrated
market shares. In 1975 GE merged with utah International
(the second ranked miller in '75). About the same time
United Nuclear (#6) merged with Homestake Mining (#13). In
1977 ARca acquired Anaconda (#3). Kerr McGee, the number 1
miller in '75 acquired 5 mining companies in the '60's
(Mulholland 1979, 134 ).
126. Among those arguing for the long run competitive
character of the uranium industry are Ahmed (1979) and
Mulholland (1979). They assert that the moderate capital
requiremeilts (from $35-$200 million for most mining
projects and less for exploration) and opportunities for
external financing of promising claims, indicate minimal
barriers to entry.
127. For an analysis along some of these lines see J. l4.
Wilson and Associates' paper reprinted in the Senate
Judiciary Committee's Hearings (1978).
128. The potential for price collusion offered by the
industry's concentrated market structure was demonstrated
on a global scale by the uranium cartel. Evidence of a
parallel collusion in the domestic market is presented in
Rothwell (1980, 235-237) and Taylor (1979, 141-158).
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129. Enrichment involves the increase of U235 from a
natural occuring rate of about .7% in milled uranium
concentrate to 3.5%. It is this isotope rather than the
more common U238 that allows a chain reaction to occur.
Currently all u.s. enrichment is performed at government
plants.
130. The dominant enrichment technique in the past has been
gaseous diffusion. It is characterized by enormous
economies of scale. The most serious privatization proposal
to date, the 1975 Ford Administration backed proposal of
Uranium Enrichment Associates (UEA), called for the
constr uction of a $3.5 billion facil ity with the capaci ty
to meet the annual fuel needs of 90 nuclear plant (Moore
1978, 36-37). Hoover Institution fellow Thomas Moore
asserts this to be the minimum efficient size for a
diffusion plant (Moore 1978,14). A major AIF fuel study
envisioned an industry initially composed of 4 plants. A
1968 GAO report foresaw a similar industrial structure and
was critical of the oligopoly implications of private
sector development.
Recent technological developments suggest that smaller
units may be feasable using laser or other techniques
(Moore 1978, Ahmed 1979). High R&D costs and regulatory
uncertainties may provide significant barriers to entry for
this option as well.
131. Fuel fabrication consists of 3 steps, the conversion
of enriched UH6 to U02; the processing of the U02 into fuel
pellets; and the fabrication of fuel elements from fuel
pellets. Because it is common for firms to be involved in
all steps in the process the triad is treated as a single
industry.
132. Kerr-,HcGee possesses fabrication capabilities, but
through the early seventies had not sought to translate
these into significant commercial initiatives.
133. It is also likely that representatives of financial
capital played an important role in nuclear planning.
134. This observation cuts across pro and anti-nuclear
distinctions. See Dawson 1976, 238-242; Bupp & Derian 1981,
179-191; and Ebbin and Kasper 1974, 244-253.
135. Chubb notes that the average utility Washington lobby
had seven times the financial resources and five times the
human resources of its environmentalist counterpart. He
also cites the industry's access to superior bureaucratic
lines of communication as a significant lobbying advantage
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(Chubb 1983, 101). He credits the latter to the practical
exchanges between the AEC and industry that accompany
functional authority, noting for example that only the
Atomic Industrial Forum and Edison Electric Institute were
in daily contact with the NRC, and recepients rather than
initiators of communication 50% of the time (Chubb 1983,
108) •
C HAP T E R IV
MECHANISMS OF ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR POWER AS AN
OFFICIAL TECHNOLOGY: THE SKEWING OF ENERGY
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPHENT ACTIVITIES
II Overyiew*
This chapter examines post-war U.S. energy research
and development (R&D) policy. Along with Chapters 5-8, it
operationalizes the concept of an Official Technology by
detailing the mode of capture and competitive advantages of
nuclear's OT status.
The major R&D decision makers were the federal
energy and defense bureaucracies and key energy sector
firms. The anti-nuclear and al terna ti ve energy movements
gained increasing influence in the seventies. The
discussion analyzes each group's impact on R&Dactivity
from an OT framework perspective. It demonstrates that the
skew ing of research towards nuclear power significantly
al tered its competi tive posi tion and was instrumental in
establisQing it as an Official Technology. The R&Dtilt
is tied to the conjunctural logic of the planning context
discussed in Chapter 3 and not the imperatives of a-priori
technical efficiencies.
----------------------------------------------------------
* All dollar entries denominated in historical doillars
unless otherwise noted.
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~ Federal Policy
2.1) Funding program~
Sta te decisions influenced the di rection of energy
research through direct funding and a system of incentives
for private R&D projects. Though precise subject area
figures for corporate R&D spending are proprietary
information and unavailable (Tilton 1974, 10), federal
monies appear to have funded 30-40% national energy R&D
expenditures from 1955-1975 (Perry 1973, 39-40; Holloman
and Grenon 1975, 106, 108; U.S. Department of Energy -
Energy Information Administration 2/81, p. 19; National
Science Foundation 1969, p. 36). The direction of federal
spending was thus able to significantly influence the
pattern of energy inquiry. From 1951-1971 more than $11
billion ('79$) was publicly allocated tor light Hater
reactor related research (U.S., Department of Energy-Energy
Information ,Administration 2/81, p, 19).[1] This total is
approximately 8 times the sum publicly spent on oil related
R&D, 15 times that expended for coal research, and 50-100
times the allocation for solar energy (See Table 10 below
for referential citations).,-.
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~~ l.Q.
Federal Energy ~ Spending 1951-1971
l.Mi,llions of Historical Dollars) (lJ
Nuclear Oil & Geother- Conser-
~ .£Qwer(2) CoalC3} Gas(4} SoladS) ma l lfi) vation(7)
1951 23
1952 31
1953 49
1954 54 11
1955 59 "
,<
1956 121 "
1957 210 " 11
1958 268 " 12
1951 295 " 27
1960 306 " 20
1961 388 " 19
1962 344 " 20
1963 344 11 21
1964 320 72
1965 340 69
1966 277 16 47
1967 300 19 46
1968 326 21 71
1969 281 34 47 50-100
1970 257 46 22 thru 7 thru minimal
1971 181 63 17 1971 1971 thru 1971
l-----------------------------------------------------------
1) It is not possible to draw upon sources utilizing common
accounting procedures for all of the energy options during
the entire '51-'71 period. The statistics are thus not
entirely comparable. (Only some, for example, appear to
include military and/or environmental related R&D.)
Nevertheless the numbers appear robust for orders of
magnitude comparisons in the areas discussed. Gaps in the
table represent years not included in the sources cited.
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(Table 10 footnotes continued)
2) Nuclear expenditures refer to outlays for converter
reactors (primarily light water reactors) and specifically
exclude outlays for breeder and fusion research.
Statistics drawn from: u.s. Department of Energy-Energy
InformationAdministration, E~.Q~.r.f!.l-S.QJ2.2g.r.t19.r ~.Q.Q~~.f!.r
J>g}:?~..G.. B~.f!.Q.tg.rn~~igll .f!llg.t.h~E1!~.l.cY.Q.l~,2/81, p. 19.
Outlays for related biological research, physics research
and program management drawn from: Battelle Hemorial
Institute,hll hll.f!.ly~i~g1 E~.Q~.r.f!.l~ l.Q~ll.tiY~~~~~g .tg
Stimulate Energy Production, 12/78, pp. 117-124 (assuming
total expenditures divided between 1956-1966 and 1966-1977
on a 1/3-2/3 basis, and reconverting '76$ into historical
dollars) •
3) Coal outlays 1954-1963 based on Cambel (1964),Energy R&D
.f!llgB.f!.tigll.f!.l~.rgg.r~~~, pp. 30-31: 1966-1972 entries drawn
from Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee (1974),
.En~.r.9Y~g.li.QY~.f!.l2~.r~pp. 315-316 (assum ingall Bur eau 0 f
l.iines expenditures for health 'and safety and all EPA
outlays for controlling stack pollution were coal related).
4) Oil ana gas outlays 1957-1969 drawn from: National
Science Foundation, B~~~.f!.r.Q.hf!ll~n~Y~.lgJ2m~n.t in ~n.Q1!~.t.ry
1~.6-~, pp. 3 4, 96: 197 0-1 97 1 en tries draw n fro m: Nat ion a1
Science Foundation,H.f!.tigll.f!.lJ>.f!.t.t~.rn~g1 .s.Qi~n.Q~ .f!ng
Technology Resources 1981 p. 44.
5) Holloman and Grenon (1975) p. 83.
6) H011 0 III anan d G ren 0n (197 5) p, 79•
7) 1973 is the t Lr s.tyear for which conservation specific
data seem to be available. Prior outlays were most likely
insignificant. The National Science Foundation's .s.Qi~ll.Q~
Indicators 121li. reports that outlays for conservation and
all non-nuclear, non-fossil fuel and non-solar-geothermal
related projects totalled $12 million in 1973, p. 97.
219
The architectonic impact of federal R&D spending was
enhanced by the traditional division of labor in public and
private research financing. Across the economy federal
dollars have generally dominated basic research, accounting
for 70% total outlays 1960-1980 (National Science
Foundation 1981, 26). In contrast, private spending has
been directed towards funding marginal innovations within
existing technologies. Case studies and qualitative reviews
indicate that a similar pattern prevailed in the energy
se ct or (Cambel 1964; ~li XQL:.K ~i..ID..e~ 7/4/76). The N eliYQil
~i..m~' review of the Energy Research and Development
Administration's 1976 "Inform" study, for example, found:
••• corporations are waiting for the government
to take the lead in deciding whether and how to pursue
[alternative energy technologies] ••• the corporations
involved were not prime movers in energy development.
Most corporations were found reluctant to invest large
sums in long range development ••• in five of the
least advanced fields, solar power plants, wind
generators, ocean thermal power plants, and the use of
waste heat - almost all corporate research is
dependent on federal funds (NeliYOll ~i.ID..e~7/4/76).
"Due largely to defense priorities, federal funding
for basic research has been skewed towards atomic energy.
Significant civilian spinoffs have resulted.[2] The
opposite situation prevailed in many non-nuclear fields
(Cambel 1964, xix; Perry 1973). The Cambel report noted
the sensitivity of campus as well as corporate R&D
activities to the direction of federal funds and the level
of ideological support for different technologies,
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concluding, "In the universities, too, the glamour of
certain disciplines and the relative ease of funding tend
to accentuate space- and defense-oriented energy R&D.
Although colleges and technological institutes are engaged
in some education and research for civilian energy, the
efforts are widely dispersed and diffused, and few, if any,
of the academic groups concerned are of an intellectually
critical size" (Cambel 1964, xix). Ten years later the
perry report found little change in university environments
(Perry 1973, 55-56, i25, 134).[3]
Nuclear power also enjoyed the lion's share of
budgeted funds and military spinoffs at the applied
research level. The naval program was especially important,
generating a reservoir of practical knowledge and pool of
skilled manpower (Little 1968, l17~ Kuhn 1966, 5~ Hewlett
and Duncan 1974, 382-384~ U.S.,Department of Energy-Energy
Information Administration 2/81, p. 8).[4J
Federal
t
suppport for large scale nuclear
demonstration projects provided the last link in the
nuclear R&D chain. Since many competing energy options
involve costly prototypes, the skewing of federal
demonstration funds towards nuclear projects (such as the
Shippingport and power Reactor Demonstration Program
plants), gave the technology a significant edge. The lack
of similar federal support for syn-fuel demonstration
plants in 1982 helps explain the cancellation of several
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commercial sized prototype projects. [5]
~l Federal incentives
Besides directly funding research, state policy
created numerous incentives for private nuclear R&D, most
often by minimizing associated risks. De facto efforts to
involve private firms in the development process began with
the concentrated contracting procedures of the AEC, which
created a self-interest on the part of select corporations
in nuclear power's technical success. Formal programs
began with the Industrial Participation Studies in 1951 and
the subsidies of the Power Reactor Demonstration Program in
1955.[6] All nuclear initiatives benfitted from the
limited liability provisions of the Price-Anderson Act, and
the AEC's de facto commitment to dissolve potential nuclear
bottlenecks. The latter served as an implicit form of
technical insurance, guaranteeing that research gaps in the
rest of th e nucl ear industry would not compr om ise th e,
economic value of power plant investments. The DOE's draft
nuclear power subsidy study rated this insurance more
economically stimula ting than direct funding, noting, "The
clear government commitment to the nuclear option has
created a general reduction in uncertainty. The industry
has been assured that the government will supply acceptable
solutions to serious outstanding problems. The result has
been a decrease in the rate of return required by nuclear
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investors, and a substantial amount of investment" (Bowring
1980, 30).
, I
The government's naval demand and subsidy support
for nuclear exports have also acted as a form of market
insurance. Along with the threat of nuclear TVA's, they
acted as a hybrid variant of Schmookler's demand pull
incentive for nuclear R&D.
~l ~D and ideology
Due in part to its role as a major financier of R&D
and bearer of uncertainty the state can assume the public
funct ion of OT annoi nt er, state decisions however are
influenced by corporate and other constraints, so it would
be incorrect to portray state policy as autonomous. While
a full inquiry into the determinants of state R&D decision
making is beyond the bounds of this discussion, the
functions of state R&D activity adduced within the OT
framework suggest some situational insights into the
character of policy making.
By highlighting the role of the state as a consensus
building mechanism, the OT framework suggests that
ideological beliefs are likely to playa key role in
de termin ing pub 1icpo 1icy. In the po stwa r per i0d, this
has involved the translation of cold war ideology into
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military related R&D. As Table 11 indicates, the defense-
space share of government research outlays varied between
60 and 90 percent in the 20 years recorded. The nuclear
tilt can be seen as a by-product of this distribution.
Rosenberg has argued this proposition more broadly,
tying the general shape of post-war technical advance to
the implications of the militarization of research. He
writes, II ••• the size and the direction of research
efforts are increasingly the product of allocative
decisions made within the public sphere Much of the
technological change in the past quarter century has been
the result of intensive public efforts undertaken in the
pursuit of goals formulated in relation to the needs of
national security - jet propulsion, numerical control,
computer technology and electronics more generally, and
atomic energy •••11 (Rosenberg 1972,183).
Table II
~rcentage Totals ~ Federal gn~ ~-Federal
M12 Spendi~ rssa .9.D.Q U@ :: 1978 (l)
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Federal Defense Space Civilian Non-
Year total related related related Federal
1953
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
54 48
52
50
48
1 5
3 965
65
64
6
7
9
9
66 41 14 11
66
65
37
33
33
35
35
19 9
11
12
13
13 .
21
19
14
64
62
61 13
58
57
56
34
33
32
11 13
10 14
9 15
55
53
51
32
31
28
8 15
15
16
7
7
7 1751 27
51
50
26
25
8 17
187
7 19
--------------
5050 24
1) Source: National Science Foundation National
Patterns Qf ~~~ ~ ~hnolQgy Resource~ ~.
46
35
35
36
34
34
35
36
38
39
42
43
44
45
47
49
49
49
50
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2LiL ~ and bureaucratic planning
The OT framework's planning context metaphor also
suggests that a key role in determining R&D directions is
likely to be played by institutional symbiosis, or the
interactive definition of planning visions by key
government and corporate bureaucracies. Independent of the
large direct clout of energy sector interests in electoral
or legislative processes, the OT perspective highlights the
ability of the active "producing institutions" in an
economy to functionally define the realm of practical and
poli tical discourse, c.lle) L,y oxtensi ori, scientific agendas.
The Harvard Business School Energy Future volume expressed
the bias in this way:
When the (energy) crisis broke in 1973, the
country turned to the experts, the people who had
spent their working lives trying to increase energy
supplies through oil, gas, coal, and nuclear. Not
suprisingly, these people forcefully advocated a rapid
further build-up of conventional sources, and their
voices were powerful. After all, they belonged to
organizati9ns set up to accomplish such tasks ••• Even
if economic self-interest had not been involved,
points of view, convictions, and experience acquired
over many decades of working to provide more energy
would naturally have caused these people to emphasize
energy production rather than conservation •••• Thus
the energy suppliers pretty much shaped the terms of
the debate, and established what was important and
what was not (Stobaugh and Yergin 1979, 140).
Holloman and Grenon indicate that variants of
"hands on authority" characterize the R&D policy of most
industrialized nations (Hollomon and Grenon 1975, 25).
Galbraith asserts the principle more generally (Galbraith
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1973, esp. pp. 142-144). Hays' study of Export-Import Bank
policy reveals a similar dependence on corporate
bureaucracies for planning data.[7] Common Cause's study
of the employment backgrounds of governm ent energy planner s
reveals the familiar pUblic/private revolving door.[8]
In summary, the state played a critical role in
shaping postwar R&Dbehavior and energy sector technical
change. Alongside skew ing its own outlays towards nuclear
power and proffering incentives for private nuclear
research, its actions signalled nuclear's OT status.
Federal decisions were themselves shaped by the military
priorities and ideology of the cold war and the planning
vision established by the close relationship be t.w ee n the
DoD, AEC and nuclear industry.
II Private Sector Participation in Energy R&DPlanning
Corporate and university/non-profit R&Dprograms
comprise the private sector share of u.S. R&D planning.
Corporate efforts are by far the most important.[9J
University/non-profit projects are only significant in the
basic research area, and as already noted are more
sensitive to corporate and federal policy than it might
first appear. [10] Conventional estimates of industry
funding levels are contained in Table 12 below.
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Tabl..e12.
~ID~ Energy R&D Outlays ~ ~ ~
(in mill ions '79$) (1)
1963 1963 1974 1974
Industry Govt. Industry Govt. Industry
Coal 25 25 151 14
-;
Oil and Gas 91 766 13 994
Nuclear (fission) 479 205 667 *(2)
Nuclear (fusion) 59 7 126 *(2)
Electrici ty 2 356 11 426
Solar 7 2 17 *(2)
Nagnetohydrodynamics 21 4 7 *(3)
Fuel Cell 18 21 *(3) *(2)
Thermionics 15 5 *(3 *(3)
Thermoelectricity 25 7 *(3) *(3)
Pollution Control
Technology no '63 listings 65 * (4)
Hiscellaneous no '63 listings 14 *(3)
Totals 742 1398 1071 1434
1) Table based on Tables 6-1 and 6-2 of the "Perry Report"
(Energy Research and Development =- problems .§.!lQ prospects,
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 1973, pp.
39-40). 1963 nuclear totals lower than entry in Table 10
due to less exhaustive accounting.
*(2) Included under electricity.
*(3) Negligible.
*(4) Included under oil and gas, and electricity.
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While the figures for private spending reflect
sources of funds rather than area of expenditure, they
appear to be representative of research directions as
well. The major exception involves the use of oil/gas
industry funds for non-oil/gas energy related research,
such as petrochemical R&D.[llJ The major weakness of the
numbers is their failure to include multi-billion dollar
nuclear outlays for Development and Demonstration projects,
such as the vendors' turnkey plants, or utilities' early
nuclear orders.
\'Jhenamended to include such nuclear spending, the
data indicate that the u.s. (1955-1975) had two privately
funded energy R&D programs, an oil/gas tack led by the
major oil companies, [12J and a nuclear program directed by
the electric equipment manufacturers and utilities. While
the IOU's lack of regulatory support for earmarked R&D
activities led to minimal (less than .5% sales) formal
outlays, their guaranteed rate base recovery of capital
expenditures led to promotional plant purchases.
Using the OT framework it is possible to construct a
Kuhnian model[13J of private sector research policy to
explain post war corporate R&D behavior. The model divides
R&D activities into years of "normal" research and
"revolutionary" departures. During normal periods, there is
a str ong tendency for co rpor ate spe nding to be ge ar ed
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towards marginal innovation within existing technical
contexts. Political-economic-scientific conjunctures can
occur, however, which raise the possibility of
"infrastructural paradigm" shifts. During these periods
incentives exist for corporate R&D risk taking, and
promotional planning.
Using the distinction between normal and
revolutionary R&D periods, it is possible to divide postwar
energy R&D into four categories. category 1 research refers
to the bulk of R&D spending for traditional energy sources.
This research was geared primarily towards producing minor
innovations directly related to the funder's existing
market activities. It was dominated by oil/gas spending.
category 2 refers to the electric equipment manufacturers
and growth oriented utilties' promotional R&D support for
nuclear p ow er, It was a more speculative venture, geared
towards winning OT status for a new technology. Category 3
research refers to reactive nuclear R&D, and represents a
\new round of normal research. It includes R&D performed by
the more passive utilities, oil companies, and firms
threatened by the nuclear canabalization of their
industries (such as the fossil fuel boiler-makers).
Category 4 refers to the R&D initiatives that followed the
disestablishment of nuclear power as an OT in the mid-
seventies. It represents a second round of revolutionary
R&D activity. The discussion below explores these
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categories in more detail.
Category 1: As noted above most private R&D projects
tend to be directed towards minor innovations. The widely
ci ted NcGraw-Hill study, for example, found that the bulk
of corporate R&D projects were expected to have a payoff
period of less than five years (Mansfield 1968c). They were
perforce directed towards producing minor technical change,
often for the purpose of product differentiation. As noted
above, this practice seems repeated in the energy sector
(Cambel 1964, 34; Perry 1973, 20; R~.N XQ.£.k ~.i.ID~.s. 7/4/76;
Freeman 1974, 11). Hansfieldls oil and coal industry case
studies, for example, found that funded projects generally
had a less than 5 year expected payoff period and required
probability of success in the range of 75% (Mansfield 1975,
318) •
Such behavior is consistent with the logic of the aT
framework. The latter highlights the role of OT dynamics
in encouraging conservative research strategies, by
emphasizing the magni tude of uncertainty associated wi th
infrastructural R&D choices, and the power of aT inertia.
Category 2: Complementing the tendency for
marginalist R&D behavior, the aT framework implies the
potential for conjunctural incentives for speculative R&D
activities. The vendors early acceptance of AEC contracting
responsibility for meager financial renumeration, GEls
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tolerance of an expected $35-$50 million ('79$) loss on its
1955 Dresden plant sale (Gandara 1977, 52-53), and the
billion dollar turnkey losses of the sixties, all
illustrate such behavior. The large growth oriented
utili ties premature nuclear orders, and Bechtel's nuclear
activities reveal a similar dynamic.
The character of promotional R&Dactivities suggests
that technical change will be biased towards technologies
offering key corporations rent capturing opportunities.
Fortune's account of GE's decision to concentrate company
investments in nuclear power, jet engines and computers,
supports this conclusio~
Category 3: As nuclear power emerged as an Official
Technology it stimulated bandwagon R&Dsupport. Recall,
for example, the effect of the technology's "coming
technology" image on utili ty nuclear investments. The oil
companies' late '60's nuclear expenditures contain aspects
of both category 2 and 3 behavior. Rivalry dynamics
amongst the reactor vendors pressured firms to match the
R&Dof the most aggressive company. The entrance of the
tradi tional fossil fuel furnace and boiler firms into the
reactor market was similarly a defensive reaction.[14]
Category 4: After the disestablishment of nuclear
power as an Official Technology in the mid-seventies, the
u.s. witnessed a second round of revolutionary R&D.
Although it initially appeared that syn-fuels or solar
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energy might emerge with a degree of aT status, the country
sub seq ue ntLy entered an ambiguous period within which no
technology enjoyed the political support necessary for bold
initiatives. Energy options that can evolve through
incremental steps in research and deployment thus currently
have an advantage over more "lumpy" alterna tives.
il Explanations for the ~id-Seventies ~ Shift
Table 13 quantifies the reorientation in R&D
spending towards solar and conservation that took place in
the mid and late seventies.
Two kinds of reasons have been adduced to explain
the change. Technically deterministic approaches interpret
the reorientation as a technocratic response to the
inevitable accumulation of empirical information concerning
nuclear and non-nuclear engineering characteristics.
Socially deterministic approaches ground the change in
shifting socio-political factors. While no serious
historian would assert either position exclusively,
differences in emphasis embody differences in kind. The aT
framework falls into the second category. It links the
reorientation of R&D projects to nuclear power's loss of aT
status. The latter is tied to the social roots underlying
the rise of the anti-nuclear and alternative energy
Table L1(l) Energy R&DFunds 1973-1979
l.11.il.lions Q.f Ristor ical Dollars) (1)
Year 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
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Totals 1,009 1,339 1,774 2,073 2,599 3,026 3,795
Fossil Fuels 438 516 550 605 765 8601,480
Oil 297
Gas 51
Shale 12
Coal 49
Syn-fuels *(2)
Nining *(2)
Other * (2)
Other Fossil Fuel 29
Nuclear 501
fission 476
fusion 25
All Other
Energy 70
Geothermal
Solar
Conservation *(2)
All other 67
329
74
18
65
21
5
39
30
601
567
34
222
1
2 7
137
333
66
19
109
50
9
50
23
700
659
41
524
2
19
435
64
381
68
24
127
74
10
43
5
799
741
58
669
6 13
43
454 * (2)
94 *(2)
35 * (2)
177 *(2)
116 * (2)
800
163
29
414
310
9 * (2) 1
52 * (2) 103
*(2) 74 *(2)
935 1,016 1,080
852 * (2)
* (2)
951
129
899 1,150 1,235
119
257
542
116
--------_.
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1) Source: National Science Foundation National Patterns Qt
~~igD~g £DQ ~ggDnQ1Q~Y Bg~Q~~gg~ 1~~2 p. 50. Due to
different accounting procedures, the numbers in the table
are generally lower than alternative citations for specific
years noted in the text. The table is cited for internal
compara ti ve purposes.
2) Category not available for reporting purposes.
76
83
24 * (2)
* (2)
* (2)
* (2)
65
528 .£ 694
85
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movements, rather than the inevitable triumph of technical
rationality confronted with "perfect information". The cold
war energy corporation dominated energy planning context of
the 1951-1971 period is argued to have produced one R&D
bundle, and the differently structured planning context of
the mid to late seventies another. The claim is not that
suspected engineering efficiencies do not influence R&D
decisions, but that the economic meaning of engineering
relations is mediated by socio-political factors.
For example, Chapter 7 develops a "sociology of
knowledge" analysis of nuclear cost predictions. It
demonstrates that even suspected engineering efficiencies
are sensitive to social context variables. The discussion
details how OT dynamics generated an average real cost
underestimation of over 100% per nuclear project (1963-
1984), or approximately 600% over the period as a whole.
R&D cost benefit analyses, such as that of the Cambel
report in 1964, were thus heavily biased in favor of
recommending increased nuclear spending.[15]
A converse planning context bias characterized the
assessment of softpath R&D projects 1951-1971. [16] While
detailed inquiry into non-nuclear R&D behavior is beyond
the scope of this discussion, a few observations suggesting
the usefulness of extending OT theory to non-nuclear
development histories are presented below. An underlying
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question is why the assessment of soft path engineering
characteristics and technical promise was inversely
correlated with nuclear power's relative OT status.[17] The
answer appears related to the ideological and institutional
biases associated with different planning contexts. For
example, u.s. energy planning in the fifties and sixties
was organized by federal bureaucracies and corporations
geared towards managing and promoting large scale
centralized energy systems like nuclear power. Within this
framework, solar and other soft path technologies were
evaluated chiefly in terms of their centralized
electrification potential, and found unprornising.[18]
The entry into the nuclear planning context of a
broadened list of participants in the seventies expanded
the realm of technological discourse. The "small is
beautiful" ideology of aspects of the anti-nuclear and
environmental movements encouraged attention to the
possible substitution of non-electric energy for
\
electricity. This shift suggested new areas for
potential solar application, and led to increased R&D for
previously neglected technical areas like passive solar
systems.
In effect, the political movements of the seventies
created an ideological climate and institutional network
capable of testing existing paradigm limits. popular
enthusiasm (on campus, in community groups and amidst risk
236
taking small entrepreneurs) and mission oriented solar
bureaucracies proved better able to test the boundries of
existing planning than older AEC-energy industry
bureaucracies. [19]
.5.l Conclusion
This chapter used the OT framework to model
infrastructural R&D behavior and to explain the skewing of
postwar energy development towards nuclear power. We have
argued that the period's energy planning context tilted R&D
towards military oriented technologies in areas where key
energy corporations possessed competitive advantages and
prospects for the capture of economic rents. This bias
oriented R&D activities towards nuclear power and was
instrumental in establishing the technology as an Official
Technology. In supporting this claim we detailed the
nature of federal and corporate energy R&D activities,
highlighting the magnitude of state nuclear support.
C HAP T E R IV
1. By 1979 this total had reached $14.5 billion ('79$), and
more than $21 billion ('79$) if breeder and fusion oriented
research is included (U.S., Department of Energy-Energy
Information Administration 2/81, 19).
2. The $15 to $30 million ('79$) spent annually from the
mid-fifites forward on' reactor physics research, for
example, was of critical importance in developing
contempor ary reactor s' neutron econom ies and led di rectly
to the development of zirconium cladding (Dawson 1976, 76-
13 6, e s p, 7 6- 83 ) •
3. The Perry report, for example, noted the weakness of
coal related basic research (Perry 1973, 125). The multi-
million dollar Ford Foundation Energy Policy Project
highlighted the research gaps in the alternative energy and
conservation areas. (Ford Foundation 1974, p. 306).
4. By 1961 the nation had 64 nuclear vessels in operation
or various stages of design and construction (IJlullenbach
1963, 132; Dawson 1976, 134). By 1972 108 nuclear powered
ships were afloat (Dawson 1976, 30). Commenting on the
program's civilian spinoffs, Hewlett and Duncan write,
"Just as much of that technology (LWR) carne directly from
the naval propulsion project, so did the laying of a broad
technical base in industry depend in large measure upon the
techniques derived in building the nuclear fleet" ( Hewlett
and Duncan 1974, 382-384).
5. Many, studies and observers have noted this impact. The
Perry report, for example, concluded, "The Government's
role in energy R&Dat this time is crucial. The projects
required are so large and expensive, and the risks so
great, that Government will be the cornerstone of any
program ••• Only Government has the capability to influence
the timing and terms of entry of any new synthetic
industry ••• II (Perry 1973, 23).
s. David Freeman, a key Carter energy advisor, and
former director of' both the Ford Foundation's Energy Policy
Project and the TVA, testified similarly during the 1972
House Committee on Science and Astronautics energy research
and development hearings. Parallel claims are made in the
Department of Interior's 1968 study "U.S. Petroleum Through
198011 (Perry 1973, 17). Commoner and many renewable
energy advocates assert similar views for a wide range of
alternative energy technologies (Commoner 1979, 39-40;
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Bu~~n~~~ ~~~k 10/9/78; Congressional Quarterly 1981,
p. 71).
The aT framework suggests that ~~~£~g~~~~ of
retrospective assessments of actual expenditure
requirements, such perceptions can discourage private R&D
initiatives and heighten the significance of public R&D
policy.
6.Recall that under the PRDP the AEC provided lump sum
R&Dgrants, supplemental R&Dsupport, and free fuel usage
for reactor projects. The last step in the light water
reactor development program, the subsidized construction of
commercial sized demonstration plants, began in 1962. In
total, 15 plants were built under various PROP incentives
(Dawson 1976, 94-95). In the mid-sixties the Commission
shifted the bulk of its reactor research to the breeder
progr am, signalling the industry that cur rent investments
could tie into long term markets.
7. Hays indicates that the Export-Import Bank relies
entirely on u.s. exporters for the technical data contained
in in its loan memoranda and the material it forwards to
Congress (Hays 1983).
8.The Common Cause study found "52.3% (or 73) of the 139
top ERDA employees came from private enterprises involved
in energy activities; 75% (or 55) of these employees carne
from private enterprises that were recipients of ERDA
contracts. This represents 40% of the 139 top employees of
ERDA. 71.5% (or 307) of the 429 NRC senior personnel have
been employed by private enterprises active in the energy
field; 90% (or 279) of those 307 employees came from
private enterprises holding licenses, permits, or contracts
from NRC. This represents 65% of NRC's top personnel"
(Nader and Abbotts 1979, 277).
9. In 1980, for example, of the $69+ billion dollars
allocated for R&D in the US, $33 billion was federally
funded, $34 billion corporate funded and only $2+ billion
university/non-profit funded. Since many federal dollars
support research in other sectors, performance statistics
for '81 look a bit different, with industry absorbing $49
billion and federal and university/non-profit projects 9
billion each (National 'Science Foundation 1981, 25).
10. Of the $8.7 billion in basic research performed in
1981, $4.3 billion was campus based (National Science
Foundation 1981, 25).
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11. Hansfield, for example, reports that about 1/4
petroleum R&Doutlays in 1970 were allocated for chemical
research (Mansfield 1975, 318).
12. In 1969 the top 8 oil companies performed 76% of oil
industry refinement and extraction R&D (National Science
Foundation 1969, 48).
13. See Kuhn (1970) for a general discussion of the concept
of paradigm shifts in scientific discourse.
14. Recall, for example, the attitude of Babcock and
wilcox, who indicate, "Hhat alarmed us ••• was the decision
by these two companies [Westinghouse & GEl to build thei r
own components. We realized that they were organizing
their facilities to include our part and share of the
business. We decided immediately that we would have to
jump all the way in and do it quickly if we were not to
lose out" (Kuhn 1966,160).
15. When comparing the economics of nuclear and fossil fuel
fired plants, the study focused its analysis on nuclear's
relative fuel cost advantage, disregarding what has turned
out to be an even larger offseting differential in relative
capital costs. The study based its calculations on the
AEC's promotionally oriented 1962 report Civilian Nuclear
POlier: b Report to the President. Had the latter's capital
costs been used, the analysis would not have been much
improved. Actual generating costs in the late seventies
were 2.5 times the AEC's predicted rates. Rather than a
projected savings of about $375 million for 1978, nuclear
fired electricity cost about 10% more than coal fired
electricity (Komanoff 1980). The difference be tw e en the
projected costs of nuclear power in the 1964 Cambel study
and current estimates for plants corning on line in the mid-
eighties is even more dramatic. Ironically, the Cambel
study noted its nuclear co st f igur es w e r e only estimates,
but suggested their bias was upwards (Cambel 1964, 84).
16. No attempt will be made to prove this proposition
here. Among the major energy studies supporting this
conclusion are: Ford Foundation (1974); Lovins (1977,
1982); Council on Environmental Quality (1978); Stobaugh
and Yergin (1979); Solar Energy Research Insti tute (1981).
See also Commanor (1979) and Taylor (1979).
Illustrative of the O'l' years' tendency to
underestimate conservation potential are the errant demand
forecasts cited in Chapter 3 section 3.2. The forecasts
were f r eq ue n t 1Y de r i ve d fro m r e1a t i vel y fix e den erg y/ GNP
ratios and embodied annual energy demand growth rates of 3-
3.5%. One Chase Hanhattan Bank study, for example,
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declared, "There is no sound, proven basis for believing
that a billion dollars of GNP can be generated with less
energy in the future" (Schurr et a1. 1979, 86). Rather
than zero, the pr ice elastici ty of energy demand is
currently estimated to range from .7-1.0 (Ford Foundation
1979, 90). The price elasticity of electricity demand is
estimated to range from 1 to 1.25 (Ford Foundation 1979,
107) •
Illustrative of the underestimation of the economic
potential of soft energy supply options are numerous
citations of unanticipated technical breakthroughs. After
a voluminous literature review and active correspondence
with state of the art practitioners, Lovins and Lovins, for
example, write, "Five years ago, analysts who suspected
that appropriate renewable energy sources might well offer
cost-effective ways to replace dwindling fossil fuels
tended to be dismissed as enthusiasts. Technologists
conditioned by dismal experience with complex large scale
energy systems told them it would take decades just to
develop renewable sources from laboratory curiousity to a
useful commercial form, and many decades more to
disseminate them through society. But since then, despite
the normal quota of trial and error, actual developments in
the field have produced more, better and cheaper renewable
options than anyone thought possible (Lovins & Lovins 1982,
373) •
Testifying at the House Interior Committee's 1979
nucLear econom ics hear ings, Equi tabl e Lif e Ins urance' s
Executive Vice President, Carleton Burt, similarly stated,
" ••• we are impressed by the rapid change in the economics
of solar and the dynamic breakthroughs in technology
relating to solar, both passive and photovoltaic" (House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs 1979, p. 129).
B.lJ.§.i~~ lY'ee.k(10/9/78) reported, "The vigor of the
R&D eforts,suggests that solar energy will ultimately find
a much wider spectrum of application - at acceptable cost -
than might have been expected a few years ago." The article
noted the costs of solar cell generated electricity had
fallen lOx 1975-1978 and reported the DOE's goals called
for another 20x decrease by 1986.
The Council on Environmental Quality (1978) added,
"Having examined the issue, our conclusion is that the
prospects for solar energy are brighter than most imagine
•••This report summarizes the recent technical and
economic progress which has led to this more optimistic
evaluation of solar technologies ••• The view of solar
energy as a a rather exotic energy source of little
practical significance from the standpoint of our larger
energy requirements is no longer justified, and may never
have been" (p. iii).
241
17. As noted above, nuclear's loss of OT status would
have been expected to increase the attractiveness of
alternative energy investment. There were also
intimations, especialy during the Carter Administration,
that solar and conservation might achieve OT status.
Generous tax credits and requirements for solar units on
defense construction, for example, provided Schmookler-like
demand incentives for solar R&D. The upward revaluation of
soft path j;;,~~.h.D1~gl possibilities, however, represents a
different phenomenon. The ability to integrate it into a
common mode of explanation, accounting for shifting
technical assessments of nuclear power and changing subsidy
and regulatory incentives as well, is one of the strengths
of the OT approach.
18) Lovins, for example, reports that ERDA indicated in
1974 that only electrification technologies would be
considered capable of making major contributions to meeting
the energy crisis (Lovins 1977, 141). Though the bias
towards electrification seems more the result of a
constrained ideological framework than a self-conscious
deference to the interests of the IOU's, the potential
financial instability caused by utility insolvencies was
probably not lost on energy officials. Lovins notes that
in 1975 ..•••some US officials were speculating that they
might have to seek central regulation of domestic solar
technologies, lest mass defections from utility grids
damage utility cash flows and the state and municipal
budgets dependent on utility tax revenues" (Lovins 1977,
154). For further analysis of the traditional bias in U.S.
R&D thinking towards electrification and large centralized
systems see: stobaugh and Yergin (1979), especially pp.
202-207; Reece (1979); and the Council on Environmental
Qua lit Y (197 8). Al 0 ngas iill i1a r 1ine, Nadera ndAb bot ts
(1979) have suggested that decades of operating experience
with high\temperature thermal energy technologies,
predisposed engineers to think solely in terms of such
system s, to the detr iment of sola r options (p, 39).
19. The traditional lack of administrative enthusiasm and
support for soft path technologies is illustrated by the
way ERDA, the AEC's bureaucratic successor, initially chose
a contractor for the Congressionally established Solar
Ener gy Re sear ch Ins tit ute (SERI) • As repor ted by £;.D~.rg~
Dg1~Y, an energy industry journal, ERDA indicated that II
••• SERI will ... try to dispel some of the solar myths
•.• on thetheory that false optimism will hurt solar
development just as much as undue pessimism ••• Hhat are
some ot the myths about solar that SERI will try to
eradicate? ••• (one is) that solar energy is an alternative
to nuclear power or coal anytime in the foreseeable
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future." According to the Institute's Deputy Director,
solar '''probably w ont t, displace a single nuclear plant or
coal t i r e o power plant'" by the year 2000 (Government
Operations Committee 1977, p. 1146-47).
Contrast the above statement with the views of Dennis
Hayes, the director of the Solar Lobby's 1978 Sun Day,
"About one-fifth of all energy used around the world now
comes r r om solar resources •.• By the year 2000, such
renewable energy sources could provide 40% of the global
energy budget; by 2025, humanity could obtain 75% of its
energy from solar resources (Hayes 1977, 155). Similar
optimism can be found in studies by the Council on
Environmental Quality (1978) and the Congressional Office
of Technology Assessment (1978).
The potential impact of political movements on
research contexts is suggested by the environmental
movement's success in lobbying for Hayes' appointment as
SERI director in 1979. The Council on Environmental Quality
was i tsel f a pr oduct of an earl ier env ironm ental ist
triumph, the National Environmental Policy Act. The
legislation also created the EP~
The point is not that scientists and research
engineers contrive results to suit political audiences, but
that socio-political environments affect the problems
scientists choose to work on and the methodologies
employed. Institutions that develop within one planning
context may internalize its ideological vision and become
independent perpetuators of that vision. The perception
that t Lrms and public bureaucracies possess an historial
identity, which they reproduce along with functional
responses to external stimulai, is one of the powerful
insights of the institutionalist school.
One of the great successes of the anti-nuclear,
a 1 t ern a t i vee ne r gy m0v emen t has bee nit s a b i 1 i t Y to
transcend older planning context ideologies and
institutions. ;It has been able, for example, to reorient
the cultural meaning and relative prestige of nuclear and
solar oriented research. The Cambel report in 1964 noted
the opposite situation, stating
Young research workers tend to gravitate toward
jobs in the more prosperous industries. R&Din su ch
areas as space, defense, and the life sciences has
become more fashionable, more glamorous, more
exciting, or more renumerative. And some research
fields currently have no scientific status ••••
In the universities, too, the glamour of certain
disciplines and the relative ease of funding t.e no to
accentua te space - and def ense -or iented energy R&D.••
(p. xix).
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Although academic institutions handle
considerable energy related research, much of it
pertains to the relatively easily funded work on
defense and space applications. Such areas become
fashionable and exciting to younger scientists and
engineers, who are reluctant to accept employment in
important but neglected sectors contributing to
civilian energy. These sectors are thereby deprived
of the young fertile minds and of basic research
(Cambel1964, xix, 34).
The Harvard Business School Study ~n~~~Y E~~~~~
similarly noted, "The lack of drama has restricted not only
policy and public attention, but also scientific interest
in conservation-oriented research (Stobaugh and Yergin
1979, 140).
By February 1984 the the situation had changed
dramatically. The Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment reported, II negative public attitudes
affect nuclear power's future in less tangible ways: The
most gifted young engineers and technicians may choose
other specializations, gradually reducing the quality of
nuclear industry personnel. And, utilities simply may not
choose nuclear plants if they perceive them as bad for
overall pub l i c relations" (Office of Technology Assessment
1984,217). As early as 1981 .tl.1!.Ql~l!~ n~~..s. reported, II •••
som e se gment s of th e U.S. nucl ear indust ry have mor e
positons available than qualified people ••• to rill t.hem"
(Hertsgaard 1983, 115). 'I'he article tied the gap to
nuclear's increasingly nega tive public image.
C HAP T E R V
HECHANISHS OF ESTABLISHHENT OF AN OFFICIAL TECHNOLOGY
PUBLIC SUBSIDY AND COST DEFERMENT*
Public subsidy and cost deferment played a major
role in establishing nuclear power as an official
technology. Taken together they approximate the average
generating cost expected during the OT years.[l] (See
Table 23.)
For the purpose of estimating a per kilowatt hour
subsidy rate, the aid has been divided into operating and
development assistance categories. Operating subsidies,
like those associated with fuel enrichment pricing, have
been distributed over the lifetime of effected plants.
Development subisides, such as R&D outlays, have been
amortized over a 30-70 year span, using average nuclear kwh
projections from the 1950-1974 period.
Operating subsidies reduced nuclear costs by 7 H/kwh
and development subsidies by 1-34 M/kwh through 1974. The
latter range reflects varrying assumptions about the cost
of capi tal and the appropriate kwh production per iod over
which to distribute development expenditures. We have
estimated a 1.8 M/kwh base case.[2] Annual totals for both
types of subsidies appear in Tables 14 and 15.
-----------------------------------------------------------
* All dollars are 179$ unless otherwise noted.
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The subsidies can be further divided into 3
categories: di rect expendi tures, tax breaks, and aid-in-
kind. The discussion below details the character of
subsidy in each of these areas.
£L Direct Expenditure Subsidies
The most important direct expenditure subsidies
involved outlays for R&D, fuel enrichment, uranium supply,
and regulatory services.
2.11 R&D outlays
'l'hemultitude of ways federal R&D programs
assisted nuclear power was discussed in Chapter 4. Annual
funding levels are reproduced in Table 14. Amortizing the
expenditures as outlined in appendix A yields a base case
per kilowatt hour subsidy rate of 1.4 N/kwh.
Since nuclear power enjoyed a level of pubic
research support nine times that of its nearest rival,
\
coal, and more than fifty times that of solar energy and
\
conservation, almost all of the R&D outlays can be
considered a differential subsidy.
~ Uranium enrichm~ pricinq
As noted in Chapter 3, all enrichment facilities in
the U.S. are owned by the federal government. Fees have
not included charges for federal, state and local taxes,
insurance, the eventual cost of facili ty decommissioning,
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or the market rate of return on employed capital. As a
result government enrichment prices have falen as much as
30% below estimated competitive market levels (u.s..
Department of Energy-Energy Information Administration
2/81, 43). Depreciation and uranium inventory carrying
charges have also been set at rates below those that would
have accompanied private ownership (Bowring 1980, 52, 56-
58; Moore 1978,12; U.S., AEC 1968a, 5-7).
Many studies of government pricing have included
only the above discounts. Illustrative of the technology's
OT status, however, is the additional subsidy contained in
the special financing and pricing policies governing the
power plants providing energy for the electricity intensive
diffusion enrichment process. The government's enr ichment
facili ties are fueled by the TVA and specially "dedicated"
power complexes. The former's tax status, and the latter's
special financing arrangements [3], resulted in low credit
costs for the utilities, and constant fixed cost generating
charges for the AEC. The latter did not rise as the capital
cost of new power plants increased across the country.
Bowring estimates the total value of pricing, power, and
depreciation discounts at $7 billion through 1979 (Bowring
1980, 60).
Nuclear's OT status also required the Commission to
assume the risks associated with building ahead of the
-- ~- - ~
-=--- --~- .. _-.:
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market to insure future supply. The Department of Energy's
recent decision to abandon its 2.6 billion dollar
investment in the portsmouth centrifuge facility, due to
insufficient demand, reflects the cost of that guarantee
(~Ql1 street Journal 6/6/85).
There is some ambiguity concerning how to cost
account the enrichment discounts. The procedure adopted
here translates the expendi tures into a 1 r-t/kwh operating
subsidy.[4] This estimate is probably biased downwards.
It excludes the real cost of supply guarantees, reflected
in liabilities such as the Portsmouth write-off. The
estimate also excludes the support given u.s. reactor
vendors through the subsidy of foreign enrichment clients.
The latter comanded 50% of u.s. enrichment capacity in the
late seventies (U.S., Department of Energy-Energy
Information Administration 2/81, 41). (5) ~ .
~ Uranium supply
As with fuel enrichment, the federal government has
sought to dissOlve potential bottlenecks and minimize
production cost in the uranium supply area. Through 1956
the subsidies were motivated by the needs of. the military
program. Aid took many forms, including: geological
surveys, long term guaranteed prices for uranium and
vanadium (a mineral commonly found along with uranium),
bonuses for new discoveries, rapid amortization for milling
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investments, and public funding for mine access roads, ore
transport costs, and milling R&D (Dawson 1976, 161; U.S.,
Department of Energy-Energy Information Administration
2/81, 27-30; Taylor 1979, 22-34). From the late fifties
onward, assistance was motivated by the civilian program.
Prior to 1964, when all uranium sales had to be made to the
AEC, the Commission subsidized its mining and milling
suppliers, undercharged its utility uranium customers, and
over compensated reactor operators for plutonium
buybacks. [6]
Illustrative of the economic insurance implied by
nuclear's OT status is the AEC's "stretch-out" program
1962-1970. Under it, and similar practices, the Commission
accumulated a 50,000 ton uranium surplus (enough to fuel
all on-line reactors in 1983 for four years)(Bowring 1980,
47). The purchases cost $1.7 billion and were intended to
provide a smooth mining transition from military to
civilian rnar ket s (Bowring 1980, 49; Hullenbach 1963, 121-
122). Programs like "stretch-out" lowered the level of
uncertainty in the uranium industry and its required rate
of return, thereby lowering long run nuclear fuel costs
(Bowring 1980, 45-46). In a slightly different vein, when
suspension of government support for fuel reprocessing and
rapid breeder development threatened to drive uranium fuel
prices upwards, a quarter of a billion dollar exploration
program (National Uranium Resource Evaluation program -
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NURE) was initiated to subsidize discovery efforts. The
lack of such insurance has helped stall various shale oil,
coal liquifaction-gasification, and other non-nuclear
energy proj ects.
It is difficult to translate federal uranium
activities into a per kilowatt hour subsidy. The programs'
primary impact was to allay fears of supply bottlenecks.
The effect of early guaranteed prices for reactor by-
products of plutonium and irradiated uranium was also
greater on expectations than lifetime plant generating
costs. The largest budgetary expense of uranium supply
subsidies involved the stockpiling and NURE programs.
These expenditures appear as development subsidies in Table
14. The calculations are biased downwards as they exclude
expenditures for plutonium "buy-backs" and all uranium
support outlays prior to 1962.
~ Regulatory costs
Becat'lse of the special health hazards and national
security issues associated with atomic energy, the
development of nuclear power has involved significant
federal regulatory expenditures, totaling $1,059 mililion
through 1974 (Battelle Memorial Institute 1978, 145) •
Distributing this sum over cumulative kwh's through 1974
yields a 3 H/kwh operating subsidy. Since some of these
early expenditures, however, were geared towards resolving
250
long term issues, only one-third have been treated as
operating expenses, yielding an operating subsidy of 1
H/kwh. This rate is slightly lower than the 1.25 til/kwh
ratio of NRC outlays to annual kwh's for the 1975-1984
years.[7] The remaining $706 million has been added to
the development subsidy totals in Table 14. The same
procedure was followed for 1974-1979. The calculations are
biased downwards as they exclude the cost of state and
local regulatory activi ties.
~ Miscellaneous assistances
Nuclear power's OT status won a myriad of special
subsidies. In the 1960's, for example, the country's only
nuclear merchant ship, the Savannah, received $2 million
per year in operating subsidies from the National Maritime
Administration (nQ~~QnigQ 7/65 p. 23; NQ~~gX IndQ~~X~
11/67). The Department of the Interior's 1967 budget
included over $100 million in aid money for the
s u b s eq ue n t Ly cancelled Bolsa Island dual purpose
de sal ini z a ti on- power pr oduct ion reactor (Nuclear Industry
5/67). u.s. support for international nuclear activity
(non-Export-Import Bank) totalled $237 million through 1977
(U.S., Department of Energy-Energy Information
Administration 2/81, 25). Efforts to attract "coming
technology" industries stimulated similar state and local
nuclear aid programs. Recall, for example, New York
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State's promotional efforts, which included: the
establ ishment of a speci al planni ng author i ty to expedi te
nuclear site selection, the assumption of a $300 million to
$1 billion liability for the clean-up and decommissioning
of the West Valley reprocessing plant (~~~ XQ~k ~iID~£
9/19/81 p. 26), the bailout purchase of Con Ed's Indian
Point 3 nuclear power plant, and state assistance for
desalinization and breeder development.
Because the miscellaneous subsidies are protean in
for m, an d of ten 10cally fun de d , they are diff i c u1t to
tally. We have estimated a $1.5 billion total in Table 14.
This figure is due almost entirely to the examples cited
above and thus most likely underestimates the true level
of miscellaneous assistance.
11 Tax Subsidies
The total impact of tax policy on nuclear
developm ent is especi ally di f f icul t to unr avel. Our best
estimate is that nuclear enjoyed about a .5 M/kwh tax
advantage over coal-fired generating alternatives during
the OT years.[8] As noted in footnote 8, this margin has
increased substantially in the 1974-1984 period, and most
likely exceeds 1 cent per kilowatt hour for reactors
currently under construction.[9] Tax subsidy comparisons
with non-utility provided energy end use services are
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harder to conceptualize, and no kilowatt hour differential
has been estimated. [10]
The effect of nuclear's OT status is seen in many
aspects of the technology's tax treatment. In the late
'50's, the Office of Defense Mobilization authorized
accelerated amortization certificates for utili ty nuclear
projects. In the 1960's, New York state established a
special authority to finance the purchase of nuclear fuel
cores with tax exempt bonds for subsequent IOU leasing.
The Treasury-IRS's initial approval of the procedure
reflected the belief that Congress wished to encourage
utility expansion (Senate Judiciary Committee 1970, 742-
3). The 1975 increase in the IOU ir.vestment tax credit
from 4-10% was similarly motivated. Though ostensibly
designed to stimulate capi tal formation, the incr ease was
granted at a time when the industry possessed significant
excess capacity. As RANDanalyst Gandara writes, "[It's
purpose was not] to spur more capital investment but to
pr ov ide cash flow" (Gandara 1977, 99) •
Chapman cites an additional tax incentive which
arose during the late seventies. He notes that 1.5% of the
investment tax credit can be used to finance employee stock
ownership plans. Assuming an average $2.2 billion price
tag for nuclear plants coming on line in the mid-eighties
(Komanof f 1984, Tabl e 1) an d a 2: 1 ca pi tal co st r ati 0 for
nuclear/coal generation, this option creates a $17 million
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employee incentive for nuclear generating choices (Chapman
1979,11,35).
Al Subsidies in Kind
~ The Price Anderson Act
The Price Anderson Act established a $560 million
(nominal $) c~iling on liability for nuclear accidents •
..),.'-Although t.he :original legislation involved a federal
assumption of $500 million (nominal $) of this liability
for only a token administrative fee, the key aspect of the
subsidy was its limited liability protection.
During the 1950's industry spokesmen and
independent analysts agreed that private sector nuclear
development would have nearly ceased without liability
legislation (Green 1973, 483-4). The insurance sector,
acting through various pools, was willing to write only $60
million ('57 $) worth of coverage per plant (11], while
worst case scenarios projected accident liabilities in the
$5-$7 billion dollar ('57$) range.(12] Though confident
serious accident probabilities were low, the leading
nuclear firms threatened to withdraw from the industry if
forced to assume multi-billion dollar risk exposures. The
NRC found a similar situation in the eighties (NRC 1983, p.
rr-7) • 'I'hus, like the federal enrichment and uranium
supply programs, the Price Anderson Act both subsidized
nuclear power and dissolved a potential bottleneck. (13]
-- -- ---
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It is difficult to quantify the market value of the
liability protection. A rough estimate can be derived,
however, using the methodology suggested by Herbert
Denenberg, a former pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner.
Denenberg assumes a maximum liability of $57 billion and a
premium of $580/million dollars of coverage (with the
latter ratio apparently based on generic rates for non-
recurring, non-predictable events) (Nader and Abbotts 1979,
227). Taken together these assumptions imply a premium of
$33 million per plant, or a 6.3 H/kwh charge. [14] If one
multiplied by 100 the $300,000 (historical $) premium paid
by 1960's plants for 60 million dollars of coverage, to
approximate the cost of 6 billion dollars of protection,
premiums would tally 5.7 H/kwh.[15J A recent DOE report
projects much lower rates, estimating a 1 H/kwh cost for
coverage of $5 billion (U.S., Department of Energy-Energy
Information Administration 5/80, 189).
Since the damage from a nuclear accident could
~
exceed $50 billion[16], and the Price Anderson Act reduced
the insurance costs for all firms along the nuclear
production function (not merely the utilities), this
analysis imputes a 1.5 H/kwh subsidy rate. [17]
An interesting aspect of the history of the Price
Anderson Act is the minimal public or academic debate it
stimulated prior to the mid-seventies. Reflective of the
, mw
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technology's promoted status, Congressional discussion in
1957 carefully avoided noting the contradiction between the
industry's extremely confident safety assurances and its
refusal to proceed without liability limitation (Green
1973, 485, 509). A similar deference surrounded
Congressional discussion of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act.[18]
~ Export-Im~ ~ credit assistance ;
Eximbank aided nuclear exports by providing
subsidized loans and loan guarantees. Through 1975, 37 of
the industry's 47 foreign sales enjoyed bank support. The
remaining 10 sales were small projects that did not require
major financing (Nawab 1980, 2). By 1979 cumulative
nuclear loans and financial guarantees totalled $6 billion,
exceeding Bank support for any other product category
(Bello, Hays & Zarsky 1979, 9). Recent calculations by
Syed Nawab imply a 30% subsidy rate per direct loan dollar.
The aid appears in Table 14 as a development
expenditur~[20] The entries underestimate the full extent
of the credit subsidies as they exclude the market value of
the Bank's loan guarantees and a number of other export
aid.
4.3)Deferment ~ ~~ction Qf
Back~ ~ ~ capital Costs
Customer bills for nuclear power have not included
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realistic charges for waste disposal or facility
decommissioning. In the waste area, AEC cost estimates have
served as a basis for ratepayer charges. Projections have
traditionally been extremely low, totaling less than .1
H/kwh as late as 1973 (U.S., AEC 1973b, 15). Recent DOE
analyses utilize a 1.2I>1/kwh charge (U.S., Department of
Energy-Energy Information Administration 11/82, 56). The
history of cost underestimation in the nuclear sector as
well a s the 80% real inc rea se in the DOE'S spent fuel
disposal cost estimates in the late seventies suggest
actual charges will be even higher. The 1.85 M/kwh waste
disposal cost assumed in this analysis implies an
historical user underpayment of 1.75 f.1/kwh.[21]
In addition to permitting utility companies and
current electricity users to defer waste containment costs,
historical arrangements transfer economic uncertainties to
pUblic shoulders. Under the DOE's 1977 and 1982 payment
\schedules. all potential cost escalation is borne by the
government or future nuclear power consumers (U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1985, 87, 106).
Nuclear power users during the OT years also
received an implicit subsidy in the form of non-payment for
the containment of uranium mill tailing hazards. In the
late seventies the government budgeted $283 million to
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clean-up 25 mill sites (U.S., Department of Energy-Energy
Administration Administ 2/81, 56). This expenditure is
subsumed in Table 14 as a miscellaneous development
subsidy. The figure underestimates the full deferred costs
of containing the mill tailings hazard, as it does not
include treatment of all contaminated sites.
The above pattern of neglect and cost
underestimation also characterizes the treatment of
decommissioning costs, and has led to a similar
undercharging of nuclear consumers. When such costs have
been included in rate payer fees, they have tended to
mirror the DOE's mid-seventies' estimate of about .05 H/kwh
(House Government Operations Committee 1977, 5). The
utilities do not appear to have established sinking funds
to offset this obligation (U.S., Department of Energy-
Energy Information Administration 5/80, 108-113). Current
government projections foresee a 1-3 M/kwh cost (U.S.,
Department of Energy-Energy Information Administration
5/80, 108-113, 170-174). A 1982 DOE study anticipated
further real escalation, noting," as with all
engineering cost estimates, it [decommissioning costs] is
subject to potential escalation as real labor and commodity
prices rise in the future, and limits to occupational
radiation exposure grow more s t r Lnqe nt." (U.S., Department
of Energy-Energy Information Administration 11/82,176).
The present analysis assumes a decommissioning cost of 1.3
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M/kwh. This rate implies a 1.25 M/kwh deferred payment
subsidy. The figure probably under-represents the full
impact of neglected decommissioning costs, as it includes
only neglected power plant costs.
21 ~ Deferment ~ Subsidy Totals
Nuclear power's annual 7 M/kwh operating and
1.8 M/kwh development aids are listed in Tables 14 and 15.
The assistance reduced average nuclear generating costs by
20% for plants ordered '63-'74. The aid also approximates
the average proj ected generating costs for plants ordered
during the aT years. (See 'l'able16.)
These figur es probably underestimate the magni tude
of subsidy due to the generally conservative assumptions
employed. Even a perfect accounting would under-represent
the aid's impact, as private spending could not have
purchased what the subsidies provided. In the absence of
the Price-Anderson Act (1.5 M/kwh), for example, nuclear,
development would have stalled. The expenditures'
downpayment implications (Le., the promise of additional
research and guarantee of fuel supply continuity) are also
incompletely captured. In an attempt to include a partial
measure of the implicit commitment implied by nuclear's O'I'
status, aT period development expenditures include outlays
through 1979. Subsequent spending such as the multi-
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billion dollar outlays for the cancelled Portsmouth
enrichment facility or annual DOE R&D funds, are not
included in the subsidy total s.
The calculations also utilize the period's projected
nuclear kwh totals, rather than historical performance and
currently projected levels. As case I-D of Table l7
indicates, calculations based on actual experience more
than double the subsidy rate.
Hithout the subsidies almost all utility
nuclear/coal comparisons would have tilted significantly in
favor of coal. Recall, for example, that many of the
rationales for ordering nuclear plants in the sixties
rested on alleged cost advantages of less than 2 M/kwh
(Perry 1977,37).
The sensitivity of development subsidy cost
accounting to the time horizon used to amortize the outlays
reinforces the key role government research subsidies are
likely to p.l ay in technical development. The 1-34 H/kwh
development aid range reflects the difference between a 40
and 70 year amortization period and risk premiums of .7%-
5.6%. (See Table 17.) Because private firms are likely to
employ relatively short cost accounting time horizons and
higher capital cost accounting, it will be difficult for
non-governmentally favored technologies to compete with
publicly financed research options, even if the former are
more cost efficient in an engineering sense. By analogy,
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options favored by large firms, with lower credit costs and
1onge r planni ng horiz ons, will dominate small firm
technologies.
~ Disestablishment and Eroding Subsidy Differentials
Chapter 4 identified the relative growth in
alternative energy R&D which occurred during the mid-
seventies. A similar but somewhat smaller shift occurred in
other subsidy areas as well. The most important changes
involved an increase in aid to non-nuclear technologies and
the defeat of nuclear industry efforts to increase their
sub si.dy support.
The use of tax policy to encourage alternative
energy development was especially important. The 1978
Energy Policy Act's tax credit for homeowner solar
expenditures, for example, was expected to generate an
extra billion dollars in solar revenues per year (Business
.N~~k 10/9/7'8 p. 89). On the state level, California's 55%
tax credit was expected to spur as many as 85,000 new solar
sales annually (~~£in~~~~~k 10/9/78 p. 95). In 1976
municipal utilities began using their tax exempt bond
financing capability to purchase solar equipment for leased
installation to homeowners (£iHt~.r.Lin~ 10/81). The 1978
Energy Act also exempted gasahol from the federal excise
tax, gave investment tax credits for business purchase of
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various alternative energy products, and extended depletion
allowance and tax deductions for intangible drilling
expenses to geothermal projects.
Federal procurement policies were also used to
subsidize the capture of scale economies in alternative
energy marke ts. The Har t amendm ent, requi ring incr eased
military use of solar equipment, was expected to generate
$lOOmillionin annual sales(j1.!J.J2ineJ2.Q}y..§j;.klO/9/78;U.S.,
Department of Energy - Energy Information Administration
1/80, 44-45). Similar programs encouraged the purchse of
photovoltaic units for federal buildings (U.S., Department
of Energy - Energy Information Administration 10/78, 37).
AI though most nuclear subsidies were not repealed,
thei r renewal faced signif icantly mor e opposi tion than in
the past. President Ford, for example, was forced to veto
an extension of the Price-Anderson Act due to a provision
permitting immediate reconsideration. President Carter
reduced enr ichment subsi dfes.
t
Congressional opponents of
the Eximbank's nuclear subsidies forced the wi thdrawal of
Bank support for a South Korean nuclear project (Adams and
Duffy 1978,60).
Most importantly, during a period of extreme utility
financing difficuliies, a series of new nuclear credit
subsidy proposals were defeated. The most dramatic setback
was Congressional rejection of the proposed Energy
Independence Author ity (EIA). The latter would have
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provided up to $100 billion for financing capital intensive
energy projects. Testifying before the Senate Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee in April 1976, Vice
President Rockefeller called for continued OT support for
nuclear projects through the EIA, arguing,
In the case of energy we have the raw materials
to achieve self-sufficiency. However, the normal
functioning of our economy will not, because of the
uncertainty of the risks involved, produce the capital
investment required to fully develop these resources
within a reasonable period of time. Private capital
sources are - for good reason - reluctant to make
capital available for domestic energy production
projects because of the uncertainty of government
regulation, cost and prices •.• Many projects, such as
floating nuclear power plants, railroad reconstructon,
or large pipelines, are of such size and scope that
financing from the private sector alone may not be
adequate. Because the electrical utilities have not
been able to raise the financing necessary to
construct them, 92 nuclear power plants have been
cancelled or postponed •.• ( Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 1976, 5).
Also rejected were: utility efforts to create a
utility reconstruction finance corporation and other credit
mechanisms such as regional energy corporations;
Westinghouse's attempts to promote a government purchase of
4-8 floating nuclear power plants for leasing to private
utilities (Olson 1976, 202-204; B~ji XQI.K l'iill~~ 3/28/75 p.
44); and Los Alamos director Harold Agnew's suggestion that
nuclear units be built for defense installations (Neji1Q.£k
l'im~12 11/ 3/7 4 p. 88)•[22] Similar efforts to utilize
public credit mechanisms for nuclear construction were
defeated on the state level. In New Hampshire, for
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example, the Clamshell Alliance successfully lobbied
against efforts by the Public Service Company to establish
a state energy corporation for purchase and subsequent
leasing of part of the Seabrook plant {EQN~K Lln~ 8/81}.
In New York, environmental groups forced the state's Atomic
and Space Development Authority to include research on non-
nuclear energy sources (Berger 1977, 335).
Also defeated were several Barnwell reprocessing
plant bailout schemes, continued funding for the Clinch
River breeder, and the Ford Administration's proposal for
government subsidy of private enrichment projects.
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Table II
Developmgnt Subsidies
(All entries in millions of '79$)
Related(2) Rela ted (3) Uranium(4)
Basic(l) Military l-1iscellan. Supply
Year R&D R&D R&D Assist.
1950 10 16
1951 15 51 '. 1- )
1952 18 70
1953 28 109
1954 52 99
1955 72 88
1956 129 135
1957 231 252 56
1958 357 259 56
1959 431 236 56
1960 585 191 56
1961 674 197 56
1962 636 112 56 2
1963 613 126 56 12
1964 680 56 22
1965 658 -, 90 30<, '-
1966 519 90 36
1967 485 145 - 42
1968 507 145 46
1969 389 145 50
1970 318 145 52
1971 332 145 52
1972 369 145 52
1973 410 145 52
1974 539 145 56
9;057- ------ --- ---Sum 1,941 1,788 504
1975 90 145 9
1976 234 145 20
1977 145 41
1978 202 145 60
1979 184 145 72
--- --- ---Sum 10,007 1,941 2,513 706
,
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Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Sum
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Sum
Table 11. cant.
Regulatory(5) Export(6)
Services Assist.
Hiscel1an.(7)
Assist.
Grand
Totals
58
26
66
88
137
151
160
264
539
672
781
937 -:
1033
917
914
891
920
839
692
886
750
821
717
996
1044
1044
5
6
6
7
31
35
39
48
54
55
59
59
79
106
117
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
5
2
7
55
34
11
47
29
251
231
87
706 817
116
37
34
276
1,500 16,313
1
51
19
14
71
100
100
100
100
100
461
550
582
555
848
Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
862 1,280 2,000 19,309
1) Basic R&D expenditures are defined as federal R&D
expenditures for non-breeder civilian reactor
development (U.S., Department of Energy-Energy
Information Administration E~g~K£l ~~~~QK~ iQK ll~~l~£~
iQ~~x~ Reactor Design and ~~ Cycl~, 1981, p. 19).
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Table II .cont.
2) Military R&D expenditures related to civilian power
development, as reported in DOEstudy cited above.
3) R&D expenditures in nuclear biology and medicine,
education and training, physical research, and program
managem ent, as calculated in Battelle Nemor ial Insti tute
study, An Analysis of Federal Incentive~ ~ to Stimulate
Energy Production, 1978, pp. 117-124. (Table entries based
on levelized distribution, assuming 1/3 Batel1e listed
outlays expended 1957-1966 and 2/3's 1967-1976.) Statistics
for 1977-1979 deduced from aggregate statistics found in
the Batelle and DOE studies.
4) Uranium assistance outlays based on 1962-1974 carrying
costs of DOE surplus uranium purchases, (per Bowring 1980,
49), assuming 3% real carrying charges. 1975-1979 outlays
represent National Uranium Resource Evaluation expenses
(Bowring 1980, 49).
5) Regulatory costs 1960-1974 drawn from Battelle study
cited in footnote 3, p. 145. 1975-1979 costs drawn from
U.S., DOE-ErA study cited in footnote 1 p. 19. Annual
development subsidies defined as [total NRC expenditures]
minus [operating subsidies], with the latter defined as 1
M/kwh times year's kwh totals.
6) Export assistance totals refer to de facto subsidies
contained in Export-Import Bank loans, per Nawab (1980),
"Nuclear Export Financing: The Role of the Export-Import
Bank of the United States", appendix A.
7) Hiscellaneous expenditure levels based on rationale
developed in text, section 2.5.
267
Table II
Operating Subsidies(ll
(All ent rie sin I 7 9 $)
Totals
I r-t/kwh
I r-t/kwh
1.5 r-t/kwh
3 M/kwh
.5 H/kwh
7 M/kwh
Enr ichment Serv ices
Regulatory Services
Price-Anderson Act
Backend Cost Deferment
Tax Assistance (2)
----------------------------------------------------------
1) Basis for subsidy rates explained in text.
2) Entry refers to nuclear/coal tax differential through
1974. Actual subsidy rate equals 1.25 H/kwh.
. ..
. ,
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Table l.Q.
Expected Domestic Gigawatt (GW) Capacity and Billion Kilo-
watt Hour (BKWH) Base for Amortizing Development Subsidies
Year Case A Case B Case C Case D
GW BKWH GW BKWH GW BKWH GW BKWH
1960 1 7 1 7 1 7 1
1961 1 7 1 7 1 7 2
1962 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 2
1963 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 3
1964 2 13 2 13 2 13 1 3
1965 2 13 2 13 2 13 1 4
1966 3 19 3 19 3 19 2 6
1967 3 19 3 19 3 19 3 8
1968 5 33 5 33 5 33 3 13
1969 6 39 6 39 6 39 4 14
1970 8 53 8 53 8 53 7 22
1971 11 72 11 72 11 72 9 36
1972 16 105 16 105 16 105 15 54
1973 22 145 22 145 22 145 20 84
1974 31 204 31 204 31 204 36 114
1975 31 204 44 289 44 289 36 173
1976 31 204 53 342 53 342 45 191
1977 31 204 63 414 63 414 47 251
1978 31 204 76 499 76 499 51 276
1979 31 204 92 604 92 604 51 255
1980 31 204 110 723 110 723 53 251
1981 31 204 130 854 130 854 56 273
1982 31 204 153 1005 153 1005 60 283
1983 31 204 180 1183 180 1183 62 296
1984 31 204 212 1392 212 1392 65 310
1985 31 204 250 1643 250 1643 68 324
1986 31 204 270 1774 270 1774 70 339
1987 31 204 292 1918 292 1918 73 355
1988 31 204 315 2010 315 2010 73 355
1989 31 204 340 2234 340 2234 79 389
1990 30 197 367 2411 367 2411 82 407
1991 30 197 398 2615 398 2615 86 426
1992 30 197 428 2812 428 2812 89 446
1993 30 197 463 3042 463 3042 93 466
1994 29 191 500 3285 500 3285 96 488
1995 29 191 540 3548 540 3548 100 511
1996 28 184 583 3830 583 3830 104 535
1997 28 184 630 4139 630 4139 108 559
1998 26 171 680 4468 680 4468 112 585
1999 24 164 734 4822 734 4822 117 613
2000 23 151 793 5210 793 5210 122 641
269
Table li cont, - -- .
Year Case A Case B Case C Case D
GW BKWH GW BKWH GW BKWH GW BKWH
2001 20 131 814 5348 814 5348 126 662
2002 15 99 836 5493' 836 5493 130 683
2003 9 59 859 5644 859 5644 134 704
2004 0 0 882 5795 882 5795 138 725
2005 869 5709 906 5952 143 752
2006 860 5650 930 6110 148 778
2007 850 5585 956 6281 152 799
2008 837 5499 982 6452 157 825
2009 821 5394 1008 6623 162 851
2010 803 5276 1036 6806 168 883
2011 783 5144 1063 6984 173 909
2012 760 4993 1092 7174 178 936
2013 733 5421 1122 7372 184 967
2014 701 5184 1152 7569 190 998
2015 663 4356 1114 7319 196 1030
2016 642 4225 1094 7188 203 1067
2017 621 4080 1072 7043 209 1135
2018 598 3929 1049 6892 216 1135
2019 574 3771 1024 6728 223 1172
2020 546 3587 996 6544 230 1209
2021 515 3384 965 6340 '..
2022 485 3186 935 6143
2023 450 2957 900 5913
2024 412 2702 862 5663
2025 372 2440 822 5401
2026 328 2155 778 5111
2027 279 1833 736 4836
2028 227 1491 684 4494
2029 112 1130 629 4133
2030 112 736 568 3732
2031 88 578 544 3574
2032 61 401 517 3397
2033 32 230 488 3206
2034 0 0 456 2996
2035 419 2753
2036 386 2536
2037 350 2300
2038 312 2050
2039 262 1721
2040 216 1419
2041 168 1110
2042 127 768
2043 62 407
2044 0 0
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Notes t& Table ~
Case A, Band C GW projections 1960-2000 based on
averaging of historical AEC projections for light water and
high temperature gas cooled reactors, per collection of
estimates in AEC 1974a, 14, 17~ AEC 1972d, 5~ AEC 1962
appendix p. 54~ JCAE 1956b, 27. The table assumes
exponential growth paths between AEC entry year data, 30
year plant lilfetimes and 75% capacity expectations.
Kwh production 2000-2014 assumed to grow at 2.7%, as
breeder captures bulk of nuclear expansion (per implication
of AEC 1972d, 4-54).
Reactor totals subsequent to last year of on-line
addi tions within each case's amor tiza tion period reflects
assumption of 30 year plant lifetimes and previous order
schedule.
Case D, current kwh projections, derived as follows:
1960-1982 based on actual kwh production data (Department
of Energy - Energy Information Administration: 4/83, table
75)~ 1983-2000 extrapolated from existing on-line totals,
and construction work in progress (per Bupp and Komanoff
1983, 4)~ 2001-2020 totals drawn from u.s Department of
Energy - Energy Information Administration 11/83, 23.
Forecasts assume 30 year lifetimes and 60% average capacity
rates (per Komanoff 1981, 246-253).
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5'able 12
Per klih ~~.lQ,Qment Subsidies (1)
(all entries '79 thlls/kwh)
CASE A CASE B CASE C CASE D
RISK PREMIUM
0 10 .6 .4 4.1 * *
7/10% 5.5
//
11.8 .8 .6
1.4% 13.9 1.0 .8 7.1
2.1% 16.3 1.4 1.1 9.3
2.8% 19.0 1.8* 1.4 11.8
3.5% 22.0 2.3 2.0 14.6
4.2% 25.4 2.9 2.6 18.4
5.6% 33.5 4.7 4.4 27.6
*Base Case
**Ex-post actual subsidy levels
----------------------------------------------------------
1) See appendix A and Table 16 for explanation of
derivation procedures.
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Table II
~ Ki~~att Hour R&D Subsidiesll)
('79 Hills/kwh)
Case A Case B Case C Case D
Risk Premium
1.4% 10.8 .8 .7 5.6
2.1% 12.7 1.1 .9 7.1
2.8% 14.8 1.4* 1.2 9.1 F
3.5% 17.1 1.8 1.6 11.5
4.2% 19.8 2.3 2.1 14.4
5.6% 26.1 3.7 3.4 21.6
*Base Case
----------------------------------------------------------
1) See appendix A for explanation of derivation procedures.
C HAP T E R V
1. See appendix A and Table 17 for an explanation of the
procedures usee to calculate the development subsidy rate,
and an analysis of the results' sensitivity to alternative
assumpti ons ,
2. For base case purposes we have projected development
subsidies of 1.8 N/kwh. This sum distributes aT period
development outlays over the lifetime kilowatt hour
production of all reactors sold through 2004. Assuming 30
year plant lives. the last kilowatt hour included occurs in
2033. A 2.8% discount rate and a 2.8% risk premium is used
to discount anticipated kilowatt hours. For more detailed
discussion of the methodology used to calcualte the subsidy
and the results' sensitivity to alternative assumptions
see appendi x A.
3. The AEC guaranteea plant financing and the SEC approved
a 90%/10% debt/equity ratio, versus the usual 60/40 split
(Hul1enbach 1963, 74).
4. The DOE-EIA subsidy study estimated that pricing
discounts totaling 707 million dollars reduced enrichment
costs by as much as 30% through 1974. It also estimated
power cost discounts at $1,456 million through 174 (U.S.,
Department of Energy-Energy Information Administration
2/81, 43,45). Bowring's study includes depreciation
discounts of $1.5 billion through '74. Extrapolating from
the 30% reduction accompanying pricing reductions of $707
million implies overall discounts of about 150%.
This study assumes average enrichment prices of
$52/SWU for the first 18 years of plant operation and
$lll/SWU for the last 12. These costs reflect historical
prices and the assumption that the utilities purchased long
terQ contracts under mid-sixties prices. (See Chapter 7
section 5-3.) Prices are assumed to be 50% below full
market prices for the first 18 years and 33% below for the
last 12, due to recent trends towards "fair value" pricing.
These discounts translate into a 1 H/kwh subsidy, assuming
3.8 S\vU/kg U, 231,000 kwh/kg and a 1.3 financing charge
mul tiplier.
5. The DOE study notes, n ••• to the extent that a lower
price for enrichment services reduces the costs of nuclear
power it increases the attractiveness of nuclear plants
relative to competing technologies. Moreover, reducing the
cost of fuel to foreign buyers tended to increase the
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demands for domestically manufactured power plants" (U.S.,
Department of Energy-Energy Information Administration
2/81, 42).
6. For example, the Commission charged its utility
customers a carrying charge of only 4.75% for uranium
inventory, compared with a market rate of 12%. The
differential reduced uranium costs by .7-1.3 H/kwh through
1970 (U.S., JCAE 1963a, 24,1580,802-3; Dawson 1976,154,
158). The AEC also guaranteed plutonium buybacks at
roughly $9-$12 per gram for future fuel use through '70,
and $30-$40/gm for military use through '64. The continued
absence of a successful reprocessing technology transforms
the former guarantee into a 1.6-2.3 M/kwh subsidy, and the
latter guarantee into a 3.9 - 5.7 H/kwh benefit of nuclear
power's joint product military status (U.S., JCAE 1963a,
240). As Nullenbach and others have noted, some of these
benefits may have been offset by the AEC'S inflationary
impact on uranium prices (Hullenbach 1963, 167-175;
Nuclear Industry Uti). ' ,
7. Net NRC outlays 1/75-9/84 totalled $3.2 billion (U.S.,
NRC 1984, 188), while cumulative nuclear kilowatt hours
1975-1984 totalled 2.5 billion (U.S., Department of Energy-
Energy Information Administration 1984, 193).
8. In the nuclear/coal fired electricity field, the major
tax subsidies can be divided into capital and fuel cost
categories. In the capital cost area the most important
tax aids were: interest deduction, utili ty investment tax
credits, accelerated depreciation and shortened book life.
Assuming an average of 53% debt financing (U.S., NRC 1980,
14), and a relevant tax rate of 48%, yields an interest
deduction subsidy of 25% plant cost. Accelerated
depreciation, abbreviated plant life (16 versus 30 years),
and a 4% investment tax credit, yield benefits of 14% plant
costs (Nader and Abbotts 1979,228). Subtracting utility
property tax payments of 2% (yields a net tax based capital
cost reduction of 37%.
In general, nuclear and coal capital expenditures were
treated similarly by the tax laws. While nuclear received
a more condensed depreciation schedule (enjoying reduction
from 30-16 years as opposed to coal's 35 to 22.5 cutback),
coal plants enjoyed a higher repair allowance than nuclear
(5% versus 3%) (Chapman, Cole and Slott 1979, 43).
Nuclear's 85% higher capital intensity, however, resulted
in the capture of 85% more capital cost tax subsidies per
kilowatt hour. Assuming average capi tal costs of $1250/kw
and 678/kw for non-turnkey nuclear and coal plants ordered
betwen 1963-1974 (per Komanoff: 1981, 294-297; 1984,
Table 2), an average real fixed charge of 9.23%, and
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capacity rates of 60%, yields average nuclear and coal
capital costs of 21.95 H/kwh and 11.91 r-1/kwh. Nuclear's
10.04 M/kwh extra capital cost charge translates into an
extra 3.7M/kwh tax subsidy.
The most important tax subsidies in the fuel area were
the resource depletion allowance, and allowance for
intangible drilling expenses. Brannon reports that while
uranium owners received higher subsidy rates, the benefits
reduced coal fuel costs by 3.4% and nuclear costs by only
2.8%, due to the former's greater mining intensity (Brannon
1974,28,33).
Assuming average coal fuel costs for OT period plants
approximately equal to projections for mid-eighties plants
(an assumption that biases the coal tax saving upwards),
implies fuel costs of about 16 H/kwh (per Komanoff 1981,
263) and a tax subsidy of .54 N/kwh. Subtracting nuclear's
tax saving yields coal a net fuel tax advantage of
approximately .5 M/kwh.
The impact of state and federal severance-excise
taxes has been ignored. They appear to have placed a
heavier burden on coal than uranium.
As there is debate over whether interest deduction
should be considered a form of tax expenditure, we have
deleted that portion of the capital subsidy (25/37),
yielding a net nuclear tax differential of about .5 H/kwh.
9. The magnitude of nuclear's differential tax subsidy has
increased dramatically due to the current 2.5:1 capital
intensity ratio between nuclear and coal projects and the
increase in the investment tax credit from 4% to more than
10%. The 1981 Economic Recovery Act also shortened both
nuclear and coal plants' depreciation periods, from 16 to
10 years and 22.5 to 15 years, respectively. Since these
changes occurred after the OT period, their impact has not
been incluaed in the tax differential. Inclusion would
increase nuclear's relative tax incentives.
10. Because solar and conservation were not perceived as
utility energy options during the OT years, it is necessary
to compare non-utility initiatives in these areas with
nuclear projects. Since solar tax credits did not corne
into existence until the late seventies, it might be
appropriate to tally· the IOU's investment tax credits,
accelerated depreciation schedule, and fuel tax subsidies
as net tax benefits. Because the two energy provision
context s are quite different, however, the tax compar ison
is somewhat questionable and has not been pursued here.
11. The $60 million (historical $) sum was itself the
largest liability contract ever written for a single plant
(Green 1973, 404).
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12. The AEC's WASH 740 study of 1957 estimated potential
accident 1iabil ities as high as $7 ('57$) billion. Dur ing
the JCAE's '56 indemnity hearings a $5 billion liability
esti mate was used (Green 1973, 483).
13. Commenting, in effect, on nuclear's OT status, one of
the leading legal historians of nuclear development, wrote
in 1973, II Because the technology is deemed vital to the
public interest, the public is forced to accept the hazards
in the same manner it is forced to pay taxes" (Green 1973,
506) •
14. Price-Anderson subsidy calculations assume a 1000HW
plant and 60% capacity rate.
15. It could be argued that such a procedure seriously
overestimates the relevant hypothetical insurance rates,
due to the diminishing probability of increasingly severe
accidents. It could also be claimed, however, that risk
aversion implies an escalating premium rate as coverage
liability exceeds firms' failure levels.
16. Worst case liability estimates implied by the AEC's '65
WASH 740 update, recent NRC analyses, and the EPA's
criticism of the Rasmussen report, range between $150-300+
billion.
17. Assuming insurance premium rates of $593/$1,000,000 of
protection (generic rate for large unpredictable events) to
$800/$1,000,000 (existing rate for nuclear coverage)
(Lanoue 1976, 17-18), this charge still requires public
liability assumption above $10-$14 billion dollars damage.
18. Harold Green writes, II The story of the libability
roadblock reflects consumate 'gamesmanship' that does not
cast industry, the AEC, or the Joint Committee in a
favorable light. The fact that potential liability would
be a substantial deterrent, even if not a 'roadblock' to
the fledgling nuclear power industry was well recognized by
all parties when the 1954 legislation was being considered.
Nevertheless, in the entire legislative history of the 1954
Act there is only one reference to the problem. The writer
was an attorney in the Office of the General Counsel of the
Atomic Energy Commission in 1953 and 1954 and was
intimately involved in the drafting of the legislation.
There was an understanding, tacit at least, that the
liability problem would not be injected into the
consideration of the legislation, lest enactment be
jeopardized by pubLic appr ehensi on" (Green 1973, 490).
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19. Illustrative of the planning context promoting nuclear
expansion, the president of Bechtel and a former head of
the Atomic Industrial Forum served on the Bank's 9 member
board of directors in the seventies (~m Ne~~ 7-8/79).
20. Nawab's methodology translates below market interest
rates and favorable repayment period terms into a summable
present value subsidy flow. His calculations are
consistent with the Congressional Budget Office's estimate
of a $163 million price tag for the Bank's FY 1975 nuclear
credit policies (Adams and Duffy 1978, 58).
21. This calculation assumes a spent fuel dispoal fee of
$375/gm. Although 15% above the DOE's current forecasts,
it is well within the $232-1129 plausible range cited in
the DOE's subsidy study (U.S., Department of Energy-Energy
Information Administration 2/81, 54; Komanoff 1981, 266).
22. Agnew's intervention in the civilian power debate
illustrates the continuing legacy of the atom's military
lineage. It is tempting to point to the impact of weapons
scientists like Teller and Agnew and infer that military
influence reduced safety margins from what they would have
been had the field been dominated by researchers from the
biological sci ence s,
Comments such as Agnew's remarks on Vietnam, reinforce
this impression "It is my belief that if people would
prepare the right spectrum of tactical weapons (small
nuclear weapons for use in conventional battle by foot
soldiers), we might be able to knock off this sort of
fool i shnes s we now have in Vietnam and the r.1iddl e East 0 r
anyplace else" (Metzger 1972, 54).
The concentration on quality control and safety
standards evidenced by Admiral Rickover, however, leaves
simple generalizations questionable.
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Appendix lll.
Calculating g ~ KilQwatt Hour Deyelop~ Subsidy Rate*
II Qyerview
Calculating a per kilowatt hour development subsidy rate
requires specifying:
1) a stream of subsidy payments
2) a stream of nuclear kwh's over which to distribute
the payments
3) an intertemporal discount rate, and
4) a risk premium to discount expected but uncertain
future kwh's.
The dissertation's base case and various alternative
assumptions are discussed below.
21 Calculating Deyelopment Subsidy Expenditure ~treaID~
The methodology used to calculate specific
subsidies, such as those involved with R&D programs or
\
Export-Import Bank assistance, is discussed in the main
text unde r each subsidy type. More general points are
noted here.
Although subsidy expenditures are distributed over
anticipated kwh's, ranging from 2003 to 2043, no dollar
spent after 1979 is included in the subsidy totals. This
-----------------------------------------------------------
*All dollars are '79$ unless otherw ise specified.
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seriously biases the calculations downwards, as the
predicted kilowatt hours were to some extent predicated on
continued federal support. To reduce the effect of this
bias, OT period subsidy totals include outlays through
1979.
Subsidy totals refer only to those outlays directly
related to non-breeder nuclear development. The $2.5
billion breeder and $750 million fusion programs through
1974 (U.S., Department of Energy - EnergyInformation
Administration 2/81, 19) are not included in the subsidy
figures. Similarly absent are expenditures for the army's
specialized line of power reactors.
11 Specifying ~ Nuclear klih Stream
Because our goal is to determine the market value of
the government's subsidy programs, it is necessary to
calculate their cost under private sponsorship. The
appropriate time period for amortization is thus the
\
planning horizon and capital recovery periods used by
private decision makers. In cases A and B we have posited
a 30 year hor izon.
In case A, the development subsidies are amortized
from the point of view of the utility sector. Outlays are
considered an additional capital cost. They are
distributed over the total kwh's anticipated during the OT
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period for the expected lifetimes of all plants on line
through 1974. The last kilowatt included is generated in
2003, when the plants entering service in 1974 are retired.
In case B the subsidies are amortized from the
perspective of the vendors. Development outlays are
distributed over the plant lifetimes of all anticipated on-
line reactors sold to the utilities through 2004. The last
kilowatt hour included is generated in 2033.
In case C the subsidies are distributed from the
perspective of the vendors using a 40 year planning
horizon.
In case D the subsidies are distributed over actual
(defined as historical plus currently projected) kwh totals
through 2020, rather than the kwh totals expected during
the OT year s,
Expected annual nuclear production totals appear in
Table 16. Anticipated kwh's through the year 2000 are
based on average AEC megawatt projections 1962-1974.[1] MW
totals are transformed into kwh's by assuming 30 year plant
lifetimes and 75% capacity rates, per popular expectations
during the OT years.
Kilowatt hour production between 2000-2014 assumes a
2.7% growth rate, with the bulk of nuclear expansion
absorbed by breeder designs. [2]
Amortization periods shorter than the Table's 1960-
2014 schedule follow the entries until the assumed cutoff
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year for including new reactors. Thereafter, kwh totals
reflect only the lifetime output of previously ordered
uni t s,
Cases A-C focus on historically rather than
currently anticipated kwh's because we are concerned wi th
the actual cost accounting private firms would have
utilized to compare and price energy alternatives, rather
than ex-post calculations. For comparative purposes,
current kwh expectations appear as case D. Since nuclear
expansion has been slower than expected, actual subsidy
rates are more than double base case levels (Table 17 case
I-D) •
We have excluded breeder generation from the kwh
base because the subsidy entries similarly exclude non-
converter reactor oriented expendi tures. The decision to
treat the two technologies separately reflects the
distinctiveness of the development paths. In areas of
overlap it's assumed that inter- technology spinoffs were
offsetting.
iL Specifying g Discount Rate
The utilities' av~rage cost of capital 1955-1974,
(.028), has been used as the discount rate.[3]
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~ Specifying ~ Premiums
Anticipated kwh's have been further discounted to
reflect the uncertainties associated with nuclear
technology. To test the sensitivity of subsidy calculations
to risk-discounting assumptions, a number of different
risk premiums have been employed. In each case the
discounting begins in 1960, 10 years after the first
subsidy expendi tur e.
~ Calculation Procedure
Step 1: Annual development subsidies (per Table 14) are
transformed into a utility sector capital cost. Each
year's entry produces a 30 year stream of payments equal to
the expenditures times the utilities' fixed charge rate
(FCR).(4) These payments can be transformed into a single
1982 present value sum (PVS) by the formula:
PVS = (historical expenditure) x FeR x M;
Where M equals:
[1982-subsidy yr.-29) 30
x [r - r] / r - 1r
where r equals thediscountrate.
Step 2: Annual nuclear kwh totals in Table 16 are summed
to a 1982 present value total (PVkwh), discounting kwh's
a !i Z i··It· 11'
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after 1960 by r plus a risk premium.
Step 3: Nuclear subsidy totals (PVS) are divided by nuclear
kwh totals (PVSkwh).
1Jl Reference Cases
Entry 3-B in Table 17 is the base case cited in the
text. Entry I-D represents ex-post actual sunai dy levels,
assuming a 2020 cut-off period.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix Notes
1. Projections drawn from summary collection in U.S., AEC
1974a, 14,17; U.S., AEC 1962, Appendix p. 54; and U.S.,
JCAE 1956b, p. 27.
2. Per implications of U.S., AEC 1972c, pp. 4-5.
3. The estimate is based on historical utili ty financing
ratios 1955-1977 of 53% bonds, 11% preferred stock, and 36%
common stock, with associated rates of return of 2.34%,
2.61% and 3.61% respectively (U.S., NRC 1980, p, 14).
4. Fixed charge rates calculated per Komanoff 1981, p.
272. The real FCR corresponding to a .028 real cost of
capital and 30 year asset lifetime equals .0923.
C HAP T E R VI
MECHANISMS OF ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFICIAL TECHNOLOGY:
THE PROMOTIONALL REGULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER
II Introduction
This chapter explores the role played by pro-nuclear
regulations in the establishment of nuclear power as an
Official Technology. A brief discussion of general
regulatory policy is followed by a more detailed analysis
of th e treatment of nuclear power's negative
externalities.
Regulatory incentives during the OT years fell into
four areas: pro-nuclear utility pricing and accounting
procedures, sympathetic anti-trust review, minimal negative
externality regulation and the general exercise of public
authority to promote nuclear development •. These policies
directly encouraged nuclear expansion, and indirectly
promoted the technology by signalling its OT status.
Regulatory support for nuclear power was the product
of a particular planning context. The aid reflected the
informational environment created by promotional research
contexts and popular ideological beliefs, as much as
official statutes and administrative procedures. It was
institutionally facilitated by the centralization of policy
making in the hands of the AEC and JCAE.[l] In concert
with the nuclear industry, these bureaucracies created a
planning nexus within which private sector firms like GE
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and westinghouse and trade associations like the AlP played
quasi pUblic roles in determining national policy.
Officials moved easily between pUblic and private
institutions, with the government frequently relying on
industry for key cost and safety-regulatory studies. As
many observers have noted, the distribution of hands-on
expertise, interest group political clout, and the period's
ideological climate created a regulatory network composed
entirely of nuclear promoters.[2]
The political challenge to nuclear power in the late
sixties and early seventies reoriented regulatory policy in
much the same manner as it affected subsidy and R&D
programs, thereby undermining the social basis for nuclear
investment.
2l General Regulatory Policy
~ Pro-nuclear utility pricing and accounting regulations
Nuclear plant orders were encouraged by rate
\
regula tions favoring capital intensive genera ting choices
and policies insulating the utilities from the normal risks
of technical innovation. Capital spending was encouraged
by rate base formulas that allowed rates of return in
excess of financing charges for capital expenditures and
only flow through recovery for labor and fuel costs.
Permission to include fuel core expenses and interest
payments dur ing construction in the rate base may have had
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a similar effect. Nuclear risk taking was encouraged by
regulatory precedents permitting full recovery of plant
cost overruns and undercapacity performances.
In the accounting area, conventions were often
adopted to facilitate utility expansion. The common choice
of a "negative salvage" method for decommissioning
accounting was due to its provision of a maximum cash flow
for new construction (U.S., Department of Energy - Energy
Information Administration 5/80, 174). Similar promotional
concerns appear to have governed the accounting treatment
given tax subsidies (Lanoue 1976, 22,24).
In contrast, utility regulations discouraged
cogeneration, conservation and solar energy options through
the use of declining block rate structures and a failure to
credit independent sources of electricity with a fair value
f or thei r grid feed-in. [3J
~ Sympathetic anti-trust treatment,
Both the AEC and Justice Department actively
facili tated industry concentration in the nuclear sector,
thereby encouraging capital commitments by the dominant
firms. The AEC's focused contracting policies for R&D and
facility administration created a strong "insider"
advantage. The Commission's characterization of all plants
through 1970 as research reactors without "practical
value", (and thus insulated from anti-trust review) [4],
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similarly facili tated the dominance of nuclear generation
by large IOU's. Indeed, the possibil i ty that nuclear scale
economies might subdue the small municipal utili ty helped
mobilize IOU support for the technology in the sixties.
Interestingly, the viability of non-nuclear cogeneration
was inhibited by antitrust policy, especially in the paper
industry (Science 4/19/74 p, 268).
~ Miscellaneous regulatory assistances
The varied form of regulatory assistance enjoyed by
nuclear power illustrates the diffuse impact of state
nuclear promotionalism. It also highlights the
"signalling" function of public policy, which by suggesting
a consensus development choice encourages private
investment. Illustrative of these regulatory aids was the
exercise of public property rights in nuclear's favor. The
iederal government owned approximately 90% of the western
lands where uranium was ini tially sought, and prospectors
were given favorable access to these sites (Taylor 1979,
24-25). The utilities were similarly assisted in power
plant site selection. In the early sixties, for e xa rnpLe ,
the AEC successfully. pressured the Navy to allow Southern
California Edison to utilize a portion of the Pendleton
naval base for the San Onofre plant (Allen 1977,72). In
New York, Governor Rockefeller announced plans to locate
nuclear facilities on state land in order to circumvent
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local siting opposition (NeiiYQIk Times 9/6/69 p. 23). In
Rh oce Island, an unused naval airstrip was impropperly
transferred to the New England Power Company for nuclear
use (Gyorgy 1979, 392).
Government activities also promoted nuclear
expansion through export policies and domestic purchase and
sale decisions. AEC fuel cycle regulation was designed to
minimize investor risk. Through the early seventies the
Commission permitted utilities to contract for enrichment
"requirements" without specifying specific commitment
levels. This flexibility insulated the utilities from the
risk of superfluous enrichment liabilities if plant
construction was slower than anticipated (Ford Foundation
1977, 366). Its insurance value has been estimated at .15
t-l/kwh ('79$) (U.S. AEC, 1974c, 48, 52; Nader and Abbotts
1979, 227). Even after requiring fixed commitments in the
mid-seventies, the AEC allowed the utilities to renegotiate
135 contracts, in August '75 in response to fuel demand
reductions. The cancellations and postponements saved the
utilities several hundred million dollars (Lanoue 1976,
20). The AEC similarly guaranteed a back-up supply of
enriched uranium to utilities participating in private
centrifuge enrichment projects as insurance against
potential project failures and fuel shortfalls (U.S., AEC
1974c,51).
Federal regulations protected the uranium and
289
reprocessing industries from foreign competition by
embargoing private uranium importation through 1974
(Bowring 1980, 44) and forbidding foreign fuel reprocessing
contracting (U.S., AEC 1968b, 175).[5J
Reprocessing entrepreneurs were also offered
guaranteed government markets and promised a bar of
utilities from continued access to government facilities if
private charges were reasonable tu.s, JCAE: 1957, 106;
1963,238-9).
Other AEC-JCAE policies have sought to minimize
intervenor influence in legislative and licensing
procedures, state and local government influence in nuclear
affairs, the access of the media to nuclear information,
th e f inanci al robustnes s requi red for utiIi ty nucl ear
undertakings, and the level of punitive fines levied for
violating AEC regulations.
,
~ Regulatory implications of disestablishmen~
The anti-nuclear movement stimulated a general
contraction in regulatory support. Analogous to the defeat
of the proposed credit subsidies cited in Chapter 5, was
the defeat of various proposals designed to facilitate rate
payer financing of incomplete nuclear construction. By 1976
31 states allowed the partial inclusion of construction
work in progress (CWIP) expenses in rate payer charges
(Gandara 1977, 75). The percentage permitted, however, was
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not enough to fund the expansion planned during the OT
years (U.S., Department of Energy - Energy Information
Aaministration 11/82, 41). Similarly, although the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission could authorize CWIP charges
for utilities in financial distress, it did not use this
authority to promote nuclear generation (Bowring 1980;
u.S., Department of Energy Energy Information
Administration 5/80, 202).
The absence of full CWIP funding was the direct
result of anti-nuclear movement pressures and rate-payer
backlash against the earlier rate increases causea by
rising fossil-fuel prices.[6] The protest movement also
undermined nuclear power's "performance Ln suranc e", as
utility commissions began disallowing full recovery of
nuclear cost overruns or project cancellations. This
change significantly increased the utilities' perception of
the risks associated with the uncertainties of nuclear,
economics.
From the mid-seventies onward state and local
governments also used their environmental protection, land
use-siting, and utility regulatory authorities to deter
nuclear expansion (Nader and Abbotts 1979, 353-366). At
least ten states limited new nuclear construction until
waste disposal and other problems Here resolved (U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1984, 216), and
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nearly 100 localities banned or limited nuclear materials
transport (Ne~ York Times 9/1/80). Numerous states limited
rate payer supported pro-nuclear advertising (Nader and
Abbotts 1979, 360-363). Post Three Mile Island regulation
permitted local veto of utility nuclear projects through
non-cooperation in emergency planning. Exacerbating
nuclear's regulatory woes during this period was a
simultaneous increase in regulatory support for non-nuclear
energy al terna tives. The Public Utilities Regulatory
POlicies Act of 1978 (PURPA), for example, facilitated:
increased payment to cogenerators, rate reform in the
direction of marginal cost pricing (and thus the
elimination of anti-solar and anti-conservation declining
block rates), and the funding of intervenor groups in
utility proceedings.[7] Additional legislation has
required the utilities to provide conservation information
to thei r customers.
11 Mechanisms Q1 Establishment of an Official TechnologYi
The Promotional Regulation of Nuclear po~er's
Negative Externalities ,k
The most important area of nuclear regulation was
the treatment of the technology's negative externalities.
The latter inclu de: routine radia tion release, the risk of
power plant accidents, thermal pollution, radwaste
disposal, increased ease of nuclear weapons proliferation,
and possible civil liberties curtailment. This section
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analyzes the link between planning context-OT dynamics and
hazard policy, by providing #ase studies of the regulatory
history of the first three externalities listed above.
From 1950-1970, industry efforts to create a
critical mass development path for nuclear power increased
the incentives firms normally have to lobby for lenient
regulation. Extending their own acceptance of the cost
uncertainties associated with the turnkey projects and
megawatt scaling race of the sixties, the vendors and
utilities actively lobbied for societal tolerance of large
safety uncertainties (Rolph 1979, 59,68,74,163; Komanoff
1981, 68; Perry 1977, 59; Hood 1983, 19-20, 66-67).
The AEC behaved similarly, treating nuclear power as
an infant industry[8], best served by a policy of "self-
regulation". [9]
The Commission's promotional bias reflected the
dynamic legacy of cold war nuclear politics and the
tendency for bureaucracies to promote their own expansio~
Ideologies and regulatory styles developed during the Atoms
for Peace program and atomic testing period were reproduced
and extended during commercialization.
AEC and industry hazard containment strategies also
reflected a shared perception of the implications of OT
status. Both assumed that its capture would successfully
resolve residual safety uncertainties, guaranteeing public
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R&D funding and institutional accomodation to hazard
containment needs.[lO] The reorientation of the
nuclear planning context in the seventies challenged the
infant industry regulatory strategy, reducing permissible
uncertainty levels and increasing hazard containment
expenses.
The analysis below illustrates the diffuse impact of
planning context variables on regulatory policy,
demonstrating how OT dynamics determined realms of
technical discourse as well as explicitly political
decisions. [11] For each of the three hazard areas studied
it examines how the different character of the nuclear
planning context 1950-1970 and 1970-1980 affected:
l)the databaseavailable for hazard assessment
2)the methodologies used to conceptualize hazard
dangers '.'
3) the level of scientific attention given anomalous
or otherwise troubling findings, and
4) the regulatory reaction to technical conclusions.
The discussion ties the recasting in the 1970's of these
four variables to rising nuclear hazard containment costs.
:L.ll. Routine radiation release regulation
activities of the AEC were initially directed towards
expanded weapons production and bomb testing, and then
towards the rapid commercialization of nuclear power, the
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Commission placed a relatively low priority on hazard data
collection during the OT years.[12] It ignored a National
Accademy of Sciences recommendation that a national record
of radiation exposure histories be established.[13]
Relatively little data was collected on the health history
of nuclear industry workers [14] or popUlations exposed to
high levels of fallout.[lS] Minimal monitoring oversaw
industry release levels. [16]
As a result a wide range of hazard claims were
consi stent with available epidemiological data 1950-1970,
allowing promotional opt i m i sra to dominate hazard estimates.
hl-.2.1 H~.t.hQ.QQ1Q.gi.Qi!.l .QQ.n12.t.Ii!i.n.t12 1..2.5-.0..=-1.9.1.0...
Centralized AEC funding of radiation research also
encouraged a methodological inbreeding which underestimated
the scope of nuclear hazards. Illustrative of this
tendency was: the early neglect of food chain avenues of
radiation exposure[17], the adoption of the now discredited
threshold hypothesis [18], the use of apparently
misestimated ratios of low to high level radiation for
Hiroshima epidemiological studies[19], the insufficient
attention given the R~D sensitivity of the genitals &
fetus[20], the inattention to the fuel cy cIe t s release of
certain radioactive isotopes [21], and the constraining of
environmental burden estimates into arbitrarily narrow time
periods compared with the lifespan of nuclear waste
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materials. [22] Describing the sociological context that
has dominated radiation research, a 4/13/79 article in
Science noted, "The radia tion research communi ty has 1ived
almost entirely off the energy and defense establishments.
The situation is conducive to a monolithic approach to
research. It also means that for anyone seeking
objective scientific advice it is practically impossible to
find someone knowledgeable who was not trained with AEC
money."[23]
3.13) Inattention to anomalous information 1950-
~. Despite limited data and methodological constraints,
findings at odds with the prevailing optimism concerning
nuclear radiation hazards emerged during the fifties and
early sixties. Both the AEC and industry, however, w e r e
able to minimize the social meaning of this material by not
pub Li c Lz Lnq anomalous findings nor funding follow-up
studies. A popular image of radiation concern as
unpatriotic[24], and the vulnerability of epidemiological
research to Type II errors, allowed this policy to dominate
information contexts.[25] The AEC also appears to have
reinforced its position by engaging in professional
reprisals against its scientific critics.[26]
hl-4. 1 .T.hg J;.illJ;J;:gJ;D.Qg Qi ~D.Q.!J12.tJ;:'y 12J;li=
regulation" and relatively lenient regulatory requirements.
The realm of discourse created by the OT period's data and
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methodological constraints allowed the AEC and nuclear
industry's infant industry perspective to dominate
regulatory design. Radiation release standards were set
with deference to the needs of the weapons testing program
and light water reactor technology.[27] In many cases
problems were sol ved by recourse to sel f-
regulation. Radon levels in uranium mines during the
'50's were left unrestrained and commonly reached rates one
hundred times current standards. Minimal regulations were
imposed on the disposal of uranium mill tailings. power
plant emission limits during the 1960's were set 20 times
higher than current legal levels.[28J Little attention was
given to high level waste disposal questions. [29J
environments. After the mid to late '60's, the penetration
of the nuclear planning context by nuclear critics
reconstituted the hazard data base available, hazard
,assessment methodologies employed, and attention given to
anomalous findings in the radiation hazard area. The
economic result was increased radiation containment
expenditures.
Although the radiation debate was conducted on a
technical plain, it was condi tioned by broader socio-
political contexts. Its roots stretch back to the
atomic testing debates in the 1950's. Key to hazard
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rethinking in both cases was the interaction between the
technical critics of the AEC and a popular political
movement. [30]
During the mid-sixties critics gained a public
platform for hazard discussion in 16 radiation related
plant licensing challenges {Rolph 1979, 113).[31]
Political pressures eventually forced the AEC to collect
health data on soldiers exposed to fallout during the
nuclear tests[32], and civilians working in nuclear
sh ipy a rd s, The Washington Post used the Freedom of
Information Act to release leukemia-fallout correlation
data. The Kennedy Health Subcommittee fallout hearings
revealed a pattern of information suppression.
Public pressures similarly forced the AEC to
investigate Ernest Sternglass's radiation hazard claims,
and to accept a relatively sympathetic review by Commission
staffers.[33] Other nuclear critics forced rejection of the
threshold hypothesis and the use of longer time periods in
calculating radiation hazard burdens.
The controversies fueled efforts to transcend the
JCAE-AEC's dominance of the federal government's nuclear
regulatory-informational apparatus. In 1967 the Department
of Labor promulgated the first federal regulations limiting
radon concentrations in u.S. uranium mines. In the early
seventies the National Environmental policy Act shifted
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much of the AEC's radiation related informational and
regulatory functions to the Environmental Protection Agency
(u.s., Department of Energy - Energy Information
Administration 5/80, 104).
3.16} The economic impact Qi challenges to radiation
regulation. The impact of escalating radiation concern on
the cost of nuclear power is difficult to quantify. In
addition to increasing outlays for radiation containment
equipment, the concern stimulated efforts to strengthen
siting distance criteria, quality control standards and
accident prevention efforts (Rolph 1979, 61,116,124).
Among the first economic consequences of the
radiation controversy were the radiation reduction
agreements negotiated between the utilities and anti-
nuclear invervenors in the late '60's and early '70's. In
return for dropping a court challenge to the Palisades
nuclear plant, for example, critics won utility agreement
to an improved liquid rad-waste discharge system (Lewis,
1972, 135-142; NEll Q~~~~~ ~2g~nEl 3/17/71 p. 10). At
Lagoona Beach, Michigan, Detroit Edison agreed to spend an
additional $5 million to upgrade its liquid rad waste
disposal system and $10 million to reduce its radioactive
gaseous releases to 1% of the AEC's permissible level
(Lewis 1972, 143). Intervenors similarly managed to win
upgrading concessions at the Point Beach reactors in
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Hisconsin, (Lewis 1972, 266) and the Dresden II plant in
Illinois (Keating 1975, 61).[34]
By 1970 political pressures stemming from the
radiation controversy had become so severe that the AECwas
forced to revise its guidelines. In an ambiguously worded
statement it called for stricter release practices (Rolph
1979, 113). The same year the National Environmental
Policy Act transferred primary radiation regulatory
authority from the AEC to the Environmental Protection
Authority. By 1977, the EPA following AEC precedents,
had reduced permissible exposure levels at plant boundries
by 20 fold (Nader and Abbotts 1979,75-76; Komanoff 1981,
113) • The reduction required numerous plant design
changes, including: the upgrading of waste holding tanks,
air filtration systems, waste monitoring capabilities,
w a s t e protection during accident conditions, and
occupational exposure protection. [35]
~ Accident prevention regulation
\
3..-.211 .QY"§J;:Y.i..§~· As in case of radiation hazard
estimates, planning context shifts during the 1970's
restructured the data base and methodologies used to assess
serious accident probabili ties. The res ul t was a massive
incr ease in construction costs. I
3..-.221 ~g~g Qg§..§ ~Qn§~J;:g.in~R ~~~~=1~2~.Because
reactor safety research held a relatively low priority in
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the AEC's development program 1950-1970, safety studies
received only modest funding.[36] Data collection was also
limited by the location of safety R&D in the promotionally
oriented Division of Reactor Development and Technology
(RDT) • In 1969 the Commission's technical experts, the
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), expressed
alarm over the lack of studies investigating potential core
melting, fuel failure, and seismic stress problems (Rolph
1979, 94). Only limited attention was given to reactor
operating experience as a source of safety information
(Ford 1982,200; pollard 1979,1-2).[37] By 1971, Robert
Gillette reported, "Scientists and engineers in the safety
program have corne to believe ••• that the AEC in its
eagerness to develop a thriving nuclear industry- and to
get on with building breeder reactors has deliberately
bypassed tough safety questions •••" CS..Qi.§.il.Q.§ 9/1/72 p.
771).[38]
The nuclear industry displayed even less interest
\
than the AEC in uncovering safety hazards. During the
JCAE's 1967 regulatory hearings, industry spokesmen
strongly opposed funding for heuristic safety research,
favoring instead studies designed to redress known hazards
(R 01 ph 1 977, 25 ,34; Per ry 1 977 , 5 9; Woo d 1983, 3 4)• Th e
minutes of a February 1968 ACRS meeting report, liThe
representatives of the reactor designers expressed
their opinions that their design are adequately safe
301
without further major R&D••• " (Okrent 1981,310, see also
194). [39]
Among the potential safety problems ignored were
current concerns regarding the adequacy of meltdown
containment systems[40], seismic stress[41] and fire
hazard[42] response systems, and quality control[43].
Problems such as fuel densification, safey system crippling
plant blackouts, endemic tube denting and steam corrosion
cracking were encountered during commercial operation
rather than design research.[44]
Increased information has typically led to increased
regulatory stringency and higher safety expenditures. For
example, plants are now equipped with back-up fossil fuel
generating capacity to guard against plant blackouts. The
reliability of the backup system, however, has i tsel f
become a serious safety issue[45],
general pr ob.l ern associated with
illustrating a more
nuclear safety: the
potential for exponential difficulties to accompany linear
increases in hazard information. The economic result has
been a negative learning curve for nuclear construction
costs (Rolph 1979 134; U.S., Department of Energy - Energy
Information Administration 11/82, 61; U.S., Department of
Energy - Energy Information Administration 5/80, 85, 131).
~ Methodological ~onstraints 1950-1910. As in
early radiation research, methodological inbreeding
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generated a narrow consensus regarding accident
probabilities. Five conceptual biases, all related to the
adoption of a restricted definition of credible accident
scenarios, lay behind the AEC-nuclear industry'sinitial
accident probability optimism.
1) The exclusion from hazard calculations of the
the impact of unanticipated events inside the reactor.
2) The characterization of various theoretically
possible events as practically impossible, such as pressure
vessel rupture or multiple failure initiated accidents.
3) A minimization of the dangers of external
disruptions such as tornadoes, earthquakes and sabotage.
4) A minimization of the dangers of human error.[46J
5) The assumed bounding of accident scenarios by
backstop defenses, such as the pressure vessel, and ECCS.
In effect, the Commission and industry began by
excluding mUltiple-failure initiated and unexpected events
from credible consideration; then, positinga pervasive
redundancy, the possibility of serious accident was
eliminated tautologically.[47J New accident paths might be
discovered, 'but their practical hazard implications were
minimal. [48J
Misplaced optimism also characterized the
Commission's confidence in the ability of computer modeling
to replace experimental data. As a result the AEC and
industry failed to conduct adequate emergency core cooling
system (ECCS) tests. Subsequent experience has found
errors in the ECCS computer modeling codes as well as those
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used for seismic stress analysis.[49] Two se ni or AEC
safety officials, have characterized the Commission's
reliance on the codes as "a triumph of faith over reason"
CS.Q.1...en.Q..e 5/5/72, p. 498). They attribute this behav ior to
the pressures of "group think" and bureaucratic
momentum. [50]
~ Inattention tQ anomalous information 1950-1970.
As in the radiation hazard area, both the AEC and the
nuclear industry were able to influence the social meaning
given technical information by:
1) discouraging interest in findings
conflicted with policy optimism,
which
2) minimizing the opportunities for networking
amongst nuclear skeptics, and
3) limiting public perception of the level of safety
uncertainty amongst Commission and industry technical
staffs.
In November 1974, for example, the New York Times
reported:
memos and letters written by AEC and industry
officials since '64, show (that the) AEC has
repeatedly sought to suppress studies by its own
scientists that found nuclear reactors are more
dangerous than officially acknowledged or that raised
questions about reactor safety devices (New York
Times Index 11/10/74).
The most pUblicized example of non-attention was the
suppression of the WASH-740-update accident probabili ties
study. The report contained high hazard estimates and was
regarded as a public relations problem (Ford 1982,77-79;
Nader and Abbotts 1979, 114; Rolph 1979, 76).[51] The
,
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follow-up Rasmussen Safety study was carefully packaged to
avoid similar difficulties. Quality control and quality
assurance issues, for example, were excluded from analysis
for fear that discussion would raise safety concerns (Ford
1982, 150-153; Bupp and Derian 1981, 123; Nader and Abbotts
1979, 372-3).[52]
The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards served
as the chief technical check on AEC-nuclear industry safety
decisions. The Commission was able to mute ACRS safety
initiatives, however, through its ability to appoint
committee members [53], and threaten committee
disbandment [54]. The soci al dynamics within the ACRS also
tended to dilute critics' concerns (Okrent 1981, 10). It ....
appears that safety skeptics' acquiesced tolax licensing
decisions in exchange for personal credibility in a long
run battle for a gradualist set of safety upgrades. In
numerous cases, for example, the committee agreed to
,
refrain from public criticism of the AEC, in exchange for
Commission promises of new research or future regulatory
upgrades. [55]
The information history of the emergency core
cooling system (ECCS) controversy mirrors, in microcosm,
the information history of nuclear power. Dur ing most of
the OT period official optimism dominated public
di scussi on. [56] In July 1971, the first mass media
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treatment of cooling system problems occurred (5 years
after the ACRS privately raised concern over related core-
melt problems). Two networks aired a Union of Concerned
Scientists' press conference analyzing the implications of
a 1970 ECCS test failure (Primack 1974, 214). In an
attempt to allay pub.Li c concern and formally exclude ECCS
issues from discussion in local licensing hearings, the AEC
agreed to hold pUblic rule-making hearings on ECCS
standards. [57J
The proceedings revealed the depth of concern that
the Commission had suppressed amongst its technical staff.
Dr. Horris Rosen indicated that system standards were
inadequate and inconsistent with the opinion of the
"majority of the knowledgeable people available to the
Regulatory staff •••• " (Primack 1974, 219).
Testimony also revealed that findings at Oak Ridge
contradicted the Commission's assumption that accident
related fuel rod behavior could not interfere with coolant
flo w (P rim a c k 1974, 216). Th e s e fin din gs we r e not
pursued. Indeed, the manager of the ECCS test facility,
Curtis Haire, indicated that research announcements were
regularly censored by the AEC "to avoid the problems or
burden, if you will, of having to spend a lot of time
answering public inquiries ••• (on) general questions of
nuclear safety" (NeX{.1.QIk Times 11/10/74). Remines cent of
the AEC's behavior during the radiation controversy, Rosen,
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Haire and Rittenhouse were subsequen tLy transferred from
their positions (Ford 1982, 128).
Gillette argues that the AEC's policy of
intimidation minimized public dissent. Representing the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, he was
forced to rendevous with lab personnel in back streets for
secret interviews. He writes, "That men nationally
recognized in their profession should feel impelled to such
maneuvers suggests how far relations between the Commission
and the Idaho installation have deteriorated" (~QieDQ&
9/1/72, p. 773). Congressional testimony, the Presidential
Commission's review of the Three Hile Island accident, and
numerous AEC-NRC-nuclear industry staff interviews,
indicate that the closed environment at the Idaho Falls lab
was reproduced in varying degrees at other public and
private nuclear enterprises. [58]
As in'the radiation hazard field, the AEC and
nuclear industry constituted the basic funding source for
hazard research. Internal criticism or testimony on behalf
of anti-nuclear intervenors was often perceived as harmful
to one's long run career (Ebbin and Kasper 1974,207-211).
Ebbin and Kasper concluded in 1974, "The AEC's role as the
major funding source for research in the nuclear sciences
over the last 25 years has created a situation in which
almost every nuclear scientist and engineer of worth is
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under grant or contract to AEC, or in the employ of the
AEC, the nuclear industry, or a national laboratory" (2ll).
Earlier they note, "Such experts, out of concern, (real or
imagined) for their positions and reputations, find it
difficult to support or testify on behalf of opponents of
nuclear power plants" (207).
Organizational loyalty and administrator control of
the coordinating function within research bureaucracies
also tended to militate against individual challenges to
organizational positions. Safety judgements often required
the integration of technical results from a number of
projects. Though the acquisition of the appropriate
knowledge for this coordination would not appear to be
beyond the ability of practitioners in anyone field (as
administrators are often less technically trained than
their staffs) there seem to be psychological and
sociological barriers to individual initiatives in this
area.
Ebbin and Kasper stress the strong inclination
among professional scientists and engineers against
becoming involved in controversies outside their
relatively narrow realm of expertise (16,17 205-223). Fear
of embarrassment and notor iety reinforce the credibility
of what might be called "organizational expertise", and the
power of administrators to pursue institutional objectives
in conflict with technical findings.[59]
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During the 1970's,
environmentalist pressures forced the AEC to increase
accident hazard R&D and to establ ish a Division of
Reactor Safety Research free from administrative control
by the promotionally oriented Division of Reactor
Development and Technology {Dawson 1976, 262,250; Rolph
1979, 130-134).[60] Congress required the Commission to
i nves tigate new safety systems in 1977 (Okrent 1981, 314).
Reactions to frNI overrode long standing industry
opposition to core meltdown containment research (Okrent
1981, 314). Almost invariably, the product of expanded
inquiry has been regulatory escalation.
The coalescence of a critical mass of
technically trained skeptics played a central role in
generating new methodological perspectives. Illustrative is
\
the impact of the Union of Concerned Scientists' activities
on the ECCS debate. Other UCS research led to the
upgrading of reactor fire and earthquake hazard response
systems, and the NRC's partial withdrawal of support for
the Rasmussen safety study.[61] The Scientists Institute
for Public Information (SIPI) played much the same role in
the breeder reactor debate (Del Sesto 1979, 166-169).
Local anti-nuclear intervenors repeatedly
';~~ -=2-~--'
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demonstrated the NRC and utilities' neglect of site-
specific geological conditions[62], and eventually forced a
general review of earthquake standards. Other local
efforts increased the AEC's attention to on-site quality
control problems and reactor building support settling
(Komanoff 1981, 60). Rolph notes that the general threat
of intervenor cross examination and design review
pressured both the industry and AEC to upgrade their
overall safety analysis (Rolph 1979, 124; see also U.S.,
Department of Energy - Energy Information Administration
5/80,131).
The intervenors also strengthened the ACRS's
internal bargaining position with the AEC bureaucracy. The
threat of pUblic disclosure of ACRS safety concerns was
more compelling when intervenor groups were likely to
Ln t rodu ce such information into local licensing hearings
and the national nuclear debate.[63]
\
The anti-nuclear movement has also been able to gain
public exposure for previously neglected research that
raised questions about the adequacy of nuclear accident
safeguards. Among the documents introduced into the public
domain by Freedom of Information suits or pressures are:
The WASH 740 Update, the AEC's "Task Force Report Study of
the Reactor Licensing Process" [64], the Nugget File [65],
the Rasmussen Correspondence[66], and a number of reports
raising questions about reactor pipe integrity and plant
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sabotage hazards. [67]
Additional information gained public review through
the discovery powers granted nuclear critics in various
hearings and other "open-government" legislation.[68]
One of the most important impacts of the protest
movement was the creation of a social context more
conducive to public dissent within the industry than the OT
period's "team-player" environment. Whistle blowing by AEC
officials, nuclear industry engineers and on-site
construction personnel has been a key source of regulatory
escalation. [69]
/
3.26) The economic impact Qi increased accident
containm~ regulation. - The integrated character of plant
design makes it difficult to isolate the financial impact
of particular regulatory upgrades.[70] Summary statistics
indicate that safety related retrofits will add more than
$80,000,000 to the average capital costs of 41 reactors
licensed 1971-1979 (mixed historical $) (..s.12~..Q.t.h!!m 4/84 p.
50). The bulk of the regulatory burden however has been
absorbed in new plant construction costs. Reactors
scheduled to come on line in the mid-eighties will cost
$1.8 billion more than plants completed by 1972. [71]
The escalation is reflected in the increased
materials requirements for plant construction. Average
cab 1 e, con cret e, and pip in9 require men ts, for examp 1e,
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increased by 150% 1971-1985. Craft labor requirements
rose from 3.5 hrs/kw capacity in '67 to 21.6 hrs/kw for
'82-'85 plants. Non-manual field and engineering services
leaped from 1.3 hrs/kw to 9.2/hr s/kw (U.S. Congr ess, Off ice
of Technology Assessment 1984, 60-61). Es cala ting
quality control requirements have been particularly costly,
more than doubling, for example, the real 1975 cost of
reactor steel supports without changing their physical
dimensions.
~ Therffigl pollution regulation
The history of waste heat
regulation follows the same pattern of of f Lci aI neglect
(1950-1970) and later concern that characterized the
treatment of radiation and accident dangers.
As in other hazard areas, only a limited data base
was available in 1970 for estimating thermal pollution
burden to specific bodies of water.[72] Reactor designers
\
initially paid little attention to thermal pollution
problems (Nelkin 1971, 118). The AEC aggressively refused
to consider the hazard in licensing review, and resisted
the JCAE's attempts to endow the Commission with regulatory
authority. The Commissioners' hostility towards
independent thermal pollution research reinforced hazard
neglect. For example, after Cornell University personnel
helped stimulate pressures for higher waste heat
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containment standards for the proposed Bell nuclear plant,
former AEC Commissioner Frank Costagliola attacked "small
academic groups who ••• degrade the competency of the AEC
in the eyes of the pub l i c;" and warned, "It is my opinion
that the access our colleges and universities have to
federal funds for the conduct of research is a privilege
and not a right" (Nelkin 1971, Ill).
Initial skirmishes
involved legal challenges during licensing proceedings.
Little concern was evident before 1966, but from '66-'71 14
plants were challenged on thermal pollution grounds (Rolph
1979, 105). The AEC parried such attacks by claiming it
lacked jurisdiction to impose thermal constraints.
As in the radiation release area, the intervenors'
first victories took the form of negotiated agreements with
the utilities. Along with reduction in radiation
emissions, the 1966 Palisades agreement between Consumers
Power Company and local intervenors called for the
\
construction of a $15,000,000 cooling tower (Olson 1976,
77). Detroit Edison similarly agreed to construct 2
cooling towers and a cooling pond for Fermi II (Lewis 1972,
143) • Commonwealth Edison and its partners reached
agr eement with intervenor s to build a $30,000,000 thermal
pollution reduction system (Lewis 1972, 296). In April
1969 New York State Electric and Gas withdrew its plans to
construct the Bell plant in the face of the pressures noted
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above.
The balance of power between the utilities and
intervenors swung significantly in the direction of the
environmentalists with the Calvert Cliffs court decision in
1971 applying the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
to nuclear power plants. The court castigated the AEC for
behavior that "makes a mockery of the Act" (Lewis 1972,
282-283).[73) Regulatory policy has increasingly required
the use of cooling towers. The latter reduce net plant
output by 3% and cost about 30-60 million dollars ('79$).
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Dynamics on Nuclear Regulation
Promotional regulation was a key mechanism behind
the establishment of nuclear power as an Official
Technology. Tables 19 and 20 list the major regulatory
aids enjoyed by the technology during the OT years. The
shifting character of the nuclear planning context in the
'70's reoriented regulatory policy in much the same manner
as it reshaped R&D behavior. The most important changes
involved the internalization of negative externalities.
Although precise figures are unobtainable, it is
possible to estimate the cost of escalating health and
environmental regulations. Deflating for general
construction cost increases, nuclear construction costs
grew from approximately $375/kw for non-turnkey plants on
314
line before 1971 to $2225/kw for plants expected on line in
the mid-eighties (Komanoff: 1981, 20, 1984, 'rable 1).
About $325 of this increase represents the impact of
higher market interest rates on interest during
construction charges.[74] Recent analyses suggest that
regulatory streamlining, more efficient construction
scheduling, standardization, and learning improvements
could reduce future construction cost by $500/kw (U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1984, 67). The
net result implies a $lOOO/kw safety and environmental
upgrade 1971-1985.
Early insulation from these charges, equal to about
18.3 Mills/kilowatt hour[75], can be considered another
dimension of nuclear's OT status. The differential exceeds
20 M/kwh if fuel cycle cost escalation is included.
Nuclear's preferential treatment 1950-1970 reflected
the interactive logic of the period's nuclear planning
context. As Table 20 indicates, this logic transcends
conventional models of lobbying pressure, and reflects the
social creation of a realm of discourse. Planning context
variables severely influenced the available data and
methodologies used to assess hazards, the attention given
anomalous findings, and the regulatory reaction to
technical informati on.[76]
I
This chapter focused on 3 externalities. The same
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pattern of regulatory escalation was repeated in both the
waste disposal and weapons proliferation areas. In the
latter case, increased concern led to the outright
suspension of fuel reprocessing during the Carter
Administration.
The chapter's central claim is that the nuclear
planning context of the '50's and '60's al.Lowed the AEC and
nuclear industry's goal of winning OT status for nuclear
power to impose an infant industry strategy on regulatory
policy. The technical and economic risks assumed by the
nuclear industry in the turnkey plants, megawatt scaling
race, bandwagon market, and enrichment and fuel
reprocessing ventures, were thus reproduced in the safety
area. A broad range of general regulatory incentives were
deployed to promote nuclear expansion (table 19), while
internalization of nuclear externalities was postponed
(table 20).
Noclear supporters have commonly disputed claims of
self-serving inattention to nuclear hazards. Proponents
point to the industry's self-interest in safe operation, as
well as the moral character of AEC regulators. The OT
framework demonstrates Othat both factors are consistent
with lax hazard containment policy, if the latter is linked
to a long run confidence in the ability of OT status to
insure successful resolution of hazard uncertainties.
To a large extent, the nuclear controversy reflects
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disagreement over the tolerable level of hazard
uncertainty. Alongside ideological and self-interest
differences with the anti-nuclear movement, the industry's
assumed safety backstop of OT status made it less risk
aver se than its cri tics.
The strength of the OT-planning context model is its
ability to integrate a wide range of phenomena into a
common framework of explanation. Throughout the
dissertation we have demonstrated a pattern of causality
which derives economic outcomes from planning context
dynamics. The goal has been to demonstrate the importance
of social as opposed to technical variables in determining
the competitiveness of nuclear power and the general
direction of technical change. rrhe same mode of analysis
has been applied to explain the pattern of nuclear industry
investment decisions, post-war energy sector R&Dbehav ior,
and nuclear regula tion., The ability to link together
changing realms of technical discourse in fields as diverse
as emergency core cooling, food chain radiation hazards,
thermal polution, electricity demand elasticity and
photovol taic eff iciency ill ustrates the robustness of the
planning context-OT model.[77]
Political scientists like Leon Lindberg (1977) have
drawn more general conclusions from post-war energy sector
behavior, noting the common tendency across nations for
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economic policy to be dominated by the planning momentum of
large self-interested pUblic and private bureaucracies.
While the cold war and extreme centralization of regulatory
authority in the AEC exacerbated this tendency in the
nuclear sector, there are many reasons to suspect that the
nuclear pattern has more general application. The nuclear
industry's powerful influence over public policy reflected
common ci rcumstances: its focused pol itical interest, the
functional authority imparted by hands on expertise, and
abil ity of bur eaucr atic mechanisms to neutral ize internal
technocratic dissent. Similar levers are likely to be
available in emerging industries like bio-technology. The
AEC's behavior also reflected relatively common conditions,
such as: its client industry's political clout, the
Commission's interest in bureaucratic expansion and the
soci 01ogy of staf f self-selection.
In response to these structural biases towards
promotional regulation nuclear critics have urged the
institutionalization of adversary science. Gofman writes,
A technology under current circumstances is
practically guaranteed to find itself burdened with a
group of 'think alikes' throughout its technical
staff, for the simple reason that those who speak out
are shortly v eede d out •••The early establishment of
reprisal-free,· fully funded centers for adversary
criticism of technology can correct this serious
situa tion (Gofman 1979, 255-256).
Hugh Folk, the director of a University of Illinois program
on the social implications of science and technology,
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argues similary,
It is inevitable that experienced experts will
usually be drawn from the interests involved in a
problem Institutional and professional biases are
at least as potent as financial conflicts of interest
in distorting one's conception of a problem. Even in
the absence of any overt bias, people used to thinking
about a certain area will tend to see it in the
context of a large set of implicit technological,
social and political assumptions (rrechnology Revie,N
3-4/73).
The OT frame of analysis supports these views.
TABLE 19
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SHIFTING LEVELS QE NQN-EXTERNALITY
RELATED REGULATORY SUPPQRr
M PERIODi (circa 1.9.50-1970)
1) Full recovery of cost
overruns and undercapacity
performance.
2) Minimal payment for
grid feed-in, declining
block rates, friendly
accounting treatment
for decommissioning
expenses and utility
taxes.
3) SEC silence concerning
utility nuclear debt
levels.
4) Exercise of land use
authority to facilitate
nuclear expansion.
5) Miscellaneous aids:
friendly import regula-
tion, promotional enrich-
ment contracting,
sympathetic anti-trust
review, capitpl intensive
rate base incentives.
DISESTABLISHMENT (post 12701
Percentage disavowal of cost
overruns, plant cancellations
& poor capacity performance.
PURPA suppor t for marginal
cost pricing,fairvalue
credit for cogenerators, and
public support for
intervenors.
Widespread resistance to
CWIP.
State and local use of land-
use authority to block
nuclear construction.
Miscellaneous obstacles:
local bans on nuclear mate-
rials transport, limits on
pro-nuclear advertising,
non-cooperation for
emergency planning.
, I
TABLE 20
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EXTERNATLITY REGULATIQN~ RADIATION HAZARDS
~ YEARS (circa 1950-1970)
DATA
PROTEST YEARS (post '70)
Lack of occupational exposure Controversy induced:
registry. Establishment of Occupational
Lack of rigorous study of radiation exposure registries.
nuclear industry cancer rates. Data collection of GI bomb test
Lack of fallout exposure data. observer cancer rates.
Lack of vigorous nuclear Study of Portsmouth Naval Yd.
power plant radiation release cancer rates.
monitoring. Upgraded mine and power plant
radiation release monitoring.
------------------------------------------------------------
I'lETHODOLOGY
General lack of attention to
cancer-nuclear power linkage.
Use of threshold hypothesis.
Neglect of food chain avenue
of human radiation exposure.
Incomplete lvst of radio-
active emissions.
Employment of 1-30-100 yr.
hazard burden ceilings.
Use of original Hiroshima
Bomb Assessment Data.
Limited attention to muta-
genic hazards.
Controversy stimulated:
Increase in nuclear power -
cancer linkage research.
Exploration and adoption of
cumulative-linear hypothesis.
Inclusion of food chain
avenue of exposur e.
Extension of hazard burden
period.
Revision of Hiroshima data.
Increased attention to
mutagenic hazards.
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Table 20 continued
SOCIAL MEANING OF ANOMALOUS INFORHATION
Suppression of early fallout
concerns.
Relative indifference to
~ill tailings hazard data.
AEC and industry
retaliation against
radiation critics.
Controversy induced:
Congressional hgs. on fall-
out information suppression.
Congressional hearings on
critics' radiation charges.
Attention to GI test observer
cancer rates.
Freedom of Information re-
leased radiation hazard data.
Transfer of regulatory and
research authority to EPA.
-----------------------------------------------------------
REGULATORY AND ECONOI1IC IHPLICATIONS
.cIT YEARS
Absence of federal mlnlng
radiation regUlations.
Relatively lenient emission
standards along entire
nuclear fuel cycle.
.£.BOT EST YEARS
Controversy induced:
Federal mining radiation
regUlations. Reduction in
permissible: power plant
boundry emission levels
(from 500-25 millirems),
average nuclear fuel cycle
popUlation exposure
(170-25 millirems), pro-
posed maximum single yr.
occupational exposure
(from 12-5 rems).
Increased power plant
capital expenditures to
contain: gaseous emissions,
1iquid wastes,
accident contingencies.
Increased solidification
requirements prior to waste
transport. Expanded design
features to reduce
occupa tional expos ure,
TABLE 21
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~X~~BNAL~~XB~~~Lb~~Q~l
ACCIDENT ~ THERMAL POLLUTION HAZARDS
QT YEARS (circa 1950-1970)
DATA
Limited accident hazard
R&D. Limited collection
of accident related
empirical data.
Prohibition of communi-
cation between regula-
tory and hazard research
staffs. Limited data and
planning attention to
thermal pollution.
PROTEST YEARS (post 1970l
Controversy induced:
Expansion of accident
hazard R&D. Establishment
of administratively
independent reactor safety
division with research
capabilities.
Increased attention to site
specific seismic hazards.
Increased attention to reactor
operating experience.
Court required thermal pol-
lution, environmental impact
review.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NETHODOLOGY
Employment of single failure
initiated accident assumpt.
Exclusion of unanticipated
accident paths from hazard
probabilities estimates.
Minimization of impact
of external events on reactor
performance.
Use of flawed computer codes
to predict seismic stress.
Minimal attention to human
error hazards.
Employment of backstop
assumption to minimize
system failure implications.
Employment of multiple fail-
ure accident path models.
Controversy induced: Review
& partial rejection of
Rasmussen fault-tree metho-
dology. Increased attention
to external hazards
(earthquakes, tornadoes,
flooding, sabotage, etc).
Recalculation of seismic
stress formulas.
Increased attention to
quality control problems.
Recalculation of adequacy
of ECCS and reactor presure
vessel.
"
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Table 21 continued
SOCIAL MEANING - ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
Public relations
campaign to minimize
accident hazard
dangers. Suppression
of WASH 740 update
& other "anomalous"
data. Suppression of
ACRS concerns.
"Safety discount" due
to postponed attention
to externality
internaliation.
Controversy induced: "Fish-bowl"
treatment of accident experience.
Freedom of Information release of
safety related documents.
Public access to ACRS proceedings.
AEC and nuclear industry
staff leaks of hazard information.
Congressionally mandated
publication of abnormal
occurrences and
unresolved safety issues.
Controversy induced upgrading of:
Emergency core cooling system.
Seismic stress response system.
Quali ty control.
Plantblackout defenses.
Fire, flooding, and other external
hazard containment systems.
Waste heat containment systems.
Maintenance of siting distance
requirement.
C HAP T E R VI
1. See Chapter 3, sections 2 and 7.
2. See for example: Bupp (1981), Chubb (1983), Dawson
(1976), Ebbin and Kaspar (1974), Ford (1982), and Wood
(1983) •
3. Until the mid to late sixties, declining block rates
could be defended on the grounds of scale economies. As
Anderson and others have observed, however, downward
sloping cost curves had ceased by 1967 (Anderson 1981, 70).
4. This characterization also permitted the continuance of
select nuclear subsidies, otherwise legislatively
prohibited.
5. The Energy Information Administration's Wo~l.Q Jlnmi.!!ID
Supply and DeID~ ~mpact of £ederal policies study noted,
"Congress legislated protection from foreign competition
for the domestic uranium mining and milling industry ....
The legislation's symbolic effect was as important to
producers as its substance. The actual and prospective
participants understood that the AEC's influence on the
market through its enrichment and stockpiling policies
would be critical to the industry. The 1964 legislation
signaled that the Federal Government would, within reason,
attempt to guarantee the industry's viability" (U.S.,
Department of Energy - Energy Information Administration
5/83) •
6. In New Hampshire, for example, anti-nuclear movement
efforts,pressured the state legislature to repeal CWIP
charges (Gyorgy 1979, 385). After New Hampshire Governor
Thompson vetoed the repeal, CWIP became a central issue in
the 1978 gUbernatorial campaign, and is widely considered a
major reason for Thompson's defeat (N£ll Qt~~~t~Q.!!~D£l
10/25/84). In r-1.issouri,CWIP was banned by the results of
a state-wide initiative referendum (Gyorgy 1979, 385).
7. Anderson's account of the history of utility rate
reform indicates that the Environmetnal Defense Fund was
especially important in gaining marginal cost pricing
(Anderson 1981, especially pp. 74,88,97 & 110-113). See
also Sci~~ 9/20/74 p. 1031.
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8. As Rand analyst Elizabeth Rolph writes, the
Commission's policy was to "••• adopt the most conservative
requirements consistent lii.t.h the ..Q.Qmmercial viabili ty ..Q.f.
..tM nJJ...Qll.ft£ J2Q~~.£ .£&~.Q.tQ.L.. The staf f had no intention of
seriously constraining its commerical use" ([Emphasis in
original], Rolph 1979, 77). See also Ford 1982 p, 65, 225;
Komanoff 1981 p. 168; and u.S. Department of Energy -
Energy Information Administration 5/80 p. 117.
Komanoff's sector size hypothesis, tying regulatory
stringency to the number of on-line reactors, is consistent
with much of this interpretation of AEC behavior. It
differs from the present analysis in emphasis, ascribing
regulatory escalation more to technocratic adjustments than
shifting socio-political contexts (Komanoff 1981, 26-27,
46-50) •
9. The popularity of the idea of industry sel f- regula tion
was the product of the period's positive public attitude
towards business, the symbiotic relationship between public
and private energy bureaucracies, and the poli tical clout
of the nuclear industry. As nine year NRC Commissioner
Victor Galinsky observed in 1983, "He're still digging our
way out of the problems created in the sixties. The
original idea - and it was a flawed idea- was that we could
operate on the basis of self-regulation. A system was set
up that was not adequate to the task ••• There was a fairly
deliberate policy of keeping the regulatory body weak ••• "
(~}i .YQ.£.K .'I'iID~..Q 10/16/83). See also: u.s. Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment 1984, p, 144: Ford 1982,
pp.52,106;Rolph 1979, pp. 158-9 and Gorinson 1979b, p. 3.
10. While the mass distribution of iodine tablets to
minimize accident hazards, for example, and civil liberties
curtailments to contain threats of nuclear sabotage,
might appBar excessive demands to support a few plants,
they could appear the price of progress with 1000 reactors
in place.
11. 1;'lhile contextual momentum can not maintain logically
i nval i d propo si ti ons or ea sily f al sifi abl e empi r i cal
assertions, it can help to define what is considered an
important problem, what data exists for analysis, and what
collection of expertise is available for networking. This
in turn can precipitate information milieus and influence
regulatory policy. Political pressures can similarly
infl uence the transla tion of technical informa tion into
regulatory standards.
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12. John Gofman, director of one of the AEC's major
radiation studies, indicates that in the first 20 years of
AEC radiation research "there were probably fewer than 10
pages of studies ••• which even mentioned ••• possibilities
of deaths from cancer from peaceful uses of the atom"
(Gyorgy 1979,221; see also Kaku 1982, 61).
13. As early as 1957 the Academy recommended that a
national registry be established to record individual
radiation exposure and health histories. The suggestion
was rejected at the time by the government as impractical
(~gli XQ£K ~iIDg~ 7/5/79), and about 13 years later as
unnecessary (Lewis 1972, 94; Sternglass 1981, 100). It was
not until 1968 that the AEC established a registry to keep
track of the health histories of plutonium workers (Nader
and Abbotts 1979, 175), and not until the late seventies
that it was decided to keep a registry of the radiation
exposure and medical experience of all uranium workers.
ERDAwas forced to acknowledge in 1976 that it was still
too early to use its plutonium data to make meaningful
assessments of the substance's health hazards (Nader and
Abbotts 1979, 175).
Alongside late inception, data gaps mar the registries
usefulness. Nuclear Fuel Services, for example, the only
company ever to operate a commercial reprocessing plant,
and thus to develop certain data histories, refused to
participate in aspects of data projects (~gygn D~Y~
3/28/77). Until recently many companies' records did not
include data on temporary hires ("jumpers") who have
increasingly accounted for significant percentages of
industry exposure levels, reaching 23% in 1969 and 50% in
the '70's (Gofman 1981,586; Horgan 1978 38; Gyorgy 1979,
92) •
14. For e-xa mp'l e , a major literature review of low level
radiation research reported that the occupational studies
of radiation hazards at or around Oak Ridge, " ••• are best
noted for the insensitive methods employed. Large groups
of unexposed persons, or recently hired individuals were
included with exposed persons when comparisons wer e made.
In some, the healthy-worker effect was ignored. In all but
the study by Patrick, there was no attempt to look at
specific causes of death. In only one of them was
consideration given to the latent period, i.e., the deaths
for the years when no excess cancers from radiation could
be expected were combined with the deaths for later years
when some might be expected" (Archer 1980, 71). The
paper's author, Victor Archer, has served in the Public
Health service and National Institute for Occupational
Health, and is probably the leading U.S. authority on
uranium miner cancer data. It should be noted that while
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critical of the methodology of many hazard studies, he does
not appear to differ significantly with their relatively
optimistic conclusions.
Prior to the Boston Globe's 1978 investigation of the
health histories of Portsmouth Naval Yard nuclear submarine
workers, no studies had been undertaken of the cancer rates
among the Navy's civilian nuclear employees. It was not
until the Globe's research reported cancer statistics twice
that in the general population, and leukemia rates four
times higher, that the Navy announced intentions for its
first study. The research will focus on the health
histories of the 250,000 workers currently or previously
employed at the government's 7 nuclear shipyards.
Illustrative of the expense barrier invovled in radiation
epidemiological studies, is the project's expected $9.5
million cost (Boston Globe 2/18/79).
As the study began, HEW secretary Califano lamented
the lack of data from which to assess radiation hazards and
called for the "establishment of a national registry of
radiation work and illness records" (Boston Globe 2/28/79).
The same year the Interagency Task Force on Low Level
Radiation called for more basic research and a reduction in
medical radiation exposures (u.S., Department of Energy -
Energy Information Administration 5/80, 107).
15.Despite the fact that more than 200,000 people
participated in the Nevada and South Pacific bomb tests
1945-1972, almost no efforts were made to monitor their
subs eq ue nt heal th histor ies (.N~.Yl XQ.h.K .Ti!!1~J2 12/5/77;
Washington Post 2/9/78; Boston Globe 2/19/78). It was not
until 1978, in response to anti-nuclear pressures, that the
Defense Department initiated data collection efforts.
"Notes of AEC meetings in 1953 1954 and 1955 show that the
commissioners were concerned primarily about the public
relations ,rather than health aspect of the fallout problem
and the delay or increased cost it could have for the
nuclear weapons development program" (H£!J2.hiD..9..tQD. EQ..s.t
4/19/79) •
Based on documents obtained through a Freedom of
Information, suit the Washington Post reports that an early
1960's Public Health Service study linking high leukemia
rates to fallout rates was witheld from publication.
Suppression followed AEC claims that its release could
cause "potential problems" for the testing program. In 1979
a Senate Health Subcommittee investigation and hearing
disclosed a pattern of AEC fallout information suppression
(4/19/79 N£!..s.hing.tQD. EQ..s.t). The spirit of the AEC's
thinking is best summarized by Commissioner Murray's
statement, " We must not let anything interfere with this
series of tests- nothing" (Wasserman 1982, 90; Washington
Post 4/19/79).
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16. Metzger (1972) notes that during the atmospheric
testing period the Commission funded only 30-50 technicians
to monitor nationwide fall-out levels (103). Perhaps as a
result, it failed to note the health hazard posed by the
bomb tests' generation of significant levels of Iodine 131,
as the latter's half-life is only 8.5 days (95,106).
Through the 1970's the NRC relied on the
utilities for self-monitoring of nuclear plant radiation
release levels. The Commission checked company records
twice a year, and spot checked 7-8 plants' actual
performance annually Oi~~.hi..n.qtQ.n .£Qli 11/1/79). The
procedure paralleled AEC monitoring practices for radiation
levels in uranium mines, where tighter oversight practices
were instituted in 1979 after a federal study found mining
companies under-reporting radiation levels by about 400%
(Denver ~ 9/2/79; see also Wasserman 1982, 150-151). In
1980 the NRC began installing dosimeters around nuclear
plants (U.S., NRC 1980b, 142-3).
One of the difficulties in assessing the impact of the
Three Mile Island accident is the paucity of radiation
release information due to the inadequacy of plant
moni taring equipment (Neji York Ti.ID~ 8/30/84 A-14; Rock;'l
Mountain Ne~B 3/29/83). There remains no national system
for assembling data concerning the linkage between power
plant emission levels and local health histories (.T..h~
Nation 1/83). Anti-nuclear critics claim a similar lack
of biostatistical follow-up surrounds the Three Mile Island
accident, especially with regard to animal experience.
(See for example Wasserman 1982, 265-266.)
17. Early AEC estimates of the health implications of
nuclear fallout were significantly biased downwards by an
inattention to the food chain avenue of human exposure.
Especially <important was the AEC's neglect of the hazards
of Iodine 131 and Strontium 90 through milk contamination
(Hetzger 1972, 85-86, 103). Early studies also neglected
uranium mining's radon decay avenue into the food chain
(Ford Foundation 1977, 174).
The Commission also misestimated the atmospheric
dispersal of fallout. It had to upgrade its hazard
projections when rather than distributing itself evenly
about the earth, as predicted, the fallout was inordinately
concentrated in the North Temperate Zone by global winds
(Metzger 1972,85, l>1cCamey 1960, 186). Concerning
strontium 90, the AEC assured the public in 1953, "the only
potential hazard to human beings would be the ingestion of
bone spl inters ••• An insignificant amount would enter the
body in this fashion" (Metzger 1972, 93-94).
Alongside errors of omission, the NRC now acknowledges
that the AEC promoted misleading studies of fallout's food
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chain flow in order to minimize opposition to the atomic
t est s (,N£!§.hi..llg.,tQ.n.£Q§.t 11/11/79) • Acco r di ng to th e Po s t
article, the AEC studies purposely selected soils that were
the least absorbent of fallout materials. Experimenters
s ub s eq ue n t Ly heated the soil in order to destroy bacteria
which otherwise aid in plant fallout absorption. Finally,
radioactive particles were added to the test plant's
environment right before harvest rather than during the
vegetation's entire growing cycle.
Controversy has continued into the eighties over food
chain radiation concentration ratios (.N~.hi.Dg.tQn EQ§..t
11/11/79; Gofman 1981, 539-543).
18. Underlying early AEC assurances about the safety of
the nuclear fuel cycle was the threshold hypothesis. The
Commmission asserted, "the body may safely receive a small
dose of radiation because the effects are repaired
virtually as rapidly as they are produced. A large number
of small doses may be given over a period of time, as the
body is able to repair itself between doses" (Metzger 1972,
'134) •
By the mid-seventies this theory had been rejected
within the scientific communi ty in favor of a 1 inear
cumulative hypothesis, raising the possibility that the
nuclear fuel cycle's chronic low level radiation releases
could pose serious heal th dangers.
A wide range of uncertainty currently exists
concerning the implications of different radiation doses.
Although many radiologists assert that the linear
hypothesis overestimates radiation health hazards at low
dose levels (Kaku 1982, 71), a modest number support an
inverse non-linear hypothesis. Recent work by Drs.
Stewart, Petkau and Morgan suggest that because low level
radiation is less likely to destory cells, it has a higher
probabili ty of causing life-threatening alterations (Nader
and Abbotts, 1979, 79; Pawlick 1980, 30; Horgan 1978;
Kaku 1982 66).
Because of the poor condition of radiation data, it
has been impossible to reach a new consensus. A National
Academy of Sciences' research task force on the health
effects of ionizing radiation, for example, had to prepare
minority and majority reports because of irreconcilable
differences of opinion.
19. A 5/22/81 report in ~~i~.n~~ indicates that the basic
data used for calculating low level radiation hazards may
be in error. Because of the classified nature of the
information related to the Hiroshima bomb blast, little or
no independent analysis was undertaken of the methods used
to determine the ratio of low/high level radiation caused
by the explosion. It was not until 1977 that the
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credibili ty of the official figures was widely suspected,
and even at that time reanalysis was impeded by fear of
alienating the prestigeous AEC veteran who had done the
original calculations. Recent work suggests that more of
the bomb correlated cancers need be attributed to low level
radiation than previously thought.
The debate is especially significant because many
radiation studies relied on "constants" derived from the
Hiroshima data in their calculations. Edward Radford,
Chairman of the National Academy of Sciences' influential
BEIR Committee (Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation
Committee), argues that the new results imply a need to
significantly increase low level radiation hazard
estimates.
Other methodological objections to Hiroshima based
hazard estimates have criticized:
-the extrapolation of constant (or "absolute")
increases in future cancer rates, rather than percentage
(or "relative") increases (Gofman 1981, 315-323).
-neglect of the uniqueness of the population (blast
survivors), and
-inattention to the downward bias in cancer reporting
amongst survivors, due to increased mortality from other
radiation related immune deficiencies (Morgan 1978).
20. For the last decade Dr. Ernest Sternglass of the
University of Pittsburgh has presented data linking infant
motality rates to nuclear plant radiation releases. Though
Sternglass's methodology appears vulnerable to criticism,
independent studies have lent some support to his general
conclusions (Pawlick 1980, 33; Lewis 1972, 77-78). Most
importantly, even skeptical reviewers have indicated that
more data and research is needed before Sternglass's
charges can be assessed.
Similar data and methodological lacunae undermine
estimates of the mutagenic hazards of low level radiation.
The Ford Foundation's nuclear study group reported in 1977
that official projections may be 800% to low (172). See
also Gofman 1979, P& 288-289; and Morgan 1978.
Much higher revisions however would be necessary
before mutagenic dangers assumed socially significant
levels, due to the very low hazards initally assumed.
Scientists like Nobel Laureate Joshua Lederberg assert such
revisions are possible, due to the large theoretical
uncertainties surrounding radiation's role in genetic
disorders and the latter's role in illness. Lederberg
suggests that a vast number of possibly.genetically related
problems (such as diabetes, atherosclerosis and mental
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retardation) could accompany emission levels consistent
with current nuclear regulation (Olson 1976, 96). Dr.
Irwin Bross, a biostatistician at the Roswell Memorial
Institute, indicated in 1974, "We now have solid evidence
that low levels of radiation which were considered 'safe' a
few years ago are able to produce cumulative genetic
degradation which can lead to leukemia and other diseases
in future generations" (Nader and Abbotts, 1979, 80). A
June '82 paper by Dr. Alice Stewart adds further weight to
these concerns (~JJ..n.Q..Qli~~~9/82 p. 9; T.h~ ~.Q.t..iQ.n1/83 p,
14) •
21. In calculating nuclear power's health burden, early
research appears to have overlooked the effect of a number
of significant emissions. John Berger reports that a 1974
EPA study found that previously ignored nuclear fuel cycle
emissions of Carbon 14 and tritium would produce 60 times
the health effects of the acknowledged polluters in a
hundred year period (Berger 1977, 76-78). Dr. Robert Pohl
of Cornell University has criticized the AEC-NRC for
ignoring the thorium hazard in uranium tailings. Dr.
Marvin Resnikoff has criticized ERDA's decommissioning
research for ignoring the presence of radioactive nickel
alloys in the reactor's steel infrastructure. See Chapter 7
section 5.33.
22. Cornell University's Dr. Robert Pohl has criticized
AEC-NRC hazard research for utilizing time periods of 1-30-
100 years for calculating environmental burdens rather than
the lifespan of the offending isotopes. The latter
approach implies uranium tailings cancer burdens thousands
of times the NRC's projection of a fractional death per
nuclear plant. The escalation reflects the cumulative
impact of thorium's 80,000 year half-life on morbidity
rates (Berger 1977, 76-78; Nug~Qnic..Q ~~k 5/25/78). In
response to such criticism, the Commission has increased
its open pit uranium mining hazard burden period from 1 to
1000 years (Nucleonics N~ 5/25/78).
The debate raises important questions about the
proper way to cost account future environmental burdens.
If the impact of radiation hazards is expressed in terms of
lives lost, there is a tendency to value a life in the
future nearly as much as a life in the present. However,
if a dollar value is placed on the lost life, and future
fatalities discounted to their present value, the burden of
long range radiation effects becomes trivial.
The logical justification for such discounting lies in
the impl icitass umption that medical-atomic science will
deter deaths at a rate roughly equal to the discount rate;
or that the resources freed in the present by reliance on
nuclear power will deter such deaths at this rate. Since
332
this is a probability statement, some weighted probability
distribution should be used to reflect the accompanyuing
uncertainties and social risk aversion. The more
conservative the assumptions, the closer to Pohl's
accounting one comes.
23. Ten years earlier the president of the National Academy
of Sciences similarly stated, "It is essentially impossible
to find more than a small handful of such experts who have
not,in relatively recent times, had significant support-
ei ther research grants or actual employment- from the u.S.
Atomic Energy Commission" (Hetzger 1972, 26).
24. Nobel Laureate Linus Pauling, for example, was called
before the House unAmerican Activities Committee for
circulating a petition calling for an end to atmospheric
testing. Labor Department efforts to raise uranium mining
safety standards were criticized by the JCAE as potential
threats to national defense (Metzger 1972, 132). The
highlighting of optimistic voices as official radiaton
hazard spokesmen was part of the larger ideological context
created by NcCarthyism. Recall for example the replacement
of "dovish" scientists like Oppenheimer by cold war
enthusiasts such as Teller as popular sources of
information about the atom. Their impact on the fallout
debate is illustrated by Teller's pUblic statements
suggesting that while radiation could be dangerous "It also
might be slightly beneficial or have no effect at all"
(He tzger 1 972 , 10 8. See a1sop p. 4 8 & 54 , and Nu.Qilg.L:.
-Sgu.ty 9-10/79).
Dr. Herbert Abrams of the Harvard l1edical School has
generalized the AEC's lack of radiation research funding to
include insufficient attention to radiation issues in
doctor training. He writes, " (the problem) can be traced
to medical schools where all too often one finds too few
radiologists on the faculty, too little support of the
department, too little time in the curriculum and too few
radiology clerkships" (Wasserman 1982, 128; see also
No rqan 1978).
25. Documents obtained by the Washington Post under
Freedom of Information review provide an insight into the
process of selective attention. In 1965 a U.S. Public
Health Service study linked elevated leukemia rates to bomb
test fallout. The study was suppressed and follow up
research blocked after AEC review suggested publication was
not in the national interest (Washington ~ 4/14,19/79;
Wasserman 1982, 65). Because of the nature of
epidemiological research it was easy for the report's
results to be ignored. The study found 28 cases of the
disease as opposed to an expected 19. Another 20 year
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study linking increased thyroid cancers to fallout levels
was discontinued after federal officials reportedly "lost
interest" in such work. Similarly downplayed was the
observation of increased birth defects in fallout areas by
local Utah physicians, and claims of increased sheep deaths
by local ranchers (~Q~~Qn~lQD~ 1/8/79). In 1980 a utah
judge reversed his own 1954 decision denying ranchers
damage payments from the AEC. The judge attacked the
Commission for having "manipulated" and "intimidated"
witnesses in perpetuating a "fraud on the court" (TM
Nation 1/83).
The AEC's resistance to researching the health hazards
posed by the use of uranium mill tailings-based building
materials in Colorado illustrates the same selective
attention to information. H. Peter Metzger writes, " After
discovery of the indoor radon problem by the Colorado State
Department of Public Health,the AEC, both on an unofficial
level and on an official level, sought to impede
investigations into the nature of the problem" (Metzger
1972, 176). The Commission blocked Public Health Service
funding for a study of home radon levels and denied AEC
funds to the Colorado Medical Center for a study of
chromosonal damage in tailings contaminated dwellings.
After dismissing the recorded radon levels as
insignificantly different from background radiation, the
Commissi on withheld contradictory resul ts of a Commission
research project (Metzger 1972, 180).
When releasing studies in conflict with official
optimism, the AEC repeatedly appended contradictory claims.
This practice tended to dull the public impact of anomalous
findings.
26. Significant circumstantial evidence suggests that the
Commission sought on a number of occasions to terminate
funding for projects at odds with its expansionist
policies. Among the most famous cases are: the recall of
92% of Dr. Arthur Tamplin's staff after his findings and
public statements challenged the Commission's radiation
standards (w asse rm an 1982, 21); the recommendation that
funding for Dr. John Gofman be terminated after he attacked
exposure standards (Berger 1977, 72); the removal of Dr.
Thomas Mancuso as director of the Hanford health study
after his preliminary findings implied higher than AEC
expected cancer hazards (Morgan 1978; Gyorgy 1979, 92); and
the lobbying of the University of Montana's Administration
to reject the job candidacy of AEC critic William pruitt,
after the Zoology department voted unanimously to offer him
a position (Hetzger 1972, 257-258).
A more important censoring device than direct
reprisals was the nuclear establishment's ability to
encourage self-censorship. AEC and nuclear industry favor
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meant publication credentials and job security. AEC
veterans comprised the "old boy network" for job
recommendations and the editorial boards of peer review
journals.
Metzger (1972), for example, cites Edward Martel's
claim that ideological censorship by a loyal AEC reviewer
prevented the publication of one of his articles in Science
(276). Anti-nuclear attorney Myron Cherry writes, "I have
talked to academicians at some of the leading institutions
in the united States ••• There is subtle intimidation, the
academicians are being purchased one way or another through
funding tha tis coming to the school s ••• The industrie s
are funding efforts and too many consultants are too afraid
to take on the hand that is feeding them" (Ebbin and
Kaspa r 1974, 208).
Private industry similarly sought to discourage its
critics. For example, mine owners in Wyoming sought to have
the state's chief radiological officer fired after he
revealed that a mine owner had falsified disclosure
information (r·1etzger 1972,127). A coalition of business
groups forced the resignation of Jefferson County Health
Department director Carl Johnson in response to his
aggressive monitoring and pUblicizing of radiation releases
from the Rocky Flats nuclear facility Oi~~ 5-6/81).
Similar events occurred in Grand Junction Colorado (Metzger
1972, 183).
In assessing the impact of promotional objectives on
scientific discourse, the key question is one of degree.
Even during the height of the OT period, articles critical
of AEC orthodoxy were pu bLi ah e d, The issue is whether or
not ideological biases influenced the frequency of
pUblication enough to discourage the growth of a cri tical
mass of al terna ti ve scholarly work.
\ .
27. In 1959 for example, at a time when the Internatlonal
Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP) was
tightening its regulations and u.s. fallout levels exceeded
certain AEC-ICRP standards, u.s. regulations were relaxed
(Rolph 1979, 108-9. See also Sternglass 1981, 121-123).
28. Through the sixties nuclear power plants had been
permitted to discharge up to 500 milirems (mr) at their
boundry. 1977 EPA guidelines reduced this level to 5-25 mr
under most ci rcumstances (Nader and Abbot ts 1979, 75-76).
The permissible average population exposure rate from the
entire nuclear fuel cycle was similarly reduced from 170 to
25 mr , (Nader and Abbotts 1979, 75-76~ Gofman 1981 532-
533). In 1979 the EPA proposed reducing maximum annual
occupational exposure rates from 12 to 5 rems (U.S.,
Department of Energy - Energy Information Administration
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5/80, 107-8). It should be noted that while much of this
reduction was in response to increased radiation hazard
concern, impetus also came from technological innovations
that made reduction less expensive.
29. In defense of the AEC-NRC, it should be noted that
given the period's data and methodological base, Commission
decisions often appeared conservative. A prime example of
this is the AEC's use of a $lOOO/rem cost estimate for
radiation exposure in regulation cost/benefit studies
(Wood 1983, 62-63; Morgan 1978).
30. Foreshadowing later petition efforts by the Union of
Concerned Scientists, Linus Pauling's mid-fifties petition
for a test ban treaty collected over 3000 U.S. scientist
signatures (Wasserman 1982, 98). The badly defeated
Stevenson campaign raised the issue in 1956. About the
same time unsuccessful efforts were made to transfer the
regulation of radiation standards from the AEC to the
Public Health Service (Rolph 1979, 109). The greater
strength of the environmental movement a decade later
succeeded in shifting significant regulatory authority to
the EPA.
In 1959 President Eisenhower established the Federal
Radiation Council, and the AEC created the Office of Health
and Safety to reassure the public that radiation issues
received serious government attention. Both efforts were
chiefly public relations gestures. The Council was denied
a research capability and the Health and Safety Office
took minimal initiatives (Rolph 1979, 110, 45; vlasserman
1982, 99). .
In the early sixties pressures for a test ban treaty
escalated. Among the groups actively organizing public
opinion were Women Strike for Peace, The Committee for
Nuclear Information and SANE. A treaty was initialed in
1962. '
Despite fallout concerns the AEC retained dominance of
radiation research and popular perceptions of the character
of radiation hazards. The controversy appears to have been
generally limited to the bomb test arena (Rolph 1979, 110).
Pressures for regulation of uranium mining radon levels,
for example, were successfully resisted. The threshold
hypothesis was publicly retained by the AEC, JCAE and
nuclear industry well into the late sixties (Rolph 1979,
110-11; Gofman and Tamplin 1971, 81-86). ,The scientific
lineage of popular criticism of nuclear power radiation
standards can be traced to studies by the National Academy
of Sciences and a UN team that challenged the threshold
hypothesis in the mid-fifties (Rolph 1979, 109). These
studies were followed by papers by Alice stewart in '59 and
Brian HacHahon in '62 linking in-utero x-rays to elevated
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cancer rates (Gofman 1981, 745), a '63 study by Ernest
Sternglass linking fallout to increased childhood cancers
and a '70 Sternglass paper linking infant mortality rates
to nuclear plant radiation emissions (Sternglass 1981, 282;
Lewis 1972, 61-63).
Popular political activity made it increasingly
difficult for the AEC to ignore such "anomalous findings".
Sternglass's mid-sixties charges, for example, received
significant media coverage in the context of the anti-
balistic missle debate, including a heavily promoted
feature article in ~§g~iX~, an appearance on the Today
show, and lecture before a Congressional seminar.
Increasing pUblic concern forced the AEC to ask two of
its radiation experts, (Drs. Gofman and Tamplin), to
review and rebut his work. Front page stories,
congressional hearings and escalating controversy
accompanied their conclusion that Sternglass was partially
right. Though significantly reducing his hazard claims,
Gofman and Tamplin's findings indicated that the AEC's
hazard calculations were more than twenty times too low
(Gofman 1979, 7). The two recommended a ten fold
reduction in permissible radiation levels.
In response, the Secretary of HEW asked the National
Academy of Sciences to review Gofman and Tamplin's
findings. The Academy's 1972 report and other research
stimulated by Sternglass's claims, concluded that the
dangers of low level radiation had been underestimated.
The report termed existing AEC radiation exposure standards
"unnecessarily high" (Nader and Abbotts 1979, 74). In
1978, Dr. Edward Radford, chair of the Academy's radiation
research committee, called for a ten fold decrease in
permissible occupational exposure levels, stating, " 'new
evidence indicates that the risk of cancer is substantially
greater' than thought just six years ago" (Washington Post
2/9/78) •
31. The most famous cases involved the Minnesota EPA's
1969 attempt to impose radiation standards 100 times
stricter than the AEC's on a Northern States Power Company
reactor, and a lengthy, highly pUblicized set of licensing
hearings for the Shoreham nuclear power plant.
32. The proximate cau~e of the DoD's decision were
hearings before the House Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, which publicized the high rate of leukemia a
pilot study found among 3153 exposed soldiers. That
research was stimulated by the disability claim of a former
GI dying of leukemia. After his suit was given press
attention, 5 other leukemia cases were reported, 300% more
than would be expected among the entire 3153 servicemen.
Interestingly, the research was not initiated by the NRC,
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ERDA, or the Army, but by the National Center for Disease
Control in Atlanta. The study's $100,000 cost illustrates
the expensiveness of assembling radiation hazard data.
The press attention given the issue was in part
reflective of the anti-nuclear movement's organizing
efforts around the nuclear testing-fallout question. Paul
Jacobs, for example, did extensive investigatory reporting
on Lnd ividual exposur e histor ies, which cuLmina ted in the
movie "Paul Jacobs and the Nuclear Gang". The film
received an Emmy award in 1979. The AlF has engaged in an
active nationwide campaign to limit its showings on
television (Wasserman 1983, 112). See also note 14.
33. Fora review of the Sternglasss controversy seenote 30.
34. Although the Minnesota EPA lost its court battle with
the Northern States Power Company over the state's right to
surpass the AEC in radiation release stringency, it won the
regulatory war. Under the threat of unfriendly state
legislation in other areas, the utility agreed to
"voluntarily " reduce its radioactive gaseous emissions by
80% (Lewis 1972, 133).
35. Upgrades occurred in the management of:
1) Gaseous radwastes: Changes included the
installation or significant improvement of gas holding
tanks and hydrogen-oxygen recombiners (to disarm short
half-lived isotopes), and the upgrading of 'high efficiency
particulate ai r' (HEPA) filtration systems (Komanoff 1981
113-114) •
2) Liquid radwastes: Changes included the upqr acnnq
and/or expansion of demineral izer systems and monitoring
capabilities (Komanoff 1981, 113-114).
3) Waste containment during accident conditions:
Changes included upgraded protection for waste systems
during seismic disturbances, improved containment vessel
seals for piping, instrument cables and other avenues to
the external environment, and additional redundancy
characteristics for post accident air filtration systems
(Komanoff 1981, 106).
4) Occupational exposure: Relatively few upgrades
were made in this area at plants completed in the
seventies (Komanoff 1981, 116). TMl investigators however
were fairly critical of existing worker radiation
protection pol icies, especi ally dur ing accident condi tions
(~12~~.t.L!Jm 4/84, 37). Plants currently under construction
are under significant pressure to increase remote radwaste
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handling equipment, shielded workspace and design access
for portable shielding. Komanoff indicates that there
also has been a shift towards material selection and
equipment design that would accept higher initial costs in
order to reduce necessary repair and worker exposure time
(Komanoff 1981, 122). The Energy Information
Admi ni s t rat ion's 1980s t udY .NJ.!.Ql.,g.5!.t:.EQ ,Yl.,g.t:BggJ.!l.2..t.iQ.D.
concluded that proposed 1979 EPA guidelines lowering
permissible occupational exposure from a maximum of 12 rems
per year to 5 rems could be quite expensive for older
plants (U.S., Department of Energy - Energy Information
Administration 5/80, 107-108). The Congress's Office of
Technology Assessment similarly cited potential health
damage claims from nuclear sector workers as an uncertainty
affecting future nuclear costs (U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment 1984, 70).
As with radiation hazards in general, early AEC
predictions underestimated plant occupational exposure
burdens (Komanoff 1981, 115), As the reactors have aged,
per plant rem burdens have increased from 300 REMS/reactor
year to 500.
5) Solid wastes: As in the occupational exposure
area, apparently few system upgrades were required in the
1970's. Komanoff notes however that recent pressures for
more complete solidification of wastes before
transportation to low-level waste depositories could add up
to $20/kw (approximately $20,000,000) to plant capital
costs (Komanoff 1981, 132).
Tighter radiation regulation similarly added to
capital and operating costs for other steps along the
nuclear production function. In 1967 the Department of
Labor imposed a 5 REH per year exposure limit. Radon
levels 100 times the new standard were said to have been
common by Union Carbide's former coordinator for
environmental control (De.D.y.,g.t:po~..t radiation series,
article #2 9/79; Nader and Abbotts 1979, 178).
Tighter r equ La t i on of mill tailings and upgraded
occupational exposure standards are expected to escalate
milling costs in the eighties (Komanoff 1981, 264; Bupp
1977, 31; Hertsgaard 1983, 156).
One of the reasons for the financial failure of fuel
reprocessing was new NRC waste guidelines requiring
solidification of reprocessed plutonium and uranium oxides
before shipment (adding about $117,000,000 to reprocessing
capi tal costs and similar treatment of high level wastes
(adding another $300,000,000 in capital costs) (Bupp 1977,
309-311; Ford Foundation 1977, 181). Resnikoff (1983)
persuasively demonstrates the potential for parallel
escalation in the cost of nuclear materials transport.
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36. The Commission's light water reactor safety budget
during the bandwagon years of 1963-1968 was less than 5%
annual AEC R&D outlays (Bowring 1980, 31; Rolph 1979, 93).
From 1965-1968 8.5% of the budget went unspent, as safety
research projects faced severe review (Rolph 1979, 93).
37. The NRC's Special Inquiry Group investigating the Three
Mile Island accident, for example, concluded, "NRC and the
industry have done almost nothing to evaluate
systematically the operation of existing reactors, pinpoint
potential safety problems, and eliminate them by requiring
changes in design, operator procedure or control logic"
(Komanoff 1981 56; see also Gorinson 1979b, 3). Although
the degree of this indictment is excessive, the direction
of criticism is correct. The extreme language probably
reflects the committee's irritation over the lack of NRC
and industry attenti on to pr e-TM I dress rehearsal s. NRC
official James Creswell, for example, tried unsuccessfully
for 5 months prior to TMI to gain regulatory attention to
problems similar to those that triggered the accident
(Gorinson 1979b, 108-112). Babcock and vHlcox, the
plant's vendor, had accumulated information on similar
accident initiating experiences at like reactors, but
neglected to forward the data to THI's managers (Gorinson
1 97 9c, 137)• The 1atter had accesst 0 va rio us 0 pe rat ing
experience data sources but judged review to be cost
ineffective (Gorinson 1979b, 116).
Similarly illustrative of the period's inattentiveness
to operating experience feedback is the regulatory
treatment of the problem of steel buckling in the
containment structure. The latter was not identified as a
potentially serious safety hazard until 1979, when the
development of a new analytic technique allowed the
"economical" discovery of the problem, Ui.!J..QilQn..i..Q.Q. N~~.k
1/11/79 p. 4). It was a year before the NRC forwarded its
nevi co n ce rn to plant licensing boards. Explaining the
reason for this delay, a Commission official replied, " We
processed about 150 of these sort of things and it fell
through the cracks" (.NucleonicQ Week 1/11/79 p, 4).
In defense of the NRC and AEC, it should be noted that
prior to TMI the Commission maintained a system of
bulletins and circulars on reactor operating experience.
It also supported a nuclear safety information center and
bi-monthly safety journal that reported on reactor
performance. Critics charge that these efforts were
insufficient rather than non-existent (Pollard 1979, 1-2).
38. Few links were established between regulatory and
safety personnel, as RDT Division director Milton Shaw
feared communication might alarm the regulatory staff.
Gillette writes,
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Researchers at both Idaho and Oak Ridge
National Laboratory say that as long ago as 1966
and as recently as 1971 they are expressly
forbidden to speak with members of the regulatory
staff about such controversial matters of reactor
safety as fuel-failure and seismic research,
except in meetings prearranged and closely
supervised by RDT officials in Washington.
During these formal meetings, the researchers
said, the RDT officials allowed them to answer
specific questions propounded by the regulatory
staff, but discouraged them from volunteering
their concerns about the safety of specific
nuclear power plants. Under no circumstances
were they allowed to discuss'program planning' or
future research with the regulatory staff or to
collaborate with the regulatory staff to define
technical uncertainties that might require R&D.
The regulatory staff, of course, could
always read the monthly progress reports that
researchers at Idaho turned out, but the same
restrictions that applied to meetings also
appl i ed to th e r epor ts (.Q.Qience 9/22/72 p.
1081) •
Shaw also prevented AEC safety researchers from
meeting with foreign reactor experts on 3 occasions, and
attempted to block a symposium on reactor safety sponsored
by the American Nuclear Society (.Q.Qi~n.Q~9/22/72 1080).
Gillette concludes, " Several research administrators
interviewed said they thought these barriers combined with
the RDT's persistent reluctance or inability to carry out
research the regulatory staff wanted, deprived the AEC of
informatio,n urgently needed to judge the safety of plants
corning up for licensing" (.Q.Qi~~ 9/22/72 p, 1082). The
policy result was a bias towards lenient hazard regulation.
39. As early as the 1950's, Westinghouse argued "industry
has developed reactor systems and engineered safeguards
that should permit thelocation of large nuclear stations
in population centers" (Rolph 1979, 61). Throughout the
'60's the vendors and utilities unsuccessfuly pressured the
AEC and th e Adv isory Commi t tee on Reactor Saf egua rds to
approve urban si tings. 0 ,
Unsuccessful efforts were made, for example, to gain
AEC OK for reactors in or very near New York City
(Ravenswood), Boston (Edgar Station), philadelphia-Trenton
(Burl ington) and the Los Angeles metroppol i tan ar ea (Bol sa)
(Nucleonics 5/63 19-20; Electri~~ ~Q£lQ 1/20/64; Okrent
1981, 58). .
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40. During the OT period, the Commission and nuclear
industry argued that meltdown scenarios were not credible
events and therefore did not require analysis or
containment responses. The vendors' vitriolic dismissal of
ACRS recommendations for an expanded pressure vessel
research program and rupture defense system typifies
industry's posi tion. Okrent reports,
Commented one industry official: ' The
question is - you can analyze things forever and
never get anything built ••• I wonder if it isn't
coming to a ridiculous point. You could analyze
if the reactor operator should ever step out in
the street: something might happen to him and he
might not be able to come to work' ••• At Burns&
Roe [a leading nuclear engineering firm] an
of f ici al said, 'we've studi ed this and concluded
that it's not possible: we could see no
conceivable possibility of a full vessel
rupture ••• ' And at General Electric there was
open talk about attempting to get the report's
recommendations reversed by AEC ••• (or) by the
courts ••• At Babcock & Vlilcox, one of the only
two u.s. firms that fabricate the huge reactor
pressure vessels, an official said, ' I believe
the possibility of massive failure of reactor
vessels has been reduced to zero ••• ' (Okrent
1981, 90).
Fifteen years later, the New York Times reported, "The
thick steel shells of the Connecticut Yankee nuclear
reactor and 12 other reactors around the country are being
turned brittle by radiation so rapidly, nuclear regulatory
officials say, that some of the plants may become unsafe to
operate by the end of next year (1982) ••• commission staff
members say it is certain that some of the plants w ill need
substantial repairs" (Ne~ ~ Ti.m~ 9/27/81). High on the
list of the NRC's unresolved safety issues in the '80's
has been the extra problem of pressurized thermal shock
(popular Science June 1983) •
A similar lack of research interest undermined
evaluation of the adequacy of the emergency core cooling
system (ECCS). Despite several years of recommendations
for an accelerated experimental program by the ACRS, the
first semi-scale test of the system was not conducted until
1970. Commenting on the latter's disturbing results, a
two volume AEC report concluded, "The complete and correct
analysis [of ECCS behavior] is beyond the scope of
currently used techniques ••• " (Ford 1982, 104). In the
- --~,-
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late seventies major questions arose about data gaps
concerning the integrity of the containment vessel.
Debates surged about the adequacy of GE's pressure
suppression and westinghouse's ice condenser containment
systems, and containment building sump adequacy. TMI
raised increased concern over hydrogen control during
sever e accident condi tions (Spectrum 4/84).
Reflecting on why key safety issues, like those
noted above, were resolved in favor of immediate licensing,
Okrent, (ACRS chair during the mid-sixties China Syndrome
debates), writes, "Why was resolution accepted based on
partial information ••• there was considerable pressure
from the industry not to impose further delays (and) •••
the commission and the AEC regualtory staff were very
sensitive to the question of delays arising from the
regualtory process" (Okrent 1981, 114).
41. It was not until the early '60's that the AEC seriously
began to review seismic hazard issues (Okrent 1981,
215,279). Two small reactors built in the fifties (GE's
Vallecitos test facility and the Humboldt Bay plant) were
sUbsequently retired due to their inability to meet
upgraded seismic stress standards (Komanoff 1981, 52). In
the spring of '82 the NRC threatened to suspend the restart
date for San Onofre I for the same reason (~n~~ gQ~~
5/21/82). Similar compliance difficulties regarding
upgraded ECCS standards led to the early retirement of
Indian Point I. After 10 years of unheeded ACRS requests
for increased earthquake hazard R&D, work completed at MIT
and UCLA in 1977-78 suggested that seismic risks may be 2
or 3 orders of magnitudes greater than previously estimated
(Okrent 1981, 283,287-8). In 1979 an error was uncovered
in the computer codes used for calculating seismic stress
resiliency, in components at 5 operating plants (U.S.,
Department of Energy - Energy Information Administration
5/80, 114; Okrent 1981, 288). Roger Mason, director of the
NRC's Division of System Safety warned, "This could be
serious because of the possibility that ••• hundreds of
pipes vital to the reactor's safety system would break
during an earthquake ••• The fact that the error was made
and not caught by the system is the important thing" (St.
Louis ~ Dispatch 12/13/79; Okrent 1981, 288).
42. A Union of Concerned Scientists study of the research
and regulatory practices responsible for the 1975 Browns
Ferry accident linked the accident to insufficient cable
separation R&D and inadequate plant quality control and
safety data collection. The study notes that in 1971 an
industry spokesman blamed information gaps for the lack of
cable separation design criteria (Ford 1976, 22). The
343
guidelines eventually adopted were undermined by the AEC's
fail ure to test thei r effectiveness exper imentally. Poor
utility data collection on safety and maintenance practices
at Browns Ferry allowed the procedure of checking cable
conduits for air leaks with a lit candle (and subsequent
plugging of the leaks with inflamable polyurethane) to
persist despite the previous occurrence of several small
fires using the same procedure (Ford 1976, 16). (For a
general discussion of quality control problems see U.S.,
JCAE 1974 part 2 vol. 2 pp. 208-270.) Okrent argues
somewhat similarly and reports that the ACRS unsuccessfully
urged the AEC to review potential fire accident paths in
1971 (Okrent 1981, 204, 219-20,231). Review of both
earthquake and fire hazards has tended to generate tighter
regulatory standards (Romanoff 1981, 94-97 ,90-92~ Okrent
1981, 262-264).
43. Consistent with its policy of "industry self-
regulation", the AEC engaged in limited data collection
concerning quality control and quality assurance.
Commission officials reviewed company quality control
records but did not dispatch on-sight inspectors (Ford
1982, 150-153). Both the staff report of the Rogovin
Commission and a 1978 GAO report were highly critical of
the NRC for continuing this practice (Gorinson 1979b). For
an earlier discussion of quality control problems see U.S.
JCAE 1974 part 2 vol. 2 pp. 208-270. Accumulating evidence
of poor quality control has been a driving force for
increased construction documentation and equipment
upgrading (Romanoff 1981, 73-77).
44. Reviewing nuclear performance, a 1973 AEC task force
concluded, "I'he large number of reactor incidents, coupled
with the fact that many of them had real safety
significance, were generic in nature, and were not
identified d~ring the normal design, fabrication, erection,
and pre-operational testing phases, raises a serious
question regarding the current review and inspection
practices both on the part of the nuclear industry and the
AEC •••" (U.S. JCAE 1974, 483-486).
45 • .Q.2~.Q.t.£..!JID(4/84) reports "12 plants in the United
states experienced in 1982 both disconnection from off site
power sources and - though never at the same time - loss of
one or more emergency disel generators." Because even
shutdown reactors require active cooling to contain core
decay heat, such power outages present potenti al mel tdown
hazards.
46. This issue was formally addressed after TMI, when the
NRC established a 5th safety unit called the Division of
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Human Factor Safety. The Commission's attention was forced
to the issue by heavy criticism from the Kemeny and Rogovin
reports.
47. The most famous embodiment of this approach was the
four million dollar Reactor Safety Study. The project
sought to attach probabilities to various kinds of accident
scenarios, and to project overall estimates of the expected
value of nuclear power's accident hazard burden. The study
estimated the average accident risk at one life per 50
reactor years. The probability of an extremely serious
accident was projected to be one in two hundred million
reactor years (Ford Foundation 1977, 229-231).
The two most controversial methodological assumptions of
the report's fault tree design were its reliance on fairly
speculative failure rates for reactor components and
assumption that it could anticipate, with only modest
error, all possible accident paths.
48. The AEC's limited safety research program and
tolerance of numerous "unresolved safety issues" reflected
this perspective. Critics were dismissed as Luddites. As
defined by the NRC, an "Unresolved Safety Issue" (USI) is:
"a matter affecting a number of nuclear plants that poses
impor tant questions concer ning the adequacy of exi sting
safety requirements for which a final resolution has not
yet been developed and that involves conditions not likely
to be acceptable over the lifetime of the plants affected"
(U.S., NRC 1978,19). As early as 1968 the ACRS complained
of the lack of research attention to these issues (Okrent
1981, 151). The 1970 AEC report "Water Reactor Safety
Program Plan" listed 139 open safety questions, identifying
44 of them as "very urgent, key problem areas, the solution
of which would clearly have great impact either directly or
indirectly on a major critical aspect of reactor safety"
(Bodde 1975, VI-16). The NRC's 1983 Annual Report listed
11 USRI's (p. 19).
49. Recent earthquake hazard research, for example, has
involved the vibration of target components along 2 axes
rather than 1 as previously conceived (Komanoff 1981, 90-
91). In addition a more realistic pattern of frequencies
has been employed. Both adjustments have tended to
increase hazard estimates. Reanalysis of the AEC's ECCS
research in the early seventies identified 3 key oversights
in the computer program's accident simulations. The codes
failed to consider: the potential for steam binding
(whereby the steam produced by a loss of coolant accident
inhibits the flow of emergency cooling water), the full
potential of fuel rod swelling (whereby rising accident
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temperatures or the effect of pellet shrinking and
concentration during normal operation, inhibit cooling
water flow) (Ford 1975, 98-103), or the dangers of fuel rod
embrittlement (due to a high temperature zirconium-steam
reaction) (Ford 1975, 97-99). In 1976 new methodological
objections were raised by NRC consultant Keith Miller
(Nader and Abbotts 1979, 108). Despite these past errors,
many experts bel ieve cur rent ECCS codes are too
conservative.
50. Similar methodological gaps or errors in other safety
areas led to potential underestimations of a myriad of
accident hazards. In the "fire-hazard" area, for example,
it was arbitrarily assumed that cable combustion could only
be sel f- ini ti ated. Regula tory requi rem ents w er e thus
insufficient to contain the candle initiated fire at Browns
Ferry (Ford '76 22). In the piping area the potential for
flow induced vibration problems was underestimated. In the
containment area the impact of asymmetric loading on
reactor vessel supports was overlooked, such that the
potential damage of pressure transients during loss of
coolant accidents was underestimated (Komanoff 1981, 54).
In the quality-assurance area ageing effects were given
apparently inadequate attention (Romanoff 1981, 81).
51. See Daniel Ford's Th§ ~gl~ Qi ~h~ h~Qm for a detailed
use of Freedom of Information documents to demonstrate
the Commission's public relations oriented treatment of the
a c cide n t pro ba b i 1 i tie s res ear ch task. Ty pi fyin g the
Commission's perspective is the planning recommendation of
one of the study's steering committee members:
"Great care should be exercised in any revision to avoi o
establishing and/or reinforcing the popular notion that
reactors \ are unsafe •.• by calculating the
con seq uences of hypotheti cal acci dent s the A.E.C.
should not place itself in the position of making the
location of reactors near urban areas nearly indefensible"
(Ford 1982, 68)• -,,
After the study's findings appeared to raise such
problems, the Commission demanded the Brookhaven scientists
recalculate their hazard figures. After reexamination
failed to alter their conclusions the decision was made to
terminate and suppress the study (Ford 1982, 70-71, 77-79).
It is interesting to note that similar public relations
concerns governed the legislative treatment of the 1954 and
1956 Atomic Energy and the Price Anderson Acts. Accident
issues were not addressed in legislative debate in '54 and
only modestly discussed in '56 (Ford 1982, 42-46). Former
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AEC attorney Har 01 d Gr een note s, '" ther e is not a singl e
reference in the legislative history'- the four thousand
pages of reports, testimony and debates before Congress
relating to the ('54) law-' as to what those health and
safety considerations really were"l (Ford 1982,41-2).
Senator Anderson has acknowledged that the choice of a
$560 million liability limit reflected a desire to provide
the appearance of liability insurance without raising
concern about the magnitude of risk (Ford 1982, 46).
The AEC's key 1962 planning study Civilian Nuclear PONer= h B~QQ~~ ~Q ~n~ ~~~l~n~, which helped trigger the
bandwagon market, similarly gave little attention to safety
issues. ~
52. Subsequent analysis of the study's methodology and
conclusions by the American physical Society, EPA and UCS
resulted in higher hazard probability estimates.
Although in a number of cases critical reviews focused
on errors which biased hazard calculations downwards, such
as those minirnizng low level radiation's carcinogenic
effects, (Ford 1982, 164-165), the most common criticism
expanded the degree of uncertainty attached to expected
values (Okrent 1981, 318). For example, recent work by
Moeller and Okrent concludes that the profusion of serious
accident paths makes it extremely difficult to demonstrate
in a statistically significant way that the probablility of
severe core damage is less than 1/2000 reactor years (or
less than 1/20 calendar years, given the existing number of
U.S. plants) (Okrent 1981, 238).
It should be noted that Okrent still finds nuclear risks
to compare favorably with those accompanying coal fired
technologies (Okrent 1981, 329).
, ,
See Ford 1982, 133-173 for numerous examples of the
report's promotional character, such as its misleading
presentation of statistical material.
53. In addition to the AEC's selection bias, the tendency
for pro-nuclear attitud~s among ACRS members reflected the
social character of available contexts for acquiring
reactor safety related experience, and the self-selection
of researchers into a field dominated by the nuclear
industry and weapons program.
54. For example, in the late '60's, when the Committee was
questioning the AEC about pressure vessel integrity and
potential China Syndrome problems, Craig Hosmer, for many
years the ranking Republican on the JCAE, told a nuclear
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industry audience," The Joint Committee might take a good
hard look at the proposition of eliminating the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards ACRS has no
responsibility for the economics of the nuclear business
and apparently could care less ••• I cannot help but wonder
if ACRS had outlived its usefulness ••." Six months later
Ho sem er told a j oint meeting of the, AIF and Am er ican
Nuclear Society, " ••• I called for burning the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards at the stake. Since then
it has moved slightly off cloud # 9 ••• So tonight I'm
going to recommend that .•• instead of letting ACRS itself
pick and choose what it wants to create fear and
trepidation about, that in the future the Commission
designate to it the matters which AEC believes important
enough for specific ACRS review ... it seems appropriate
that the Commission tell it what it wants to be advised
about instead of ACRS telling AEC what advice it is going
to get" (Okrent 1981, 184-5). Although such "reforms" were
not adopted, the AEC did suggest such legislation, sending
clear warning signals to the Committee.
The AEC's head of regulation Dr. Clifford Beck had
similarly sought to constrain ACRS staff size and limit
Committee access to outside consultants in the mid-sixties
(Okrent 1981, 122). Okrent reports that similar battles
had been fought in the fifties. "
55. The licenses for Dresden 3 and Indian Point 2, for
example, were approved on the condition that the Committee
could attach a list of safety issues needing attention
between the construction permit and operating license stage
to its public letter of approval. This concession was
later exchanged for the AEC's agreement to establish the
Ergen Committee's review of loss of coolant accidents. The
latter group subsequently redefined its mission and
neglected some of the ACRS's concerns.
The Committee similarly refrained from publicly
reporting its conclusion that urban reactors required
stiffer safeguards than rural reactors, in order to avoid
pUblic relations problems for the Commission in thinly
populated areas (Okrent 1981,191-198). It also desisted
f rom sending a formal-publ ic note to the Commission
concerning quality assurance problems at reactor sites
after the AEC indicated that an oral message would generate
much less public "misunder standing" (Okrent 1981, 231).
56. Indeed, prior to 1966 no high pressure high capacity
emergency cooling system existed. Attention to core cooling
problems was forced in 1966 by the ACRS. The Committee
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threatened to write a pUblic letter to the Commission
spelling out its belief that the larger reactors of the
si xtie s requi red incr eased "enqi neered saf eg uar ds II to
complement the industry's previous re.liance on containm ent
integrity, siting distance, and passive cooling system
responses to a loss of coolant accident. To avoid this
embarrassment the AEC agreed in 1966 to establish an
independent task force to study the adequacy of existing
accident safeguards (Rolph 1977, 39).
Because of this arrangement the pUblic remained unaware
of the serious concern a majority of the ACRS had
concerning the possibility and implications of a core
meltdown in the newly approved commerical sized reactors.
Former ACRS chair Okrent writes:
"The only thing on the public record which indicated
that some new provision for full-scale core melt had been
considered in any way was the amendment to the Preliminary
Safety Analysis Report submitted for the Indian Point 2
reactor in late June [1966], in which Consolidated Edison
proposed to put a core-retention structure under the
reactor vessel. It is interesting to look at the Public
Safety Evaluation pUblished for Dresden Nuclear Power
Station Unit 3 on August 31,1966, by the regulatory staff.
There is no hint anywhere in this report that the China
Syndrome and the inability of the containment vessel to
withstand core melt had been a major concern ••• one might
consider this a less than candid review .••" (Okrent 1981,
125) •
Although the task force's report was generally
optimistic about the condition of reactor safety, it did
express concern about the uncertainties associated with the
reliability of the ECCS (Rolph 1979, 89). A second AEC
study reached similar conclusions about the same time.
Gillette indicates that the final committee report was a
substantive compromise between highly optimistic
representatives of the nuclear industry and more skeptical
committee members (~~l~n~~9/15/72 p. 972). Okrent
suggests that the composition of the committee and
definition of its agenda (both determined by the AEC), was
biased towards an industry perspective (Okrent 1981,167;
Ford 1982, 95). -,
(See 0 kr ent (1 981, 16 7-17 6) for a cr itique 0f the
Committee's optimistic findings. As later research has
demonstrated, the report ignored, for example, the
important problems of fuel rod embrittlement and steam
binding.)
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Troubled by the muted doubts raised in the report, the
AEC successfully sought to limit the study's visibility.
Gillette notes that " the public version bore no date,
price, or address of any place where it might be obtained,
nor did it bear the identification numbers customarily
assigned to such reports" (.s.g.i~.ng~ 9/15/72, p. 972). The
AEC with industry's support also rebuffed new ACRS efforts
to resolve the technical uncertainties identified by the
task force (Rolph 1979, 89~ Science 9/15/72 p. 972).
In defense of the Commission it should be noted that the
AEC did adopt what it believed were conservative ECCS
guidelines in response to the uncertainties identified.
What Ford and other critics charge is that it
underestimated the implication of the uncertainties and
disingenuously refused to research them.
57. The need for this exclusion had taken on an element of
urgency in November 1971 when the hearing board for the
Indian point II plant informed the AEC of its concern over
intervenor claims about the adequacy of the plant's cooling
system (Nader and Abbotts 1979, l04).
58. Four years after the ECCS hearings, for example, the
follow ing exchange took place dur ing a congressional
hearing called to investigate the charges of 3 senior GE
engineers who resigned in protest over company and industry
safety practices:
"Representative Hinshaw: •.•are you expressing the view
that •••General Electric's policy would be that you [as an
employee] would have to be an advocate [of nuclear power]
to the exclusion of expressing concerns about safety?
Hr. Bridenbaugh: I think that is an unwritten kind of
policy that perhaps is self-imposed by many of us in the
industry. That certainly is the attitude~ yes.
Rep. Hinshaw: Is that a common attitude with your
associates at General Electric?
Mr. Bridenbaugh: Yes, it is.
Rep. Hinshaw: Do you think it is a common attitude among
people in similar positions in other companies?
Hr. Bridenbaugh: I am sure it is" (U.S. JCAE 1976 p. 35-
36) •
The Presidential Commission's review of the Three Hile
Island accident found significant support for this
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viewpoint. NRC Commissioner Galinsky testified,
"(o)ne of the problems we have is that industry has
taken the view that they will do just what the NRCrequires
and not mor e ... " NRCChai r Henrdr ie indica ted "vendors are
reluctant to propose a modification to a plant for fear
that the NRC will mandate that it be supplied to all other
like plants." ACRSmember Ebersole added, " A finding made
by an individual deep in an organization which implies
heavy costs which is not a regulatory requirement is not
likely to be encouraged by what I call the shell of middle
management" (Gorinson 1979b,' 100-102).
Robert pollard, a former NRC official in charge of
safety review for the Indiant point III reactor and 6 other
plants, has described a parallel atmosphere inside the
Commission:
" ••• many of the dedicated government employees in the
NRC are deeply troubled about the pervasive attitude in the
NRC that our most important job is to get the licenses out
as quickly as possible and to keep the plants running •••
Until you have been part of the agency at a level where the
technical work is performed, it is difficult to appreciate
the kind of pressure that inhibits your staff from doing
its job ••• by the use of highly effective pressures,
middle management totally suppresses most of the dissent
within the NRC. In addition to outright threats of adverse
consequences for one's job, pressures are applied by the
device of requiring numerous rewritings of proposed
position papers which conflict with rapid licensing, and
continued operation of reactors- even though there are no
identified technical errors in the papers" (Nader and
Abbotts 1979, 113).
Numerous NRC reports and interviews confirm
pollard's charges. The NRC's inspector general, Thomas
HcTiernan recorded similar comments in his 1976 study of
the safety review process (Ford 1982, 181,198,214). A
November 1978 study by Opinion Research of NRC inspection
and enforcement officials found, "six in ten employees
bel ieve that many managers practice a 'don't-rock-the-boat'
philosophy" (Gorinson 1979b, 112; see also .N~li .xQll.'I'i.ID~.Q
6/4/79) •
An interview between THI inquiry chairman John Kemeny
and James Creswell (the NRC staffer who had tried
unsuccessfully to obtain NRC attention to the kinds of
problems that triggered TMI) reported similar sentiments:
"Kerneny: Is the kind of experience you had in trying to
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follow up the two Davis-Besse incidents unique in your
opinion or is it fairly typical?
Creswell: There has been a certain history of individuals
that have worked for NRC that have had problems with
dealing with safety issues. That is well documented, Mr.
pollard, Mr. Conrad and others, some to the extent that
they have left the Commission. ,
Kemeny: Are you suggesting there that individuals who
raise fairly consistently serious safety issues may, in the
long run, find that they cannot work for NRC? '
Creswell: That they cannot work for NRC or that they would
be placed in other organizations" (Gorinson 1979b, 112).
59. This leverage was heightened in many areas of nuclear
safety by the lack of fully specified theoretical models.
As in the radiation hazard area, resulting ambiguities
permitted promotional interpretation. Leon Lindberg has
asserted similar sociology of knowledge proposi tions more
generally, applying them across the energy sector. He
writes, " The decision maker will seek to control
uncertainty and 'preserve internal simplicity' by screening
out information that his organization's established
repertory or response pattern is not programmed to accept
•••" (341). He concludes, "These forces tend to reinforce
a disaggregated, incremental, and sectoral approach to
policy that implicitly advantages established groups and
assumptions about policy ••." (Lindberg 1977, 340).
60. See also: Okrent 1981, 313-14; Ford Foundation 1977,
234. Pressures for increased administrative freedom for
safety researchers had been growing for some time. In 1969
the ACRS ~rged greater cooperation between the regulatory
and research staffs, implici tly attacking the limi tations
on safety discussion imposed by Shaw (Okrent 1981, 311).
In 1971 the ACRS suggested that the regulatory staff be
given its own budget for safety research and in '72 it
orally advised the AEC to establish a separate safety
research division (Okrent 1981, 312). It was not until the
storm created by the ECCS controversy, however, that these
suggestions were adopted.
Political pressures insured a safety
for the NRC's regulatory staff in
reorganization act. The legislation
Commission's promotional and regulatory
between two separate bureaucracies, as
nuclear critics since 1956.
research capability
the 1974 energy
also divided the
responsibilities
had been urged by
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61. Earlier political pressures had forced the JCAE to
direct the AEC to include participation by
environmentalists in its safety study of 1971. Though
input from anti-nuclear groups was not included in the
original draft, UCS and SIPI representatives were asked to
comment on a preliminary version of the report. While most
of the groups' recommendations were ignored, their
criticisms did spur an extra chapter on previously
neglected hazard problems such as operator error, poor
qbality control, sabotage, and breeder reactor meltdown.
The level of public concern generated by the UCS and SIPI
interventions also helped ferment the JCAE's 1973-1974
reactor safety hearings, which further escalated safety
debate (Del Sesto 1979, 173-4).
62. In virginia, for example, local intervenors discoverd
the existence of a fault near the nearly completed North
Anna plant. A subsequent Justice Department investigation
indicated that the utility and NRC had collaborated to
suppress knowledge about the fault during the licensing
process (Ne.w.York Times 10/2/77-22). Intervenor activity
similarly expanded seismic hazard inquiries in the Malibu,
Bodega Bay, Diablo Canyon, and Seabrook licensing process.
63. The AEC and nuclear industry's concern over such
intervenor-ACRS linkages is illustrated by the repeated
requests of both parties that the ACRS communicate its
safety concerns orally rather than through formal public
letters. Bridenbaugh reports a similar preoccupation
prevailed during the investigation of containment integrity
problems by GE and the utilities in the mid-seventies
(U.S., JCAE 1976).
64. Like the WASH 740 update this study highlighted the
uncertainties surrounding nuclear hazards and the troubling
implicationstof previous operating experience.
65. The file lists the most serious nuclear accidents from
the mid-sixties to the mid-seventies. It was compiled by
NRC safety expert Stepehn Hanauer. The UCS became aware of
the file's existence through references in other FOI
documents. (Pollard 1979, 1-3).
66. A set of internal memorandum and letters, the
documents undermined the perceived objectivity and thus
credibility of the report's principal designers.' For
example, the papers revealed the authors' decision not to
address quality control issues for fear of undermining
public confidence in the AEC (Ford 1982, 150-153).
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67. The information released undermined the reliability of
the Commission's use of ultrasonic tests to insure pipe
integrity, and revealed an alarmingly high level of
attempted sabotage at nuclear power plants (Ne~ York TiID~~
3/30/76) •
68. As noted above, important information about ECCS
problems surfaced in this manner. Additional open
government requirements, such as the Federal Advisory
Committee Act of 1972 and Sunshine Act of 1976, increased
the access of perceptive anti-nuclear critics to internal
disagreements within the AEC bureaucracy. //
Still other information was introduced into the public
realm through political pressures that generated
Congressional information requests. At the initiative of
Congressman Hughes of New Jersey, for example, the GAO
investigated the NRC'S safety-environmental evaluation of
westinghouse's proposed floating nucler power plants. The
study found that the Commission's optimistic review omitted
the contradictory findings of some major environmental
impact laboratories (Ne~ XQ.I..K 1'1ID~~ 10/31/77 p. 65).
Another GAO report in 1978 attacked the NRC for sloppy and
inadequate monitoring of reactor construction practices
(Komanoff 1981, 126, 149). Other Congressional initiatives
required the NRC publish a list of abnormal occurrences,
unresolved safety issues and current plans to rectify
outstanding safety problems.
Public pressures in the wake of the Three Mile Island
accident also stimulated upgraded attention to operating
experience data (Komanoff 1981, 60, 166-167).
69. One of the earliest whistle-blowing incidents by
sci enti st s land engineer s invol ved the 1972 recei pt of an
anonymous letter by the ACRS. The note revealed serious
design deficiencies at the Prairie Island reactor, and
precipitated regulatory upgrades costing as much as
$20,000,000 for some plants (Ford 1975, 111-112; Okrent
1981, 235). The UCS case against the AEC's ECCS criteria
was greatly strengthened by a flow of leaked documents
during the rule making hearings. This material appears to
have been especially effective in shaking the confidence of
the New York Times in the reliability of the cooling
system. The intervenors in the Shoreham plant hearings
were similarly endowed with a bundle of engineering
documents that raised serious questions about plant safety
(Seven ~ 10/26/79).
In the mid-seventies the industry suffered a series of
highly publicized protest resignations, including that of
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AEC safety expert Carl Hocevar, Indian point safety
manager Robert pollard, the 3 GE engineers noted earlier,
and NRC engineer, Ronald Fluegge. At least 17 separate New
York Times articles covered thei r safety charges.
The same pattern of escalating whistle-blowing occurred
on site, initiated by construction workers. Komanoff
identifies the reporting of numerous deficient welds at
the surry nuclear plant in 1971, as the first of these
incidents (Komanoff 1981, 61). By the late seventies local
anti-nuclear groupS were strong enough to insure the
disclosures received serious public attention.
Intervenors in the Shoreham plant licensing hearings,
for example, pUblicized worker charges of damaged pipes,
deficient welds, and quality assurance violations (.Q~~n
.Q£!YJ2 10/26/79). Clamshell Alliance opponents of the
Seabrook plant interviewed si te construction workers who
raised similar safety questions. opponents of the Marble
Hill plant transformed the allegations of a concrete
finisher's helper's into a broad NRC investigation and
confirmation of widespread quality control deficiencies.
Similar events took place at the Callaway and Zimmer
plants.
In 1979 security personnel at the Indian point Plants
attacked the facility's lax security procedures, citing
poor personnel training, the falsification of personnel
qualification records, and the cushion of advance warning
before NRC inspector visits (~~~ XQK1 ~iID~~ 10/17/79).
other whistle blowing incidents occurred at the Wolff Creek
and South Texas plants.
70. An AIF study on the impact of NRC regulatory policy
noted in, 1978: "(I) t is insuff icient to identify the cost
of material and labor as, for example, an added pipe, or
pump or valve ••• (S)ignificant ripples caused by such
changes affected not just the changed system but also, for
example, supporting structures, normal or emergency power
supplies, ventilation systems, radwaste, etc" (Komanoff
1981, 68). This perspective is implicitly repeated in the
DOE's study of the cost impact of nuclear regulation (U.S.,
Department of Energy - Energy Information Administration
5/80) and the congressional Office of Technology
Assessment's 1984 analysi s.
71. The average constant '79 $ cost of plants corning on
line in 1971 and 1978 was $366/kw and $887/kw respectively
(Komanoff 1981 20). The average cost of the 34 plants
scheduled for completion in or after 1982 is $2226/kw (79$)
(Komanoff 6/84 Table 2). Nuclear supporters assert that
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with NRC procedural reforms, improved utility project
management, and learning (especially planned as opposed to
retrofit responses to regualtory upgrades), new nuclear
plants could be built for approximately $1400/kw (U.S.
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 1984, 67). This
w ould appear a lower bound estimate for future costs.
Consistent with this judgement, Chapman notes that new
env ironrnental and safety features added morethan 1.5
billion dollars to the Shoreham and 9 Mile point plants'
originally projected costs of $450 million (Chapman 1983,
266-267)• .
72. See for example, Nelkin's discussion of the
uncertainties regarding the impact of the Bell plant on
Cayuga Lake (Nelkin 1971, 92-96, 98-116).
73. The Calvert Cliffs decision coincided with the
beginning of Schlesinger's tenure as head of the AEC. He
sought to reform the Commission's critic tarnished image.
In addition to not appealing the Cliffs ruling, he
increased document availability to the public, expanded
intervenor access to the licensing process, and rescinded
AEC approval for site preparation prior to construction
permit receipt (Rolph 1979, 136-7).
74. Construction without IDC for mid-eighties plants is
estimated to cost $1640/kw (Komanoff 1984, Tables 1&2).
Assuming a real interest rate of 3.3% and 94 month
construction period yields an IDC increment of 13.9% or
$1868/kw overall. (3.3% is Komanoff's estimate of the
utilities' '78 cost of capital [Komanoff 1981, 244], 94
month duration assumed in U.S. Department of Energy -
Energy Information Administration 11/82, p. 105. IDC
multiplier based on Comtois formula listed in Komanoff 1981
p, 244.)
75. The translation of a $lOOO/kw increase in construction
costs into a 18.3 H/kwh cost assumes a 9.61% fixed charge
rate and 60% capacity rate.
76. For a less formal, but suprisingly similar account of
the history of nuclear information contexts, see the
remarks of NRC Commissioner Bradford before the Groton
School 1/15/82 (NUREG /BR-0032 Vol. 2 No. 11).
77. The OT framework also suggests an explanation for the
divergence between expert and science-journalist opinion
concerning nuclear hazards. Nuclear advocates have
commonly pointed to the greater confidence that individuals
have in nuclear safety, the more nuclear specific their
356
technical expertise is, as evidence of the irrationality of
nuclear skeptics. In contrast, the OT framework suggests
the tilt of opinion may reflect the legacy of promotional
env ironm ents, and the gr eater sensi ti vity of "general ists"
and science-journalists to sociology of knowledge
concerns.
The AEC's first director, David Lilienthal argued
similarly concerning the mid-sixties wisdom of AEC and
industry studies justifying the siting of a nuclear plant
inside New York City. He commented, II No I don't have
detailed knowledge. I think one of the best ways to get
confused is to get detailed knowledge ... " (Nucleonic..s 5/63
p. 21).
C HAP T E R VII
HECHANISNS OF ESTABLISHHENT OF AN OFFICIAL TECHNOLOGY:
DOWNSIDE BIASING COST ESTIMATES*
II Introduction
For over two decades nuclear plant orders have been
encouraged by misleadingly optimistic cost expectations.
New plants have consistently generated electricity at twice
their inflation adjusted predicted costs at time of
purchase. The 34 plants scheduled to come on line in the
mid-eighties will cost eight times the constant dollar sum
projected in the mid-sixties, and generate electricity at
6 times the period's predictions. (See Table 22) This
chapter explores the reasons for such systematic
for ecasti ng errors,
The analysis develops a sociology of nuclear cost
information that ties repeated cost underestimation to the
characteristics of the nuclear planning context and the
logic of OT competition. In doing so the argument departs
from the dominant tradition in neoclassical economics of
assuming perfect information or appealing in an ad hoc,
deus ex machina fashion to the unexplained presence of
imperfect information.
* All costs expressed in constant '79$ unless otherwise
specified.
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TABLE 22
NUCLEAR gQ~ER ~OST PREDICTIONS (constant '79$)
YEAR ill: ACTUAL!:Im-'8Q'S
.l'.!llilllcrIQ1i! ~~ ~ ~ PL1>1i!1!:QJ>1J>ill
CAPITAL COSTS
PER KILOWATT
$290 $370 $680
$2225
-----------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL GENERA- 9r1/kwh 11~1/kwh
TING COSTS
21M/kwh 61M/kwh
-----------------------------------------------------------
Sources
1) 1963-1968 cost estimates: Burn 1967, p. 38; perry 1977.
pp. 30 ,3 5; J'Q.rtJJ~ 9/ 66; JUi<Q.tti>@.l ~QxlQ 5/ 2/ 66; ®~ XQU
Timgj2 4/10/66; Quirk and Montgomery 1978, p. 24; U.S•• AEC
1968ai Little 1968.
2) 1969-1972 cost estimates: Quirk and Hont90mery 1978. p.
24; U.S•• AEC: 1970a, 1972b; House committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs 7/12/79 p. 226.
3) 1973-1974,cost estimates: U.S., AEC: 1973b. 1974C; Quirk
and Hontgomery 1978, p. 24.
4) Actual Costs refer to current estimates for reactors due
on line in mid-eighties, see Table 23.
)
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2l An QT Model Qf Nuclear ~ projections
The dominance of the nuclear planning context 1950-
1970 by promotional interests contributed to cost
underestimation in several ways. The vendors and AEC were
spurred to promote misleadingly optimistic cost
expectations by inter-technology competition for OT status
and.zor in tr a-n uclear technology competion for mar ket
share. [1] Even if partially contradicted by subsequent
experience, such expectations could impart critical mass
advantages to the nuclear sector and prosletizing firms.
The utilities and their consultants were discouraged
from critical cost review by their: expected insulation
from cost overrun penalties, self-interest in successful
nuclear development, traditional reliance on the vendors'
technical judgment, and \ deference to the self-fulfilling
prophecy aspect of OT dynamics. [2] Eventually, a modified
"emperor has no clothes" syndrome emerged, as many nuclear
firms sought to protect prior nuclear investments by
encouraging ,overall nuclear expansion.
Several ideological and institutional
characteristics of the 1950-1965 period increased the
industry's potenti al for sel f-deception by insulating the
sector from critical review. Among these were: the
classified nature of early nuclear information, the
dominance of "hands-on" expertise by nuclear promoters,
the relative absence of pUblic interest group attention to
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utility issues, the "organization-man" outlook of nuclear
personnel, the public's awed fascination with the atom, and
the cold w ar,
The result of this insularity was a severe
methodological inbreeding (Bupp and Derian 1981,
81,227).[3] Kuhn's (1966) study of nuclear manpower
illuminates how a narrowness of scope and sameness of
perspective were reproduced within nuclear firms. Written
prior to nuclear's economic problems, the study is
generally sympathetic to the industry. It is only with
hindsight that its analysis of manpower policy presages
forecasting errors. [4]
Repeating the history of radiation hazard
assessment and alternative energy R&D evaluation, the early
nuclear -planni nq context imposed data and methodological
constraints on cost forecasting. The boundries oriented
conclusions towards nuclear expansio~ The most important
constraints reflected:
1) The paucity of empirical cost data for large
sized reactors and the proprietary nature of true turnkey
costs. Through 1970 complete cost information was
available for only 5 500+MH plants. Due to data
limitations, the first regression analysis of nuclear
costs was not pu blL'sh ed until 1974. Information gaps in
areas such as capacity performance and decommissioning
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costs were even larger, allowing promotional claims to
dominate actual experience.
2) The underestimation of quality control
requirements and the economic significance of existing gaps
in nuclear engineering knowledge. Especially important was
the neglect of the technical uncertainties associated with
the 500% scaling leap of the 1960's.[5]
3) The misuse of learning curve theory. Cost
reduction schedules appropriate for a mature technology
were applied to an immature one, projecting learning gains
across rather than along tasks. Thus though learning
did occur in the seventies, it was overwhelmed by the
impact of unanticipated technical problems.[6] As
demonstrated in Chapter 6, the progressive tightening of
accident prevention standards was the chief cause of real
nuclear cost increases. Neglect of this phenomena was
formalized in engineering studies of expected nuclear
costs that assumed static design requirements.
\
4) The neglect of anomalous findings or data in
conflict with popular optimism. Little attention, for
example, was given to the implications of prior cost
overruns and the institutional interests of most nuclear
cost forecasters.
The most general cause for nuclear cost
misestimation was the technology's unexpected loss of OT
status. The latter escalated hazard containment and credit
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costs, reduced regulatory and sub si dy support, shifted R&D
funds towards non-nuclear technologies and minimized the
capture of systemwide efficiencies.
Without appeal to the OT framework, the period's
oversights and risk-laden investment can appear
anomalous. By 1962, for example, Rand Corporation analyses
had confirmed the common sense notion that cost overruns
are positively correlated with the level of technological
leap attempted (Hansfield 1968a, 57-58). The suprising
aspect of the bandwagon market's scaling effort is not that
unan ti ci pa ted engi neer ing problem s a r ose, but tha t a
detailed and optimistic cost consensus emerged which
required neglect of technical uncertainties.
The history of this consensus is analyzed below. The
discussion chronicles the behavior of overall generating
cost projections, with special attention directed to plant
construction cost estimates. Subsequent sections focus on
cost pr ed i ct ions for other components of the nuclear
production function. The OT framework is used to examine
how social contexts can determine the economic meaning of
uncertainty. This is especially true when future
expectations dominate existing data in determining economic
forecasts. By focusing on the path character of expected
nuclear costs, the framework ties cost predictions to the
current status of OT competition.
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11 Nuclear Plant £onstruction ~ Qverall
~enerating ~ Projections
The early character of nuclear power cost studies
established a pattern that persisted until the late
seventies. Technical reports underestimated future
engineering problems, and available warnings about cost
trends were ignored. Economic analyses were almost always
performed by self-interested advocates of nuclear expansion
and frequently served more as marketing documents than
forecasting models.
The overly optimistic and quickly pulled together
Thomas report of 1946 served as a basis for a number of
early economic studies and significantly influenced early
business opinion (Hullenbach 1963, 54-55; Kuhn 1966,
21).[7J The more cautious perspective of the General
Advisory Committee (the AEC's chief technical resource)
received less popular attention (Lilienthal 1963, 98-99;
Dawson 1976, 40; Ford 1982, 33-35).[8J Similar neglect
greeted concerns about the political-economic
implications of nuclear's negative externalites.
President Eisenhower's geopolitically motivated
Atoms for Peace speech at the UN in 1953[9J, and the U.S.
presentations at the Geneva conference on atomic energy in
1955, provided a second round of misleading nuclear
optimism. The latter projected future nuclear costs in the
realm of 1.1-1.3 cents/kwh (Mullenbach 1963). In
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September 1954, AEC Chairman Lewis strauss urged science
journalists to promote nuclear expansion, predicting
electr ici ty "too cheap to meter" (Ford 1982, 50).
In th e mid-f ifti es a for ecasti ng consensus ernerged
that predicted 1980 generating costs in the range of 1-1.5
cents/kwh. The projections boldly assumed scale and
learning cost reductions of 50% from the already optimistic
predictions for plants then under construction.[lO] The
merging of learning curve projections and demonstrated
economic performance characterized nuclear economics for 25
years.
In the early sixties, industry's promotional
forecasts precipitated a third round of short run cost
optimism. In mid-'61 GE and the Pacific Gas and Electric
Company (PG&E) predicted costs of 1.5cents/kwh for their
newly announced Bodega Bay plant. Assuming a 90% capacity
figure (50% higher than nuclear's subsequent performance),
they pr oj'e c t ed a 1% nuclear cost advantage over oil fired
generation (Mullenbach 1963, 69).[11]
In 1962 the AEC released its much quoted study,
.ciyi.lian .N~ilg.h .£Q1ter =- 11.B~J2Q.h.t.tQ .t.h~ li~ll.den.t. The
document cited the convergence of manufacturers' cost
estimates in the neighborhood of 1.4 cents/kwh and foresaw
another .1 cent/kw h dec1 ine over the 1 if e of new 1y bui 1 t
reactor s due to f ut ur e fuel util iza tion impr ovements (U.S.,
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AEC 1962 , 33- 35) • [1 2)
The first turnkey contract was signed in December
1962 and appeared to confirm ahead of schedule the AEC's
optimism.
Generating costs w e r e projected to be
approximately.9 cents/kwh. Capital costs were guaranteed
at $300/kw and projected to be less than $250/kw (U.S.,
JCAE 1968, 44-45).[13)
From late '62 to mid-'66 13
vendor subsidy of 50% (U.S., AEC 1974b 29~ Quirk and
turnkey plants were sold,
at a retrospectively estimated
Montgomery 1978, 15~ Perry 1977, 37). Building on past
optimism, and the widely read AEC study, the loss-leaders
helped precipitate 72 nuclear orders 1963-1969.
Confirming nuclear's capture of OT status was the
TVA's 1966 purchase of a GE reactor near Alabama's coal
f i el d s , The plant had pr edi cted capi tal co st s of $250/kw
and projected generating costs of .5 cents/kwh (U.S., AEC:
1966, p. 77~ 1967b, P 76~ ..E.Q.£.t1!.n~ 9/66), less than one
tenth the constant dollar costs currently expected for
reactors coming on line in the mid-eighties
(KOmanoff
1984a). The contract was widely accepted as J2.£QQ.t of the
coming of age of nuclear power,[14) and well illustrates
the merging of promotial prediction and planning data
encouraged by OT dynamics.
In 1968 the first of a new series of AEC cost
studies, (U.S., AEC 1968a), lent added credibility to the
turnkey estimates. The study projected capital costs of
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$268/kw and overall generating costs of .85 cents/kwh for
plants under construction (pp. 1-27,1-29, 2-4).[15] While
acknowledging the possibility of regulatory escalation, the
report was hopeful that learning and scale economies, and
duplicate pla~t sitings could contain costs (pp. 3-1 to
3-3).[16] The AEC's Jg.1J.Q.l5!axIn.d.1J§1.ryserial of 1969
continued this optimisrn.[17]
By the 1970's experience with the first generation
of full-sized reactor began to contradict early cost
estimates. [18] Non-turnkey plants gradually revealed a
pattern of severe cost overruns. The actual/predicted cost
ratio for mid-sixties' orders was: $120:240/kw for 1965;
$125:240 for '66; $150:365 for '67 and 155:460 for 1968
(historical dollars) (Quirk and Hontgomery 1978, 35). The
AEC and industry's forecasting response was a series of
reactive adjustments that always lagged behind current
experience. Even plants in mid-construction suffered
significant\ esca~ation from mia-~oint cost estimates to
rate base-on line cost figures.[19]
The industry's ability to neutralize empirical
experience with promotional expectations 1969-1974
reillustrates the influence of OT status. Typical of the
official response to cost overruns were the learning curve
assurances of M. J. Whitman at the fourth Geneva Conference
on the peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1971. Bupp and
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Derian indicate, II During the entire first half of the
1970's, this continued to be the conventional wisdom
It actually became the basis for a new surge of reactor
orders ••• Literature from both the united States
government and the electric utilities industry reflected
confidence that the causes of initial cost problems were
now fully understood and resolved. Unfortunately, they
were not II (Bupp and Derian 1981, 82; see also Gandara 1977,
62). [20]
OT dynamics continued to shield the technology from
negative cost experience until the mid seventies.[21] Cost
overruns for the last 35 plants ordered will be well over
200% (Komanoff 1984a, Table 1).
It is difficult to calculate an average capital cost
underestimation for the OT period, as official cost
estimates escalated annually. Average non-turnkey capi tal
costs expected at time of plant purchase 1963-1974 were
approximately $350/KW. Final on-line costs (including
,
current utility projections for 34 in progress plants) are
expected to be 1280/KW [22], representing an average
overrun of more than 250%.[23]
II Hethodological Revisions
While the promotional purpose and insular origins of
AEC-nuclear industry economic analyses were resistant to
pessimistic revision, the growth of the anti-nuclear
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movement stimulated support for an alternative realm of
discourse.[24] Alongside protest groups, the university
and state government also provided organizational contexts
for rethinking nuclear economics.[25] writing in early
1981 Bupp noted, "One might have expected documentation of
these cost increases to come from the electric
utili ties that purchase and operate nuclear power plants.
The utilities have the cost data and anecdotal experience
necessary for such analysis, and presumably they would be
ardently interested in learning industry cost trends. But
reluctant to buck what my colleague, Jean Claude Derian,
and I have called the 'extravagance of prophesy' that has
long prevailed among nuclear supporters, and wary about
offering ammunition to its critics, the nuclear industry
has produced remarkably little analysis of its economic
misf ortunes. Nor have the industry's official government
and academic sponsors produced any objective analysis of
\
nuclear costs. That task has had to be assumed by
outsiders" (Komanoff 1981, p. i).[26]
In addition to generating information, the anti-
nuclear movement established its own network of
di ssem ina tion. The movement's journals, newsletters,
clipping services, bibliographies, etc., were especially
effective in reproducing on the local level the economic
analyses developed by the groups' professional and
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volunteer staffs. Local activists and national
environmental law firms injected the information into
licensing, rate determination, and legislative hearings.
Demonstrations and teach-ins also attracted media interest
in the material. Eventually anti-nuclear groupS gained
credibility as information sources.
The impact of Charles Komanoff's work provides a
good illustration of the dynamics of "outsider" criticism.
Komanoff began his research as a New York City
Env ironm ental Protection Agency analyst. Subsequently he
directed the energy projects of the council on Economic
Priorities. In the late seventies he established his own
energy consulting firm, preparing analyses for anti-nuclear
groups (such as the Environmental Action Foundation), state
bodies (such as the Wisconsin and Kentucky Attorney General
offices), and sympathetic journals (such as the Bulletin Qf
His expertise and increased media
interest in \non-AEC-nuclear industry perspectives enabled
him to tarnish formerly unchallenged industry claims. Two
examples follow. /:
In the mid-seventies, New York City's Consolidated
Edison Company argued .that operation of its Indian point
nuclear station had saved its New York customers
$95,000,000 in 1974. Komanoff's reanalysis demonstrated
that the utility's carefully worded claim compared the cost
of owning the plant and operating it, with owning the plant
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and not operating it. Had Con Ed built and operated a
coal plant at the same site, Komanoff's figures
demonstrated that it could have saved 25% of its Indian
Point costs. [27]
In 1979 Komanoff discredited the AIF'S widely
circulated and definitively quoted 1978 study of relative
nuclear and coal generating costs.[28] By uncovering such
biases as the non-randomness of the study's sample, he
demonstrated how the Forum had transformed a nuclear cost
disadvantage into a 33% cost edge.[29] During the
seventi es, other anti-nuclear research successfully
challenged the demand forecasts justifying new nuclear
capaci ty.
The import of increasing attention to "outsider"
economic analyses was slower nuclear expansion. Friends of
the Earth staffer Jim Harding, for example, is credited by
the Investors Responsibility Research Center with shifting
\the Sacremento Municipal Utility District away from nuclear
commitments (Olson 1976, 205). In 1976, an anti-nuclear
suit led to the revocation of the Nidland plant's
construction permit on the grounds that inadequate
attention had been given to the relative economics of
conserva ti on. In 1978 an Environmental Defense Fund
intervention before the California Public Utilities
Commission spurred PG&E to investigate and subsequently
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promote conservation programs (stobaugh and Yergin 1979,
141,302) .
OT period had been replaced by a sense of uncertainty.[30]
By the late seventies the nuclear consensus of the
In 1984 the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
gave greater credibility to Komanoff1s nuclear cost
projections than to the continuing optimism of the
Department of Energy (Office of Technology Assessment 1984,
65) •
2t Non-Plant construction ~ost Factors~
Actual and ~redicteg Values ~
The next sections detail the history of cost misestimation
in non-direct plant construction cost areas, demonstrating
the systemic rather than random character of forecasting
errors.
5-.1..1 ~aJ?acity performancellll
'I'hehistory of capaci ty performance pr ediction
Ea rly AEC and
parallels that of construction costs.
nuclear industry projections were about 1.3 times higher
than subsequent operating experience. Skeptical review was
instigated by anti-nuclear critics.
until the mid-
seventies, official opinion was able to dismiss performance
data as either a temporary feature of the "shake-down"
years of new plants, or an anomaly that would notI .
characterize the next round of reactors.
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As Con Ed President Louis Roddis indicated in 1972,
"most if not all of the economic studies that led utilities
to go nuclear were based on assumed energy deliverabili ty
of 80% or more" (Neli l.Q.£.K 1'.i.ID~.Q11/9/72).[32) The most
optimistic projections were used in cost calculations for
som e of the first commerci al sized plants, with Bodega Bay,
for example, projected to operate at a 90% rate and Oyster
Creek at an 83% rate.
Actual performance has been considerably lower.
Through mid-1980 current market sized plants (800+ MW)
averaged only 54%, while plants of 400-800 MW averaged 66%
(KOmanoff 1981, 248). As in the area of overall generating
costs, various public relations techniques have been used
by the industry to put a better face on the data.[33)
The utilities ability to pass through under-capacity
performances to customers, and the IOU's long run interest
in promoting the growth of nuclear power, blunted their
public and private concern over reliability standards.[34)
,
The task of reanalysis often defaulted to the anti-nuclear
movement. David Comey (Business and professional People
for the Public Interst) and Charles Komanoff have been
especially active in this area.[35)
Whether the nuclear industry would have been able to
maintain another decade of 80% capacity forecasts in the
absence of the anti-nuclear movement is impossible to
determine. Official estimates did begin to decline in the
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mid-seventies, coincident with both anti-nuclear criticism
and the accumulation of operating experience data. An AEC
industry study in 1974 projected a capacity figure of 75%
information pamphlet use6 a 72% figure (House, committee on
(u.s., AEC, 1974c, 20).
In 1976 an ERDA nuclear
Interior and Insular Affairs 1976, 22). A 70% estimate was
supplied to the House Government operations Committee by
industry spokesmen during the 1977 "Nuclear power Cost"
hearings. A 65% figure is used in the DOE's November '82
nuclear cost forecast and acknowledged as an optimistic
estimate.
The report notes that actual performance could
fall below 50% (U.S., DOE-EIA 11/82,45,117-118).
Komanoff's current calculations and this analysis
project 60% lifetime capacity rates.[36] This implies a
downward bias of 25%-33% during the OT years, due to the
period's average 75%-80% expectation. Since fixed costs
account for about 80% total generating costs, capacity
forecasting errors lowered expected generating costs by
mor ethan 20%.
Two factors have been responsible for the
underestimation of the interest during construction cost
multiplier (IDC),[37] the underestimation of plant
construction aurations, and the underestimation of
financing charges.
£
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42 months in 1960 to 48 in 1967, 52 in '69, and 60 in
AEC construction period projections increased from
'74.[38] All estimates fell short of the the actual 78
month average for plants completed '71-78, and estimated
94-100+ month average for plants coming on line in the mid-
eighties (Komanoff 1981, 231, 244; congressional Office of
Technology Assesment 1984, 63; U.S., DOE-EIA 11/83,
12).[39]
The main reasons for construction period
underestimation were escalating
safety standards,
especially those requiring retrofit adjustments during
construction.
Industry inexperience also encouraged
underestimation of the quality control constraints on
nuclear projects (Rolph 1979, 126-127).
As in the case
of construction cost overruns, the industry sought to
dismiss past peformance with learning curve assurances and
temporary bottleneck explanations. [40]
The reasons for underestimation of plant financing
\charges were largely unrelated to OT dynamics, as such
these errors are not included in nuclear forecasting error
calculations. Table 23 reflects what actual nuclear costs
would have been wi thout macroeconomic related interest rate
changes. A small unanticipated interest premium was
attached to some nuclear projects in the late seventies as
a market reaction to the technology's declining OT
stat us. [41] Failure to anticipate the level of post
»
_ 7
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operating license retrofits (generally due to escalating
safety requirements) also resulted in an underestimation of
annual capital costs. This effect is sometimes subsumed
under fixed charge rate differentials (Komanoff 1981, 271).
Combining the impacts of underestimated construction
duration, and OT related interest rate errors yields an
IDC forecasting error of 4.5% for plants in operation by
'78 and 10.1%
for plants coming on line in the mid-
eighties. The OT related underestimation of fixed charge
rates also yields a 4% underestimation of average direct
construction costs 1963-1974.[42]
~ Fuel cycl~ cost underestimation
The fuel cycle can be divided into 3 parts: the
front end, composed of uranium mining and milling,
enrichment, and fuel fabrication; the middle, comprising
reactor fuel consumption; and the back-end, involving
possible reprocessing, and waste disposal. Cost
underestimation has characterized all steps.
t
The maj or expendi tur es of the front end are
uranium ore and enrichment costs. Though significant
uncertainty has always existed about the level of uranium
reserves and their cost of extraction, most estimates until
the early seventies implied lifetime reactor costs of less
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than $12-$19.1b.[43] Beginning in 1973 uranium prices
increased noticeably, reaching $50/1b on the spot market in
'75-'76 (Komanoff 1981, 262). Early 1980s estimates for
'85-'95 were in the neighborhood of $31/1b (U.S., DOE-EIA
11/82, 56).
The failure of the nuclear industry to anticipate
the doubling of ore costs in the seventies reflects the
early character of the nuclear planning context and the
logic of OT dynamics in several ways. The promotional
character of fuel reprocessing and breeder reactor studies
led to unj ustified optimism about the processes' imminent
commercialization and ability to reduce demand pressures on
uranium ore (Bupp 1977, 311). Alongside underestimating the
cost of containing the processes' env ironm ental and heal th
hazards, early projections neglected the implications of
associated proliferation problems.[44]
OT dynamics also led to an underestimation of the
cost of containing radiation hazards in uranium mining and
milling. Regulatory escalation has, for example, required
improvement in mine ventilation systems, open pit mining
procedures, and mill tailings disposal.
The above factors driving uranium prices upwards
were reinforced by the DOE's decision to stockpile enriched
uranium in the mid-seventies, and the formation of a
uranium producers cartel. Though reference to the latter
has been used by Westinghouse as a legal justification for
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abrogating its utility supply contracts, some recent
analysis suggests that the cartel had only a minor effect
on the U.S. market (Grounds.Y!~ 9/80, 9).
Early eighties $31/1b. uranium cost projections,
imply a 100% cost increase for reactors purchasing uranium
after 1975 or a cost of 2.4/kwh.[45l Since many OT period
plants enjoyed long term uranium contracts under earlier
prices, we shall assume an average cost of $23/1b or a 1
M/kwh underestimation.
Enrichment Costs
Cost projections during the OT period also
underestimated fuel enrichment prices. As late as 1968 the
AEC assumed an erichment cost of $52 per "separative work
unit" (SWU) (U.S., AEC 1968a, pp. 1-17,5-71). By the early
eighties actual costs had risen to more than $lOO/SWU and
expected costs to si i r/swu for '85-'95 (u.s., DOE-EIA
11/83,56). Failure to anticipate price increases in the
cost of electricity (amounting to 60% of enrichment costs)
and reduced government subsidy levels, were primarily
responsible for forecasting errors (Komanoff 1981 264).
Assuming average enrichment costs of $76/SWU for OT
period reactors and a predicted cost of $52/SWU, yields an
OT cost underestimation of .7 M/kwh.[46l
Fuel Manufactur~
Fuel fabrication costs were expected to decline
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dramatically over the life of OT period plants, due to
learning curve and scale economies. In 1968 the AEC
foresaw reductions from $158/kg or 1.35 M/kwh in 1970 to
$62/kw or .52 N/kwh in 1990 (U.S., AEC 1968a, pp. 1-29, 5-
83). While costs through the early seventies appear to
have behaved as expected, current estimates foresee a
$140/kg cost in 1990 (U.S., DOE-EIA 11/82, 56; Komanoff
1981, 264-266). projecting average expected costs of 8
H/kwh yields an OT cost underestimation of .1 M/kwh (U.S.,
DOE-EIA 11/82, 56; Komanoff 1981, 266).
h.l2.1 .Mi.Q.Ql~ ..f.!J~1 .QY.Ql~ .Q.Q-s1':-S.i. .t:~.9.Q1':.Q.t: i.1!~l
.Q.Qll-S.1!IDn1':i.Qll. The chief areas for cost estimation during
this stage of the fuel cycle are the "burn" (the level of
heat produced per unit of uranium), and the "heat-rate"
(the amount of electr i ci ty pr oduced per BTU of heat).
Together they allow calculation of a "conversion ratio",
expressed in kilowatt hours per kilogram of enriched
uranium (kwh/kg).
Through the late seventies the utilities used the
vendors' design "burn" estimates in their cost projections.
Actual performance appears to have fallen 15%-25% below
predicted values (Komanoff 1978, 134-136; Lanoue 1976, 65;
Berger 1977,152). Among the reasons for this decline are
technical problems with fuel cladding leakage and poor
plant capacity performance. The latter often requires
fuel rod discharge for scheduled refueling before full
379
utilization (KOmanoff 1978, 134-136).
In the late seventies reactor "heat-rates" were
about 8% worse than predicted.[47]
As a result of disappointing burn and heat rates,
the conversion ratio of operating reactors through the
seventies appears to have averaged only 65-75% of the
expected 240,000 rate.
Assuming improved fuel
utilization over the life of 1963-1974 plants (Komanoff
1981, 266), yields a 10% average coversion rate shortfall.
The focusing of public attention on conversion
errors was often the product of anti-nuclear activist
efforts. [48]
A familiar pattern of official neglect, OT
optimism, anti-nuclear movement criticism, and cost
estimate escalation characterizes waste disposal
projections. Reflecting AEC and nuclear industry
promotional priorities, relatively little attention was
\
given to waste issues until the mid-seventies. The
congressional Office of Technology Assessment concluded in
1985, "An illusion of certainty was created
technological optimism embedded itself in the attitudes and
thoughts of important agency policy makers. It becam e, in
a sense, an official doctrine at AEC (202)."
Industry and Commission spokesmen repeatedly
A L3 SQ2W#34Z k~$Q 4 4.420;. _ kSL
380
minimized the uncertainties surrounding waste disposal.
Their optimism helped induce New York state to agree to
assume perpetual care liability for W. R. Grace's West
Valley reprocessing project, should the company encounter
unexpected technical problems and withdraw from the market.
As a safeguard Grace was required to post a $3.7 million
bond for funding decontamination expenses. Recent clean-up
cost estimates have ranged as high as $1 billion (~e~ York
j'ilD~.Q 9/19/81 p. 26). Testifying in 1977, Peter Skinner of
the NY State Attorney General's Office said, " NevI York
State originally welcomed the so-called back-end of the
n uc 1 ear f ue 1 cy c1e •. • It has t a ken 1 4 yea r s f 0 r us to
realize this early optimism, urged upon us by industry and
the Federal Government ••• had no basis" (House, Government
Operations Committee 1977, 757).
In 1971 the AEC predicted waste disposal costs of
.OSH - .09H/kwh (naw s on 1976, 145).Significant efforts
,
were made to manage the information environment about
nuclear waste in order to maintain the credibility of such
claims. Berge r r epor ts, for exampl e, th at "A 1968 Gener al
Accounting Office report which found numerous defects in
the AEC waste management program was classified and kept
from the pub l i c until 1970. The earliest warning, a U.S.
Geological Survey report on groundwater at Hanford, was
kept classified until 1960 and was not published until
1973. A National Accademy of Sciences study concluding
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that AEC waste management practices were unsafe was
supressed from 1966 to 1970, until Senator Frank Church of
Idaho compelled its release" (Berger 1977, 100).
Because the specifics of waste disposal
techniques have not been established, cost estimates have
had a very general air to them. Typic ali s the For d
Foundation's conclusion of 1977. "The exact costs of the
'back-end' of the fuel cycle are not yet clearly defined.
However, enough information exists to conclude that they
will not contribute substantially to the cost of
electricity .... we have estimated these costs at about .4
mills/kwh ('76$] •.• This estimate is probably uncertain
+/- .2 mills/kwh" (Ford Foundation 1977, 122).
Beginning with the Lyons, Kansas depository protests
in 1971, the anti-nuclear movement began to turn its
attention to the waste issue. By the end of the seventies
cost estimates more than fifteen times the AEC's 1971
projections were offered by a group of former nuclear
t
industry-government engineers (U.S., DOE-EIA 2/81, 54). In
'76 the EPA's top radiation official acknowledged that
serious attention to disposal questions had just begun.
He tied the new interest to public pressure (N~~~ ~~~~~~
Journal 7/26/76).
By 1979 the Ford Foundation had doubled its 1977
waste disposal cost estimate (Ford Foundation 1979, 419).
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The DOE increased its back-end fuel cost projections from
2.5% to 4-5% total generating costs in 1978 (Ne~ York Ti~
3/16/78). Projecting this escalation into the futur e, thi s
analysis assumes a 1.85 M/kwh waste disposal cost, implying
an OT period cost underestimation of 1.75 M/kwh. [49]
Two recent government decisions shifting waste
disposal cost uncertainties to public shoulders
reillustrate the aT framework's explanation for why cost
underestimation occurred. In ea rly 1981, the Reagan
Administration agreed to share responsiblity for the
disposal of high level radioactive waste from Three Hile
Island. In 1977 the Carter Administration proposed
government assumption of all power plant high level waste
at fees reflecting mid-seventies cost projections.
Decommissioning [50]
until the mid-seventies there was little information
available for estimating decommissioning costs.
Government spokesmen were forced to rely on AIF cost
\figures in 1977 congressional hearings due to the absence
of completed AEC cost studies. Practical experience was
virtually non-existent.
Reflective of nuclear power's aT status was the
optimistic belief that inexpensive decommissioning
techniques would be found. In addition it was assumed that
public funds would "bail-out" facilities' owners should
decommissioning expenses be significantly greater than
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expected. [51]
In an apparent effort to bolster nuclear
pow erl s initial cost competitiveness, the AEC and NRC did
not require utilities to include decommissioning costs in
rate charges or to post bond to insure future
decommissioning capability.[52]
until the mid-seventies decommissioning tasks were
judged so insignificant that acknowledged uncertainties
were ignored in economic analyses. The AIF's widely cited
1976 study served to reinforce this optimism, projecting
costs of $6.5 million for mothballing, $11.5 - $15 million
for entombment and $45.5 - $52.5 million for dismantling an
1150MW reactor (House, Government operations Committee
1977, 427). The recommended procedure, a hybred
entombment-dismantling, was predicted to cost $23.5 million
_ $27 million or about $23/KW. Based on these figures the
NRC projected a .05H/kwh decommissioning cost (House,
Government operations Committtee 1977, 391).
spokesmen Clifford Smith assured the House Government
~
Displaying an air of relaxed confidence, NRC
operations Comrl1ittee in 1977, "The decommissioning of
nuclear reactors has been relatively well developed and is
routinely considered· in the licensing process" (329).
Characteristic of an OT frame of mind, he added, "It should
be mentioned that advances in technology might improve the
economics of decommissioning" (335).
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The official optimism of the AEC-NRC and nuclear
industry strongly influenced "independent" cost analyses.
The Ford Foundation's influential 1977 report, ~~Q~Q~
EQ~ Issues and Choices, for example, gave virtually no
attention to decommissioning costs. The Massachusetts
Energy Policy Office and Arthur D Little nuclear cost
studies of the mid to late seventies merely adopted the
AIF's figur es, as did many util ities.
Once again, however, preliminary research and anti-
nuclear movement criticism have begun to push estimates
upwards. As early as August 1975, Friends of the Earth
analyst Jim Harding projected an $80/KW decommissioning
cost. In December of 1977 Peter Skinner, of the New York
State Attorney General's Office, foresaw costs 7-34 times
ERDA's estimates, based on the state's traumatic experience
with the West Valley clean up (House, Government Operations
Committee 1977, 808). In 1980 a DOE study found $125/KW
to be "representative of the most current dismantling
,
assessments" (U.S., DOE-ErA 5/80,172). The latter figure
translates into a I-3M/kwh decommissioning cost, depending
on financing mechanisms (U.S., DOE-EIA 5/80, 173).
Dr. Marvin Resnikoff's work helps to uncover the OT
dynamics behind this pattern of estimate escalation. It
demonstrates anew how the insularity and promotional
purpose of early AEC-NRC-industry decommissioning analyses
encouraged a selective misperception of uncertainty.
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Resnikoff questions, for example, the legitimacy of past
studies' linear extrapolations from test reactors to
commercial sized plants, citing a case where the scaling
exercise altered the nature of the dismantling problem.[53]
His research also found that a previously neglected
radioactive nickel product in reactor infrastructures
would require much more complex handling than officially
assumed. [54] Resnikoff comments, " there is a need
for an independent evaluation of the nuclear industry.
Because of the 'old boy' network that exists, decisions--
very costly decisions--are being made based on incomplete
information. When four undergraduate engineering students
and myself can find what tens of thousands of technicians
in industry and the federal agencies have missed concerning
decommissioning, something is not right" (House, Government
Operations Committee 1977, 261).
Further work by Pohl and Stephens, concerning trace
\
elements, revealed greater uncertainties about the likely
radioactive conditions in a 30 year old commercial reactor
than previously projected from decommissioning experience
wit h a 6 year old t est rea cto r (House, Go v ern men t
Operations Committee 1977, 231). Their findings suggest
that more expensive burial procedures than the surface
techniques recommended by the AlP study w ill be necessa ry
(247) .
"i..
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As with the remainder of the nuclear cycle,
escalating safety standards have also increased
decommissioning costs. In place of earlier decommissioning
analyses, which suggested that mothballing and entombment
be considered viable decommissioning options, ERDA's
assistant director for nuclear programs, Robert Ramsey,
noted in 1977, n The only poli tically acceptable solution
is to dismantle the reactor and go bury it" (House,
Government Operations Committee 1977,1707). A 1977 GAO
report, highly critical of previous government
decommissioning policies and studies, concluded, "If the
historical trend for radiation standards continues, then
the rules that we now use to govern decommissioning and
decontamination will likely be considered unsafe years from
now" (House, Gover nment Operations Committee 1977, 1556).
Costs would be expected to incr ease commensur ately. This
view is echoed in a 1980 DOE-EIA study (U.S., DOE-EIA 5/80,
172) •
utilizing a DOE-EIA mid-range estimate of
decommissioning cost projections (1.3/kwh) implies an OT
period underestimation of 1.25H/kwh. [55]
~ operation gnQ Maintenance Costs
As might be expected, the dynamics which escalated
costs for the rest of the nuclear fuel cycle affected
operation and maintenance (O&M)costs as well. The latter
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increased at a 12% real rate 1975-1980 (U.S., DOE-EIA
11/82, 45-46). New NRC r egul a ti ons, for instance, imposed
tighter plant security requirements and increased
maintenance activities (U.S., DOE-EIA 5/80,179). There
were also pressures for reduced worker radiation exposure
(u.s., DOE-EIA 5/80176). As 80%-90% of nuclear operating
and maintenance expenditures are independent of output
levels, nuclear's Lowe r than expected capaci ty performance
also increased per kilowatt hour O&E costs (U.S., DOE-EIA
11/82, 45). 1980's average nuclear O&I\jcosts of 4.75
M/kwh were approximately twice the figure expected in the
mid-seventies (Ford Foundation 1977, 126; U.S., AEC 1974c,
20; House, Government Operations Committee 1977, 391) and
about 5 times the constant dollar value of the AEC's 1971
estimate of .85 H/kwh (U.S., AEC 1971a, 91). Due to public
and regulatory reaction to the Tf.'iI accident, it is likely
that real O&Mprice increases will continue.
Assuming lifetime aT reactor O&l-1costs of 5N/kwh
\
implies a OT period cost underestimation of 4 H/kwh
(Komanoff 1981, 267).
As Table 23 indicates nuclear generating costs were
underestimated by an average of 24 mills per killowatt hour
1963-1974. Plant capital costs were under predicted by 15
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M/kwh, decommissioning costs by 1 M/kwh, fuel costs by 3.5
H/kwh, and operation and maintenance costs by 4 H/kwh.
Holding real interest rates constant, actual generating
costs exceeded expected costs by more than 250%.
Capital costs for plants coming on line in the mid-
eighties will exceed the optimism of the mid-sixties by
600%. Real per kwh capital cost charges will be more than
1200% than expected if interest rates are not held
constant. Under estima tion character ized all areas of the
nuclear production function and reflected the logic of OT
dynamics.
Pursuing OT status for nuclear power and oligopoly
market shares, the AEC and reactor vendors promoted
excessive nuclear cost optimism. The utilities and their
consultants accepted these estimates with minimal review.
The latter reflected many factors: (1) "active-firm" growth
strategies, (2) expected regulatory insulation from severe
penalty for potential plant cost overruns or poor
\performance, (3) deference to self-fulfilling prophecy
dynamics, (4) traditional utility reliance on vendor
technical judgement and, eventually, (5) bureaucratic
momentum and (6) an accrued interest in sector expansion.
The period's t~anslation of promotional forecasts
into planning data was facilitated by a number of
ideological and institutional variables. These factors
insulated early cost analysis from critical review,
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facilitating both internal and external deception. Among
the most important were: the cold war, the lack of public
interest groupS in the utility field, and the huge
promotional resources available to the AEC and nuclear
industry.
As in the hazard assessment area, the early nuclear
planning context generated a forecasting environment
marred by data gaps, constrained methodologies and
inattention to anomalous information. Table 24 summarizes
these factors. Especially important was the neglect of
potenti al quali ty control problems and hazard containment
cost escalation. The misuse of learning curve theory and
neglect of di seconomies of scale in capaci ty performance
also proved costly. Since many nuclear orders in the
sixties were justified on the basis of cost advantages of
less than 2 lvI/kwh (Perry 1977, 37), forecasting errors were
central to nuclear's expansion.
De'spite the accumulation of contradictory
information, the industry and AECmaintained cost optimism
through the early eighties. Upward adjustments
persistently lagged behind actual costs. As in other
areas, forecasting revision was spearheaded by nuclear
critics.
It is difficult to assign quantitative measures to
the different reasons for cost underestimation. It is
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possible however to draw order of magnitude conclusions.
Non-turnkey plants ordered in 1965 and 1966 were expected
to cost approximately $250jkw. They eventually cost $475-
500jkw.[56J Up to one-half this difference was the product
of the vendo rs' loss-leader marketing strategy. The
remainder reflects the insular environment of early cost
analyses which led to an underestimation of the nuclear
task.
Recent DOE-nuclear industry projections foresee
capital costs in the neighborhood of $1400jkw for plants
coming on line in 1995 (Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment 1984, 67; U.S., DOE-EIA 11/82, 113). The
$900jkw escalation from the actual costs of plants on-line
in the early-seventies, reflects the impact of escalating
saf ety standa rds.
Holding market interest rates at 171-'78 levels, the
utilities currently project capital costs of 1900jkw for
plants coming on line in the mid-eighties. The $500,
addend to the DOE figure reflects: the inefficiencies
imposed on current plants by retrofit response to
regulatory escalation, the non-capture of learning curve
and standardization induced scale efficiencies assumed for
future plants and, probably, a residual promotional bias in
DOE expecta tions.
All of the factors responsible for cost
misestimation, loss leader pricing, insular biases towards
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task underestimation, misestimation of regulatory
standards, and rivalry induced construction inefficiencies,
reflect the history of nuclear's OT dynamics.
The pervasiveness of misinformation during the OT
period about
nuclear hazards, nuclear costs and
alternative R&D prospects, illustrates the discourse
creating capacity of planning contexts.
By uncover ing
similar patterns of behavior in diverse technical fields,
the thesis has sought to demonstrate the impact of social
variables (i.e. planning context defining variables) on
technology assessment and technical change.
$;;41, 4$" ,~,,~¥?~$
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TABLE 2...1
NUCLEARPLANT GENERATINGCQSTS~PREDICTIQN
ANDPERFORMANCE1963-74(1)
('79 Mills/kwh, assuming constant real interest rates)
fixed charge
interest rate
differential(5)
o
Act ual (2) Actual(3)
Costs Costs on-
1963-1974 line mid-80's
33.35 l. 54.15
20.1 38.1
1100 .~, 1904
60% 60 :.
.3% 1.0%
Overall generating
costs
Expected
Costs
1963-1974
9.40
Capital Costs(4) 4.9
$/KW 350
capaci ty rates 75%
back-end cost
'<, 1.3 . 1.30
6.95 .~ 8.25
2.40 3.00
1.80 2.50
.90 .90
220,000 240,000
1.85 1.85
5.00 6.50
Decommissioning Costs
Fuel Costs(6)
ur ani urn costs (7)
enrichment costs(8)
fuel fabrication
and conversion
conversion ratio
Operation &
Haintenance
1) Per estimating procedures described in text.
2) Actual costs for plants ordered '63-'74 based on
current estimates. Totals include projections for the 34
plants scheduled to come on line in the mid-eighties, per
Komanoff 1984a.
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TABLE23 Notes continued
3) Actual costs for plants coming on line in the rnid-
eighties based on current projections per Komanoff 1984a.
4)Capital costs assume constant real market interest rates
of 2.8% in order to avoid confounding nuclear cost
increases with non-nuclear factors. Use of historical
financing charges increases average capital costs '63-'74
to 1280 /kw. Mid-eighties' costs similarly rise to
2225/kw.
5) A .25% fixed charge rate differential has been added to
'63-'74 capital cost calculations to reflect nuclear's
experience of higher than expected interim investment
requirements. A .05% addend has also been included to
reflect minimally higher risk premiums. The latter
increases to .7% for plants coming on line in the mid-
eighties. See Chapter 8 section 6 for further discussion
of risk premiums.
6) Fuel costs include financing charge & assume no
reprocessing. As almost all pre'75 cost analyses assumed
posi tive values for nuclear waste, this assumption biases
misprediction measures downward.
7) Per kilowatt
assumes: $15/1b.
uranium, 240,000
char ge of 40%.
1963-1974 plants
enriched Uranium.
Actual uranium cost calculation
in mid-eighties assumes: $31/1b.
enriched uranium.
hour expected uranium cost calculation
uranium, 16.6 lbs. uranium/kg enriched
kwh's/kg enriched U, and fuel carrying
Actual uranium cost calculation for
assumes: $23/1b. U, and 220,000 kwh/kg
for plants due on line
U and 240,000 kwh/kg
8) Expected enrichment cost calculations assume: $52/SWU,
4 SWU/kg U, 240,000 kwh/kg enriched uranium and a fuel
carrying charge of 30%.
Actual enrichment cost calculations for 1963-1974
plants assumes: $76/SWU and 220,000 kwh/kg U.
Actual enrichment cost calculation for plants due on
line in mid-eighties assumes: $lll/SWU, 4.2 SwU/kg U, and
240 ,0 00 kwh/ kg U.
~"b5 ~ss
TABLE II
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A SOCIOLOGY OF NUCLEAR COST INFORMATION
.Q1' Year.s
DATA Lack of significant empiricaldata re: plant construction
costs, capaci ty and fuel
performance
Absence of true turnkey costs
Inattention toback-endcosts
IvlETHODOLOGY
Static engineering-based
cost models
Use of Mature technology
learning curve parameters
Ina ttention to capaci ty &
conversion rate factors
Neglect back-end costs
Assumption of breeder-
reprocessing backstop
for uranium costs
t
SOCIAL lllEANING
popular acceptance of nuclear
industry-AEC promotional cost
estimates
Closure of JCAE-AEC forums to
pessimisticeconomic testimony
Expected utility insulation
from cost-overrun, poor
performance penalties
protest Years
Accumulation of
cost over run &
poor performance
data i ;
Protest movement
induced attention
towa st e iss ues
Dynamic forecasting
with regulatory
escalation
Negative learning
coefficients
Attention to capaci ty
& conversion rate
factors
Inclusionback-end
costs
Suspension ofback-
stop assumption
Anti-nuclear
pressure for atten-
tion to empi rical
cost experience
Increased attention
tonuclearcost
skeptics
Increasing regulatory
penal ty for poor
nuclear performance
C HAP T E R VII
1. See Chapter 3 sections 3.2 and 3.3.
2. See Chapter 3, sections 3.41-3.42 and 4.2-4.3.
3. For example, Bupp and Derian write, "Beginning in 1957,
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held annual public
hearings on the 'development, growth and state of the
atomic energy industry'. The voluminous record of these
hearings is an impressive monument to the mutually
reinforcing government industry capacity for self-
deception" (Bupp and Derian 1981, 227). Elsewhere they
add, "In all the official, quasi-official, and private
studies, reviews, symposia, conferences, hearings and
reports on the economics of light water reactors between
1965 and 1975, only Sporn expressed any sustained
skepti ci sm" (81).
4. Kuhn (1966) celebrates the "practicality" of industry
planners in contrast to the aesthetic curiousity of
academic scientists. His depiction, however, also
describes men who were unlikely to challenge the
conventional wisdom. Describing the vendors' staffs, he
writes, "They were company men, trained to respect costs
and schedules. Research was subordinated to practical
engineering and the short run view of the project
superseded any long run development perspective ••• (the
men) were used to business discipline and willing to submit
to it. Those who did not measure up moved to other
positions in the company or to other organizations" (89).
Of the utilities he writes, "[Management] wanted men who
intimately knew company standards and procedures ••• They
were old enough to be familiar with the utility business
and to accept its values and outlook ••• In every company
the engineers chosen for training were looked upon as the
most likely candidates for future managerial positions"
(Kuhn 1966,149).
Summarizing his observations, Kuhn highlights the
importance of frames of reference in technology assessment,
"The policy followed in making the initial selection of
personnel to work in a technological area can be cri tical.
The men called upon as advisors or used as managers and
employees can determine the pace and direction of an
organization's attack upon, and use of, a technology,
fixing the perspective in which it is seen ••• A developing
technology appears to be in part an artifact of the men
395
396
used by a company to work in it, not simply an objective
body of knowledge ••• Business managers and government
officials might wisely recognize that in employing men,
they obtain expertness and skill which are, however,
accompanied by values and outlook not readily visible ••••"
(98). Unbeknownst to Kuhn, the nuclear industry's
absorption of the promotional attitude of the AEC and
vendors was to plague its economic analyses for the next
two decades. (See Chapter 3 section 3.41.)
5. For example, besides ignoring the problems posed by the
accumulation of a greater volume of radioactive materials,
scaling optimism neglected the extra piping, valve, and
welding burdens that nuclear's low temperature-low
pressure-high quantity steam implied for larger reactors
(Hellman and Hellman 1983, 11-17; Perry 1977, 34).
6. For example, Komanof f' s (1981) regr essions suggest that
learning reduced plant construction costs by an estimated
13% 1971-1978 (200). The redress of unanticipated
technical problems, however, incr eased costs by 155% (22).
using cumulative years of sector operating experience as a
proxy for "learning by doing" (which should reduce costs)
and de facto safety R&D (which could increase coststhrough
discovery of neglected hazard routes), Komanoff created a
dynamic learning variable. It had a negative sign and
proved statistically significant at the 93% level (206-
207) •
Mooz (1979) also found modest evidence of construction
cost learning (p. v). Hellman and Hellman found minimal
capacity rate improvement over time, though they do not
appear to have controlled for changing regulatory
conditions (Hellman and Hellman Chapter 4).
7. Widespread\ press accounts celebrated the atom's civilian
potential, and by the late forties it was popularly
thought that private enterprise could develop competi tive
nuclear power within a few years (Mullenbach 1963). The
main impediment to cheap nuclear energy appeared to be
government constraints on private access to nuclear
information (Dawson 1976, 231). Economists often
incorporated official optimism in planning models. A
1947 article in Econometrica, for example, foresaw nuclear
costs of about 1 cent/kwh ('79$) in the sixties (Isard and
Whitney 1952, 30).
8. Similarly subdued conclusions, however, were reached by
the first private studies with access to classified data,
the Industrial participation studies of the early fifties.
Only dual purpose reactors, with significant revenues from
La : 12£$.;
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both electricity and weapons grade plutonium sales, were
predicted to be economically competitive in the near term.
Despite the AEC's rejection of such joint product
scenarios, and the report's identification of serious
obstacles in the way of single purpose reactor
profitability, the studies were taken as further
endorsements for rapid commercialization (Mullenbach 1963,
55) •
9. Recall Mullenbach's claim that the speech was written
without technical input from the Commission, and exceeded
even the AEC's optimism (Hullenbach 1963, 270-71, 16).
10. In 1956 the staff of the McKinney panel projected 1980
generating costs ranging from 1.3-1.6 cents/kwh (Mullenbach
1963, 59). In 1958 the National Planning Association's
.N1!.Qilg~ Jill&~.9Yand .u.....s...... .£.!.J.&.l ECQ.nQIDY study cited a rough
consensus among scientists around long run costs of 1-
1.2cents/kwh (p. 50). The latter figure was approximately
50% of the projected costs for the 3 private reactors then
under construction.
11. Commenting on the specious precision suggested by such
comparisons, Harold Orlans reported in a Brookings
Institution study, "Some of the assumptions upon which
these calculations are based are so gross, the decimal
places are a 'joke in the fraternity', one reader observes"
(Orlans1967,47).
12. The report concluded, "Nuclear power is on the
threshold of economic competitiveness and can soon be made
competitive in areas consuming a significant fraction of
the nation's electrical energy; relatively modest
assistance by the AEC will assure the crossing of that
threshold and bring about widespread acceptance by the
utility in'dustry" (u.S., AEC 1962,34).
The Commission predicted capital costs of $289/kw and
generating costs of .9 cents/kwh for plants coming on line
in 1980 (U.S., JCAE 1968, 226-227). Existing fossil fuel
costs were in the neighborhood of 1-1.5cents/kwh and
falling. <;.
13. Capital costs of $222/kw were anticipated, but not
guaranteed in the contract (U.S., JCAE 1968,45; Bupp and
Derian 1981, 43). Capital costs for all 13 turnkeys
averaged $250-275/kw, roughly one half the vendors' costs
(Perry 1977, 35, 37).
14) The AEC (1966) reported, "1966 will be remembered as
the year in which the atom became economically competitive
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This was demonstrated most forcefully with the
announcement of the selection of nuclear power by the
Tennessee Valley Authority for a plant in the Southeastern
Uni ted Sta tes which is near a loca tion of maj or coal
fields. "
Julian Gumperz reported in Financial Analysts Journal
"Events during the early weeks of 1966 confirm ••• that
nuclear power generation is now competitive ••• It seems
appropriate therefore to regard the establishment and
expansion of nuclear energy ••• as assured" (3-4/66). Oak
Ridge director Alvin Weinberg opined, " Nuclear reactors
now appear to be the cheapest of all sources of energy •••
It is this nuclear energy revolution, based upon the
permanent and ubiquitous availability of cheap nuclear
power, about which we shall speculate •••" (U.S., JCAE 1968,
5). Electrical World's editorial foresaw generating costs
of less than .9 cents/kwh and added, "competi tion has
spurred a revolution in energy economics. In doing so, it
has completely vindicated the atomic expert who in 1954
predicted economic nuclear power within a decade" (5/2/66
p. 29).
15. Two other commonly cited studies of this period, Little
(1968) and an Ebasco Services report in 1969 echoed similar
conclusions. The Little study foresaw mid-seventies
generating costs in the range of 11 M/kwh (p. 12), while
Ebasco Services predicted capital costs in the area of
$300/kw (House, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
1979, 226).
16. One of the most optimistic learning forecasts was
offered in August '68 by James Lane. At an AEC co-sponsored
symposium, the Oak Ridge scientist foresaw scale and
learning curve efficiencies reducing nuclear capital costs
to $92j!k\v by 2010. (Lane, "Rationale for Low Cost Nuclear
Heat and Electricity", "Abundant Nuclear Energy" Symposium
8/26-29/68 Gatl inburg Tennessee.)
17. The AEC report declared " It is anticipated that
reductions in cost will occur in the future for nuclear
plants, due to the following reason: construction
experience should minimize delays that have been
experienced in the past, operating experience should
provide additional assurance of the safety of operation,
and manufacturing experience and expanded capacity of
suppliers should relieve their tremendous backlog of work"
(U.S., AEC, 1969b, 130).
18 • The fir s t two mod ern s i zed pLa nt s (40 0+ r-nn,
Connecticutt Yankee and San Onofre, were completed in 1967
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at announced costs of roughly $340/kw and $475/kw
respectively, reputedly in line with official learning
curve expectations. There is now speculation, however,
that actual costs were significantly higher than reported
costs due to the turkey terms employed. Quirk and
Montgomery (1978), for example, note that the AEC's 1974
cost study (U.S., AEC 1974b) implied costs 62% higher for
Connecticut Yankee and 35% higher for San Onof re, (though
the estimating model does not appear too reliable) (p 15).
19. Projected costs for plants ordered '68-'70, for
example, increased nearly 50% in real terms from '72-'76
(Quirk and Nontgomery 1978, 24).
20. The AEC and vendors' promotional optimism was echoed in
numerous planning and policy studies. For example, a
European Commission reported in 1972, " For power plants
ordered during the first half decade of the 1970's, there
is every reason to expect that at constant dollar values,
there will be a stabilization of prices at the 1969 to 1970
level. During the end of the decade prices should take a
downward turn. There is no doubt that the above mentioned
factors causing the high increases in capital cost in
recent years will gradually be brought under control and
that numerous uncertainties will cease to exist" (Bupp and
Derian 1981,89). While past errors of optimism were
acknowledged in AEC-industry cost analyses, new claims of
competitiveness and cost stabilization were made. A 1974
World Bank paper assured planners, "Current cost estimates
are thus likely to be more reliable than was the case in
the past, a view supported by contracts presently being
executed (House, Committee on Government Operations 1977,
173 8) • The For d F0un da t ion's (1 97 7) i nflu e nt i a 1 .NJJ.Qlea-r
.l:Qli~-r l.~JJ~'§ £W~ ,CnQiceJ2 study concluded, " Despi te this
disconcerting record [i.e., past mispredictions], there
seems to be convergence on estimates of future capital
costs and some reason for optimism that cost escalation and
uncertaint~ can be alleviated" (Ill). Based on projections
by 6 utilities, 3 nuclear engineering firms, and aspects of
AEC material, the study predicted a stabilization of
capital costs in the neighborhood of $807/kw.
21. Such was the case in 1975, for example, when the ~li
XQ-r.K ~iID~12 r epor ted a bela ted ac know 1edgement by the
president of the Atomic Industrial Forum that "overly
optimistic expectations about the potential of nuclear
power were created during the 1950's by the unrealistic
claims of various competing reactor manufacturers" (.N~li
~ TiID§.§ 11/16/75 p. 1). Such was the case in 1979, when
6 months after the Three Bile Island accident, and amidst
mounting pressures for regulatory upgrading, Westinghouse
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assured skeptics that nuclear power was achieving
"regualtory maturity" (.Eil.Q.t.Li.Q~l XlQ.r.lQ12/1/79, pp.20-
21) •
22. Cost expectations tally $llOO/kw if '71-'78 real
interest rates are used in place of experienced financing
charges, as the latter were increasing in the late
seventies and eighties.
23. Average expected capital costs based on projections
listed in Table 22 and purchase years per Komanoff 1981
294-297, Komanoff 1984a Table 1, and AEC 1974c Table l-l.
Actual costs for reactors on line through '82 based on
utility mixed current dollar reported costs (Komanoff 1981,
294-297). Post 1982 plant costs based on Komanoff constant
dollar calculations. Costs include real IDC (Komanoff
1984a Table 1).
24. Among the key "movement" groupS generating alternative
economic information were: Komanoff Energy Associates, (see
RQlier ~~nt kQ~.t .E~.Q~~.tiQll); Business and professionalpe 0 p1e for the Pub 1 i c In t ere s t , (see Dav i d Comey' s "\v ill
Idle Capacity Kill Nuclear power?"); the Environmental
Action Foundation, (see Richard Morgan's ~~.Q~~.r ~Q~~.I.i
Th~ Barg~in Xl~ .Q~n't h1tQ.rg and the group's periodical
~Q~~.r Lin~); the Environmental Defense Fund (see W. R. Z.
Wiley's "Alternative Energy Systems for Pacific Gas and
Electric company-An Economic Analysis"); Friends of the
Earth, (see Jim Harding's "The Def lation of Rancho Seco 2",
John Berger's ~~.Qlea.r RQ~~.r .th~ nnvi~hl~ Q~.tiQn, Amory
Lovins' .sQll.E~Y Pa.tb.s., and the groupS journal No.t l1~n
h~~.r.t); various Ralph Nader affiliated projects such as
Critical Bass & The Center for the study of Responsive Law,
(see Nader and Abbotts' ~h~ l1~n~.Q~ Qt h.tQIDic .En~.rgY, Ron
Lanoue's Nuclear Plants: ~ Mor~ ~ Build: The ~ You
.£9.Y, and the journal ~ritical 11~); various Barry Commoner
affiliated projects, such as the Scientists Institute for
Publ i c Inf orma tion and the Center f or the Biology of
Natural Systems, (see Richard Scott's "Proj ections for the
cost of Generating Electricity in Nuclear and Coal Fired
Plants", and various issues of .EnY1.rQllID.!m.t); the Nuclear
Information Resource Service, (see the groupS newsletter
IIGroundswell"); the Investor's Responsibility Research
Center, (see "The Nuclear Alterna tive"); Environmentalists
for Full-Employment, (see Grossm an and Daneker' s IIJobs and
Energy"); and the Union of concerned Scientists, (see
Daniel Ford's IINuclear power Some Basic Economic Issues
ll
).
More traditional social action groupS like the
American Friends Service Committee and the council on
Economic priorities also made important contributions.
_ . ...-..----
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Komanoff, for example, pub l d sh e d his original nuclear
capaci ty performance study while at the Council.
The anti-nuclear movement's local organizations also
produced some excellent economic analyses. The Clamshell
Alliance put together ~~ ~~k~~. The New York Public
Interest Research Group released an important study of
nuclear plant decommissioning costs. Lengthy critiques of
the economic assumptions underlying numerous specific
plants were compiled by local activists. (See for example
Dr. Harold Cassidy's analysis of the economics of the
Marble Hill Plant prepared for the Save the Valley
organization; Russel Love's analysis of the economics of
the Palo Verde plant, prepared for Arizonians for Safe
Energy, and Hiles Hales & Marvin Cooke's analysis of the
economics of the Black Fox Plant, distributed by the
Environmental Action Foundation.
25. Important contributions were made by university
professors such as Irvin Bupp of Harvard (see "The
Economics of Nuclear Power"), and Duane Chapman of Cornell
(see "Decommissioning, Taxation, and Nuclear Power Cost").
State agencies frequently provided independent review of
utility generating choice analysis and funding for anti-
nuclear research. New Jersey's Department of Public
Advocate funded a Komanoff study of comparative nuclear and
coal generating costs. California's Energy Resources
Conservation and Devlopment Commission funded Jim Harding's
critical review of the economics of the Sun Desert nuclear
plant. The California Energy Commission funded a Chapman
decommissioning cost study. New York State's Attorney
General's Office, Bureau of Environmental Protection,
challenged the optimistic waste disposal and
decommissioning cost estimates of the AEC.
26. Tliough suprisingly few critical reviews originated in
the commercial sector, there were some notable exceptions,
such as Saunders Miller's 1976 book j'.h~ ECQ.n.QIDi..Q~Q.I.
Nuclear and ~ R.QN...e.r.
27. In response to Komanoff's charge, the utility noted
that the statement mailed to ratepayers along with their
bills, ("Operation of Con Ed's nuclear plant in 1974 saved
our customer's $95,000,000 they would have otherwise paid
for an equivalent amount of oil") was technically correct.
No oil had been purchased (Ne~ XQ£k TiID~ 5/11/75 IV-4).
An almost identical ploy on the part of Commonwealth
Edison, the nation's most nuclear oriented utility, was
successfully challenged by anti-nuclear critic David Corney
in the February '75 issue of the ~~11~1i.nQI h1QIDi..Q
402
~~ieD~i~~~. In this case the utility had claimed a $100
million rate payer savings by citing the relative fuel
costs of nuclear and coal fired plants. Corney forced the
company to acknowledge that including relative capital
costs in the calculations eliminated nuclear's alleged
savings (Nader and Abbotts 1979, 216).
28. Among the figures' pUblic appearances were citations in
the N~.N YQ.I..K ~.iID~.s.: 4/8/79 and 12/30/79; the N£!l.l. ~~re~~
Journal 4/24/79 and Science 5/11/79 and 2/15/80 (Komanoff
1981,12-13).
29. The AIF study reported costs of 15 r-1jkwh for nuclear
fired plants and 23 M/kwh for coal plants. It did not
indicate however that the 20 nuclear plants omitted from
the sample had 66% higher costs than the 38 plants
included. The neglected reactors also had outage rates 24%
above the sample's figures. The nation's cheapest coal
plants were absent from the coal fired sample. All told,
when the AIF'S figures were corrected for methodological
errors (including minimal adjustment for highly unrealistic
waste disposal and decommissioning costs), nuclear power
costs averaged 9% higher rather than 34% lower than coal
fired plants. Recent reanalyses of older AIF cost surveys
by Komanoff and the Environmental Action Foundation reveal
similar biases (EQli§.I. Line 7/81).
30. In 1978, for example, the Public Service Commission of
Wisconsin concluded, "there is a wide range of views
concerning the relative economics of nuclear and coal fired
generation." The New York Public Service Commission
reported, II There is no credible bottom line comparison of
the total generating costs of nuclear and fossil facilities
which can be extracted from this (hearing) record"
(Stobaugh apd Yergin 1979,124). What had shifted was the
realm of discourse. The nuclear industry and ERDA
contin ued to exude cost optimi sm. The soci al meaning of
their claims however was diluted by the informational
activities of the anti-nuclear movement.
31. Capacity statistics represent a performance index.
They measure the total generating output of a plant as a
percentage of the output that would accrue if it operated
at full design power 100% of the time. Since plants
require periodic refueling and scheduled maintenance,
actual and expected capaci ty figures are always less than
unity. The economics of nuclear power are very sensitive
to capacity variations, as about 80% of nuclear generating
costs are non-variable costs. A fall in capacity
performance from 80 to 60 percent produces a 20/60 x .8 or
approximately 25% increase in generating costs. This is a
! £
..
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conservative estimate as it does not include the increased
reserve requirements imposed on the utility system as a
whole by lower performance rates.
32. See for example: U.S., AEC: 1960, 134; AEC, 1968a, I-
29. Most nuclear cost-benefit studies and Environmental
Impact Statements also assumed an 80% figure (Quirk and
Montgomery 1978, 52; E~~ XQSk ~lID~~ : 11/19/72 p. 73,
3/9/75 p. 4; ~ Street Journal 5/3/73, 2).
33. Though these campaigns may not influence the utilities,
they do help legitimize utility nuclear decisions in the
eyes of the public. One misleading practice noted by the
Ford Foundation's ~~ue~ ~n~ ~hQ1g~~ volume has been to
lump together the higher performance history of smaller
reactors with the lower rates of current market sized
(800+MW) plants. (153 of the 161 plants ordered from 1968
to the spring of 1974 were 800 HW or larger.) Carrying
this dubious averaging one step further has been
westinghouse's practice of weighing all plants equally
regardless of their megawatt design rating, and the AIF's
habit of weighing plants by the amount of electricity they
produce. The latter procedure minimizes the impact of
poorly producing units and deletes plants like Three Mile
Island from the sample.
The industry has also sought to increase performance
rates by revising "capacityll definitions. An alternative
measure called "maximum dependable capacity" has been used
to reduce the denominator in capaci ty calculations from a
plant's rate based determined design rating. The new
denominator equals the design rating minus the percentage
of time reactors are idled by regulatory or mechanical
difficulties generic to nuclear plants. Another
redefinition has been employed to increase the numerator in
capacity calculations. The availability factor equals the
percentage of time a plant operated at any percentage of
its design rating. Since nuclear plants are frequently
forced by regulatory edict and mechanical failure to
operate at reduced power levels, this index can be very
misleading.
The total impact of the adjustments can be
significant. using the original definition of capacity
rates (total HW's generated/total design rating) Komanoff
calculated a 1975 performance average of 53% for market
sized plants (Komanoff 1981, 250). westinghouse reported a
62.8% rate and the AIF a 64.4% rate for the same year (FOrd
Foundation 1977, 119). While Komanoff calculated a 51%
capacity rate for all 14 GE boiling water reactors (BWR) in
1975, the company boasted in the 9/15/76 issue of
u.: z£.
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Electrical 1Y~," BWR plants continue to perform well (in
'75 the best achieved 91% availability; the top 6
performer s averaged 87% availability)" (Komanoff 1976, 12).
One caveat has to be offered in defense of the
official optimism. This concerns the downward bias that
reactors' poor performance in the first 3-4 years of
operation may impart to existing operating experience data.
There are not enough observations for older commercial
sized plants to determine if a significant improvement
occurs. There is also concern, however, that long term
ageing could cause greater than expected problems in later
years.
34. In 1974, for example, Con Ed vice Chairman Louis Roddis
charged that some utility executives "did not want to
criticize the nuclear industry, because they were depending
on it heavily as a future power source" (Ne~ XQll Ti.m~.s.
2/3/74 p. 37) A 1975 review of industry behavior by
Barber Associates for ERDA concluded, "We noted a distinct
tendency in the nuclear energy industry to underestimate
nuclear power costs by simply omitting some costs, or
negl ecti ng th e potenti al effect s on co sts of pr acti calor
operational experience such as significantly lower capacity
factors than theoretical projections would suggest" (NeYl
Yor.k Times 11/16/75 p. 1).
35. Com ey was the fir st to f0cus pub 1 icat ten tion 0nth e
issue through a paper given at a September '74 public
meeting of the Federal Energy Administration, a series of
art i c 1 e sin the ~J.!11~.t1n Qi b.tQ .m1g .s.Q1~n.t.iJ2.tJ2
(11/74,2/75,10/75), and various media activities of his
organization. His work was based on a government study. In
1976 Komanoff's PoYl~ ElQll.tE~~lQ~IDgng~ analysis was
pUblished with updates released in subsequent years. The
material r~ceived widespread attention and promotion by the
anti-nuclear movement.
36. Early '80's industry projections foresaw a 70% capacity
rate (Komanoff 1981, 247). The same methodological
differences that distinguished AEc-industry capital cost
projections from nuclear critics' expectations distinguish
capacity performance forecasts. The nuclear industry
foresees learning curve based reliability improvements and
regulatory reform in the direction of fewer NRC safety
related shutdowns. Komanoff foresees political pressures
for higher operating standards. The latter would likely
require increased periods of downtime for safety retrofits
and fewer deferments of safety checks until scheduled
maintenance. Komanoff also aruges that increased operating
experience will continue to uncover unanticipated safetry
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problems. He points, for example, to recent reactor
problems with cracked feed-water piping welds and cracks in
the piping system itself, the late discovery of technical
errors in seismic stress calculations, and the largely
unknown effects of reactor ageing on plant performance.
37. These costs refer to the interest charges that
accumulate during plant construction. Because a utility
generally can not charge customers for construction costs
until a plant comes on line and is included in the rate
base, financing costs during construction are treated as
part of plant capital costs. They are also called "AFDC"
costs - "Allowance for Funds Used During Construction"
Costs.
38. The 1960 construction duration estimate is from AEC
(1960). Six months has been added to the study's actual
projection of 36 months to cover the period from
construction completion to commercial operation in order to
standardize period lenghts. Sources for other duration
estimates are as follows: 1967-AEC 1968a, 1969-AEC 1970a,
1974-AEC 1974b. Current DOE estimates project a 94 month
period (U.S., DOE-EIA 11/83, p. 11-12).
39. 1985 data suggests that construction duration for mid-
eighties plants will be significantly longer than the 94-
100 month estimate prevalent in the early eighties.
40. In 1970, for example, the President of Westinghouse
Power Systems asserted, "much of the delay being
experienced by some utilities is simply the result of the
large influx of orders experienced 1966-1967. Once this is
behind us, plants should consistently corne on line with a
five year lead time from order to operation" (Quirk and
Nont qome r v 1978,32). Current DOEforecasts project a 10
year hor dz on (U.S. DOE-EIA, 11/83 12).
41. For a discussion of the increasing risk premiums
attached to nuclear credit offerings see Chapter 8 section6.
42. See Komanoff 1981 p. 272 for the formula used to
calculate the IOU's fixed charge rates. Estimated
increases in nuclear utilities' cost of capital and
interim investment requirements from 2.8% to 3.1% to 3.8%,
increased the fixed charge rate from 9.23 to 9.61 to
10.53%.
----------- --~----
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The Comtois formula for determining real IDC is:
N
IDC= l-(l+r) / N Ln(l/ [l+r]) - 1 (Komanoff 1981 244)
Calculating the IDC multiplier under the AEC assumption of
a 50 month construction period, using a 2.8% interest rate
(the utilities' real cost of capital 1955-1977) yields an
expected 6% IDC multiplier. Substituting a 3.1% interest
rate to reflect OT related fixed charge rate errors and a
77.7 month construction period, to reflect actual
experience 1971-1978, results in an 10.6% IDC multiplier or
net error of about 4.5%. For plants coming on line in the
mid-eighties, with expected construction durations of 94
months and 3.8% base capital charge rates, the OT related
IDC error is 10.1%. Actual IDC for mid-eighties plants is
expected to be about 30-40% due to higher real interest
rates. The extra 15%-25% cost underestimation is unrelated
to OT dynamics and not included in the OT differential.
43. Most projections were framed in 1-10 year time horizons
so it is often difficult to infer lifetime predictions from
them. In the late '60's GE projected long term uranium
prices of less than $lO/lb (Berger 1977,116). By 1975
westinghouse had committed itself to supply 81,000,000
pounds of uranium at $8-$10/lb (historical $), though it
owned only 15,000 pounds. It's guarantees reflected the
period's rivalry dynamics (Taylor 1979, 200). When the
spot price of uranium exceeded $40 in the late seventies,
westinghouse reneged on its contracts, incuring multi-
billion dollar law suits (Berger 1977, 116). Sommers
(1978) indicates that the utilities expected uranium
availabili ty at about $17/1b in the mid-sixties. In 1968,
the AEC\projected uranium costs of $16/1b through 1980,
rising to $28/1b by the turn of the century (AEC 1968a, 1-
17,5-69).
44. The extent of forecasting errors for breeder capital
costs and fuel reprocessing surpasses even the turnkey
miscalculations. In the late '60's Clinch River breeder
capital costs were projected to be less than $400/kw. By
1972 projected costs had reached $3000/kw (Ford Foundation
1977, 342) and by 1974 they exceeded $4,500/kw (Miller
1976, 93).
Estimated reprocessing costs follow a similar pattern,
growing from $55/kg in the early seventies (u.S., AEC
1973b, 15), to a 1976 estimate of $186/kg (Ford Foundation
1977, 321-325), to current DOE projections of $550/kg
(U.S., DOE-EIA 11/82,57-58).
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It was expected that reprocessing would reduce uranium
demand by 20-40%. Breeder devloprnent would have a much
larger long term impact.
45. Per kilowatt hour uranium cost expectation calculations
assume: initial expectation of $15/1b. U, 16.6 pounds
purchased uranium per enriched kilogram of fuel, 240,000
kwh's expected per kg. U, and fuel carrying charge
mul tipl ier of 1.4. Cost error calcula tions assum e: $31/lb.
U or $23/1b. U as stated in the text, and 220,000 kwh's/kg
U.
46. Per kilowatt hour enrichment calculations assume an
average of 4 SWU/kg U (3.8 SWU/kg U through the mid-
eighties and 4.2 SWU/kg U thereafter), 240,000 kwh/kg U
expected and 220,000 kwh/kg U actual, and a fuel carrying
charge mul tLp.laer of 1.3 (Komanoff 1981, 266).
47. From 1975-1984 heat rates averaged 10,950 BTU/kwh
(U.S., DOE-EIA 1984b, 236). The AEC predicted rates of
10,200 in the early seventies (1972c, 1974a).
48. See for example: the testimony of Friends of the Earth
staffer Jim Harding before the Board of Directors of the
Sacremento Municipal Utility District, the testimony of
Charles Komanoff before the New Jersey Board of Public
Utilites, and Hales and Cooke's critique of the economics
of the Black Fox nuclear plant. Also important was the
work of Horgan Huntington of the Department of Interior's
Nining Enforcement and Safety Admi nistra tion (Berger 1977,
119). The latter was given "social meaning" by its
injection into utility nuclear hearings by the anti-nuclear
movement.
49. This figure underestimates back-end forecasting errors,
as most projections assumed positive credits for fuel
reprocessing.
50. Decommissioning refers to the process of neutralizing
the radiation hazards of retired nuclear facilities. Three
alternative procedures have been suggested: mothballing,
entombment, and dismantling. Mothballing involves the
removal of all unused fuel and waste material from the core
and minimal protective measures to restrict ~ccess to the
site. Through the mid~seventies, 10 reactors had been
mothball ed, En t.ornb'ment entail s enca sing the press ure
vessel and reactor internals in concrete in addition to
mothballing. Three small government reactors have been
entombed. Dismantling involves the actual piece by piece
removal of the reactor for burial at another site. Two
small reactors have been dismantled. Because the largest
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one was less than 2.5% the size of current commercial
reactors and had accumulated only 6 years of decay
products, its dismantling provides only limited help in
forecasting commercial costs.
51. Illustratively, a 6/16/77 GAOreport on Decommissioning
concluded, " The Commission has done relatively little to
plan for and to provide guidance for decommissioning of
commercial nuclear facilities. Studies sponsored by the
Commission on acceptable alternative methods to
decommission are several years from completion. It does
not r eq uire owne r s 0 f nuc1ear f a c I Li.tie s - ex c e p t ur an i urn
mills- to develop plans or make financial provisions to
cover the cost for future decommissioning. Consequently,
the true cost of nuclear power is not being reflected in
the cost to the consumer of nuclear power. Without this
financial provision, the Federal or State Governments can
be asked to pay for problems that rightfully should be paid
by private industry.
Sit ua t ion s wher e th ish ash appe ned, 0 r may, hav e
already arisen. For example, the Federal Government w i.Ll
pay about $85 million to clean up residues from inoperative
uranium mills that were privately owned. Also, as much as
$600 million may be needed to decommission a privately
owned nuclear fuel reprocessing plant at West Valley, New
York. The State Government. •• has asked the Federal
Government for assistance. [Note: current estimates suggest
final clean up costs may approach $1 billion • .N~.Yl XQ.£k
Times '9/19/81 p. 26] In a case at Cl inton, Tennessee, the
Federal and State Governments shared the cost--
approximately $110,000-- to decontaminate a facili ty tha t
the owners walked away from in 1971" (House, Government
Opera tions Committee 1977, 1529).
52. In many cases where state regulations include
decommissioning charges in rate calculations, the funds are
not isolated from other utility revenues. They have been
often viewed as a funding source for utilities facing
construction financing problems (U.S., DOE-EIA 5/80, 174).
53. As of 1977, for example, no cutting tools existed for
slicing commercial sized reactor walls under water, as must
be done to shield workmen from high radioactivi ty (House,
Government Operations Committee 1977, 301).
54. A 1980 DOE-EIA study has similarly criticized past
industry nickel decay assumptions (U.S., DOE-EIA 5/80,
110) •
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55. Given the historical pattern of serial cost
estimation, this is probably a very conservative estimate.
It also ignores the financial impact of underestimating the
cost of decommissioning nuclear fuel cycle facilities, such
as fuel fabrication and conversion plants.
56. The $475 figure differs from the $366 average cited in
Chapter 6 because the earlier calculation included only
plants in operation by 1972. The more expensive plants
came on-line later.
C HAP T E R VIII
THE MICROECONOMIC IMPACT OF NUCLEAR POWER'S PROMOTIONAL
ASSISTANCE AND CAPTURE OF OT STATUS[l]
11 ~oduction*
Chapters 4-7 analyzed the mechanisms by which
nuclear power achieved OT status. The key levers were the
skewing of R&D efforts, public subsidy, and regulatory
incentives in nuclear's favor, and the promotion of
misleadingly optimistic cost expectations. This chapter
examines the benefits accrued nuclear power from the
capture of OT status and the related enjoyment of
increased: economies of scale, learning curve
efficiencies, systemwide efficiencies, privileged access to
capital markets, and bureaucratic momentum. The final
sections examine the combined advantages nuclear gained
from promotional assistance and OT captur~
21 Scale and Learning Curve Efficiencies
From the beginning of atomic development the capture
of scale and learning curve cost reductions was a central
part of nuclear development strategy.[2] Learning curve
theory typically projects 10-20% cost declines per doubling
in cumulative output (Stewart 1981, 192). [3J Nuclear
planning assumed similar gains (Tybout 1957; U.S., AEC
1968a, pp. 1-33, 3-2; Little 1968; Bupp 1974, 1755).[4]
-----------------------------------------------------------
* All dollars are '79$ unless otherwise specified.
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In the early seventies the capture of OT status was
expected to reduce generating costs by 50%, 1965-2000, due
to learning curve efficiencies. Treating the first 16
commercial plants as de facto R&D projects, about six
sector doublings were required to reach the 1000 plants
expected in operation by the year 2000. Assuming a 90%
learning curve implies expected growth induced cost
reductions of 47%.
Actual scale and learning curve efficiency gains
have been much less than anticipated. The contraction of
projected nuclear sector size to only 125 plants in the
year 2000 reduced expected learning curve gains to about
27%. Escalating regulatory standards inhibited capture of
that reduction by repeatedly changing plant designs (U.S.,
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment 1981).
Despite these difficulties a number of analyses
have found evidence of significant learning. Bodde (1976)
indicates that the nuclear steam supply vendors were able
to deflect design changes to other parts of the plant, and
achieved significant standardization. Mooz found a 10%
decline in construction costs for each doubling of
architect-engineer construction experience (Mooz 1979, p.
v ), After reporting 1981 results simiilar to Mooz,
Komanoff's '84 analysis vested learning in the sponsoring
utility. Plant costs were found to decline by 7% per new
nuclear site (Komanoff 1984a, 11).[51
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It is difficult to estimate the overall learning
cost reductions associated with nuclear's '63-'74
expansion, due to the counter-factual aspect of the
calculation. Based on Mooz-Komanoff findings, and downward
revision of conventional 90% cost declines (due to unstable
plant designs), we estimate learning curve savings of
approximately 20%.
The quest for learning efficiencies remains a major
goal of the NRC and nuclear industry. [6] Legisla tion was
introduced in 1982 to facilitate standardization. Recent
analyses suggest the latter could reduce capital costs by
20-25% for new plants (S.M. Stoller Corporation 1982, pp.
B-5, B-6).[7]
1l Megawatt Scaling Effects
Nuclear promoters also anticipated cost reductions
through the construction of larger sized plants. Each
megawatt doubling was expected to reduce per/kw capital
costs by 20-30% (Komanoff 1981, 200, U.S., AEC 1974b, 43;
Ford Foundation 1977, 112). About 3 megawatt doublings
were expected from the early sixties to the year 2000,
t :
implying cost reductions of 50%-60%. The savings are akin
to the learning curve-scale effects noted above, as they
ar e tied to "pa th" deci s ions,
Actual scaling effects have been less than
anticipated. The AEC put a 1300MW ceiling on plant size in
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the early seventies, blocking plans for 2000NVl plants. [8)
Romanoff found only a 10% cost reduction per megawatt
doubling in 1970's plants (Romanoff 1981, 200).[91 This
rate implies a 25% scaling savings for the period's
upgrading from 200 HW- 1300 MW.
4l ~ Capture Qf SysteID~ Efficiencies
Nuclear promoters could anticipate several
systemwide economies from sector expansion. Among these
were:
1) multiple siting economies,
2)external economi es, and
3) the economic benefits of social accomodation
to the institutional needs of the technology.
In 1968 the AEC foresaw capital cost declines of 9%
from dual plant sitings (u.s., AEC 1968a, p, 2-3). In '74
the Commission increased expected savings to 10-15% (U.S.,
AEC 1974b, 74). Actual savings appear even greater.
Komanoff found a suprising 28% cost reduction for plants\
expected to be completed in the mid-eighties (Komanoff
1984a,11).
Weinberg and others have urged the construction of
"nuclear parks", complete with on-site fuel reprocessing
capabilities. GE has estimated that a cluster of 20 units
would reduce capital cost by about 20% in comparison with
2-4 unit sites (Garvey 1977, 83). Additional benefits from
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reduced materials transport costs and transport hazards,
and the capture of scale economies in skilled O&M manpower
have been claimed for the parks (Garvey 1977, 94-97).
Capture of OT status was also expected to stimulate
economies of scale in manpower training, and increased
private investment in complementary technologies throughout
the economy. Illustrative of the positive externalities
anticipated are the benefits expected from increased
research on long distance electricity transmission.
Breakthroughs in this area would decrease the economic cost
of nuclear's siting distance penalty. Anticipation of
nuclear expansion might also encourage increased research
on electricity end-uses, leaving nuclear competitive in new
markets. [10]
The relevance of institutional accomodation to
nuclear needs can be illustrated by the adjustments
required for viable nuclear parks. The latter would likely
necessitate the creation of mega-utilities and modification
of anti-trust policy. Also needed would be aggressive
exercise of eminent domain in order to create extensive
transmission corridors. The lack of similar land-use
initiatives may have helped stall the growth of slurry
pipel Lnes,
~ Scaling ~ SysteID~ide Efficiencies SUIDID~ed
It is difficult to quantify the market value of OT
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induced complementary investments and institutional
accomodation. Totaling only learning curve-sector size,
megawatt, and multiple siting economies, implies expected
OT induced cost reductions of about 120%. Actual OT
related savings in these three areas have been about half
this amount.
The work of Oak Ridge researcher James Lane
reflects the more expansive implications of OT status
anticipated in the late sixties. In a paper entitled
"Rationale for Low-Cost Nuclear Heat and Electricity",
Lane assumes R&D improvements, learning curve efficiencies,
mass production economies, megawatt scaling, increased
industry competition, and breakthroughs in electricity
transmission technology. He projects year 2000 generating
costs of 3 M/kwh for a 5,000 11Wplant. [11]
In addi tion to redu cing its own co sts, nucLe a r' s
capture of OT status discouraged the development of
competing options by denying them access to similar scale
induced efficiencies. [12]
Ql privileged Access to Capital Markets
Nuclear power's promotional assistance and capture
of OT status also gave the technology privileged access to
capi tal markets. [13] As Herrill Lynch vice president
Leonard Hyman has observed," the investor bestowed
blanket confidence on the technology and the technicians
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behind it" (Hyman and Kelly 12/3/81). In addition to the
Price Anderson Act, numerous government guarantees reduced
nuclear investment risks. De facto government policy
promised smooth fuel supply, trouble-shooting R&D, and
congenial regulation. promotional informational
environments dulled investor skepticism.
It is difficult to estimate the credit costs nuclear
would have incurred without OT status. One approach is to
compare nuclear credit costs before and after
disestablishment. Several studies have sought to determine
whether nuclear utili ty f inanci al instruments bore higher
credit costs than coal utility offerings after the late
seven ti es. Through the early eighties the results were
inconclusive (U.S., Department of Energy - Energy
Information Administration 11/82, 114; U.S., congressional
Office of Technology Assessment 1984, 70). The failure to
find significant difference is partially due to the
\
methodology used. Adequate distinctior.s were not el.ways
made between nuclear utilities with plants completed during
the OT years and those with nuclear plants still under
construction after disestablishment.
Nevertheless, the New York State Public Service
Commission found a .25% risk premium attached to nuclear
utility offerings in 1979, a month before T~1I.[14] This
margin increased to .65% immediately after the
Li. __ 2$ XipZJ~, 2 ww a
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accident. [15] An even larger differential was suggested by
J. Hugh Devlin, managing director of Morgan Stanley, in his
1979 testimony before the House Interior Committee. Devlin
blamed regulatory escalation before and after TNI, rather
than the accident itself, for higher credit costs. He
warned, " the confidence of investors is extremely
fragile If they see actions which they regard as unduly
burdensome - an extended moratorium on the licensing of
nuclear plants, for example - their confidence will vanish
abruptly .•• and make it difficult if not impossible for
these companies to raise additional capital at reasonable
costs We therefore urge you to move cautiously and to
carefully consider the capital-raising implications of any
legislative actions you may take" (House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs 1979, 115).[16]
In August of 1981 ]2M.rQ.llJ2 noted there had been
extensive nuclear related utility bond rating declines
(]2g.r.rQ.ll§ 8/24/81). In December '81 Merrill Lynch found
--.. ,
that only 26% of the utilites with nuclear construction
projects had "A" or "Aa" ratings. This compared with more
than 50% for utilities without nuclear construction (Hyman
and Kelly 12/3/81, 23,24). Komanoff estimates that in May
1984 nuclear risk premiums exceeded several percentage
points (Komanoff 1984b, 72). Table 25 illustrates the
impact of various interest rate penalties on current
nuclear costs. While a number of factors exacerbated the
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technology's financing difficulties (such as electricity
demand declines) the bulk of the differential reflects the
loss of OT status.
TABLE 2..5..
THE IMPACTQ£ INCREASED~ PREMIUMQN NUCLEARCOSTSllL
Additional Interest Charge
1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
Fixed Charge Increment(2)
IDC Hultiplier Increment(3)
1.3% 2.7% 4.1% 5.6% 7.2% 8.8%
4.5% 9.0% 14% 19%, 24% 30%
Capi tal Cost H/kwh(4)
Incr ernent
6M 13M 21M 29.5H 39M 49.5H
-----------------------------------------------------------
1) Calculations assume average direct construction capital
costs fpr mid-'80's plants of $1640/KW (Komanoff 1984a).
2) See Komanoff 1981 p. 272 for formula used to calculate
fixed charge rates. Calculations assume a 2.8% base
interest rate plus assigned interest rate penalty. Base
case fixed charge equals 9.23%.
3) For formula
7 footnote 42.
period. Base
equals 11.6%.
used to calculate IDC multiplier see Chapter
Calculations assume 94 month construction
case (2.8% interest rate) IDC multiplier
4) Per kwh calculations assume 60% capacity rates.
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II Enjoyment of Bureaucrati~ l1Q.!I\entuill
In 1968 former AECconsultant John Hogerton observed
that utility markets had vested the benefit of doubt in
nuclear as opposed to coal technologies (Hogerton 1968,
29). contemporary theorists of bureaucra tic behavior argue
that such planning assumptions are difficult to dislodge.
Lindberg emphasizes this endurance in explaining the
persistence of supply side responses to the energy crisis in
almost all advanced countries. The concept is also implicit
in the work of Bupp and Nader.
Complementing bureaucratic momentum, Lindberg
emphasizes the paradoxical ability of highly trained
professional personnel to maintain policy positions in
conflict with existing empirical information. Ironically f
he argues it is their theoretical sophistication, self-
selected into a mission oriented bureaucracy, that insulates
policy from practical revie<,q.[17]
He w r Lt.e s -"
\
II bureaucracies seem prone to certain behavioral
patterns in decision making that theorists have
alternatively dubbed 'dynamicallyconservative, ,
'cybernetic,' or 'sectoraL! Such patterns ••• constrain
the search for alternative policies toward energy and
development ••• The decision maker i.s guided by tminimally
articulated, preservative values' that do not 'yield a
coherent. pr eference .ordering for al ternative states of the
world under tradeoff conditions' ••• His essential purpose
is personal and organizational survival and not the
achievement of some optimal outcome •••• The deci.sion maker
will seek to control uncertainty and 'preserve internal
simplicity' by screening out information that his
or qa ni.za t i.ori' s establi shed repertory or response pattern is
not programmed to accept. Selective feedback ••• '....il1
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govern the processing of information. 'Favorable outcomes
will be inferred for preferred alternatives and ..•
unfavorable outcomes will be projected for alternatives the
decision maker intends to reject" (Lindberg 1977, 339-341).
at Calculating ~ ~mbined ~ Differential
It is possible to estimate the sensitivity of nuclear
economics to promotional activities by combining the market
advantages gained by nuclear power from promotional
assistance and OT capture. Nuclear plants ordered '63-'74
enj oyed an average 8.8 H/kwh subsidy rate. [18] Infant
industry hazard regulation reduced the costs of plants on
line by 1972 by 20 ~1/kwh.[19] The promotion of misleading
cost optimism improved nuclear's competitive appearance by
an addi tional 10 H/kwh (independent of forecasting errors
associated with the erosion of hazard internalization
protection). [20] summing these subsidy, regulatory, and
forecasting aids together yields net promotional benefits of
39 H/kwh.
Nucl ear's captur e of
\
scale and systemwide
efficiencies associated with OT status reduced nuclear costs
by an additional 50%, or approximately 17 M/kwh.[21]
Failure to capture as large as expected scaling efficiencies
explains part of the reason for the 10 M/kwh forecasting
errors cited above.
Summing all development aid for nuclear power (see
Table 26) yields a net benefit of approximately 55 M/kwh.
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This total is a lower oo un d estimate of nuclear's
promotional assistance. It excludes the benefits of many
aids which are difficult to quantify, suchas social
accornoua ti on to the insti tuti ona I needs of th e technology,
and the benefits of non-hazard related regulatory
incentives. It also relies on a conservative accounting tor
cal cul.a ting subsi dy total s,
------ ---------------------------------------------------
Aid categories Economi c Impact
Totals
8.8 H/kwh
20.0 H/kwb
10.0 H/kwh
17.0 t-t/kwh
---------
55.8 I'1/kwh
Subsiay Assistance
Regulatory Protection
Forecasting Errors
Learning Curve &
Scaling Benefits
---------------
* See section 7.0 tor derivation methodology
Despite the conservative estimating procedures, the
aid totals 6 times the expected cost of nuclear generation
duri n9 the ban dwag 0 n Ii1 ark e t 0f the six tie s , '1'11e ben e fit s
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are more than 25 times the 2 M/kwh expected nuclear cost
advantage over coal generation, which publicly justified
many nuclear orders (Perry 1977, 37).
Hore important than the aids' airthmetic sum, was
their dynamic and synergistic effects. Nuclear subsidies,
for example, stimulated private capital commitments, which
in turn made possible scale economies, and a cash flow basis
for continued R&D. Regulatory incentives encouraged private
capital commitments and the establishment of bureaucratic
momentum, which facilitated the capture of systemwide
eff iciencies, and soci al accomoda tion to the institutional
needs of the technology. /
A key aspect of the OT process is the risk reduction
which accompanies OT status. This effect transcends
marginal notions of differential credit costs, as it tends
to define the entire context within which capital
commitments are made. The process is pervasive and
potentially self-perpetuating. On a technical level, OT
status reduces engineering uncertainty by increasing R&D
spending. On a socio-political level, OT dynamics reduce
uncertanity by cementing political support amongst dependent
corporate, labor, and consumer constituencies.
~ The Macro/Micro Logic Qf System~ide Planning contexts
The best metaphor for depicting the impact of OT
status on technical choice decisions is the planning context
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image of macro determined micro efficiencies. Amory Lovins
has articulated this idea in terms of "hard and soft energy
paths". He writes,
"These two directions of development are Illutually
exclusive; the pattern of cOfilTIlitmentsof resources and time
require6 for the hard energy path and the pervasive
infrastructure that it accretes gradually make the soft path
less and less attainable. That is, our sets of choices
compete not only in w na t they accomplish, but also in what
they allow us to conteml?late later. 'I'ney are logistically
competitive, institutionally incompatible, and culturally
antithetical" (Lovins 1977, 49).
without employing the formal language ot political or
economic theory, Lovins has rocused on the natural monopoly
characteristics of energy choices highlighteo by the OT
framework. In addition he has emphasized the dynamic aspect
of social life highlighted by n arxi st theory, ",herein
social contexts determine the shape of apparently naturally
or technically deterrnirledconstraints.
Employment of the OT framework allows a
disaggregation ot Lovins' ~utual exclusivity assertion into
,its constitutive parts, a task Lovins never systema tically
addresses. \'ihile his w ork is replete with individual
examples of system incompatibilities and assertions of
their general character, no formal model or accounting is
presented to support this claim. The categories of the OT
differential tallied in this chapter can be used to fill
this gap.
Lovins ciivides t ne basis tor mutual exclusivity
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between energy options into technical and social elements.
The former can be compared with the economic level of OT
theory and represents the extent to which preemptive
economies of scale, learning curve efficiencies, systemwide
positive externalities and interdependent risk premiums
charactereize the energy sector.
Describing the latter, the social basis for
exclusivity, Lovins writes,
II (the two paths) are culturally incompatible.
Each entails an evolution of perceptions that makes the
other kind of world harder and harder to imagine ••• (they)
are institutionally antagonistic. Each entails
organizations and policy actions that inhibit the
other ••• (for example) the rigidity of some of our
institutions, notably the utility sector, is a result of
past commitments to a nascent hard path and is manifestly
inhibiting proper consideration and implementation of a soft
path ••• 11 (Nash 1979, 339-340).
In OT terms the above incompatibilities refer to
realms of discourse and planning context logics.
Implicitly, Lovins asserts the mutually determining
character of political, economic, and ideological phenomena.
Though \underdeveloped in his work, the ideas contain the
seeds of a structuralist view of social life. Behind
competing energy paths are competing planning contxts; and
behind them are alternative sets of structurally given
interests and outlooks.
In both Lovins' work and the OT framework, the
planning context metaphor highlights the role of social
contexts in shaping technical change. The concept of OT
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dynamics allows path dependent theories to' be
operational iz ed.
C HAP T E R VIII
1. The meaning of learning curve cost reduction is
ambiguous in the nuclear literature. The term sometimes
refers to the cost savings attendant with improved
pr oducti on technique sat existing output level s. On other
occasions the savings involve the benefits of
standardization and the capture of production economies at
higher output levels. For purposes of maintaining a
conservative estimating bias and avoiding possible double
counting, we shall collapse the two effects in our
calculations. These gains are independent of and additional
to, however, any improvements resulting from increased R&D
expenditures.:.
2. In 1962, for example, the AEC observed: "Efficiency of
operation and low cost construction are to a considerable
extent brought about through construction and operating
experience. After more than half a century of experience,
fossil fueled steam electric plants are still achieving very
worthwhile increases in efficiency and reductions in real
dollar construction costs. It seems almost certain that
part of the improvement in nuclear electric plants will come
in the same manner. Consequently. nuclear generation in the
year 2000 will be more efficient and lower cost if a number
of large nuclear plants are built during the next ten to
fifteen years, than if the acquisition of this experience is
delayed" (U.S. AEC 1962, reprinted in: JCAE 1968,220).
3. Learning curve effects are commonly expressed in terms of
percentage cost experienced per doubling of output. A 90%
learning ~urve implies a cost function with the following
form:
where Yn equals the cost of the nth plant and Yl equals the
cost of the first plant. An 80% learning curve implies a
learning curve exponent of -.322.
4. For example, the reactor vendors assumed learning cost
reductions of 20%-25% ($55/kw) over the 1963-1966 period in
their turnkey cost calculations (Perry 1977, 33).
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The AEC r e por t e d in 1968: "Experience gained in the
various activities ot the nuclear industry ... has already
led to cost reductions ••• The effects of this trend to
standardization, taken in conjunction with design
repetition, experience gained in manufacturing, and the
i mpr ov eo techniq ue s or mas s pr ouuct I on, will pr obably lead
to cost reductions which have in the past in similar
industries generally r ol Lov ec a 90 per-cent learning cur ve
relationship. A major reactor manufacturer uses the
learning curve technisue to analyze and forecast progress in
cost reductions in the manufacture of nuclear components"
(U.S., AEC 1968a, p.3-2).
The Little study of '68 estimated that an increase in
vendor output from 3 to 6 nuclear stearn supply systems per
year would reduce overheaa and R&D costs by about 15% ana
direct production costs by about 3-5% (156-158).
Si nee the rnid f if i ti es 1earni ng curve theory has al so
been applied to nuclear fuel cost projections. 'I'ybout
(1957) and Little (1968), tor e xa mp.l e , emphasized the cost
reductions expected from scale economies in fuel fabrication
and reprocessing.
The AEC's 1968 nuclear cost study assumed a 90%
learning curve for the first 2 doublings of fuel
fabrication output, followed by a 95% rate for the next 4
do ub1 i n g s , Th ere s u1twa sap r 0 j e c ted 33% cos t red u c t ion
1970-2000 (AEC 1968a, c h , 5 p. 83). Larger scale ana
learning curve cost declines were assumed for fuel
reprocessing costs (AEC 1968a, chapter 5 pp. 101-105).
Little (1968) assumed a reprocessing scaling
coefficient of -.35 (p. 221), projecting a two-thirds
decline,in costs for 6 ton versus 1 ton/day reprocessing
p1 ant s (245) . A 6- 7 ton / day s i z e was est i IIIate d t 0 be
optimal (245). As the latter plant would meet the
reprocessing needs of 60 1000 HW reactors a year, it
presumes a large nuclear sector.
Scaling economies will probably be even larger in the
waste disposal area.
5. Kornanoff found a 3.5% cost reduction per plant for
utilities with multiple reactor sites (Komanoff 1984a, 11).
6. Stanoardization became an official regulatory goal in
1972 when the AEC announced licensing preference for
standa rei z eo desi qn s, \'Jesti nghouse' s of f shor e power sy stem
project was the major standardization initiative (U.S.,
Congressional Otiice of Technology Assessment 1981, 36).
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Severe public opposition to many of the coastal plants,
utility financing difficulties, and TMI ultimately forced
abandonment of the project. (Price 1982, 46-49; Olson 1976,
200-205) •
A consortium of utilities organized the standardized
Nuclear Unit Power Plant System (SNUPPS) and originally
contracted for 6 units at 4 sites. Although 2 units were
sUbsequently cancelled the utilities claim that standardized
procedures has brought 10% cost savings to the remaining
plants (U.S., Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
1981, 46-48). Commonwealth Edison's 4 Bryon-Braidwood
plants also appear to have benefitted significantly from
standardization (Komanoff and Bupp 1983, 11).
The French program provides an often cited model for
standardization. Alleged savings are argued to exceed 25%
(U.S., Congressional Office of Technology Assessment 1984,
67) •
7. In 1982 the Stoller corporation's "Nuclear Supply
Infrastructure Viability Study" estimated that pre-certified
designs and standardization could reduce craft labor
requirements by 20%-25%, engineering costs by 50% and
construction duration by 3 years. projections were based on
comparisons with French and Japanese experience (Stoller
1982, B-5, B- 6)•
8. The AEC (1968a) noted that existing research indicated
that 3000MW light water reactors were technically feasable
(ch, 3 p. 18). It foresaw potential savings as high as 20%
for a scaling leap from 1000 MW-3000 Mvl ( ch, 3 p. 18, ch , 1
p. 27).
9. \Komanoff (1981) found each megawatt doubling reduced
direct construction costs by 13%. Increased construction
duration, however, added 3% in costs, for a net gain of only
10%. The lower capacity rates of larger plants reduced
overall generating cost gains even further (Komanoff 1981,
200). Mooz (1979) found little evidence of demonstrable
scal ing efficiencies (32,42).
10. Another aspect of systemwide efficiencies are joint
product efficiencies and economies of scope. A number of
efforts have been made during nuclear development to capture
related cost reductions. As noted in Chapter 1, nuclear
development was initially aided by its joint product status
with weapons production and naval reactor development. Fuel
cycle costs were reduced by the enrichment scale economies
made possible by the military program. Abortive attempts
were made to develop joint processes for electricity
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production and desalinization. Billion dollar efforts were
made to link reactor expertise to air and merchant marine
transport. Although these and other nuclear projects, such
as th e "Plow sh are" and Gasbuggy II pr ogr am s de signed to use
nuclear explosives for excavation and fossil fuel recovery,
proved unsuccessful, they tended to stimulate private
nuclear investment by portraying atomic experience as a
valuable by-product of nuclear initiatives.
The integrated reactor vendors appear to have
captur ed som e econom ies of scope.
11. Lane's conclusion illustrates the planning vision
associated with nuclear's aT status. He writes:
It appears that I have painted a very optimistic
picture of the future outlook for low-cost nuclear power;
however, in all probability it may be too conservative.
First of all, the projected per capita use of electricity in
the year 2000 represents merely a saturation of current
applications, such as home heating, air conditioning, and
color television, and makes no allowance for the
introduction of new applications. If, for example, because
of shor tages of petr oleum the U.s. transpor ta tion indust ry
converts to electricity-powered vehicles, this would
increase the per capita consumption of electricity by 10,000
kw-hr/yr with resulting decreases in costs.
n ••• The overall result. may lead to fulfillment of the
age-old dream of electricity too cheap to meter" (Lane p
25) •
12. Absence of aT status can discourage research and sector
investment by deflating the economic benefits of
technological breakthroughs in isolated parts of an energy
system. For example, while the AEC insured that bottlenecks
in areas l'ike uranium supply, enrichment or waste disposal
did not retard reactor development, the lack of solar energy
storage technology, and absence of engines able to operate
on small temperature differentials, discouraged investment
in solar collector research. The slow expansion of slurry
pipelines may have similarly undermined coal based
investment.
Only as nuclear power's aT status began to erode did
the scaling and systemwide potential of alternative energy
sources such as solar and biomass begin to receive serious
planning attention. Commoner (1979) illustrates this
phenom ena with respect to photovol taics.
In 1976 anti-nuclear pressures led to the adoption of
legislation requiring the Federal Energy Administration
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(FEA) to cievelop strategies for accelerating solar
Q eve 1 0 pmen t. Are s u1 tin g FEAre P0 r t est i mate d t 11a t a $440
million Department of Defense photovoltaic purchase could
r eouce the cost of solar electricity from $lO/peak watt to
50 cents/peak watt. This would make photovoltaics
competitive with current generating technologies in certain
remote site and street lighting applications, and lay the
learning curve groundwork for penetration of larger markets.
The report suggests that federal funding and pro-
solar signaling were necessary to offset inertias imposed by
factor s such as nuclea r" s OT stat us (Commoner 1979, 33-38).
Commoner (1979) also argues that the nuge investment
in pipeline infrastructure necessary for an integrated
biomass-methane based energy system, makes such technology
feasable only on a large scale basis (56, 64).
13. The technology's support trom aiversified corporations
like General Electric ana westinghouse also endowed it with
a source of internally generated funds. Its utility
sponsorship gave it easy access to bank and insurance
company cr edi t. As noted in th e appendi x to Chapter 5,
real ·IOU credit costs 1955-1977 averaged only 2.8%.
14. The report found average yields of 9.74% for 59 major
utili ties with nuclear genera tion in opera tion or planned,
as compared with average y ielas of 9.49% for 41 non-nuclear
utilities (Komanoff 1984b, 68).
15. The Public Service Commission iound the 59 nuclear
utilities of footnote 14 yielding 10.43% in April '79,
compared with 9.7% for the non-nuclear utilites (Komanoff
1984b). A December '79 Paine \~ebber Hi tchell Hutchins Inc.
study implied a continuing .5% differential (Komanoff 1981,
271,276). Salomon Brother s 12/4/79 found a similar decl i ne
in the relative price of nuclear and non-nuclear orienteci
utilities right after the THI accident, but noted the
general erosion of this differential over time (Salomon
Broth e r s 1 2/ 4/ 79 , 2 , 23) •
16. More in line with Devlin's assessment of the importance
of nuclear power's de facto "insured" status than the one-
half percent increase in financing costs observed in the
aftermath of TMI, was the extraordinary drop in Combustion
Engineering's stock in Hay 1974. On Hay 7th the ligll Str~~.t
Jgurnal reported that the company had entered into reactor
contracts "allowing power utilities considerable freedom to
back out of deals they had made with Combustion ana
extending broad warranties that even cover equipment changes
that may be required by future revisions in Atomic Energy
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Commission rules." The article noted, "Normally contracts
provide that any AEC caused cost overruns are to be divided,
usually with the utility paying at least two-thirds •••"
Combustion's stock, which stood at 75 and 1/8 on May 6th
plummeted to 46 1/2 on May 8th. The bulk of the near 40%
decline reflected investor concern over company liability
for nuclear uncertainties.
Similar investor caution greeted private sector
efforts to fund enrichment ventures without government
guarantees (Barrons 7/7/75).
Six months after the Three Mile Island accident,
Equitable Life Insurance Vice President Carleton Burtt told
the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, "We at the
Equitable are proceeding cautiously at this moment regarding
fur ther cornmi tm ent s in nucl ear power. We cannot commi t
further without a clearly defined policy framework and an
adequate regulatory protection" (House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs 1979, Ill).
17. Lindberg cites the work of cybernetic theorist John
Steinbrunner, for example, regarding the legacy of highly
structured professional training:
"With his beliefs established in a long-range
framework and well anchored, his inference management
mechanisms are able to handle the pressure of inconsistency
in any short-term situation. Inferences of transformation
and impossibility, the selective use of information and
other inconsistency management mechanisms are brought to
bear for this purpose. Since the theoretical thought
process is strongly deductive, and thus relatively less
dependent upon incoming information in order to M.!;.ill2l..i..Q..h
(in original) coherent beliefs, incoming information can be
molded and even ignored or denied .••" (Lindberg 1977,
343) •
Essentially Lindberg and Steinbrunner outline the
implications of a paradigm conception of technical realms of
discourse. The history of radiation hazard, nuclear
accident and cost analysis supports their claims.
18. See Tables 15 and 17 for derivation of the 8.8 M/kwh
subsidy figure.
19. See Chapter 6 section 4.0 for derivation of the 20 M/kwh
requLat o ry protection figure.
20. Cost underestimation assumes two-thirds average capital
cost forecasting error due to hazard regulation escalation
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(per Chapter 6 section 4.0). Considering the remaining
overrun independent of regulatory policy yields a separate 6
M/kwh forecasting error (per Table 23). o s n cost
underestimation adds an aditional error of 4 M/kwh (per
Table 23).
21. Learning curve-scaling cost reductions assumed to be 50%
(per discussion in chapter 8 section 5.0), or one-half
average generating costs for plants ordered '63-'74 (33.45
M/kwh - Table 23).
C HAP T E R IX
CONCLUSION
Using the OT framework the dissertation explained the
pattern of nuclear power development in the United States
1946-1982. The history challenges technically deterministic
theories of the market's organization of innovation. The
pace of nuclear development was tied to the technology's
degree of OT status. Social as well as technical variables
were found to determine the relative capture of this status.
The strength of the OT concept is its ability to
integrate social and technical variables in a single
framework. As Chapters 3-8 demonstrated, the approach is
able to encompass a wide range of phenomena within a common
pattern of explanation. Chapter 3 outlined the
character of the nuclear planning context during nuclear's
expansion years. Promotional support for the technology was
tied to the pursuit of economic rents and positive political
externalities 'by cold war planners, the naval reactor
vendors, a number of growth oriented utilities, and several
large architect-engineering-construction firms. These
groups' success in creating a critical mass development path
was facilitated by the pervasiveness of cold war ideology,
technocratic professionalism, and consumerism in the fifties
and sixties. ,)
Chapters 4-7 outlined the mechanisms used by nuclear
f
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advocates to win OT status for nuclear power. Chapters 4-6
detailed the period's pro-nuclear subsidies and regulatory
incentives. Chapters 4 and 7 discussed the origins of a
miseladingly optimistic set of nuclear cost expectations.
The analysis demonstrated the social roots of a realm of
discourse favorable to nuclear expansion.
Chapter 8 quantified the microeconomic impact of
nuclear's capture of OT status. Alongside the benefits of
public subsidy and regulatory favor, the OT differential
included the benef its of induced scale economies, learning
effects, and misleadingly optimistic cost expectations.
Even excluding many difficult to quantify advantages of OT
status, such as improved access to capital markets, the 5.5
cent/kwh differential dominates other factors in explaining
the expansion of nuclear power 1965-1974.
The erosion of this differential, due to nuclear's
subsequent loss of OT status, is primarily responsible for
\the technology's decline. From 1965 to 1968 there were 290
articles about nuclear power recorded in the ~~~ XQ~k
Times's summary index. Only 42 of these, or 14%, included
ref erence to opposition to nuclear power. For the years
1975-1978 over 50% of the articles summarized (641 of 1245)
contained opposi tional references. The numbers record the
't' ,
collapse of the planning context consensus which authored
nuclear's earlier capture of OT status.
The above data has interesting implications for
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nuclear cost forecasting. Engineering models have
persistently proven worse nuclear cost predictors than
forecasting models which included proxy variables for the
level of pol itical opposi tion to the technology.
Regression studies by Komanoff (1981), Hooz (1978,1979) and
Bupp et ale (1975) ,found socially related variables
statistically significant in explaining nuclear cost trends.
Preliminary work within the aT framework has found nuclear
cost increases to be significantly correlated with the
number of oppositional articles appearing in the Times'
summary index. These relationships reflect the diffuse ways
social variables determine relative economic efficiencies,
in both real resource and accounting terms.
i
The history of nuclear power suggests several
conclusions for economic theory and public policy. The
activities of the reactor vendors and pro-nuclear utilities
support an "active-firm" theory of market behavior and
Ln du st ni aI organization. The aT model also suggests that
pressures for excessive risk taking may emerge in new
industries, as firms struggle to win aT status for congenial
technologies and market shares within them. In the absence
of a well funded system of adversary science and technology
assessment, emerging industries may create public health
hazards. The Reagan Administration's support for the
principle of "self-regulation" seems especially dangerous in
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the area of biotechnology. The history of nuclear power
also suggests that decentralized or competing public
bureaucracies are more likely to protect the public interest
than centralized institutions such as the AEC and JCAE.
The dissertation suggests several avenues for future
research. Especially useful would be a planning context
analysis of the socio-political factors responsible for the
disestablishment of nuclear power as an Official Technology.
Attempts to apply the OT concept to non-nuclear technical
choices, perhaps in the transportation, medical or
agricultural sectors, could test the concept's general
applicability. The OT framework's focus on path dependent
choices and competition for scale economies may have
application in historical analysis of regional development.
The dissertation also suggests some areas for further
research within Marxist theory. The logic of planning
context analysis suggests a linkage between the concept of a
"social structure of accumulation" (SSA) and analysis of
technical change. Since the viability of different critical
mass development paths is influenced by institutional
structures, it should be possible to link the shape of
technical change to SSA characteristics.
A fully developed SSA framework might be able to
endogenize the nature of the original planning context that
promoted nuclear development and the later context that
discouraged it, within a broader analysis of the changing
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character of post-war American capitalism.
pregnant in such a project would be a powerful
critique of the methodologially individualistic
underpinnings of neoclassical economic theory. The
direction of technical change would be tied to the
interactive logic of a social system which created
particular planning contexts, rather than the aggregated
logic of individual maximization decisions subject to
exogenous constraints.
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